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 Abstract 
The analytical core of this study is the historical development of the relationship between 
nature and the capitalist mode of production. In particular, we aim at shedding light on 
the process through which the “grammar” of ecological crisis (and consequently of its 
possible solutions) turned into an exclusively economic one. In addressing this issue we 
discuss the successive problematisations of the environment that took place since the 
emergence of biopolitical governmentality (late Eighteenth century). Following 
Foucault's intuition, and supplementing it with aspects of Marxist analysis, we argue for a 
profound transformation – based on a crucial leap of abstraction – of the notion of nature: 
from enacting limit to the economic process to fundamental element of market 
valorisation. Especially, we show how this modification discloses a new way to approach 
contemporary commodification, organised around the crucial notion of general intellect. 
Carbon commodities, for instance, should be conceived of as second order abstractions: 
in them, the differentiation between natural distinctness of use-value and economic 
equivalence of exchange value tends to blur since a decisive element of their exchange-
value resides in the ex ante creation of capital-based use-values. Hence, use-value loses 
its innocence.  
The neoliberalisation of nature is analysed – with specific regard to the climate crisis – 
both from the perspective of its supporters (carbon traders), and from the standpoint of its 
critics (climate justice activists). Carbon trading – and the dogma upon which it rests – is 
understood as a material-discursive device through which climate change is seen as a 
market failure whose only possible solution lies, paradoxically, in further implementing 
market-based policies. By contrast, climate resistance is the multifarious disarticulation 
of this dogma. Such a transnational movement is approached through the concept of 
carbon profanations, which simultaneously possesses a deconstructive component – 
whose aim is to disarticulate the supports of carbon trading dogma – and a creative 
element – whose goal is to establish concrete-prefigurative organisational configurations, 
irreducible to a regime of truth centred around the marketisation of global warming.  
iii 
 
Finally, an empirical analysis of Durban's COP17 is proposed as a background against 
which to interpret the transformative potential of climate struggles, with particular focus 
on the notion of planetary climate as a global common/s. 
 
Keywords 
Biopolitics; Foucault, Michel; Marx, Karl; Carbon markets; Climate justice; 
Environmental Crisis; General Intellect; Liberalism; Neoliberalism; Durban's COP17; 
Carbon profanations; Carbon trading dogma; Antagonistic tendency; Marketisation of 
nature; Commons. 
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General Introduction: Towards a Biopolitical Reading of the 
Environmental Crisis 
 
 Today, at the dawn of the 21st century, are we witnessing an environmental crisis? 
Surprisingly enough, this apparently naive question is not simply rhetorical. In fact, 
despite the talk about global warming, nuclear energy, toxic pollution, ozone layer 
depletion and peak oil, for example, the current ecological crisis has less to do with the 
preservation or destruction of the so-called “natural world” than with a crisis of 
interpretation of this “natural world”, that is to say with its putatively indisputable 
objective determination. In other words, what is in crisis is not the environment tout 
court, but rather the human environment: not only because the ultimate reason why 
ecosystems have lost their balance is to be found in an unprecedented and unsustainable 
anthropic impact, but also because the way we, as a species, look at nature is a cause – 
amongst many others, to be sure – of the crisis we are living in. As Alan Weisman (2007) 
has brilliantly shown, a hypothetical “world without us” could easily and thoughtlessly 
carry on for billions of years. Speculatively, it may be useful to go even further than 
Weisman's hypothesis and wonder whether the very distinction between a homogeneous 
us and an unquestioned rest is part of the solution, as it has often been suggested,1 or 
whether it is a distinctive feature of the problem itself. We contend that the latter scenario 
is more persuasive than the former. If this is so, the provisional answer to the question 
                                                 
1 Two examples, from opposite political standpoints but very similar in maintaining this rigid 
distinction are to be found in Brown (2006; 2008), and in Lovelock (1988; 2006). 
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that began this Introduction should be a counter-intuitive “yes but no”: on the one hand, 
yes, the homeostatic equilibrium that used to characterise human and non-human 
environments is deteriorating at a worrisome pace; on the other hand, no, because the 
range of the current crisis extends beyond the simple dichotomy between Man and Nature 
and implicates facts and values, objects and subjects, living beings and non-living beings 
that exceed the traditionally conceived scientific borders of Nature. To sum up: the entire 
categorial apparatus of the Western tradition seems to be called into question by this 
particular seismic shock we name ecological crisis. This is the reason why we can easily 
find, with respect to these issues, odd and seemingly contradictory configurations: for 
example, governments that have restored (UK), or planned to restore (Italy) nuclear 
power plants in order to match the CO2 emissions reduction objectives set up in 1997 by 
the Kyoto Protocol, the most important anti-global warming agreement. 
 The peculiar complexity of the environmental crisis resides in its in-betweenness, in its 
tendency to escape established borders, at every level: political borders between nation-
states, social borders between classes and ethnic groups, traditional borders between 
genders. Last but not least, the ecological crisis cannot be constrained in our usual 
epistemological frontiers, the most insurmountable one being the conceived border 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences: the cold incontrovertibility of 
matters of fact on one side, and on the other, the passive acceptance of the volatile and 
the contestable. Contrary to this tight division of labour, environmental issues tend to be 
interconnected and multi-dimensional. When they collide with the political field, whose 
defining feature is decision, they present a twofold complexity: on the one hand, it is 
widely recognised that our knowledge of ecosystems is limited, that scientists 
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increasingly confront a sort of constitutive uncertainty;2 on the other, human social 
systems are very complex too, traversed as they are by a multitude of uneven 
interconnections. As John Dryzek puts it: “Environmental problems by definition are 
found at the intersection of ecosystems and human social systems, so one should expect 
them to be doubly complex” (Dryzek 1997: 9).  
 To give an example of such double complexity, it might be useful to consider the most 
recent environment-related international event, namely Rio+20, also known as Earth 
Summit 2012. This United Nations gathering was the third international conference on 
sustainable development aimed at reconciling the economic and environmental goals of 
the global community. The first meeting was the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) – Earth Summit 1992, also held in Rio de 
Janeiro – while the second was the World Summit on Sustainable Development – Earth 
Summit 2002, held in Johannesburg. However important the agreements and resolutions 
produced by those conferences,3 their crucial aspect resides in the process of 
institutionalisation of the environmental crisis they set in motion. After the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment – held in Stockholm in 1972 – 
ecological issues begun to be widely recognised as legitimate and, after the first Earth 
Summit, they have slowly but constantly become significant elements in business as well 
as governmental agendas. 
                                                 
2 For a detailed overview of this topic, see Waltner-Toews, Kay, and Lister (2008). We shall 
address this issue in more detail in Chapter 3. 
3 Climate Change Convention, Agenda 21 and Convention on Biological Diversity in 1992; 
Johannesburg Declaration and Millennium Development Goals in 2002; “The Future We Want” non-
binding document in 2012. 
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 Now, after forty years of political recognition and twenty years of international policy 
implementation, one would expect the situation to have improved or, at the very least, not 
to have further deteriorated. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The more climate science 
sounds its loud alarm about rising temperatures, melting ice caps and increasing ocean 
acidification, the more international meetings seem to be unable to radically change 
direction. Paradoxically, the emergence of a broad – if fragile – consensus about the 
findings of climate science (denialism has rapidly declined in recent years) has apparently 
caused deep confusion with regard to the political management of the ecological crisis. 
This is surely a sign of the double complexity of this particular issue, but it seems to us 
that a more profound hypothesis should be advanced here: a modification in the 
relationship between the environment (and its crisis) and the capitalist mode of 
production (and its crises). This hypothesis shall be carefully analysed throughout the 
present work, but to introduce its main characters a review of the reactions to the Rio+20 
outcome, namely the non-binding 49-page working paper titled The Future We Want, 
might be of use. 
 According to journalist Ina Porras, Rio+20 has been a success and has indicated feasible 
policies – such as the one implemented in Costa Rica – to harmonise the imperative of 
economic growth and the necessity of environmental preservation: 
Controversy stalks the green economy concept, even as it topped the agenda of 
world leaders at the Rio+20 summit. Its detractors say it spells a commodification 
of nature that will transfer money, power and land to elites and corporations 
while supporters counter that our collective failure to value nature is why forests 
and other ecosystems are in such trouble. As the world watches and waits to see 
how giants like the US and China respond to our environmental, social and 
economic crises, a small country – Costa Rica – has big lessons to share. The 
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story emerged last week at the International Institute for Environment and 
Development's fair ideas conference in Rio, when Costa Rican politicians, 
community leaders and researchers related their experiences of putting the green 
economy model into practice as they pioneered Payments for Environmental 
Services (PES). The idea is simple: landowners are rewarded financially for 
actions that maintain environmental services that benefit other people, who then 
pay for that gain. Lowland water users would, for example, pay highland 
communities that plant or protect forests and so maintain the flow of water 
downstream (Porras 2012). 
 
According to environmentalist George Monbiot, things went a little differently in Rio de 
Janeiro and the balance sheet of twenty years of engagement in multilateral negotiations 
is disastrous: in fact, those years are dubbed as “decades of anger and frustration”. As he 
continues: 
It is, perhaps, the greatest failure of collective leadership since the first World 
War. The Earth's living systems are collapsing, and the leaders of some of the 
most powerful nations – the United States, the UK, Germany, Russia – could not 
even be bothered to turn up and discuss it. Those who did attend the Earth summit 
in Rio last week solemnly agreed to keep stoking the destructive fires: sixteen 
times in their text they pledged to pursue 'sustained growth', the primary cause of 
the biosphere's losses. The efforts of governments are concentrated not on 
defending the living Earth from destruction, but on defending the machine that is 
destroying it. Whenever consumer capitalism becomes snarled up by its own 
contradictions, governments scramble to mend the machine, to ensure – though it 
consumes the conditions that sustain our lives – that it runs faster than ever before 
(Monbiot 2012). 
 
This profound distance in evaluating the outcome of Rio+20 can be more clearly 
understood by accounting for the profound shift undergone by ecological policies from 
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the 1990s onwards. Whereas in the late 1960s – when the environmental crisis appeared 
as a fully political issue – its management used to be seen as a costly but unproductive 
necessity, in more recent years the corporate community has elaborated and eventually 
imposed a new mindset according to which ecological criticality is to be approached as a 
profitable business opportunity rather than an unavoidable nuisance. The trajectory that 
connects the notion of sustainable development (which emerged in the late 1980s) and its 
contemporary, more radical form – namely the green economy (popularised in the course 
of the 2000s) – is nothing else than a chapter in the history of neoliberalism as a 
progressively hegemonic governmental rationality.  
 Originally perceived as a crisis of capitalism (the industry-caused crossing of the 
immutable threshold represented by the physical limits of the planet), ecological 
deterioration ended up being considered as a crisis for capitalism, as yet another tile in 
the astonishing mosaic of creative destruction. This apparently perfect translation of the 
environment into the homogeneous grammar of money is the main characteristic of the 
green economy. Moreover, its total acceptance on the part of the UN explains the sidereal 
distance that separates supporters and critics of the financialisation of nature. To realise 
how profound is the adherence of the UN to the green economy dogma (“the market will 
solve the problem it has itself created in the first place”) we can report on two articles 
from The Future We Want:  
58. We affirm that green economy policies in the context of sustainable 
development and poverty eradication should: [...] (d) Promote sustained and 
inclusive economic growth [...] (h) Not constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, avoid 
unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of 
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the importing country [...] 61. We recognise that urgent action on unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption where they occur remains fundamental in 
addressing environmental sustainability and promoting conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity and and ecosystems, regeneration of natural 
resources and the promotion of sustained, inclusive and equitable global growth 
(UN 2012: 10-12).  
 
There are three points we need to highlight from this passage: a) the imperative of 
economic growth is never contested – actually, not even questioned; b) the green 
economy is represented as the new frontier of free trade agreements and, as such, is not 
going to establish tensive relationships with them; c) the urgency and gravity of the 
environmental crisis is assessed only in so far as the solution to it is configured as market-
based and growth-ensuring. As we see, the notion of green economy entails a new 
relation between the capitalist mode of production (more specifically: its mechanisms of 
valorisation/exploitation) and nature (more specifically: its peculiar role within the 
process of value production).  
 In very general terms, our dissertation aims at shedding new light on this unprecedented 
relation between capital and nature. In particular, we would like to avoid the double trap 
of an excessive emphasis on physical limits to growth (essential incompatibility between 
capital and the environment) and an unproblematic trust in the green economy (essential 
affinity between capital and the environment). In fact, despite their diametrical political 
opposition, these two positions hypostatise the terms of the relationship instead of 
investigating their mutual and reciprocal constitution. Our goal, instead, is to focus on the 
historicity – and, hence, intrinsic transformability – of the configurations of such relation. 
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In other words, we are interested in investigating the different modalities through which 
the two terms have been interacting and have created at least two different socio-natural 
links, which we shall call “liberal” and “neoliberal”.  
 
 To carry out this kind of analysis, the present work is structured in four chapters. Chapter 
1 delineates the general methodological framework – biopolitics as method – through 
which the object of study is going to be investigated. The main interlocutors in our 
methodological exploration are Karl Marx and, more comprehensively, Michel Foucault. 
By means of an original connection of their respective theoretical parables – and 
especially a non-determinist account of historical materialism and a technical and 
specific approach to the notion of biopolitics – we shall attempt to elaborate a 
simultaneously political and epistemological grid of intelligibility which is potentially 
able to fruitfully articulate the productive frictions between the formal status of theory 
and its historical consistency. On the one hand, we need to understand and explain the 
relatively stable logical connections that allow the monetary system to subsume the 
ecological crisis under its highly speculative, formalistic modus operandi. On the other 
hand, we need to take into account the history of social struggle and capitalist 
development that allow us to understand and explain the different configurations in which 
capital's formal logic expresses itself in highly context-specific spatio-temporal 
constellations. 
 In other words, the research question is the following: how can a simultaneously 
biopolitical and historico-materialistic framework help us in defining the specific 
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features of the ecological crisis? To properly answer, we shall put forward a 
methodological understanding of the notion of “biopolitics” based on some revisions to 
the concept proposed by Giorgio Agamben and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. 
Through a critical discussion of some of their philosophical formulations, we shall 
elaborate a Marxian-Foucauldian methodology grounded on three fundamental 
assumptions: a) the simultaneously ontological and historical character of the concept of 
freedom in the late Foucault; b) the politico-epistemological explanatory power provided 
by the notion of antagonistic tendency as elaborated by the Italian workerist tradition, and 
lately popularised by Hardt and Negri; c) the philosophical articulation of the relation 
between ontology and politics such as the one proposed by Agamben, in which the two 
elements are thought as distinct but inseparable: they are not the same thing, but outside 
of their relation they lose their meaning as theoretical categories. 
 
 Chapter 2 constitutes a first abstract application of such a methodological 
framework. The main point is to show the historical change undergone by the notion of 
nature in its three main steps: pre-capitalist; early-capitalist (or liberal); late-capitalist (or 
neoliberal). To exemplify this trajectory, the chapter's title sets as its goal an in-depth 
exploration of the difference between the ancient almond described by Jared Diamond in 
his notorious Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997) and the Genetically Modified RoundUp 
Ready soybean produced by the infamous corporation Monsanto. 
 In a nutshell, the argument we are going to sustain suggests that, whereas in pre-
capitalism the relation between economy and environment is constituted as extrinsic, with 
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the advent of capitalism a shift can be witnessed towards the becoming intrinsic of such 
relationship. Furthermore, within a biopolitical and capitalist horizon, such internality 
modifies itself through time: whereas in liberal capitalism nature plays the role of an 
enacting limit to productive activity, in neoliberalism it is turned into a crucial element of 
valorisation. Such transformation is analysed with specific regard to both the new 
importance gained by social knowledge – or, to use Marx's terminology, the general 
intellect – in the context of contemporary productive process, and the unprecedented 
political function currently performed by financial systems as main subjects of global 
governance. The general point we argue for is that, in the course of the last four decades, 
an unprecedented leap of abstraction has taken place. Such a second order abstraction is 
necessary – albeit in no way sufficient – for the understanding of the contemporary 
tendency of capitalist development and, as a consequence, also of the current ecological 
crisis. 
 The conclusion of the chapter elaborates on the difference between Diamond's 
almond and Monsanto's GM soybean as follows: in the biopolitical arena, power and 
knowledge are entangled in multifarious dispositifs whose very existence rest upon 
irreducible historical contingency and spatial situatedness. Thus, grasped through 
biopolitical lenses, the two entities have nothing to do with each other, simply because 
such products belong to different forms of the socio-natural link.  
 
 Chapter 3 puts to work the previously established methodological framework at a 
slightly lower level of abstraction, namely the crucial issue of climate change and the 
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global policies implemented to challenge it. First and foremost, it is suggested that carbon 
trading, which is to say the mainstream solution to global warming, should be understood 
as a contemporary form of enclosure within the context of a planetary unfolding of a new 
wave of primitive accumulation. Furthermore, the case of climate change is chosen as 
paradigmatic of the new relationship between capital and nature in that it shows a 
constitutive tension between abstraction and concreteness that makes such an issue the 
most suitable in order to analyse continuities and ruptures within the movements of old 
and new enclosures.  
 Another aspect that renders global warming particularly interesting for our 
purposes is its profound hybridity, its being at the same time materially concrete and 
informationally intangible. No one, according to historian Paul Edwards (2010), lives a 
planetary atmospheric experience without the support of climate science. To link a 
weather-related event – no matter how extreme it presents itself – to climate change, a 
massive mobilisation of the general intellect is invariably required. Obviously, this 
dependence on knowledge does not make climate change any less concrete or material, 
both in the individuation of its multiple causes and in the destructiveness of its 
heterogeneous effects. Rather, those causes and effects disclose an entirely new way of 
enacting the tensive interaction between the abstract and the concrete. None of these two 
dimensions is, per se, sufficient to theoretically grasp and politically act upon climate 
change; to the contrary, both are necessary.  
 To analyse this unprecedented intertwining, after having briefly reviewed the 
history of climate policy, we shall advance a basic argument that might be summarised as 
follows: carbon commodities (cap-and-trade units [e.g. European Union Allowances], 
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offsets [e.g. Certified Emissions Reductions] and tradable carbon units in general) should 
be approached by taking into account their role in multifariously supporting the carbon 
trading dogma, which is to say an extremely cogent – albeit empirically undemonstrable 
– political assumption according to which although climate change must be considered a 
market failure, only markets can provide a viable solution to it. This dogma 
simultaneously presents governmental aspects, which we shall analyse from a 
Foucauldian perspective, and exploitative ones, which we shall address starting from a 
(post)Marxist account of the exploitation of the general intellect. Consistent with the 
framework of biopolitics as method, we shall conclude that carbon commodities should 
be conceived of as second order abstractions since, in them, the Marxian differentiation 
between natural distinctness of use-value and economic equivalence of exchange value 
tends to blur since a decisive element of their exchange-value resides in the ex ante 
creation of capital-based use-values. This is the process we shall define as the lost 
innocence of use-value.  
 To further substantiate such an argument, we shall propose a detailed analysis of 
the three supports that practically enact the ideological structure of carbon trading dogma: 
a) the informational one, whose main example is provided by carbon forestry; b) the 
legal one, whose main focus is on the contested juridical nature of carbon commodities 
such as European Union Allowances; c) the calculative/promissory one, whose main field 
of application concerns the notion of additionality as prescribed by Clean Development 
Mechanism, and the paradoxical interplay it activates between past, present and future. 
To conclude the chapter, we shall inscribe the specificities of carbon sellable units into a 
broader history of commodification. 
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 Chapter 4 reports and discusses the results of an empirical research we conducted 
in Durban, South Africa, during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC)'s Seventeenth Conference of the Parties (COP17). Here the analytical 
focus shifts from the investigation of the relationship between capital and nature to the 
multiscale resistances carbon trading has encountered so far. As a first step, we shall 
propose to approach the climate justice movement from the perspective of the notion of 
profanations, namely a political and context-specific re-assembling of a concept 
originally proposed by Giorgio Agamben. It is important to stress the twofold nature of 
conflictual profanations: on the one hand, immanent critique of the present state of 
affairs; on the other, material prefiguration of a new possible social structure. In temporal 
terms, the reference to a desirable future enacts already existing critical potentials in such 
a way that an opposition to the status quo immediately activates the construction of a new 
form of social organisation, previously unimaginable.  
 Thus, we contend that contemporary climate struggles can be read as 
disarticulations of the carbon trading dogma which simultaneously undermine its 
functioning and prefigure alternative solutions to the challenges of global warming. 
Hence, we might call carbon profanations those conflicts that already affect the carbon 
trading dogma, and that problematically disclose a series of post-capitalist scenarios. In 
particular, after having reported both the official outcome of Durban's COP17 and the 
numerous protests by civil society it was surrounded by, we shall analyse three specific 
campaigns situated at three different scales. 
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a) At the transnational level, we choose to focus on the issue of climate debt and on the 
most important campaign from this perspective, namely the Yasuní proposal to leave the 
oil underground in Ecuador. In particular, we shall attempt to show how the demand of 
an unconditional basic income – as pushed forward by Western social movements in 
open opposition to austerity measures – can be politically connected with a climate basic 
income – as embryonically experimented in Namibia. 
b) At the national, South African level, we decided to concentrate our attention on the 
One Million Climate Jobs campaign, whose main merit is the profound link it constructs 
between the transition to a low-carbon economy and the erasure of unemployment, a 
historical and particularly dramatic plague of the South African workforce. According to 
OMCJ activists, by shifting crucial productive activities from a fossil fuel-based model to 
a low-carbon scheme it is possible to create at least one million new jobs. Our analysis 
shall focus on the role played by bottom-up research and on the problematic function 
OMCJ campaigners assign to the state apparatus. 
c) At the local level concerning the city of Durban, our research has assumed the 
controversial issue of the Bisasar Road landfill as its main object. The reason for this 
choice is twofold: on the one hand, such an issue links together apartheid-era 
environmental racism and contemporary carbon trading's devastating effects (it is part of 
the Clean Development Mechanism); on the other hand, its complex unfolding – which 
affected both supporters of the landfill and resisting communities – presents itself as 
particularly useful to problematise our hypothesis of carbon profanations. In fact, both of 
its aspects (critical and prefigurative) have been at times overwhelmed by tactical 
concerns and/or by tacit co-optation. In other words, profaning acts can never be taken 
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for granted; rather, they need constant participation, persevering organising and 
favourable contingent conditions to be effective and fulfil their emancipatory promises.  
 
 The Conclusion of our dissertation aims at proposing a few possible further lines of 
research regarding the material previously investigated. Basically, it contends that all 
three empirical case studies would benefit by a sort of contamination with a perspective 
centred around the notion of the common/s. Such a notion is then analysed from three 
different – but closely interrelated – standpoints. First, it is suggested that the common/s 
diagonally cuts the state vs. market dichotomy and opens up the possibility of new 
configurations of shared ownership. Second, it is argued that the common/s diagonally 
cuts the material vs. immaterial dichotomy and, as a consequence, should not be 
understood as a natural given but, rather, as the political outcome of an ever-contested 
process of production. Third, it is posited that the common/s' dynamic unfolds by 
incrementally reinforcing its revolutionary potential and, as such, can be formulated in 
fruitful connection with the notion of profanations. 
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Biopolitics as Method 
 
In a thought-provoking article, Michele Cammelli complains that the notion of biopolitics 
has been used during the last decades in such different fashions and conceptual 
extensions that it is almost impossible to precisely situate its theoretical borders 
(Cammelli 2003).4 We agree with this statement but, whereas for Cammelli this is 
considered to be a regrettable limit, for us it is a proof of the analytical potentials 
contained in the concept. Nonetheless (or, better: precisely because of this), our goal is 
not to restore the putative “purity” of biopolitics. On the contrary, through a critical 
overview of some of its different articulations, we will attempt to isolate some useful 
aspects of biopolitics in order to answer the following question: how can the biopolitical 
framework help us in defining the specific features of the ecological crisis? Clearly, this 
is an entirely methodological question. It configures the problem of the relation between 
the formal status of theory and its historical consistency. This tension will guide our 
exploration of three different formulations of biopolitics. 
 
                                                 
4 More radically, Roberto Esposito has recognized the source of such confusion within Foucault's 
own works: “It is to be noted that not even Foucault is able to escape completely from such a deadlock, and 
this despite working in a profoundly new framework with respect to the preceding formulations. Foucault 
too ends up reproducing the stalemate in the form of a further 'indecisiveness' – no longer relative to the 
already acquired impact of power on life, but relative to its effects, measured upon a moving line that has at 
one hand the production of new subjectivity and at the other its radical destruction. That these contrastive 
possibilities cohabit within the same analytic axis, the logical extremes of which they constitute, does not 
detract from the fact that their different accentuations determine an oscillation in the entire discourse in 
opposite directions both from the interpretative and the stylistic point of view. Such a dyscrasia is 
recognizable in a series of logical gaps and small lexical incongruences or of sudden changes in tonality 
[...] When taken together they mark a difficulty that is never overcome” (Esposito 2008: 32-33). 
17 
 
1- FOUCAULT: THE BIOPOLITICAL HYPOTHESIS 
 Although Foucault did not coin the term (Cutro 2005), his fundamental 
contribution to the field of studies related to biopolitics cannot be overestimated. 
Moreover, the fragmented nature of his reflection about this issue might be considered 
responsible for the profound richness (but also, to a certain extent, for possible 
confusions) of biopolitics as a specific theoretical tool. In fact, Foucault undertook this 
research project in the mid-1970s and carried it until 1980 in a variety of different forms: 
official publications (The History of Sexuality, vol. I, 1976), academic conferences (“La 
naissance de la médicine sociale”, 1974; “Les mailles du pouvoir”, 1976), and four 
series of lectures at the Collège de France (“Society Must Be Defended”, 1975-1976; 
Security, Territory, Population, 1977-1978; Birth of Biopolitics, 1978-1979; On the 
Government of Living Beings, 1979-1980), whose definitive publication was not 
complete until very recently.5 If we bear in mind the trajectory of Foucault's general 
philosophical development,6 we can easily realise that biopolitics as an object of 
                                                 
5 At the time of writing, the fourth series of lectures is still unpublished. Apparently, its French edition 
will be released on October 25th, 2012. 
6 From a purely heuristic perspective, it is possible to subdivide Foucault's theoretical production into 
three distinct phases (which nonetheless do not configure radical caesurae). In the first period (History 
of Madness, 1961; The Order of Things, 1966; The Archeology of Knowledge, 1969), the focus is on 
how a given discourse manages to create and investigate its own objects. In the second period (The 
Order of Discourse, 1971; Discipline and Punish, 1975; The History of Sexuality. Vol. I, 1976) the 
emphasis is on how, historically, power and knowledge relate to each other and, in so doing, allow a 
specific hierarchical system to emerge and work. It is in this context that the well known critiques 
addressed by Fraser (1981) and Habermas (1987) should be framed. To put it shortly, the problem they 
raise is the following: if there is no way to escape power, if every original production of norms will be 
necessarily captured and normalised, then there is no ground for political action and social 
transformation. The third phase of Foucault's work (The Use of Pleasure, 1985; The Care of the Self, 
1986; Late lectures at Collège de France; late interviews) might be interpreted as an indirect response to 
such criticism. In fact, Foucault attempts to articulate more explicitly his ontological and normative 
presuppositions. Moreover, he seems to propose a theoretical distinction between creation of norms 
(resistance and technologies of the self) and normalisation (technologies of power). The focus of his 
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scientific interest started to attract him at the apex of the “genealogical” period, whose 
methodological foundations were exposed in 1971 in “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, 
and whose main achievements are represented by Discipline and Punish (1975) and the 
already mentioned first volume of The History of Sexuality. Nonetheless, it is also quite 
clear that it is in the course of the biopolitical investigation that Foucault begins to feel 
compelled to expose more explicitly the ontological and normative presuppositions of his 
critique of governmentality and, subsequently, decides to turn his analytical gaze towards 
the Greek and Roman antiquity. It is important, we argue, to recall the vortical motion in 
which Foucault's thought was kept during the second half of the 1970s in order to better 
understand the fragmented nature of the first “proper” biopolitical hypothesis. 
 In the context of the present work, our aim is to briefly present Foucault's 
argument in order highlight two historical points, a novel theoretical articulation and a 
methodological assumption which will set our discussion towards a biopolitical reading 
of the environmental crisis. Needless to say, all these elements are closely interconnected 
and distinguishing between them serves merely the purposes of analytic clarity. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
analysis is now on the different modalities through which, in the West, individuals and collectives have 
constructed themselves in relation to multifarious power/knowledge dispositifs. I suggest that this may 
be the reason why Foucault partially dismisses the empirical results of the first volume of the History of 
Sexuality to turn his attention towards a generative genealogy of the desiring subject, starting from 
classical antiquity and the first centuries of Christianity.     
 On this periodisation, see Marzocca (2007) and Sorrentino (2008). 
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 As a starting point, from an empirical, micro-physical perspective, it is possible to 
situate the emergence of biopolitics in the progressive implementation of governmental 
technologies of power whose specific goal is the simultaneous empowerment of 
individual and collective bodies. With the term governmentality, Foucault articulates 
three aspects: a) the ensemble of institutions, tactics and analyses that allow a specific 
kind of power to be exercised over the population (through a knowledge apparatus 
defined by political economy and a set of technical dispositifs oriented towards security); 
b) the historical tendency of this new kind of power to become prominent over older 
forms of power; c) the process through which, from the Middle Ages onwards, the state 
shifts progressively from being juridically-based to being thought of in terms of 
administrative procedures and, finally, to being entirely governmentalised (Foucault 
2007). This set of practices, initially proposed in the second half of the Eighteenth 
century, was organised around four main fields of intervention: natality, morbidity, 
ability, and, most importantly from our standpoint, environment (Foucault 2003). As a 
consequence of this, biopolitics is deployed through four different types of social control. 
Firstly, this form of power is exercised over phenomena such as fecundity and longevity 
by means of demographic regulation and statistical analysis. Secondly, it refers to health 
variables such as endemic and epidemic diseases through a conception of death as a 
decreasing factor of individual and collective performances, whose inevitable outcomes 
involve an increase regarding the administrative costs of treatments and, more generally, 
a reduction of efficiency in the medical regulation of society. Thirdly, biopower 
intervenes on aleatory events which imply a more or less severe reduction of social 
abilities (such as accidents, infirmities, anomalies, and old age) by means of the 
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development of a pervasive system of governmental insurance. Finally, as we shall see in 
more detail later in this section, biopolitics implies the political creation of an 
intermediate space between natural environment and artificial urbanisation, investing in 
particular the process of shaping natural systems (both at the climatic and hydrographical 
level) according to governmental expansive necessities. 
 The second historical point, already introduced by mentioning the issue of 
urbanisation, concerns the relationship between the emergence of biopolitics and the 
process of industrialisation or, by extension, by the rise of capitalism as a dominant mode 
of production. In Foucault, it seems to us, the link between these two dimensions is 
inextricable. In his works, we can find both direct and indirect proofs of this crucial 
contiguity. In “The Birth of Social Medicine,” a lecture delivered in Brazil in October 
1974, Foucault writes:  
I advance the hypothesis that with capitalism we did not shift from a collective 
medicine to a private one. On the contrary, it is the opposite that actually 
occurred. Capitalism, which developed at the end of the Eighteenth century and at 
the beginning of the Nineteenth, had initially socialised a first object, the body, as 
a function of productive forces, of labour power. The social control on individuals 
did not only take place through consciousness or ideology, but also within [dans] 
and with [avec] the body. For a capitalist society it is above all biopolitics the 
fundamental issue: the biological, the somatic, the corporeal. The body is a 
biopolitical reality, medicine is a biopolitical strategy (Foucault 1994a: 209-210. 
Our translation).  
 
 Similarly, in a pivotal passage of the first volume of The History of Sexuality we 
can read the following statement: 
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This biopower was without question an indispensable element in the development 
of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled 
insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the 
phenomena of population to economic processes [...] The adjustment of the 
accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups 
to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were 
made possible in part by the exercise of biopower in its many forms and modes of 
application. The investment of the living body, its valorisation, and the 
distributive management of its forces were at the time indispensable (Foucault 
1978: 140-141). 
 
 Along with these explicit references, however, we can also find in Foucault's 
corpus of the late 1970s indirect proofs of the link between biopolitics and capitalism. 
From this perspective, the best example is perhaps “The Meshes of Power,” a lecture 
delivered in Brazil in 1976. We refer to it as an “indirect” proof since Foucault does not 
specifically address the nature of the bond between capitalism and biopolitics, but rather 
recognises in Marx the main precursor of a new, anti-representative modality to approach 
power in its “real functioning” (Foucault 1994: 186). In other words, what interests us 
here is to show how the critique of political economy proposed by Marx constitutes a 
fundamental condition of possibility (certainly amongst many others) for the issue of 
biopolitics to be addressed. In “The Meshes of Power” Foucault complains about the fact 
that power has been analysed, at least within the context of Western society (Kant, 
Durkheim and Lévi-Strauss are listed), in a restrictive way mainly based around the ideas 
of prohibition and detachment. Anticipating a well-known argument7 that will be 
                                                 
7 According to Foucault, the new socio-historical scenario disclosed by the emergence of biopolitics 
made the sovereign theory of power, based on the notion of law, obsolete. As he famously stated: “In 
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developed shortly after, Foucault criticises this juridical notion of power and declares his 
intention to study power in its positive, productive dimension. As a consequence of this, 
he asks: “How can we attempt to analyse power in its positive mechanisms?” Reading 
Marx, especially the second volume of Capital (Marx 1971),8 seems to be a proper 
answer to this question. Foucault finds in the Marx of fixed and circulating capital four 
elements that allows the positive technologies of a new form of power to be seen, 
analysed and, possibly, critiqued. First, Marx clearly recognises that power is by nature 
heterogeneous, plural and excessive: “There is not just one form of power, but several 
ones [...] Society is an archipelago of different powers”. Second, Marx convincingly 
shows that force relations are local, regional, specific, and that their legal unification is 
the result of a secondary process. Third, the specific goal of these regional powers does 
not consist in restraining from acting, but is rather configured as a permanent incitement 
to produce “an efficiency, an attitude”. Finally, power is inherently technological and the 
historical traces of its mechanisms are to be found in practical implementations rather 
than in a posteriori ideological justifications. At this point, implicitly announcing the 
analysis he was going to publish, Foucault concludes:  
                                                                                                                                                 
 
political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” (Foucault 1978: 88-89). The 
theoretical innovation he proposes consists in analysing power starting from its twofold nature of 
individualising and (at the same time) totalising entity. In another much quoted passage, he proposes to 
focus on the articulation of “an anatomo-politics of the human body”, centred on the notion of discipline, 
and “a bio-politics of the population”, organised around technologies of security (Ibid.: 139).  
8 Although Foucault explicitly states to be referring to volume II of Capital, he is actually thinking 
of the middle part of volume I. Rudy Leonelli has exposed and rectified this mistake by consulting 
Foucault's personal library and by noting that the edition of Capital he was using divided volume I in 
several tomes, the second of which corresponds to the contents he is analysing. See Leonelli (1999; 2010).  
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Well, what I would like to do – reworking what has been found in the second 
volume of Capital, and refusing what has been subsequently added on the 
privileges of the state apparatus, the reproductive function of power, the features 
of the juridical superstructure – what I would like to do is an attempt to see how 
is it possible to elaborate a history of powers in the West, and essentially of 
powers as they are invested in sexuality (Foucault 1994b: 189). 
 
 To sum up this first part of our discussion, we might say the following: when 
Foucault insists that Western society, in the course of the second half of the Eighteenth 
century, has crossed a “threshold of biological modernity” and has consequently 
“wagered the life of the species on its own political strategies” (Foucault 1978: 143), he 
intends to establish a line not of homology, but rather of convergence amongst the 
theoretical triad of biopolitics, governmentality and capitalism. Those concepts, in other 
words, do not by any means identify the same set of phenomena. On the contrary, their 
specificity should be jealously preserved (the risk here is that of a linearisation of the 
historical process, potentially at the service of yet another grand narrative). Simply, they 
converge not primarily in their chronological simultaneity (which is, after all, far from 
perfectly congruent) but, more importantly, in the unprecedented political intelligibility 
that their integration provides. A whole set of contemporary problematic issues, in fact, 
emerge at the intersection of these three practico-theoretical elements and are, we 
contend, more easily understood and acted upon from this complex but profoundly 
fruitful perspective.   
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 Although the biopolitical hypothesis is initially based on a new micro-physical 
understanding of the second half of the Eighteenth century, it cannot be reduced to that. 
On the contrary, its core resides in a novel formulation of a classical theoretical element 
which refers to the relationship between life and politics. To put it crudely, we might say 
that before the emergence of biopolitics, the relation between life and politics was 
extrinsic, in the sense that the two poles defined different fields of intervention and 
development which, although often overlapping each other, used to be conceived 
autonomously, as irreducibly distinct. On the contrary, after the “threshold of biological 
modernity” was crossed, the two fields merged into one set of phenomena within the 
context of which their respective identities became indistiguishable. In other words, life 
became a specific target of political power and, as a consequence, their relationship was 
configured as intrinsic.9 To put it differently: neither scientific reductionism nor cultural 
determinism can properly represent the new internal and qualitative connection between 
life and politics. The governmental dispositif through which this epochal passage was 
accomplished is to be found in the notion of population. Clearly, the concept did not arise 
in the Eighteenth century, but (according to Foucault) in that period its meaning 
undertook a decisive transformation. Previously, the role of the population was 
subordinated to its territorial function: the mere sum total of individuals inhabiting a 
determined geographical area, to be managed through the creation of docile bodies, was 
the main goal of sovereign power. With the emergence of biopolitics, however, what is 
                                                 
9 It might be useful to note that the intrinsic relationship between life and politics also necessarily implies 
the fall of the rigid distinction between nature and history. Within the biopolitical horizon, naturalness 
and artificiality are kept in an indefinite interplay which defines, after their encounter, the specificity of 
any given situation. 
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mainly at stake is the governmental function of the population. Accordingly, the 
intervention on the laws of development of the population is no longer external, namely 
juridically exercised over a flat, disposable given nature, but rather internal, since the 
active regulation of this development is the peculiar goal of the art of government. In 
Foucault's own words: 
Taking the effects specific to population into consideration is, I think, a very 
important phenomenon: the entry of a 'nature' into the fields of techniques of 
power, of a nature that is not something on which, above which, or against which 
the sovereign must impose just laws. There is not nature and then, above nature 
and against it, the sovereign and the relationship of obedience that is owed to him. 
We have a population whose nature is such that the sovereign must deploy 
reflected procedures of government within this nature, with the help of it, and with 
regard to it (Foucault 2007: 75. Our emphasis). 
 
As we see, population is surely defined in terms of naturalness, but this naturalness 
presents very different features than the normative, eternal, factual nature that is 
traditionally opposed to politics as a value-oriented practice. Here politics and nature 
merge into each other and finally open up a new field of power intervention – the 
environment – which will be defined as the permanent negotiation between natural and 
historical determinations. 
 The new concept of natural population possesses three fundamental aspects 
(Pandolfi 2006):  
a) Its substance is constituted by a net of variables. It is not a “primary datum,” a 
primordial matter, an immediate referent upon which power deploys its mechanisms. On 
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the contrary, the peculiar being of population is attainable through mediation, through the 
specific knowledge that allows its changeable individuation. The rigidity of this 
mediative individuation is not given once and for all (the regularity of climate laws 
functions on a different level than, for example, the pedagogic strategies that organise the 
education of children), but what really matters is that it defines the field of tensions 
within which power must intervene if it aims at producing effective regulation.  
b) The second aspect concerns the notion of desire. The naturalness of population is, in 
fact, a peculiar weaving of heterogeneous desires. Some of them are irrepressible but 
potentially noxious, whereas others might produce, when left free to spontaneously 
organize, “the general interest of population.” Again, more than definitions, what counts 
is that governmentality must act as a translation process in which the passive acceptance 
of a plurality of irreducible desires co-exists with the active regulation of their interplay.  
c) The third aspect that characterises the naturalness of population is constancy. This is a 
sort of practical perspective through which what appears to be singular, unstable and 
contingent can be inscribed in a series of occurrences that repeat themselves with a 
certain regularity. In other terms, phenomena like natality, morbidity, ability, and the 
environment are susceptible to (at least partially) predictable distributions and statistical 
partitions. 
 To conclude, the emergence of this new concept of population opens up the 
possibility to govern the environment, conceived of as nothing more than the principle by 
means of which a set of heterogeneous elements, both natural and artificial, are 
formalized to be managed, or subordinated to an abstract mise en série in order to be 
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politically regulated. In other words, if in the sovereign paradigm nature and politics 
were confronting each other from mutually exclusive standpoints, the biopolitical 
paradigm of nature determines the exact opposite situation: political artificiality and 
species naturality melt into a zone of indistinction constitutively exposed to governmental 
capture. 
  
 The methodological premises of Foucault's biopolitical period are a much 
contested issue.10 Again, these controversies might be due to actual contradictions 
disseminated throughout various sources of the Foucauldian corpus. To better 
contextualise this crucial debate, let us briefly (and very schematically) recall the 
succession of Foucault's three phases from a methodological standpoint:  
a) In the “archaeological” period, Foucault assumes the non-existence of his objects of 
study, which he calls “historical a priori” (Foucault 2002: 142) or “positivities” 
(Ibid.:183), in order to epistemologically isolate the discursive formations in which these 
objects find themselves embedded. As it has been noted (Sorrentino 2008), this 
perspective cannot give a proper account of historical change. While it is formally 
irreprehensible, it lacks the capacity to give historical consistency a meaningful role.  
b) In the “genealogical” phase, Foucault amends his methodology through a new take on 
power relations, assuming history as a non-historicist element: 
                                                 
10 Two opposite, but equally remarkable perspectives are elaborated by Cutro (2004) and Revel 
(2005). 
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If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history, 
he finds that there is “something altogether different” [a reference to Nietzsche's 
The Dawn] behind things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that 
they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms (Foucault 1980: 142).  
 
 As we can see, the postulate of the non-existence of the objects of study remains 
intact. Affirming their non-existence, however, does not mean that they are nothing: on 
the very contrary, this approach allows researchers to genealogically reconstruct the 
historical processes through which a given epistemological field realises itself as a 
practical grid of intelligibility. Nonetheless, the trap of the omnipresence of power 
relations produces an uncomfortable feeling of legitimising the status quo. In other 
words, it seems as though everything changes in accordance with power strategies.  
c) In the “ethical” phase, as we shall see in more detail later, Foucault turns his gaze 
towards the multifarious processes of subjectification that constitute, at least potentially, 
an insuperable barrier to the full realisation of power prescriptions. Those latter will be 
investigated as problematisations, namely as always-contested processes of establishing 
new grids of intelligibility. In other words, the emergence of the new in history is due to 
the intrinsic possibility of resistance. In this way, freedom assumes the role of a 
methodological principle. 
 As we already said, the biopolitical period represents both the apex of the second 
phase and the inception of the third. As a consequence, we simultaneously find elements 
of the genealogical period and openings towards a successive, freedom-based 
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methodology. Referring to the former, this passage from The Birth of Biopolitics, in 
which Foucault reviews his previous works, is particularly instructive: 
It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices – from 
the moment they become co-ordinated with a regime of truth – was able to make 
what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etc.), nonetheless 
become something, something however that continues not to exist. That is to say, 
what I would like to show is not that an error [...] or an illusion could be born, but 
how a particular regime of truth, and therefore not an error, makes something that 
does not exist able to become something. It is not an illusion since it is precisely a 
set of practices, real practices, which establishes it and thus imperiously marks it 
in reality [et le marque ainsi impérieusement dans le réel] (Foucault 2008: 19. 
Our emphasis). 
 
Evidently, Foucault's perspective here is not ontological, but rather ontogenetic: more 
than the discovery of what things are, his research attempts to show how things came to 
be, how they realised themselves and how they work in relation to each other.11 In other 
words, establishing the intelligibility of a historical occurrence consists in “simply 
showing that it was possible [que le réel soit possible; c'est ça sa mise en intelligibilité]” 
(Foucault 2008: 34). As we said, this approach presents the relevant advantage of 
providing excellent empirical insights. Nonetheless, the apparently “simple” act of 
delineating the possibility of reality hides insidious analytical risks. In fact, the very 
                                                 
11 From this perspective, the following statement by Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker seems 
to be at the same time profoundly insightful and strikingly contradictory: “Such an analysis [Foucault's one] 
describes how power comes to be, but says little about how it works or even that it exists as such” 
(Galloway and Thacker 2007: 8). As for the non-existence of power, and the concern about its appearance, 
they are absolutely right: genealogy as methodology prescribes such theoretical procedures. More 
problematic is the claim that this approach says little about how power works: if so, through which 
alternative analytic processes could it be possible to describe how power came to be? 
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possibility of a critique of what is real becomes methodologically unacceptable: once the 
intelligibility of reality has been shown, what remains is the indelible trace of power. To 
put it differently, genealogy is intrinsically haunted by the possibility to transform what 
could merely be an unstable outcome of strategic force relations into the necessary result 
of an omnipotent deus ex machina. Paradoxically, genealogy seemed to be trapped in a 
curious inversion: the refusal of the deterministic tyranny of the origin barely brought to 
light the uncomfortable transcendency of the status quo, marked by an indisputable 
legitimacy provided by the mere fact to be real, actually occurring.  
 However, in Birth of Biopolitics we can also find, surely in embryonic form, a 
criticism of this involuntary analytical outcome. In a dense passage concerned with the 
particular modulation of the notion of freedom within the framework of liberal 
governmentality, Foucault takes a methodological detour and states: 
We should not think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realised over 
time, or which undergoes quantitative variations, greater or lesser drastic 
reductions, or more or less important periods of eclipse. Freedom is neither a 
universal which is particularised in time and geography, nor a white surface with 
more or less numerous black spaces here and there and from time to time. 
Freedom is never anything other – but this is already a great deal – than an 
actual relation between governors and governed, a relation in which the measure 
of the “too little” existing freedom is given by the “even more” freedom 
demanded (Foucault 2008: 63. Our emphasis. Translation modified). 
 
As we see, freedom is proposed as an inherently relational concept and, even more 
importantly, its measure within a given governmental framework is defined by the 
demands advanced by the governed and not by the concession gracefully granted by the 
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governors. This articulation of freedom, which will be subsequently refined, opens up the 
possibility to formulate the ontological primacy of resistance over power.12 We shall see 
later in this section the methodological implications of freedom conceived as an 
ontological postulate. For the time being, we want to show how this development begins, 
in a sort of larval configuration, during the biopolitical phase of Foucault's research, 
without being for this reason the only key to interpret it.  
 
2 - AGAMBEN vs. HARDT & NEGRI: BIOPOLITICS REVISITED 
 In recent years the debate about biopolitics has mainly been centred around the 
formulations proposed by Giorgio Agamben, on the one hand, and, on the other, by 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Although in very different fashions, we claim that 
their attempts operate an ontological revision of Foucault's work. Consequently, the point 
of contention between these two approaches is fundamentally related to ontology. 
Whereas Agamben, maintaining sovereignty as an irremissible theoretical compass, 
originally reworks sources such as Heidegger, Benjamin and Schmitt, Hardt and Negri 
privilege an alternative line of development, based on the notion of constituent power, 
whose crucial articulations are to be found in Spinoza, Marx and Deleuze.13 However, the 
                                                 
12 It is necessary at this point to acknowledge that the first thinker to make this point was Gilles 
Deleuze in his famous commentary on Foucault's work, in which he stated that “the final word on power is 
that resistance comes first” (Deleuze 1988: 89). 
13 An excellent interpretation of the ontological differences between Agamben and Negri can be 
found in Neilson (2004). 
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aim of this section is to provide a critical methodological comparison between the 
specific modalities through which these authors utilise the concept of biopolitics.  
 
2.1 - Let us start with Agamben. His attempt to “ontologise” Foucault's methodology is 
clearly exposed in an important book titled The Signature of All Things: On Method, 
published in 2009. In “What is a Paradigm?”, the first essay of the volume, Agamben 
rightly points out the profound differences between Foucault and epistemologist Thomas 
Kuhn with regard to the notion of paradigm. In fact, whereas for Kuhn a paradigm 
designates a sort of disciplinary matrix, the common set of statements and procedures 
which define a particular scientific field in a given moment, for Foucault the paradigm 
(especially during the genealogical phase) incessantly refers to the interplay between 
politics and epistemology and, accordingly, is configured as a sort of cartography of 
power/knowledge relations in a determined historical period. Moreover, as Agamben 
convincingly argues, the peculiar logic of the Foucauldian paradigm cannot be 
constrained within the dichotomous (or binary) structure of traditional Western logic 
since it enacts neither an inductive development (from the particular to the universal), nor 
a deductive one (from the universal to the particular). Rather, this concept of paradigm 
enables the researcher to establish an epistemological connection from a singularity to 
another singularity. Agamben calls this formal structure analogy, whose specific 
production is epistemological intelligibility. Analogy is situated in a diagonal position 
with regard to the particulars it connects and consequently creates a third term which is at 
the same time included in their relationship (as an example of their commonality) and 
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excluded from it (in order to be exemplary, the third element must lose its particular 
features). In Agamben's own words: 
The analogical third is attested here above all as the disidentification and 
neutralisation of the first two [elements of the relation] which now become 
indiscernible. The third is this indiscernibility, and if one tries to grasp it by 
means of bivalent caesurae, one necessarily runs up against an undecidable. It is 
thus impossible to clearly separate an example's paradigmatic character – its 
standing for all cases – from the fact that it is one case among others. As in a 
magnetic field, we are dealing not with extensive and scalable magnitudes but 
with vectorial intensities (Agamben 2009a: 20). 
 
This passage is crucial because it shows the very foundation of the Agambenian attempt 
to turn Foucault's methodological genealogy into an ontological structure. First of all, we 
see that intelligibility is no longer read as that specific standpoint, situated between 
power/knowledge and within a given historical conjuncture, which is potentially able to 
show how that reality is to be conceived as actually possible. On the contrary, the deepest 
layer of Agamben's intelligibility rests upon an inescapable indiscernibility. In fact, it is 
on the basis of a paradoxical, simultaneous co-existence of an inside and an outside 
within the formal structure of a bipolar analogical model that singular historical 
occurrences can show their irreducible differences. Rather than accounting for the 
singular uniqueness of the various manifestations of the consistency of history, this 
intelligibility shows their common dependence on an ineluctable indiscernibility (whose 
political side is a radical indecidability). Moreover, Agamben makes clear that the 
indiscernible intelligibility embedded in the notion of paradigm possesses an ontological 
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status: “The intelligibility in question in the paradigm has an ontological character [...] 
There is, then, a paradigmatic ontology” (Agamben 2009a: 32).  
 A fundamental consequence derives from the assumption of the paradigmatic 
nature of ontology: methodology is conflated onto ontology. Valid research about the 
world is possible as far as the ontological structure of this world is mirrored in the 
methodological presuppositions of the investigation. Obviously, this is not a deterministic 
statement (the act of mirroring might be multifariously performed), but it undoubtedly 
privileges the ontological substratum (indiscernibility) over the epistemological 
phenomenon (historicity). In other words, the particular articulations of power/knowledge 
relations in given events is not disregarded by Agamben, but his emphasis is clearly 
placed on the formal structure (bipolar analogical model) of the paradigmatic ontology. 
This is why his elaboration might be defined as an onto-logical interpretation of 
Foucault's biopolitical hypothesis. The primacy of the logical moment over the historical 
one is never in question. This approach presents a number of advantages: a) it possesses a 
strong theoretical and narrative coherence; b) it cleverly shows continuities and analogies 
between apparently unrelated (and supposedly unrelatable) historical phenomena; c) it 
posits (contra the biopolitical Foucault) the necessity of thinking ontology and 
methodology as distinct but in no way separate entities (even if it does so by assuming 
the indisputable priority of the ontological moment).  
 On the other hand, however, this theoretical perspective also presents problematic 
shortcomings. Firstly, its emphasis on the formal structure of being seems to over-
determine and pre-shape any possible empirical material, no matter the choice of various 
methodological techniques. Any concrete difference ends up being nothing but an 
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irrelevant epi-phenomenon of the fundamental structure that, being situated in a different 
– and higher – level of intelligibility, cannot be refuted by empirical findings. Secondly, 
we contend that Agamben's methodology is politically disempowering. As Paolo Virno 
puts it: “Agamben is a thinker of great value but with no political vocation” (Virno 2002). 
The problem is that insofar as every historical discontinuity ends up being, in a way or in 
another, a confirmation of an apparently timeless and unchangeable ontological structure 
whose formal configuration is detectable in every situation, the only political solution is a 
radical act of distancing (no matter whether in the guise of inoperativeness, as Agamben 
seems to suggest, or as a violent and palingenetic revolution). We suggest that this call 
for an absolute radicalness is responsible for the vagueness and, in the last instance, 
impracticability of Agamben's political formulas, as exemplified by the following 
passage: 
The problem of the profanation of apparatuses – that is to say, the restitution to 
the common use of what has been captured and separated in them – is all the 
more urgent. But this problem cannot be properly raised as long as those who are 
concerned with it are unable to intervene in their own processes of 
subjectification, any more than in their apparatuses, in order to bring to light the 
Ungovernable, which is the beginning and, at the same time, the vanishing point 
of every politics (Agamben 2009b: 24).14     
                                                 
14 These kinds of messianic political statements are recurrently disseminated throughout Agamben's 
work as a whole. Other example are the following: “Only a politics that will have learned to take the 
fundamental biopolitical fracture of the West into account will be able to stop this oscillation and to put an 
end to the civil war that divides the peoples and the cities of the earth” (Agamben 1998: 180); “The 
profanation of the Unprofanable is the political task of the coming generation” (Agamben 2007a: 92); “It 
does not make any sense to oppose secularism and the general will to theology and its providential 
paradigm. Rather, what is needed is an archaeological investigation like the one we attempted here that, 
dating back to the origin of the scission that produced them as rival brothers but inseparable, shows and 
makes inoperative the economic-theological apparatus as a whole” (Agamben 2007b: 313). A quotation 
less messianic and more programmatic than the previous ones might be this: “Selecting in the new 
planetary humanity those characteristics that allow for its survival, removing the thin diaphragm that 
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Before engaging Hardt and Negri's work, let us provide an example of the 
methodological structure we traced in Agamben's philosophy. The primacy of the logical 
form of the sovereign ban, with its paradoxical inclusion and exclusion of bare life, over 
the contingent configurations of historical events is articulated since the beginning of 
Homo Sacer, undoubtedly the most important study published by Agamben. As he writes 
in the “Introduction”: 
The idea of an inner solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism (which 
here we must, with every caution, advance) is obviously not [...] a 
historiographical claim, which would authorise the liquidation and levelling of the 
enormous differences that characterise their history and their rivalry. Yet this idea 
must nevertheless be strongly maintained on a historico-philosophical level, since 
it alone will allow us to orient ourselves in relation to the new realities and 
unforeseen convergences of the new millennium. This idea alone will make it 
possible to clear the way for the new politics, which remains largely to be 
invented (Agamben 1998: 10-11). 
 
As we see, Agamben is well aware of the problems we highlighted above. He does not 
intend to claim a putative flatness of history; however, he prefers to situate his 
enunciation on the “historico-philosophical level”, that is “the logical and topological 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
separates bad mediatized advertising from the perfect exteriority that communicates only itself – this is the 
political task of our generation” (Agamben 1993: 65). 
 In the fourth chapter of this work, we shall attempt to remove Agamben's fruitful notion of 
profanation from its political vagueness in order to use it as a methodological compass to analyse 
contemporary social movements in the field of climate justice. 
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structure of sovereignty” (Agamben 1998: 67). This tension profoundly permeates his 
corpus as a whole. With regards to biopolitics, Agamben not only concedes that the camp 
as paradigm is a modern phenomenon,15 but also goes as far as envisaging the crossing of 
a threshold within modernity,16 which might be interpreted, perhaps forcing the point a 
little, as the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism. However, the primacy of the formal 
structure of the camp, its being in a sense “beyond history”, is quickly re-stated and, 
finally, operates as an indisputable postulate.17 This is also demonstrated by the 
apparently peremptory thesis according to which “the fundamental activity of sovereign 
power is the production of bare life as an originary political element”, whose main 
implication would be “that Western politics is a biopolitics from the very beginning” 
(Agamben 1998: 181). Therefore, biopolitics does not disclose a historico-political 
horizon. Rather, it names the logico-formal operation through which sovereign power 
(and its paradoxical interplay between inclusion and exclusion) produces bare life. 
Obviously, this operation occurs differently in different historical contexts, but this 
difference is by no means essential. What really matters is its structural coherence at the 
“historico-philosophical level”. 
                                                 
15 “The birth of the camp in our time appears as an event that decisively signals the political space of 
modernity itself” (Agamben 1998: 174). 
16 Discussing the issues of “overcoma” and, more broadly, of the process of politicisation of death, 
Agamben writes that “neither Reiter nor Versucher [Nazi eugenists] had ever gone so far along the path of 
politicisation of bare life. But (and this is a clear sign that biopolitics has passed beyond a new threshold) 
in modern democracies it is possible to state in public what Nazi biopoliticians did not dare to say” 
(Agamben 1998:165. Our emphasis). This biopolitical shift within the context of modernity seems 
confirmed by the following passage from State of Exception: “the state of exception has today reached its 
maximum worldwide deployment” (Agamben 2005: 87). It seems to us that the emphasis on a 
contemporary situation implies a qualitative change between the state of exception as having become the 
rule, already envisaged by Benjamin in late-1930s, and our current globalised world. 
17 “If it is true that the essence of the camp consists in the materialisation of the state of exception 
and in the subsequent creation of a space of indistinction, then we must admit that we find ourselves 
virtually in the presence of a camp every time such a structure is created, independent of the kinds of crime 
that are committed there and whatever its denomination and specific topography” (Agamben 1998: 174). 
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 Evidently, Agamben's conclusions cannot be labelled as “false” or “incorrect”. 
However, we might ask ourselves whether or not fruitful lines of further research are 
opened up by them. We contend that Agamben's work tends to organise issues according 
to the logic of an original either/or structure. As a consequence, the potential of 
empirical research is underestimated when not dismissed. In order to rehabilitate the 
empirical side of the biopolitical hypothesis we suggest that the relationship between the 
consistency of history and the “historico-philosophical level” must be further and 
differently problematised. 
  
2.2 - The attempt to “ontologise” the Foucauldian methodology of the biopolitical period 
is shared by Hardt and Negri. The modalities through which this task is accomplished, 
however, are very different from those of Agamben. Rather than emphasising the 
formalistic structure of ontology, in fact, Hardt and Negri underlines the pivotal role of 
the substance of being conceived of in terms of constituent power. This concept refers to 
the fact that historical change is irreducible to the multifarious forms that constituted 
power has assumed in different spatio-temporal configurations. On the one hand, 
constituent power is presented as a distributed, multitudinous force of desire that drives 
ontological emergence and social innovation, as a sort of minoritarian energy perpetually 
opposed to the static, parasitical sedimentations of the modern state (Negri 1999). On the 
other hand, constituted power might be defined as the centralised, transcendental force of 
command that characterises established forms of political order and bureaucratic 
institutional organisation. As we see, every formalistic metaphysics is resolutely rejected 
in favour of an immanent materialism whose political and epistemological implications 
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are of fundamental importance in the economy of our discussion. As Negri writes: 
“Materialism is revolutionary because truth 'without ornament' is an engagement in 
being” (Negri 2003a: 176). 
 In order to understand the specific relevance of this intertwining of politics and 
epistemology with regard to the notion of biopolitics as proposed by Hardt and Negri, it 
is necessary to briefly outline their central methodological assumption, whose original 
formulation dates back to the 1960s and the heterodox re-reading of Marx articulated by 
the Italian operaismo.18 To put it briefly, this strain of thought proposes to theoretically 
assume, in the context of a practical and empirical production of knowledge – “workers' 
inquiry” (Panzieri 1965) – the primacy of working class struggle over capitalist 
structurations.19 This means that the historical phases of capitalist development have to 
be read as subsequent articulations of resistance on the part of the governed. First comes 
labour, whose capability to shape the world (labour-power as production of surplus-
value) marks its ontological consistency. Then, and only then, comes capital, whose 
ability to violently appropriate labour's creative potential (exploitation) entails its 
ontological vampirism. As Negri remarks: “The rhythm of the passage from one epoch of 
capitalist development to another is marked by proletarian struggles” (Negri 1996: 166). 
Accordingly, this view interprets the industrial model as having emerged from the 
                                                 
18 On operaismo ( or workerism, as it is often translated into English), see Hardt and Virno 1996; 
Dyer-Witheford 1999; Wright 2002; Borio, Pozzi and Roggero (2002). 
19 It may be useful to report a passage from the classical locus of this methodological formulation, 
namely Mario Tronti's Operai e capitale: “We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist 
development first, and workers second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its 
head, to change perspective and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the class struggle of 
the working class. At the level of socially developed capital, the capitalist development is subordinate to 
workers' struggles, comes after them and on them it has to build the political mechanism of its own 
production (Tronti 2006: 39) 
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struggle of the professional worker, the welfare state as having been brought to light by 
the opposition of the mass worker and, finally, the current phase of Post-Fordism as 
having originated with the widespread refusal of work carried by the 1968 (and beyond) 
planetary uprisings. Moreover, the positive corollary of this statement is that politics has 
to be understood as partiality, as the antagonistic activity of conflictual parts. And it is 
just through the subjective assumption of this partiality that an effective revolutionary 
strategy can be set up. 
 This methodology can be said to possess a twofold epistemological character as 
well as a twofold political aim. Firstly, it proposes a conception of both knowledge 
articulations and historical becomings as marked by an irreducible discontinuity. The 
processes through which history unfolds and through which knowledge is produced are 
never linear, necessary and deterministically defined. On the contrary, these processes are 
radically contingent and impossible to be foreseen, to be given in advance. Moreover, the 
subjective dimension that is embodied in the cultural/historical processuality is 
considered to be intrinsically excessive, which is to say beyond measure. In other words, 
measure is always configured as the seal of a certain power structure, as the violent 
closure that the form operates over the substance-in-becoming. Epistemologically, Hardt 
and Negri's theoretical endeavour reflects the ontological primacy of creative productivity 
over formalistic measurement. Secondly, the political dimension of Hardt and Negri's 
thought is exposed in the double nature of their methodology. In Empire, the two 
approaches they intend to link are 
intended to be nondialectical and absolutely immanent: the first is critical and 
deconstructive, aiming to subvert the hegemonic languages and social structures 
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and thereby reveal an alternative ontological basis that resides in the creative and 
productive practices of the multitude; the second is constructive and ethico-
political, seeking to lead the processes of the production of subjectivity towards 
the constitution of an effective social, political alternative, a new constituent 
power (Hardt and Negri 2000: 47). 
 
As we see, in this case we also have the conflation of methodology onto ontology, but in 
an inverse modality with respect to Agamben. They share a similarity in that Hardt and 
Negri also reverse the Foucauldian hypothesis according to which methodology is 
independent from ontology in order to state that the assumptions through which 
knowledge can be produced refer directly to the structure of being. However, unlike 
Agamben, these authors assume the incontestable primacy of creative substance 
(resistance) over static form (power) and, consequently, provide an onto-logical 
interpretation of biopolitics. 
 To better contextualize this theoretical passage we can read the double nature of 
Hardt and Negri's methodology from the perspective of the articulation of politics and 
epistemology. These two components are conceived of as closely interrelated and, 
indeed, co-extensive: only a partial decision can shed light on the ontological antagonism 
which opposes constituent and constituted power. Otherwise put, there is no such a thing 
as neutral knowledge. Conversely, however, a profound rigour is needed in order to 
properly decipher the historical tendency of this antagonism. In other words, true politics 
(i.e. revolutionary politics) exists only insofar as the tendency has been firmly and 
correctly grasped. From this methodological intertwining of politics and epistemology 
descends a deeply original understanding of biopolitics as method. In fact, although Hardt 
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and Negri partially agree with Foucault about the periodization of the historical horizon 
disclosed by the emergence of biopolitics,20 for them, this aspect is not the fundamental 
one. Rather, they decline the concept along the double methodological line that we have 
just discussed. Firstly, from a political perspective, they claim that the current phase is 
defined by a radical separation between biopower (the parasitical apparatus through 
which capital ensures exploitation) and biopolitical production (the level at which the 
potentiality of social cooperation is autonomously and fully actualised). As they write in 
Multitude: 
Both of them engage social life in its entirety – hence the common prefix bio – 
but they do so in very different ways. Biopower stands above society, 
transcendent, as a sovereign authority and imposes its order. Biopolitical 
production, in contrast, is immanent to society and creates social relationships and 
forms through collaborative forms of labour (Hardt and Negri 2004: 94-95). 
 
It is clear that, in the authors' view, biopolitical production names the creative side of 
social ontology and is conceived of as an extension of class struggle in the Post-Fordist 
era of capitalist development. Conversely, biopower is the purely exploitative element 
which performs a sort of domination without social guidance.21 
                                                 
20 Hardt and Negri read Foucault through Deleuze and, as a consequence, interpret the first 
biopolitical period (from the second half of the Eighteenth century to mid-Twentieth) as a disciplinary 
society, whereas the co-optation of the 1968 struggles is seen as the birth of the second biopolitical period, 
namely a society of control. This type of society is defined by the full deployment of biopower as a 
dispositif through which life is fully captured by power. As we saw, Foucault's account is a little different 
(and perhaps less schematic), but it has to be noted that he was not interested in mapping the development 
of an ontological antagonism. 
21 Hardt and Negri concede that in the first biopolitical period the rule of capital was managerially 
progressive (although absolutely damaging and finally parasitical). However, with the shift from Fordism 
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 From an epistemological standpoint, the second aspect of their twofold 
methodology, Hardt and Negri argue that true knowledge has to be conceived of as 
inherently part of the broader process of subjectivation through which the Multitude 
organises its struggle (in the form of exodus) within and against the Empire. In fact, it 
might be argued that there is a sort of “biopolitical incarnation of method” (Negri 2003b: 
47), which would be the passage of real abstraction from the ethereal laws of value 
production to the material corporealness of bodies and affects. As they clearly expose in 
Commonwealth: 
Biopolitics is a partisan relationship between subjectivity and history that is 
crafted by a multitudinous strategy, formed by events and resistances, and 
articulated by a discourse that links political decision making to the construction 
of bodies in struggle (Hardt and Negri 2009: 61). 
 
As we can easily recognise, politics and epistemology are nothing but two sides of the 
same coin, namely methodology. With a single move, Hardt and Negri not only articulate 
an effective critique of scientific objectivism, but also undermine cultural flatness or 
transparency, that is the pretension that the social field can be traversed without being 
modified (and, in turn, without modifying it) by the movement of knowledge. Another 
advantage of their complex methodology resides in its being politically enacting: 
claiming partiality as a necessary condition (and not an obstacle) to the production of 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
to Post-Fordism the new level of autonomy gained by social cooperation makes the rule of capital 
completely parasitical, without any positive role whatsoever. 
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truth implies an immediate engagement of knowledge in the very texture of social 
struggles. Properly isolating the core elements of the current tendency of (antagonist) 
capitalist development inherently means engaging either in the liberating assemblages 
that compose biopolitics or the exploitative apparatuses that constitute biopower. 
However, this politically enabling potential must be paired with rigorous and meticulous 
empirical research in order to avoid the trap of self-referentiality.22 In fact, what Negri 
once named, reversing Gramsci's famous slogan, “optimism of the intelligence” (Negri 
1996: 173) permanently runs the risk of confusing the cartography of contemporary 
tendential effects with the projection of a desired autonomy of the oppressed onto strictly 
scientific investigations.  
 Although it is not our intention to deny the relevance of Hardt and Negri's 
theoretical achievements, we nevertheless contend that the biopolitical grounding of the 
notion of multitude constitute exactly such a confusion. By opposing an always-already 
progressive/creative ontological force (biopolitical production) to an always-already 
negative/exploitative formalistic entity (imperial biopower) these authors end up 
delineating a mystical profile of social cooperation, an image of the multitude as good in 
itself, as intrinsically innocent. As Nick Dyer-Witheford has appropriately noted through 
a Deleuzo-Guattarian terminology, Hardt and Negri emphasize the “smoothness” of the 
global multitude at the expenses of its (empirically incontestable) “striating divisions” 
(Dyer-Witheford 2005: 154). As a consequence, the profound ambivalence which defines 
                                                 
22 Paradoxically, the pure positivity accorded to ontological substance newly proposes the question 
of formality in the guise of a monolithic axiomatic. From this perspective, Hardt and Negri's theoretical 
elaboration actually runs the risk of fulfilling the dark prophecy Tronti expressed as early as in 1962: “A 
discourse which grows upon itself carries the mortal danger of verifying itself always and only through the 
successive passages of its own formal logic” (Tronti quoted in Wright 2002: 12). 
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the notion of the antagonistic tendency is overlooked in favour of the clear demarcation 
of two irreducibly different subjects: the heroic triad multitude-biopolitics-constituency 
versus the villainous articulation of the empire and its constituted biopower. In other 
words, what should be posed as a task of a correctly grasped materialist teleology,23 is 
instead presented as an actual state of affairs. As we shall see in the subsequent section, a 
new account on the relationship between empirical findings and historical lines of 
development within the methodology of the antagonistic tendency might provide a set of 
amendments to the shortcomings we just highlighted. 
 
3 - METHODOLOGICAL ASSEMBLAGES 
 Through a critical confrontation with the three perspectives discussed so far, we 
will now be able to fully clarify what we mean by the expression “biopolitics as method.” 
From Foucault, we retain the conceptualisation of biopolitics as a historical horizon 
which discloses an unprecedented relationship between life and politics such that the two 
terms have to be thought simultaneously but distinctly. Moreover, his reflection about the 
naturalness of population will serve as a basis for the problematisation of the notion of 
environment, which will be the next step of our research. Nevertheless, we assume as 
necessary an effort to “ontologise” Foucault's thought in order to escape the trap of 
legitimizing the status quo. In this regard, our task is similar to those of Agamben and 
                                                 
23 It might be useful to recall that, given the workerist emphasis on discontinuity, this teleology is based 
on the contingency rather than pre-given determinacy of history. Hence, it must not be confused with 
the putative historico-materialist determinism. 
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Hardt and Negri. However, we will try to overcome the shortcomings that affect their 
propositions: on the one hand, an extreme emphasis on the formal structure of being and 
its politically disempowering implications and, on the other, an unjustified overlooking of 
the constitutive ambivalence that characterises the contemporary tendency of capitalist 
development. 
 In order to overcome such shortcomings, however, we want to introduce three 
more elements, again drawn from our sources, which can be connected originally to 
produce a new methodological tool-kit potentially able to guide our exploration of the 
biopolitical nature of the environmental crisis. The first component of this politico-
epistemological assemblage is provided by Foucault in a well-known essay published in 
1982, titled “The Subject and Power” (2000). Here, the notion of freedom ceases to be 
conceived of as a universal (or a positivity) and turns into an ontological postulate, a 
constitutive feature of the notion of power. As he writes: “Power is exercised only over 
free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault 2000: 342). This intransitivity 
of freedom allows for a re-reading of the research results of the biopolitical period in 
terms of the primacy of resistance over power and, consequently, is able dismantle the 
all-encompassing nature of power dispositifs with their legitimizing features.24 
 Moreover, this freedom presents fundamental implications in terms of 
methodology. In a series of six lectures delivered at the University of California at 
Berkeley in the Fall Term of 1983, Foucault advanced a central distinction between 
                                                 
24 It is just from this perspective that claims such as those of John Protevi, according to which a 
distinctive Deleuzian ontology is at play in Foucault's biopolitical texts, can be effectively sustained 
(Protevi 2010). In other words, although a fully genealogical approach denies its own ontological 
consistency, it is nonetheless possible to re-read its results from an ontological standpoint (which can be 
Deleuzian, of course, but also late-Foucauldian, as we are attempting to argue). 
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“history of ideas” and “history of thought” (Foucault 2001b: 74). The former is basically 
concerned with questions such as when a specific field of knowledge emerged, how it 
was structured and through which modalities it influenced the development of other 
related ideas. In contrast, history of thought designates the effort to isolate the ways 
through which unproblematic areas of research became progressively contested issues, 
objects of new public interest, targets of social institutions, discursive practices and 
technologies of power. This is what Foucault refers to as problematisation: the definition 
of material practices that constitute the conditions upon which what was previously taken 
for granted emerges as an object of government, namely as at the same time exposed to 
power/knowledge relations and to potentially autonomous processes of subjectivation 
(1990). What is crucial here is that, differently from the genealogical period, it is freedom 
that sets in motion the thought-procedure. As Foucault masterfully explains in an 
interview released in 1984: 
Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the motion by which one 
detaches from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on it as a problem. To say 
that the study of thought is the analysis of a freedom does not mean one is dealing 
with a formal system that has reference only to itself. Actually, for a domain of 
action, a behaviour, to enter the field of thought, it is necessary for a certain 
number of factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or 
to have provoked a certain number of difficulties around it. These elements result 
from social, economic, or political processes. But here, their only role is that of 
instigation. They can exist and perform their action for a very long time, before 
there is effective problematisation by thought. And when thought intervenes, it 
doesn’t assume a unique form that is the direct result or the necessary expression 
of these difficulties; it is an original or specific response – often taking many 
forms, sometimes even contradictory in its different aspects – to these difficulties, 
which are defined for it by a situation or a context, and which hold true as a 
possible question (Foucault 1997: 119).   
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As this passage clearly shows, the complex variables which compose a problematisation 
can be grasped exclusively from a historical perspective (be it expressed in a “social, 
economic or political process”). By means of a comparison of this perspective with the 
genealogical one, we are finally able to see a key aspect of Foucault's late philosophy: 
whereas freedom is ontologically invested (power exists only in so far as it assumes the 
form of an “instigation”), the specific modalities through which this ontological agonism 
exposes itself become intelligible only in historical terms. 
 The second component of the assemblage we are trying to delineate refers to the 
notion of the antagonistic tendency, which we have already (briefly) discussed. Our point 
is that it must be further problematised in order to avoid the trap of over-simplification 
(i.e. biopolitics vs. biopower as monolithic entities confronting each other upon the same 
battlefield). In this context, it might be useful to engage in a discussion with the key text 
in which Negri developed, following/re-interpreting Marx's Grundrisse, this complex 
methodology. In Marx Beyond Marx, an extremely dense text originally published in 
1979, Negri writes that in the Grundrisse 
the relation between the simple and the complex is a relation in the full sense of 
the term, and therefore a dynamism, animated by historical subjectivity, by the 
dynamic collective which is its mark [...] There exist different degrees of 
abstraction: on the one hand the abstraction which seeks the real in the concrete 
(determinate abstraction), and on the other hand, the concrete which seeks in 
abstraction its determination (the process of the tendency). It is a historical 
movement which is determined by production and class struggle: which goes 
from the first to the 'second nature', from the first, immediate, concrete truth to 
the truth of the reversal, of the project (Negri 1984: 48).  
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Let us try to clarify the fundamental twofold procedure of this tendential method as 
articulated in this passage. In order for the tendency to be properly grasped, two 
abstractions are needed: the first goes beyond scientific objectivity to discover “the 
historical subjectivity” which represents the driving force of capitalist development (class 
struggle). The second abstraction, equally important, intervenes in the ambivalence of the 
tendential antagonism to show its potential reversibility by means of an autonomous 
political project (communism). For this methodological intervention to work, it is crucial 
that the balance between the two abstractions is firmly maintained. It is a matter of 
proportion between ontological constitution (revealed by the first abstraction) and 
historical horizon (which is the political object of the second abstraction).25 This balance 
or proportion is what differentiates a “voluntaristic projection”, which is to say a process 
of flattening the ambivalence of the antagonistic tendency, from a “subjective 
verification”, namely the operation through which increased knowledge of the tendency 
fosters a higher degree of political autonomy (and vice versa).  
 It seems to us that that the question concerning the proportion between the two 
abstractions can be epistemologically reflected in the relation between theoretical activity 
and empirical research. In fact, we contend that a careful balance between awareness of a 
                                                 
25 As Negri notes: “it is a process that goes from the abstract to the concrete, and then, in proportion 
to the historical extension of the horizon, of the tendency, goes again from the abstract to the concrete” 
(Negri 1984: 50-51). 
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timeless ontological productivity and scientifically valid empirical insights26 is a 
necessary condition for the proper deciphering of the antagonistic tendency in its 
multifarious ramifications. And it is at this level that Hardt and Negri's position appears 
to be more similar to a voluntaristic projection than to a subjective verification. The rigid 
distinction between biopolitics and biopower conceals the tendency rather than 
illuminating it by positing a political task to be achieved (the communist project) in terms 
of an already present historical condition (the autonomy of the multitude). Moreover, 
there seems to be a consolatory aftertaste in their interpretation of a succession of 
struggles that do not know defeat. For these reasons, in the course of our research we 
shall privilege the analysis of ambivalence over the tactical reflection on how to re-
appropriate what is already there to be merely picked up. Put otherwise, we shall consider 
the figure of the researcher and that of the activist to be reciprocal and mutually 
constitutive, but in no way perfectly overlapping or intrinsically convergent. In fact, 
whereas politics (the realm of decision) and epistemology (the locus of scientific validity) 
are not thinkable outside of the relation that links them, it is nonetheless undeniable that 
they do not belong to the same ambit of thought and practice. Their convergence is 
indeed indispensable for the transformative historical process to occur, but it is not 
already present. Rather, it represents the possible outcome of a struggle which is 
dependent on historical contingency. 
                                                 
26 Let us stress that it is not our intention to radically separate theoretical and empirical work. As 
Negri himself would put it “there exist different degrees of abstraction.” From this perspective, the category 
of proportion points towards the presence, within the scientific enterprise, of both logical consistency and 
political realism (in the Machiavellian sense).  
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 The third element of our methodological assemblage is provided by Agamben and 
refers to the relationship between ontology and politics. Above we have defined the 
political as the realm of decision; to develop our discourse a bit further, we might add 
that deciding means, in this context, acting in a non-neutral way. This non-neutrality, 
which from the outset requires the abandonment of every kind of rigid determinism (we 
shall talk instead of reversible processes of determination), also implies its own 
inevitability. To put it otherwise, the only postulate of our account of politics is the 
unevenness of the social field (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), namely the impossibility to 
fully compose its various elements in an organic, unified whole. In the framework 
established by this hypothesis, it is clear that violence, antagonism and struggle cannot 
but find themselves at the core of every political understanding. This conception does not 
deny a priori the possibility of a provisional unity or composition, but shows how this 
possible crystallisation of force relations cannot claim eternity, neither as a restoration of 
a putative Golden Age nor as the final triumph of a self-declared New Man. To put it 
differently, this formulation seems very much akin to Nietzsche's concluding words in his 
famous lecture on Anaximander: “Infinite worlds one after another” (Nietzsche 2006: 
37). 
 Starting from this indicative definition of politics, we are now ready to analyse its 
relationship with ontology. In a recent work on Heidegger, Agamben provides an 
illuminating point of departure for our exploration: 
Ontology, or first philosophy, is not an innocuous academic discipline, but in 
every sense the fundamental operation in which anthropogenesis, the becoming 
human of the living being, is realised. From the beginning, metaphysics is taken 
up in this strategy: it concerns precisely that meta that completes and preserves 
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the overcoming of animal physis in the direction of human history. This 
overcoming is not an event that has been completed once and for all, but an 
occurrence that is always under way, that every time and in each individual 
decides between the human and the animal, between nature and history, between 
life and death (Agamben 2004: 79). 
 
As it is manifest, Agamben distinguish between ontology as the discourse on the ontos, 
the general framework within which anthropogenesis occurs, and politics as the “always 
under way” (i.e. reversible, never completed) act of deciding where the demarcating line 
between animality and humanity has to be drawn. The two elements must be thought as 
distinct but inseparable. They are not the same thing, but outside of their relation they 
lose their meaning as theoretical categories. This is the way the following, apparently 
peremptory remark proposed by Negri has to be understood: “Every metaphysics is a 
political ontology” (Negri 2007: 11)27. Thus, we suggest, it is from the standpoint of this 
constitutive ambiguity between sameness and distinction that the politico-ontological 
dimension of biopolitical governmentality should be conceptualised.  
 To conclude this section, we propose a political and epistemological ontology 
centred around three main bases: a) an account of the One as a timeless and unstructured 
field pervaded by pre-individual intensive energies; b) a concept of the Multiple as a 
dynamic and reversible putting-into-form of these energies (which become extensive); c) 
                                                 
27 It may be useful to underline that, if ontology and politics were one and the same thing, the 
expression “political ontology” would be tautological and, consequently, uselessly redundant. When the 
workerist tradition claims that “everything is political”, it is not implying that everything is reducible to 
politics, but that every single act, whatever form it assumes, involves to a certain degree the necessity to 
operate a decision, which amounts to saying that everything possesses a political dimension.  
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and a notion of the methodological (politics + epistemology) threshold from which we 
can access this ontological scheme as characterised by its own historicity (diachronic 
dimension) and by its necessary partiality (synchronic-cartographic dimension). In other 
words, the threshold is the battlefield upon which the virtual configuration of a thousand 
possible worlds becomes a determined social formation. From this perspective, 
biopolitics is configured as an entirely methodological category. In fact, it designates at 
the same time the historical horizon that we are embedded in (with its political 
opportunities and epistemological borders) and its fragility, which is to say the lines of 
force that can potentially reverse its current mode of socio-political organisation (i.e. 
governmentality). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In order to bring to a close the discussion we have articulated in this chapter, let us briefly 
introduce some elements of the next steps in our research. In particular, let us come back 
(and sketch a provisional answer) to the question we posed at the beginning of this 
section: how can the biopolitical framework help us in defining the specific features of 
the ecological crisis? First of all, as a preliminary warning, the concept of biopolitics 
refers to a historical horizon marked by its inconclusiveness. This means that the 
biopolitical transition (begun during the second half of the Eighteenth century) is still 
under way and that it is important to acknowledge its constitutively mobile, differentiated 
and viscous reality (Chignola 2008). By emphasising the methodological side of 
biopolitics, we investigate, research and analyse from within this heterogeneous spatio-
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temporal dimension. This internal positionality is especially fruitful from the standpoint 
of environmental studies (Dobson 1990), an emergent field whose characteristic feature is 
uncertainty. Furthermore, this methodology entails the possibility to take into account the 
contested nature of the ecological crisis, both from an epistemological perspective 
(Latour 1991; 2004), and from a politico-subjective one (Guattari 2000).  
 Even more importantly, however, biopolitics as method allows us to read the 
problematisation of the concept of the environment as a ramification of the two 
fundamental tendencies of capitalist historical development: liberalism (or Fordism, as its 
mature form) on the one hand, and neoliberalism (or Post-Fordism, as its inceptive form) 
on the other. In other words, in our dissertation we will follow the hypothesis according 
to which the environment would have been “silent” or “familiar” until the emergence of 
biopolitics and that only afterwards has it been recognised as a fully political issue. Far 
from being a linear development, however, this passage involved highly contested 
paradigmatic shifts in the fields of knowledge (most notably the rise of political 
economy), of politics (the rule of the bourgeoisie and the resistance of the proletariat), 
and of technology (for the first time productive applications could provide the means for a 
systematic pollution). It is not a coincidence, we argue, that the first wave of ecological 
issues was inextricably related with industrial production (air and water pollution, 
unsustainable urban development, depletion of natural resources, etc.). Moreover, the 
establishment of the population as the main target of governmental capture made 
politically practicable the specific articulation of artificiality and naturality that, in turn, 
opened up the possibility to join biology and political economy within the realm of power 
exercise. In other words, we claim that, without the peculiar intertwining of life and 
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politics which defines the biopolitical horizon, the emergence of the environment as an 
object of public and scientific concern would be unthinkable.28  
 Another important transformation is the shift, internal to the biopolitical horizon, 
from liberal to neoliberal governmentality (Rose 1999; 2007; Harvey 2005). In fact, 
whereas the liberal constellation of political, epistemological and technological 
developments made the multifarious phenomenology of the ecological crisis visible, the 
actual attempts to politically deal with it are entirely neoliberal (it is not by chance that 
the very idea of a comprehensive environmental policy emerged in Western societies 
during the second half of the 1960s). Moreover, neoliberalism brought to light the second 
wave of environmental issues, most notably climate change and post-industrial 
biotechnological applications. Our hypothesis to interpret such a transformation refers to 
the fact that, whereas liberal naturalism posited the environment in terms of a given to be 
exchanged (either as a unity of production – raw materials – or as final container of 
waste), neoliberalism envisages the environment as a political surface upon which to 
produce new commodities in order to enact a creative conception of economic 
competition. The next chapter shall be entirely dedicated to the analysis of these issues. 
For the time being, however, to clarify this theoretical junction suffice to say that, 
whereas in liberalism the circuits of capital accumulation and valorisation are deployed 
onto nature (conceived of as a limit to capital's [re]production), in neoliberalism the same 
circuits occur within nature (conceived of as a target of capital's [re]production) (Heynen, 
                                                 
28 Obviously, we do not intend to deny the well-documented fact that the surrounding environment 
has always constituted a problem for human populations. Less ambitiously, we simply would like to 
suggest that biopolitics opens up a new configuration of the relationship (intrinsic rather than extrinsic) 
between natural environment and social environment. To put it otherwise, the environment in the 
biopolitical context represents the fundamental stake of the relation between nature and politics and not 
merely the passive background upon which they relate to each other. 
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McCarthy, Prudham, Scott 2007). From a “managerial” perspective this shift is especially 
visible in the different language spoken by environmental actors (policy makers, 
enterprises, social movements): whereas in the first half of the Twentieth century 
ecological discursive practices are mainly organised around the theme of passive 
restoration of damaged natural sites, from the late 1960s onwards their rhetoric becomes 
based on the recurrent theme of active production of socio-natural environments (Darier 
1999). It is this new role of the natural that will frame the next step of our analysis. 
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On the Difference Between an Ancient Almond and a 
Roundup Ready GM Soybean 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the previous chapter we have argued that the disclosure of a distinctive biopolitical 
horizon, marked by the discursive centrality of population – conceived in terms of limited 
but malleable naturalness – brought to the foreground the possibility to govern the 
environment. The very existence of such a possibility implies a profound historical 
rupture concerning the interface between nature and politics. Moreover, we advanced the 
hypothesis according to which a new split would occur, within the biopolitical era, in the 
passage from liberal to neoliberal capitalism. The aim of this chapter is to “verify” such 
hypotheses, which is to say to “implement” on a slightly less abstract level the 
methodological structure previously outlined. To do so, our focus shall be centred around 
the multifarious relationships linking the notion of nature29 to the power/knowledge 
apparatus of political economy. 
 The idea of a multiple historical shift in the interrelation between nature's evolution and 
society's development is, however, deeply contested and, in some instances, entirely 
refused. As a consequence, in order to precisely clarify what the stakes of the matter 
amount to, we shall set our argument against the background of an important stream of 
thought which tends to deny the role of history in human vicissitudes. Not surprisingly, 
our reference is to the best-selling book Guns, Germs and Steel: The Fates of Human 
                                                 
29 Notion which is rendered, in purely governmental terms, by land/earth in Marx and by 
milieu/environment in Foucault. 
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Societies, published in 1997 by environmental anthropologist (amongst other academic 
qualifications) Jared Diamond. Diamond attempts to answer the famous Yali's question30 
by exclusively emphasizing the role played by environmental factors: “Environment 
moulds history” (Diamond 1997: 352). In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows: every 
relevant event in human development since the Paleolithic is caused by environmental 
influences. More specifically, every difference to be detected amongst human societies, 
distinctions that eventually decided their “success” or “failure”, depends on strictly 
natural agents, such as climate, geographical location and resource availability. History, 
posits Diamond, is nothing more than the temporal structure which mirrors the interplay 
between environmental forces. Consequently, culture is irrelevant to explaining the 
multilayered diversity – power, technology, political systems, religious beliefs, etc. – 
which defines human societies (Blaut 1999; 2000).  
 According to Diamond the most decisive historical event in humankind's developmental 
trajectory was the co-presence of three environmental advantages (large number and kind 
of domesticable plants and animals, plus multiple natural barriers to dispersive travelling) 
in the Fertile Crescent after the last Ice Age, some 13,000 years ago. In passing, it might 
be worth noting that the current environmentalist common sense, marked as it is by a 
vaguely Heideggerian “return to nature” and a decidedly Hayekian stress on the 
imperfection of human nature, is paradoxically able to enact, at the very same time, a 
dismissal of any project of social transformation (as irremediably utopian) and a new 
                                                 
30 The book's incipit shows the American scientist walking on a solitary beach with Yali, a New 
Guinean politician, who asks him: “Why is that you white people developed much cargo and brought it to 
New Guinea, but we black people had little cargo of our own?” (Diamond 1997: 3). In general terms, the 
problem Diamond is trying to address relates to the rise of white Europe (and, by extension the United 
States) as a dominant power on a world scale. 
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cultural framework legitimating eco-business based on the ideology of eco-technological 
fix. Here lies, we contend, its precise political danger. 
 Yet, while it would be unfair to ignore the appreciable political critique Diamond's 
approach allows us to address to “racial hereditarians” – whose main point consists in 
explaining cultural difference through genetic asymmetries – it would nonetheless be 
false to infer that for such a critique to be formulated one needs an environmental 
determinist framework. In fact, critical historical analysis can be (and has been) as much 
if not more effective than environmental determinism in deconstructing and opposing 
racism, in all its forms and variations. Diamond's reflection, however, is important to us 
in that it represents the polar opposite of a biopolitical method applied to the logico-
historical trajectory of the nature-society dyad. A good case in point to appreciate the 
implications entailed by such a sidereal theoretical distance is outlined in the well-known 
chapter 7 of Guns, Germs and Steel, titled “How to Make an Almond”. Here, Diamond 
narrates the adventures of plant domestication, a practice defined as the act of genetically 
modify a wild plant, whether consciously or not, to better fit human needs. Almonds are a 
perfect example since, in their wild state, they are very bitter and in many cases fatally 
poisonous. How did they become domesticated? Initially by means of natural selection; 
subsequently, artificial selection became prominent: at first unconsciously through trial-
and-error procedures, then increasingly consciously as knowledge progressed. Indeed, 
knowledge cumulative increase is what connects – albeit by way of differentiation – 
ancient hunter-gatherers to contemporary hi-tech lab scientists. In fact, whereas for the 
former “the resulting evolution of wild plants into crops was an unconscious process”, for 
the latter  
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crop development is a conscious, highly specialised effort. [...] They already 
know about the hundreds of existing crops and set out to develop yet another one. 
To achieve that goal, they plant many different seeds or roots, select the best 
progeny and plant their seeds, apply knowledge of genetics to develop good 
varieties that breed true, and perhaps even use the latest techniques of genetic 
engineering to transfer specific useful genes (Diamond 1997: 115).   
 
This passage is of particular relevance in that it illuminates the respective roles played by 
history and the environment, as mediated by knowledge, in Diamond's methodology. 
History, or the mere flow of temporal progression, allows us to map our surroundings 
based on incremental scientific discoveries in the realm of the environment. Every 
subsequent stage of humankind's development is thus better equipped than its predecessor 
to cope with natural threats: the wise use of perpetually advanced knowledge is what 
marks “successful” civilisations whereas, conversely, “failing” societies either did not 
possess a sufficiently advanced scientific system or proved unable to properly apply it.31 
This presupposition is what allows Diamond to compare, in a strikingly unproblematic 
manner, “the little wild peas collected by hunter-gatherers for thousands of years” and 
                                                 
31 Such overly simplistic view of historical becoming is even more evident in Collapse: How 
Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005), where Diamond confronts on a putative social common ground 
civilisations as diverse as the Norse and Inuit of Greenland, the Maya, the Anasazi, the indigenous people 
of Rapa Nui (Easter Island), Japan, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and contemporary Montana. It comes as 
no surprise, given the lack of any socio-political dimension to the analysis, that Diamond ends Collapse by 
praising big oil corporation Chevron for its genuine concern for the environment, as expressed by the “bird-
watcher's dream” (Diamond 2005: 444) created by the company and visited by the author in Papua New 
Guinea. The lack of socio-political critique exposes another difference with the biopolitical paradigm: by 
sharply separating nature and society, environmental determinism finds itself unable to formulate a critique 
of contemporary green economy (most of the times, actually, such a theoretical option ends up fostering 
this kind of corporate strategy). On the contrary, as we will discuss later in this chapter, biopolitics as 
method allows us to deconstruct the very premises of the green economy and, potentially, to articulate 
embryonic prefigurations of alternative ways to conceive of (and live) the intrinsic relationship between 
environment and economy. 
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contemporary “supermarket apples” (Ibid.: 117-118) on the sole basis of the different 
level of scientific understanding their producers bore. Unfolding such an argument until 
its logical conclusion, calculating the difference between an ancient almond and a GM 
soybean would be simple: botanics + classical genetics + genetic engineering. In other 
words, the amount of scientific knowledge to which they refer. 
 As we see, underlying Diamond's theoretical procedure is a conception of science as an 
independent variable, as a hidden but stable treasure to be progressively discovered by 
human courage and perseverance – environmental conditions permitting, of course. This 
idea of science could not be more incompatible with the intertwining of epistemology and 
politics biopolitics evokes. In the biopolitical arena, power and knowledge are seen as 
entangled in multifarious dispositifs whose very existence – and internal articulation – 
rest upon irreducible historical contingency and spatial situatedness. Thus, grasped 
through biopolitical lenses, Diamond's almond has little to do with contemporary GM 
crops, simply because such products belong to different forms of the socio-natural link.  
 The rest of the chapter will be dedicated to a clarification of this statement. Our 
exploration shall begin by focussing particularly on two fundamental sections of Marx's 
oeuvre, namely the “Forms which Precede Capitalist Production” [Formen, die der 
kapitalistichen Produktion vorhergehn], from the Grundrisse, and the part on the “So-
Called Primitive Accumulation”, from Capital. After this mainly historical detour, we 
shall turn our attention to the inner logic of capital's valorisation and, more specifically, 
to the way Marx's critique of political economy deals with its inceptive agent, namely 
Physiocracy. Following this, we shall analyse how Foucault's reflections on the 
Physiocrats' policy recommendations differs, but also complements, Marx's insights and 
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how this issue sheds new light on the shift from liberalism to neoliberalism, especially 
from an environmental perspective. On this basis, we will advance the hypothesis of an 
elective affinity amongst ecological crises, financial markets and neoliberal 
governmentality. Such an affinity, we will show, is rooted in the new role played by 
knowledge in the productive process and shows a new type of capitalist abstraction 
whose core is perfectly represented by the proliferation of business practices and theories 
about the green economy. Finally, a critique of this contemporary discursive formation 
shall shortly precedes the conclusion of the chapter, which shall discuss the many reasons 
that make Diamond's almond and a Roundup Ready GM soybean incomparable, and 
indeed belonging to different worlds.       
 
1 - MARX: NATURE AS CAPITAL 
 
 Before undertaking our reading of Marx's passages, it is necessary to transpose 
the methodological argument formulated in Chapter 1 on the proper terrain upon which 
our current interest (the relationship between the notion of nature and the development of 
political economy) ultimately rests. This is that a fruitful but problematic tension between 
logical aspects and historical elements seems to be at play also in Marx's theoretical 
endeavour. In proper Marxist terms, the friction is located between the logic of capital's 
self-reproduction and the history of capitalism as a mode of production. Although such 
an issue is far from new and has been largely debated in Marxist scholarship, it will be 
useful for our purposes to briefly recall a facet of this debate in order to clarify the goal of 
63 
 
our current exploration. The kernel of the controversy is entirely contained in Marx's 
famous methodological statement from the Einleitung: 
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic 
organisation of production. The categories which express its relations, the 
comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the structure and 
the relations of production of all the vanished social formations out of whose 
ruins and elements it built itself up, whose partly still unconquered remnants are 
carried along within it, etc. Human anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the 
ape (Marx 1993: 105). 
 
From a very general perspective, this passage reiterates and exemplifies one of Marx's 
greatest achievements, namely the thought-procedure movement from the abstract to the 
concrete (i.e. historical materialism). Nonetheless, such a formulation, which in different 
ways affects both the analysis of pre-capitalist societies and that of primitive 
accumulation, raises a number of problems. For instance, how does one consider issues as 
diverse (and crucial) as that of transition, of the relationship between “core” and 
“peripheries”, of uneven development? From a methodological standpoint, however, the 
most profound concern is arguably that of historicism, which is to say the assumption that 
behind capitalist abstractions (those “categories which express its relations”) would lay – 
concealed – a strict general law of development of which capitalism would be the current, 
unavoidable stage and communism, just as necessarily, the next. To a certain extent, such 
a historicist emphasis is undeniably present in Marx's words. From this perspective, 
Antonio Negri is right in pointing out that “the general law smells of philosophy of 
history” (1984: 111), and Dipesh Chakrabarty is justified in associating Marxism and 
liberalism on the basis of a common view of capital as arising in a specific geographical 
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location and then diffusing to the rest of the world or, if “global”, similarly operating as a 
“totalising unity” (2000: 23). It is important to stress that such a problematic does not 
merely concern theoretical production. For example, Marx's striking ambiguity vis-à-vis 
colonisation – always criticised but often conceived of in terms of “necessary evil” – 
manifestly materialises the practical implications of such a delicate issue.     
 Yet it must also be acknowledged that a number of non-historicist, counterbalancing 
elements are dispersed both throughout Marx's corpus and in subsequent elaborations by 
a variety of Marxist scholars. Belonging to the first category are the profound interest 
Marx shown for empirico-historical specificities and the very relevant late 
reconsideration of the necessity of the transition from capitalism to communism.32 More 
importantly, however, what must be highlighted and fully appreciated is the political 
dimension of Marx's method: capitalism sheds new light on what precedes it because the 
goal set for the analysis is to show capitalism's contradictions in order to eventually 
overcome it. In other terms, although the present is highly influenced by the past, it is the 
former that illuminates the latter. Present urgencies shape the way we approach historical 
past: every single degree of explanatory power gained by Marx's reflections is directly a 
weapon to be employed in class struggle. This is why the danger represented by 
                                                 
32 In the preface to the Russian edition of the Communist Manifesto, Marx wondered whether or not 
the obshchina, social formation typical of Russian countryside, could possibly pass into the form of 
common ownership without experiencing a process of capitalisation. His answer was that “if the Russian 
revolution becomes the signal for the proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each 
other reciprocally, the current Russian ownership of land could serve as a starting point for communist 
development” (Marx quoted in Tomba 2009: 47).    
 On this issue, see Shanin (1983) and Fusaro (2009); this latter cautiously advances the hypothesis, 
plausible at the very least, that behind the late Marx's (partial) loss of interest in the economic analysis of 
the modern capitalist mode of production may lay a progressive lack of trust in the imminent collapse of 
capitalism. 
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philosophy of history (once conceived of in terms of subjective intervention, of a risky 
but fruitful mixture of political practice and historical analysis) must be always taken in 
careful account but cannot be avoided once and for all. In fact, as soon as we get rid of 
capitalist historical development we would find ourselves immediately confronted with 
two very troubling problems: on the one hand, we would lose a specific point of view on 
capitalism, a theoretical positionality that allows us to select empirical data on the basis 
of a methodological grid of intelligibility (which will always be to a certain degree 
arbitrary, but that does not necessarily have to present itself as pure subjective 
projection). On the other hand, we would be facing a paradoxically static vision of 
capitalism, always-already caught up in the perpetually synchronic repetition of its 
defining contradiction (only labour-power produces value but capital can never fully 
appropriate it). We shall develop such critique in the next few pages and chapters, but it is 
important to introduce in this context an important point formulated by Fredric Jameson: 
When one is immersed in the immediate [...] the abrupt distance afforded by an 
abstract concept, a more global characterisation of the secret affinities between 
those apparently autonomous and unrelated domains, and of the rhythms and 
hidden sequences of things we normally remember only in isolation and one by 
one, is a unique resource, particularly since the history of the preceding few years 
is always what is least accessible to us. Historical reconstruction, then, the 
positing of global characterisations and hypotheses, the abstraction from the 
'blooming, buzzing confusion' of immediacy, was always a radical intervention in 
the here-and-now and the promise of resistance to its blind fatalities (Jameson 
1998: 35).33 
                                                 
33 Jameson's point in 'Marxism and Postmodernism' aims at defending a Marxist totalising 
methodology. He seems to imply that abstraction and totalisation are overlapping concepts (even 
synonyms). We contend that, although totalisation is surely a form of abstraction, the opposite does not 
hold true. 
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Jameson's passionate praise for the notion of abstraction and, indirectly, for that of 
capitalist development, allows us to reinstate, at the level of Marx's analysis of pre-
capitalist forms of production, the method of (balanced, cautious) tendency we drew from 
the workerist tradition elaborated in Chapter 1. The tendency's main task is to articulate 
historical discontinuities as real abstractions, so that the twofold trap of the dictatorship 
of abstraction (objective philosophy of history) and of the tyranny of concreteness (non-
intelligibility of the historical context) can be avoided. Far from re-instating the historicist 
equation according to which, mutatis mutandis, every epoch (and every phase of 
capitalism) would be confronted with a formally similar set of contradictions, the method 
of the tendency seeks to discern the thin line of capitalist development in order to produce 
an analysis at the same time empirically accurate and politically empowering. Repetita 
juvant: a proper account on historical contingency does not necessarily imply the absence 
of a line of expansion characteristic of a given social constellation. 
 
1.1 - In the course of our previous discussion we have briefly introduced the notion of 
real abstraction. Such a category plays a pivotal role in the analysis we are going to 
undertake and thus requires a more detailed exploration. According to Marx, capitalism 
can be adequately understood as a machine of abstraction. The process of valorisation 
upon which it rests is first and foremost defined by its indifference toward the concrete 
qualities which, in different modes of wealth production, used to define objects (or 
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products, or “things”).34 However, such indifference has nothing to do with a refusal to 
engage in the “secret abode of production”. To the contrary, although markedly self-
referential, it is a typology of indifference which produces actual worlds and the 
multifarious social relations that structure them. This kind of performative, self-
referential indifference is one of the many possible permutations of real abstraction. As 
Alberto Toscano poignantly argues, ultimately “abstraction transforms (and the fact that 
what it transforms is itself abstract does not make it any less real)” (Toscano 2008a: 279). 
Beyond its transformative character, what is unique of real abstraction is the special link 
– we might even call it a true elective affinity – it establishes with capitalism: real 
abstractions (such as labour, value, money, etc.) emerge historically in connection with 
the rise of the capitalist mode of production and deploy themselves (along temporal, 
geographical and logical lines) in accordance with capitalism's inner transformations. 
After having countered humanist-based denunciations of the dominant ideology on the 
premise that capitalist society is to a great extent driven by abstract entities, Toscano 
concludes: “A particular modality of social abstraction can thus be identified as the 
differentia specifica of capitalism vis-à-vis other modes of production” (Toscano 2008b: 
65). Following Toscano, in maintaining the relationship between nature and value as our 
object of study, our main analytical compass shall refer to the ways through which real 
abstractions arose within classical political economy (and got subsequently modified 
following the rhythm of capitalist dynamics). 
                                                 
34 Marx refers to the opposition between “natural distinctness” and “economic equivalence” (Marx 
1993: 141). 
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 A fundamental example of real abstraction is labour. As an original introduction to this 
fundamental category, let us briefly return to Diamond's almond production. Recall, he 
assumes as his starting point a very precise definition of plant domestication; what might 
appear as more surprising, perhaps, is that with all probability Marx would have 
enthusiastically accepted it. Diamond writes: “Plant domestication may be defined as 
growing a plant and thereby causing it to change genetically from its wild ancestor in 
ways making it more useful to human consumers” (1997: 114). Leaving aside a clear 
distinction in style and terminology, this formulation does not substantially differ from 
the following: “The product of the [labour] process is a use-value, a piece of natural 
material adapted to human needs by means of a change in its form” (Marx 1990: 287).35 
Despite their similarities, however, Marx's and Diamond's paths diverge irremediably as 
soon as the analytical requirement of historicisation is introduced. Given the general, 
timeless validity of a notion of labour conceived of in terms of organic interaction, or 
metabolism, between man and nature (mythical abstraction), a scientifically correct 
analysis sets as its task the definition of the actual, empirical translations of such a 
generalisation into multifarious – but always determinate – space-time co-ordinates.36 
Hence, Marx's and Diamond's accounts of plant domestication would be identical only in 
                                                 
35 To stress the trans-historical validity of such a definition, Marx adds shortly after: “The labour 
process is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in 
nature for the requirement of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic interaction [Stoffwechsel] 
between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore 
independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human 
beings live” (Marx 1990: 290). 
36 “This example of labour shows strikingly how even the most abstract categories, despite their 
validity – precisely because of their abstractness – for all epochs, are nevertheless, in the specific character 
of this abstraction, themselves likewise a product of historic relations, and possess their full validity only 
for and within those relations” (Marx 1993: 105). 
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so far as they specifically refer to a pre-capitalist context, in which such a translation 
gives rise to what we might define as pure concretisation.  
 To properly understand this crucial point it is useful to take a closer look at Die Formen. 
Here, we arguably find the most detailed study Marx devoted to the specific logico-
historical distance that separates capitalist from pre-capitalist societies. First and 
foremost, pre-capitalist social formations are characterised by the hegemony of landed 
property and agriculture, which constitute an economic disposition whose main objective 
is the creation of use-values or, in other words, whose productive system is devoted to the 
mere sustenance of the community with no interest for the generation and accumulation 
of a surplus.37 The purpose of labour, in this context, is limited to the simple 
(re)production of the community-form: “The aim of this work is not the creation of value 
[...] its aim is sustenance of the individual proprietor and of his family, as well as of the 
total community” (Marx 1993: 471-472). 
 A second fundamental feature of pre-capitalist modes of production is the naïve 
relationship between nature and community as mediated by a collective, unitary system 
of common property. As Marx puts it: 
In this natural community [...] the earth is the great workshop, the arsenal which 
furnishes both means and material of labour, as well as the seat, the base of the 
community. They relate naïvely to it as the property of the community, of the 
community producing and reproducing itself in living labour. Each individual 
                                                 
37 On the theoretical role played by the concept of surplus in the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, see the important essay by Pietro Bianchi (2010), and in particular the following sentence: “The 
cut that separates the capitalist mode of production from allegedly ancient societies devoted to the pure 
reproduction of themselves, is none other than the production of a surplus: an element that cannot be 
explained in pure conservative and homeostatic terms” (126). 
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conducts himself only as a link, as a member of this community as proprietor or 
possessor. The real appropriation through the labour process happens under 
these presuppositions, which are not themselves the product of labour, but appear 
as its natural or divine presuppositions. (Marx 1993: 472). 
 
In this passage we find the very kernel of the relationship between man and nature in pre-
bourgeois “natural communities”: humans and the surrounding environment stand in 
external opposition to each other, confronting themselves on the basis of a reciprocal 
irreducibility. The earth is nothing more than the inorganic condition of communitarian 
reproduction. Man is tied to the land as its “natural workshop [natürliches 
Laboratorium]” (Ibid.: 471).38 The mediation between the two (labour) is purely concrete 
in that it is entirely centred around the production of use-values, whose sole finality is the 
satisfaction of social needs. Labour before capitalism is an essentially qualitative practice 
since its only source of measurement is defined by the unique attributes of the products it 
brings to light. This qualitative dimension can be fully appreciated considering the 
scheme of simple circulation (C-M-C): money here is a thoroughly transparent medium 
whose ultimate benchmark is the usefulness of a given commodity. No abstraction is at 
play here: concrete features of concrete objects preside over the measurement of labour, 
which is to say the exchange between man and nature.  
                                                 
38 Marx brilliantly summarises this conceptual relation-through-externality as follows: “The 
individual relates simply to the objective conditions of labour as being his; [relates] to them as the 
inorganic nature of his subjectivity, in which the latter realises itself; the chief objective condition of labour 
does not itself appear as a product of labour, but is already there as nature; on one side the living 
individual, on the other the earth, as the objective condition of his reproduction” (Marx 1993: 485). It goes 
without saying that this formulation closely recalls Foucault's vision on the pre-biopolitical relationship 
between life and politics. 
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 Before discussing the modality through which labour became a real abstraction – which 
is to say: a strictly capitalist category – we need to emphasise an important point 
regarding the internal articulation of the notion of pure concretisation. As we anticipated 
above, it is certainly possible to read in Marx's pages a sort of inclination towards a 
philosophy of history: after all, isn't communism a self-conscious form of collective 
property, whose naïvety has been erased by the “civilising” violence of capitalist real 
abstractions? Actually, the so-called “historical chapters” of Capital are not devoid of 
some problematic openings in that regard. This is much less the case with Die Formen, 
however: here Marx does not read historical phases – the succession of modes of 
production – as necessary stages of a single, inevitable evolutionary process. Regressions, 
aborted advancements – both socially and economically – and a plurality of 
developmental channels are consistent with the historical material examined to unfold the 
argument (whose focus is to show the genesis of capitalism in order to critically 
denaturalise it). As a consequence, there exist, according to Marx, different forms of pure 
concretisation which can be further dissected39 and whose only common feature is the 
lack of an abstract mediative apparatus between man and nature. In particular, following 
but also innovating the periodisation laid out in The German Ideology, Marx 
distinguishes three pre-capitalist modes of production: Asiatic, ancient and feudal. The 
connection amongst those socio-economic formation is not predetermined or fixed: Die 
Formen provides several examples of contingent assemblages. Once again, what is 
important is to emphasise that the only element those historical configurations share is 
                                                 
39 For example, Marx suggested that the Asiatic mode of production can be characterised by three 
different forms of State power: natural, ancient and Germanic. 
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“the natural unity of labour with its material presuppositions [die natürliche Einheit der 
Arbeit mit ihren sachlichen Voraussetzungen]” (Ibid.), which is to say the concrete 
mediation – via a use-value-oriented labour process – between man and nature. 
 
 How did labour become a real abstraction? Or, which is simply a different way to pose 
the same question, how did capitalism come to be? The best way to approach such a 
pivotal issue is to make explicit reference to the notorious part eight of Capital, 
significantly entitled “So-Called Primitive Accumulation”. The link between this text and 
Die Formen (beyond a clear thematic affinity) is explicitly expressed by the subtitle of 
these latter: “Concerning the Process Which Precedes the Formation of the Capital 
Relation or of Original Accumulation”.40 According to Marx, “primitive accumulation 
plays a similar role in political economy as original sin does in theology” (Marx1990: 
873). In fact, it disarticulated the two conditions of possibility of pure concretisation and, 
in so doing, paved the way for a full deployment of capital's mechanism of valorisation. 
On the one hand, such mechanism challenged (and eventually overthrew) the primacy of 
use-value by establishing a new, more complex form of circulation (M-C-M') based on 
exchange-value and, as such, surplus-oriented (money as medium, here, is all but 
transparent). This transformation was made possible by the dissolution of the “natural 
unity” of man and labour conditions: this kind of separation between the producer and the 
means of production is indeed the crucial element of Marx's “counter-history” of the birth 
                                                 
40 “Primitive” and “original” accumulation are different translations of the same German expression: 
Urprüngliche Akkumulation.  
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of the proletariat. It is only insofar as the labourer confronts the capitalist as separated 
from both objective and subjective conditions of production – on the basis of a formal yet 
real freedom – that the dominance of exchange-value can be fully displayed. As Marx 
states: 
As a matter of fact, the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but 
idyllic [...] The capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the 
workers and the ownership of the conditions for the realisation of their labour. As 
soon as capitalist production stands on its own feet, it not only maintains this 
separation, but reproduces it on a constantly extended scale [...] So-called 
primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of 
divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as 'primitive' 
because it forms the pre-history of capital, and of the mode of production 
corresponding to capital [...] And this history of expropriation is written in the 
annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire. (Marx 1990: 873-875). 
 
Three main points derive from this account of primitive accumulation: firstly, the process 
of separation between producers and means of production (with the former now 
confronting the latter as capital) is coextensively accompanied by an increase in the level 
of abstraction: “These objective dependency relations appear, in antithesis to those of 
personal dependence [...] in such a way that individuals are now ruled by abstractions, 
whereas earlier they depended on one another.” (Marx 1993: 164). More importantly, 
however, this irruption of real abstractions is characterized by the extreme violence of 
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exploitation41 and by a very concrete process of expropriation through enclosures, whose 
final consequence will be the proletarianisation of all underclasses.42 
 Secondly, the separation between producers and conditions of production entails the 
dissolution of the unity, externally mediated by labour, between man and nature. In 
Marx's word, capital's dissolution of previous social relations gives rise to “the process of 
his [the worker's] release from the earth” (Marx 1993: 502). From the standpoint of the 
notion of nature, this crucial movement of atomisation explains why the role of labour as 
medium undertakes an epochal change. Instead of connecting external entities (as it was 
the case in pre-bourgeois societies), labour internalises both man and nature in order to 
differentially inscribe them in a productive process whose only aim is the creation of 
exchange-value. Moreover, such a profound melting of the ancient order produces a new 
configuration of space within the realm of productive activity: the inversion of the 
relationship between town and countryside.43 Acutely, Henri Lefebvre (1991) reads this 
                                                 
41 The twofold nature of exploitation, both abstract and concrete, and its unmistakably violent root 
are fundamental achievements of Marx's analysis of the primacy of exchange-value: “This system of 
exchange rests on capital as its foundation, and, when it is regarded in isolation from capital, as it appears 
on the surface, as an independent system, than it is a mere illusion, but a necessary illusion. Thus there is 
no longer any ground for astonishment that the system of exchange values – exchange of equivalents 
measured through labour – turns into, or rather reveals as its hidden background, the appropriation of alien 
labour without exchange, complete separation of labour and property.” (Marx 1993: 509).  
42 As Massimo De Angelis has aptly shown, the drive to enclosing is an essential character of capital 
(De Angelis, 2007 – especially Chapters 10 and 11: 133-149). On the dramatic consequences of early 
capitalist processes of expropriation it suffices to recall Thomas More's Utopia, and especially the section 
concerned with the problems of England, a country where “sheep, which are naturally mild and easily kept 
in order, may be said now to devour men and unpeople, not only villages, but towns” (More 2008: 16). In 
fact, arable land is turned over to the lucrative wool trade, creating a dispossessed underclass which will 
then form the industrial reserve army of labour. 
43 Particularly decisive is the following passage from Die Formen: “The history of classical antiquity 
is the histories of cities, but of cities founded on land property and agriculture; Asiatic history is a kind of 
indifferent unity of town and countryside [...] The Middle Ages begins with the land as the seat of history, 
whose further development then moves forward in the contradiction between town and countryside; the 
75 
 
historical development as the shift from the experience of absolute space, organised 
around the embodied principles of use-value, to the production of abstract space, based 
on the performative, empty logic of exchange-value.44 As we shall see in more detail 
below, such an inversion is important to understand the “metabolic rift”45 imposed by 
capital on the “original unity” between man and nature.    
 Thirdly, it is necessary to consider what exactly Marx's expression “pre-history of 
capital” means. On the one hand, there is an obvious reference to a set of historical 
transformations that made possible the rise, and progressive institutional establishment, of 
the capitalist mode of production. On the other hand, it is decisive not to forget that, for 
Marx, capital is a social relation and not, as was the case for Adam Smith, a stock. 
Accordingly, what primitive accumulation primarily accomplishes is the – dreadfully 
violent – creation of a set of conditions of possibility such that the capitalist relation of 
production, namely the “free” encounter of a seller and a buyer of that very particular 
commodity which is labour power, can actually take place. It is, in the last instance, a 
pure matter of power exercise and, therefore, of the social requisites of its increasing 
reproducibility. From this perspective, primitive accumulation is the constant conditio 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
modern [age] is the urbanisation of the countryside, not the ruralisation of the city as in antiquity.” (Marx 
1993: 479). 
 The consequence of such a pivotal transformation, Marx writes in Capital, is twofold: “On the one 
hand it concentrates the historical motive force of society; on the other hand, it disturbs the metabolic 
interaction between man and the earth, i.e. it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements 
consumed by man in the form of food and clothing; hence it hinders the operation of the eternal natural 
condition for the lasting fertility of the soil” (Marx 1990: 637). 
44 For a compelling commentary of Lefebvre's analysis of space and visuality, see Gardiner (2012). 
45 See Foster (2000; 2009). 
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sine qua non of capital relations' (re)production and must therefore be ceaselessly 
performed. In the words of Sandro Mezzadra, what must be critically assessed is the 
“topicality of prehistory” (Mezzadra 2011: 302).  
 A last, very brief methodological remark: understanding primitive accumulation as a 
permanent character of valorisation does not mean it relates to a sort of compulsion to 
repeat, in such a way that we would face an always identical (formal) positing of always 
different (substantial) processes. This is a mistake that, albeit involuntarily, is made when 
the chaotic complexity of capitalist contemporaneity is read as the amorphous, synchronic 
co-presence of a multitude of contradictory elements, so that no unitary (if multilayered) 
logic can make sense of the multifarious components structuring the value-chains. 
Paradoxically, the insistence on the co-presence of heterogeneous elements, when devoid 
of any theoretical selecting-tool (e.g., the antagonistic tendency), freezes history by 
forcing the new to ineluctably show itself in the guise of the old.46 It is, therefore, 
fundamental to clarify our approach with regard to these problematics: from a solely 
capitalist perspective, primitive accumulation is a substantial necessity. The contingent 
form of its evental occurrence, however, cannot be predetermined. Moreover, the 
reproduction of capital relations undergoes a tremendous change in the moment in which 
their progressive extension reaches a certain limit. Insofar as there is no longer an outside 
                                                 
46 Here resides the main difference between Mezzadra's (2011) and Tomba's (2009) analyses of the 
permanence of primitive accumulation: whereas Mezzadra uses the multiple temporalities of contemporary 
capitalism to criticise excessively linear understanding of the tendency of capitalist development (without 
getting rid of the concept), Tomba starts from the same premise to eventually negate the possibility of any 
theoretical emphasis which would be able to show the mail line of capital's movement. As a consequence, 
he seems to consider extra-economic violence (mainly on the part of the state) as if a logico-historical 
comparison between state's functions with regard to accumulation-valorisation in the Seventeenth century 
and today would make even the slightest bit of sense!     
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to valorisation, the continuous production of capital relations must be investigated by 
accounting for its intensive character: capital incessantly carves its own surface of 
deployment seeking to create new, potentially exploitable time-space configurations. In 
other words, contemporary capitalism brings about new forms of real abstraction, which 
need and deserve specific – albeit not exclusive – consideration. It is from this 
perspective that our exploration of the notion of nature in political economy shall be 
carried out in the next sections.    
 
1.2 - It is notorious that, as a very general point, Marx intended his theoretical production 
as a critical engagement with political economy, namely the science of capital from a 
capitalist perspective. Just as famously, his basic problem with Smith, Ricardo and all the 
other scientific political economists was their attempt to “naturalise” capitalism, to show 
its origin as an uncontested, peaceful and ultimately unproblematic transition. As we have 
seen, Marx was able to isolate and recognise not only the tragic amount of violence 
hidden behind primitive accumulation, but also the modality through which capital's real 
abstraction came to dominate the field of social production and reproduction. Keeping 
this in mind, we are now going to analyse the role played by nature in political economy, 
especially in its inceptive phase, as represented by the Physiocratic doctrine. Before 
doing so, however, it is important to underline that the “birth” of political economy as an 
internally structured scientific enterprise coincides with the disclosure of the biopolitical 
horizon as formulated by Foucault. This is no mere accident, of course. In fact, although 
biopolitics and capitalism cannot be conceived of in terms of overlapping concepts, it is 
clear that a fundamental solidarity links the two. As we shall see later, Foucault will 
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dedicate extensive attention to political economy in his attempt to trace a genealogy of 
biopolitics (especially liberal governmentality). For the time being, however, it is 
sufficient to recall that the formation of political economy occurs in the second half of the 
Eighteenth century and is developed primarily due to the appearance of a properly 
functioning capitalist mode of production. In other words, the process of autonomisation 
of the economic discourse is strictly intertwined with a large-scale deployment of 
capital's abstract self-referentiality (Napoleoni 1973).  
 This constitutive link is first glimpsed by the Physiocrats in the guise of the 
centrality accorded to production in the context of the analysis of wealth. Whereas 
Mercantilism saw the source of wealth in the realm of exchange, Physiocracy emphasised 
the primacy of the productive dimension. Such a centrality lead to the “discovery” of an 
embryonic form of surplus-value: agricultural net product. This pivotal conceptual 
disclosure must be grasped in its three-dimensional character: from the point of view of 
its recognition, the net product did not distinguish between value-substance and physical 
substances. Lacking any theory of value whatsoever, the Physiocrats could only 
emphasise the physical aspect of production: this is why agriculture was the only sector 
involved in the actual productive realm. As a consequence, with regard to its origin, the 
net product cannot but be generated by the natural fertility of the soil. This is the driving 
force of production: in fact, it is not that agriculture is the only generative activity 
because capitalism takes place just in it; rather, it is because the net product exists only in 
agriculture that capitalism – as a means to enlarge the surplus – is configured as 
meaningful just in agriculture. Otherwise put, the Physiocrats definitely believe that 
capitalist agriculture is superior to any other, but such a superiority, in their view, is due 
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to increased efficiency and more attentive management rather than to a productive 
revolution. Finally, from the standpoint of attribution (namely the forms of revenue to 
which the surplus gives rise), Physiocracy consequentially stresses the exclusive role of 
land rent (as opposed to industrial profit). The role of manufactures cannot but be 
secondary, given the premise that only nature is, through the distribution of its free gifts, 
generative.  
 The famous Tableau économique, elaborated in different versions by François 
Quesnay starting in 1758-59, perfectly exemplifies such a peculiar view of the net 
product. According to these scheme, society is divided into productive, sterile and 
proprietary (landowners) classes. The first one (productive class) is constituted by the 
ensemble of subjects (no matter whether waged workers or capitalist tenants) involved in 
the agricultural sector. The second one (sterile class) is composed by the entirety of 
labourers employed in manufacturing activity; in Quesnay's thought, this activity is 
useful but does not create any surplus, hence must be defined as sterile. In contrast to the 
productive and sterile classes, the third class, i.e., the proprietary, does not perform any 
economic function but still possesses the right to appropriate almost entirely the net 
product. By analysing the interaction of flows and stocks among the three classes, the 
Tableau represents the first attempt to study the general equilibrium of the economic 
system from the perspective of its own internal dynamics.   
 Given its profound richness, the Tableau would surely deserve a more in-depth 
exploration. What is of particular interest for our purposes, however, is that Physiocracy 
as an economic set of theories represents a transitional moment in the history of political 
economy (and, as a consequence, of capitalism). In the view of its followers, what Marx 
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called “naïve relationship” between workers and the land is over, but the new man-nature 
bond based on the mediation of labour as a real abstraction remains elusive, out of sight. 
To put it differently, from a Marxian perspective the progenitor of surplus-value, namely 
the “net product” in Quesnay's terminology, is the greatest achievement of the 
Physiocrats, while the failure to recognise labour as its source is their main shortcoming. 
 In an important book, Paul Burkett (2006) reports and comments Marx's critique 
of Physiocracy in a very detailed and precise way, aptly underlining how his high regard 
for the like of Turgot, Quesnay and Mirabeau was not limited to the Tableau, but actually 
constituted to a significant extent an invaluable basis for his own reflection. Burkett, 
however, focuses more on mature writings (in particular Capital and Theories of Surplus-
Value) whereas, from our perspective, the best locus of Marx's corpus at which to look in 
order to grasp the Physiocrats' “productive mistake” (Marazzi 2011: 62) in its full 
assemblage of implications is constituted by the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844. Here, the articulation amongst historical rupture, logical irruption of labour as 
real abstraction and new qualitative dimension of the notion of nature are so closely 
entangled that the richness of political analysis shows itself in the most disruptive form. 
In an astonishing excerpt, which is worth quoting at length, Marx writes: 
The Physiocratic doctrines of Dr. Quesnay forms the transition from the 
mercantile system to Adam Smith. Physiocracy represents directly the 
decomposition of feudal property in economic terms, but it therefore just as 
directly represents its economic metamorphosis and restoration, save that now its 
language is no longer feudal but economic [...] Land is not yet capital: it is still a 
special mode of its existence, the validity of which is supposed to lie in, and to 
derive from, its natural peculiarity. Yet land is a general element, whilst the 
mercantile system admits the existence of wealth only in the form of precious 
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metal. Thus the object of wealth – its matter – has straightway obtained the 
highest degree of universality within the bounds of nature, insofar as even as 
nature, it is immediate objective wealth. And land only exists for man through 
labour, through agriculture. Thus the subjective essence of wealth has already 
been transferred to labour. But at the same time agriculture is the only productive 
labour. Hence, labour is not yet grasped in its generality and abstraction: it is still 
bound to a particular natural element as its matter, and it is therefore only 
recognised in a particular mode of existence determined by nature (Marx 1988: 
96-97). 
 
This quotation allows us to properly frame Marx's new understanding of nature: first of 
all, what must be acknowledged is the historical rupture imposed by the rise of 
capitalism. A red thread that runs through Marx's work as a whole is what he sees as one 
of the main characteristics of capital, namely its constitutive cannibalism, its irrepressible 
drive to cross the borders it had itself previously established. In the Grundrisse, he states: 
“Every boundary [Grenze] is and has to be a barrier [Shranke] for it” (Marx, 1993: 334). 
Shortly after Marx further specifies the concept: “The quantitative boundary of the 
surplus-value appears to it as mere natural barrier [Naturschranke], as a necessity it 
constantly tries to violate and beyond which it constantly seeks to go” (Ibid.: 334-335). 
This formulation is particularly interesting because it permits us to advance a 
methodological distinction between what is formally invariant in capitalism (the drive to 
overcome its self-imposed limits) and what is historically contingent in its development 
(the actual content of the “natural barrier”). In other words, limits must be continually 
posed and thus change according to spatial as well as temporal coordinates. 
82 
 
Furthermore, Marx underlines “the great civilising influence of capital; its production of 
a stage of society in comparison to which all earlier ones appear as mere local 
developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry.” (Ibid.: 409-410). Whereas in pre-
capitalist economic formations nature is seen as a transcendent force, as an external 
normative entity, in capitalism its function is from the very beginning mediated by the 
social production of surplus-value. The kind of nature to which capital refers is from the 
very beginning internal to its production and reproduction. Far from being transcendent 
or external with regard to the interplay between productive forces and capitalist relations 
of production, nature has to be understood as capital, as a specific modality of its 
existence. Here the reference to Physiocracy is crucial: according to Marx the Physiocrats 
were right in pointing out that wealth is produced within the limits of nature, but they fell 
short in recognising that this nature is not something other than capital, but capital itself 
in its natural form. Indeed, the function of nature in the early Nineteenth century 
capitalism is to provide an internal and flexible limitation to the process of valorisation.  
 In order to fully grasp this idea of nature as an indirect, enacting limit to 
valorisation it is necessary to take a closer look to the relationship between surplus-value 
and its natural basis. For the Physiocrats, there is no distinction between the two: the net 
product is the direct function of soil fertility. What they do not recognise, however, is 
labour as real abstraction: the natural basis of surplus-value is surely a necessary 
condition for its production, but it is nonetheless far from being also sufficient. On the 
contrary, it sets the limits within which abstract labour is put to work to produce surplus-
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value.47 This point can be better appreciated by following Marx's analysis of Smith's and 
Ricardo's reaction to the Physiocrats. Smith goes beyond them in recognising labour as 
the substance of value, but does so by fatally forgetting the role played by nature: “In 
manufactures […] nature does nothing; man does all” (Smith quoted in Marx 1963: 60). 
On the contrary, Ricardo realised that the function of nature in the early Nineteenth 
century capitalism was to provide an internal and flexible limitation to the process of 
valorisation. He must have been well aware of that if he could write: “There is not a 
manufacture which can be mentioned, in which nature does not give her assistance to 
man, and give it too, generously and gratuitously” (Ibid.). This free assistance may take 
the form of an infinite source of raw materials, at the beginning of the process, or that of 
an inexhaustible garbage bin, at its end. In both cases, however, nature and valorisation 
do not overlap according to Ricardo; rather, nature is configured as the border within 
which value-creation occurs. To summarise: in its compulsive search for limits to 
overcome, capital assumes nature as its primal hold, as the relatively stable surface upon 
which differentiated circuits of valorisation deploy themselves. Its function, far from 
being transcendent, is rather that of providing an internal limit to the process of 
valorisation.    
 A possible example of such an enacting limitation may be provided by the 
input/output model formulated in the 1930s by Wassily Leontief (1986), whose graphic 
rendition can be found in figure 1. Leontief's input/output model makes explicit reference 
                                                 
47 Abstract labour as substance of value is valid if, and only if, capitalist self-referentiality is already 
fully deployed. In fact, as Burkett (1999) reminds us, as far as wealth-creation (which is not to be confused 
with value-production) or use-value is concerned, labour and nature performs an equally important role.  
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to Quesnay's Tableau, but, for obvious reasons, does not consider agriculture to be the 
only productive sector in the economy. It represents the general production of wealth 
starting from the combination of a series of components provided by the natural 
environment (populations, raw materials, energy sources, etc.) which, through a 
transformative process performed by a technical system (machines), eventually generate 
a product (output). Bringing together all economic sectors in a matrix structured in such a 
way, it becomes fairly easy to deduce the golden rule of political economy: maximising 
the value of final products and, simultaneously, minimising the cost of initial 
components. 
 
Figure 1. Source: Author. 
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Leaving aside other possible critical considerations, what is important to show in our 
research context is that, in this model, nature works as internal but unaccounted for limit 
both at the beginning of the process (raw materials, energy sources) and at the end of the 
process (waste disposal). To conclude, here nature is surely internalised (it appears as 
free source of inputs and as free landfill for outputs), but it is so in such a way as to 
define the limits of the productive process, limits that prevent it to be involved in the 
generative-transformative activity properly defined. Again: the relationship between 
nature and capital assumes the form of an intrinsic, but nonetheless indirect, principle of 
limitation. 
 
1.3 - Before engaging in a comparison between Marx's account on the nature-capital 
bond and Foucault's elaboration on the milieu-governmentality link, we would like to 
briefly situate our analysis so far within the international debate about the relationship 
between Marxism and ecological thought. Such a debate has flourished recently,48 and 
even a succinct overview would be well beyond the limited scope of our study. That said, 
from our present vantage point, one can identify two elements of such a rich debate that 
must be taken into careful account: John Bellamy Foster's analysis of the metabolic rift 
(2000; 2009) and Jason Moore's definition of capitalism as world-ecology (2011a; 
2011b). 
                                                 
48 Fundamental references are the following: Smith (1984), Martinez-Alier (1987), Benton (1989), 
Harvey (1996), O'Connor (1998), Heynen et al. (2007).  
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 Foster's masterful reading of Marx's contribution to ecological thought is centred around 
the notion of metabolic rift. Although Marx never directly used the term, he alluded to it 
by mentioning several times the word “metabolism” [Stoffwechsel] and by arguing in 
Volume III of Capital that an “irreparable rift in the interdependent process of social 
metabolism” (Marx 1981: 949) was caused by the historical development of the capitalist 
mode of production. More than philological accuracy, however, what Foster is able to 
show is the consistency of the theory of metabolic rift with Marx's thought in general. By 
reviewing Marx's engagement with Malthus, Ricardo and, above all, chemist Justus von 
Liebig, Foster argues that the capital-driven process of “urbanization of the countryside” 
(Marx 1993: 479) broke the naturally balanced – tendentially – interaction between 
economic circular flows and ecological circular flows and, in so doing, produced the 
conditions of possibility for the environmental crisis to arise. A good case in point to 
understand this key shift is provided by the evolution of the town-countryside relationship 
from the second half of the Eighteenth century onwards (Foster 2000: 148-149). In this 
period, known as the first agricultural revolution, the rapid diffusion of capitalist farming 
techniques represented the apex of a slow and gradual process which brought to its 
extreme limits the closed energetic circle binding town and countryside: whereas the 
latter provided food and raw materials, the former returned organic waste to be employed 
in agriculture as fertiliser. Although capitalistic innovations (i.e., improved manuring, 
crop rotation, drainage, more efficient livestock management, etc.) significantly increased 
the yields, they also involuntarily entailed progressive soil exhaustion. In order to solve 
this debilitating problem, capital heavily resorted to soil chemistry in agriculture. 
Chemical intervention constitutes the kernel of the second agricultural revolution (1830-
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1880), whose main character is a decisive global dimension, since soil depletion was to 
be fought particularly by means of massive imports of guano from Peru and nitrates from 
Chile.49 Although such innovations fostered a short-term recovery in terms of agricultural 
productivity, the contradiction between economic circular flows and ecological circular 
flows was by then an established reality and, with it, the very notion of environmental 
crisis made its historical appearance. By showing capitalism's systemic tendency towards 
biophysical degradation in the countryside and towards increasing pollution in the city, 
Foster aims to place the emergence of ecological issues within the development of 
capitalism itself. He does so by arguing that the crisis of the earth, based on the 
contradiction between “natural distinctness” and “economic equivalence” (Marx 1993: 
141), accompanies the periodic crises of accumulation that marks capital's reproduction.  
 Foster's theory of metabolic rift is important in two main ways: first, it provides a solid 
argument against a putative Marx's indifference towards ecological issues (allegation 
which is today commonplace in a large section of environmentalist advocacy); second, it 
articulates, from an internal perspective, the rise of capitalism and the exploitation of the 
biosphere. There are, however, two important problematic points that should be 
addressed. On the one hand the separation in incommunicable spheres between 
accumulation crises and ecological crises seems to recall all too evidently a suspicious 
Cartesian epistemology. In fact, how to sharply distinguish between the two? As Jason 
Moore precisely puts it: “From biorhythms (proliferating shift work) to bioaccumulation 
                                                 
49 A third agricultural revolution took place in the first half of Twentieth century and involved, 
among other factors, the substitution of animal traction with mechanical traction, the massive diffusion of 
intensive breeding, the primacy of monocultures, and the large dissemination of synthetic pesticides and 
fertilisers. 
88 
 
(rising toxicity), on a closer inspection we find it challenging indeed to determine the 
boundaries of the allegedly social and the seemingly natural” (Moore 2011a: 9). On the 
other hand, taking a different path to get to the same conclusion, the theory of metabolic 
rift fails to properly assemble the specific internality of nature to capital's circuits of 
valorisation. The qualitative dimension of nature as capital is surely the source of 
contemporary environmental crises, but not as an accident, a mere unintended side effect 
of capitalist development; rather, it is a constitutive element of it. The biopolitical nature 
of the ecological crises, after all, implies exactly this: capitalism does not produce the 
environmental crisis; it is the environmental crisis. To paraphrase Moore, capitalist 
circuits of exploitation do not act upon nature but, rather, pass through it. 
 Moore's analysis, however, proposes much more than a mere – if crucial – critical 
remark. It suggests a fundamental concept to read the relationship between capitalism and 
socio-natural interactions and, furthermore, it advances a convincing framework to grasp 
the transition to capitalism from an ecological perspective. Firstly, Moore proposes to 
read capitalism as a world ecology, as a specific articulation of what he calls, following 
Theophrastus, the oikeios:  
This signifies the relation that produces manifold environments and organisms as 
irreducibly plural abstractions. To take the Nature/Society binary as a point of 
departure confuses the origins of a process with its results. The plethora of ways 
that human and biophysical natures are intertwined at every scale – from the body 
to the world market – is obscured to the degree that we take nature and society as 
purified essences rather than tangled bundles of human- and extra-human nature 
(Moore 2011b: 114). 
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Posing capitalism as oikeios is a fundamental theoretical move which allows us to 
account for the historicity not only of capitalism as a specific mode of production, but 
also as a mode of production which developed through history presenting a variety of 
different socio-natural crystallisations. Moore further specifies how “Capitalism-in-
nature” (Ibid: 109) is characterised by a complex and multilayered process of 
simultaneous internalisation and externalisation of nature: while abstract labour becomes 
the measure of value through which nature is mediated, the free appropriation of its “free 
gifts” does not cease to foster profits' increase. To better understand this passage 
(especially in historical terms), Moore introduces the concept of commodity frontier,50 
according to which capital's further expansion is possible only insofar as, beyond the 
frontier, non-commodified land and labour are available.51 The historical succession of 
different commodity frontiers shows the irreducible contradiction between the logic of 
capital (best expressed by political economy), which does not account for nature unless in 
the form of free source of raw materials/free waste disposal container, and the actual 
history of capitalism with its uncountable episodes of plunder and degradation. As Moore 
concludes: “Capital's dynamism turns on the exhaustion of the very webs of life 
necessary to sustain accumulation; the history of capitalism has been one of recurrent 
frontier movements to overcome that exhaustion, through the appropriation of nature's 
free gifts hitherto beyond capital's reach” (Ibid.: 110). It would be difficult to find a better 
                                                 
50 The critical issue of the frontier is also brilliantly raised by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing (2005). Her 
analysis highlights the twofold nature of the frontier: savage frontier accounts for the violence unavoidably 
entailed by such a practice; salvage frontier shows how capital cynically takes advantage of the emptiness 
created by the destruction of traditional social environments.    
51 Clearly, this analysis is deeply influenced by Rosa Luxemburg's understanding of imperialism 
(1951). 
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definition of the paradoxical position of nature as enacting limit to capitalist valorisation: 
on the one hand, it is internal but unaccounted for, whereas on the other it is posed under 
constant threat of destruction. The biopolitical nature of the environmental crisis is 
nothing other than this constant and unsurpassable tension. 
 Keeping the valuable insights provided by such an elaboration firmly in mind, as we 
move towards an attempt to analyse the current role played by nature in the most recent 
developments of political economy, two shortcomings of Moore's understanding must 
nevertheless be emphasised. The first concerns the total absence of social struggles from 
his accounts. He seems to be aware of this issue,52 and contends that “Alas, we cannot do 
everything at once” (Moore 2011a: 16). This is obviously true, but it sounds as a sort of 
excusatio non petita: such a criticism, in fact, is not addressed to the actual analysis 
(which can evidently be pursued as one prefers), but rather to its presuppositions. In 
Moore's view, it is not clear what drives capitalist development and, as a result of a 
prolonged exposition to this missing element, it is difficult to avoid the impression of 
facing not a social relation but a thing (somehow similar to Smith's stock) equipped with 
a sort of independent will and power. A methodology based on a biopolitical re-reading 
of the workerist “primacy of working class struggle”, we propose, would overcome such 
a problem by implying (even without analysing it) the historical role of struggles in the 
context of the rise of capitalism53 and by clarifying what is at stake in contemporary 
                                                 
52 “Mine is a capital-centric approach that brackets the necessary questions of class struggles and 
social movements” (Moore 2011a: 16). 
53 On the pivotal role of peasants' revolts in disarticulating the feudal social fabric, and especially 
pre-capitalist agriculture, see Allen (1997).  
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environmental struggles.54 When Moore reflects on whether the current crisis is 
developmental (pushing towards a “higher” restructuring of capitalism) or epochal 
(leading to the dissolution of capitalism), he does so by neglecting that such alternative is 
not a matter of objective investigation, but rather the very battlefield upon which global 
social movements are engaging capital's supremacy and, in many instances, prefiguring 
viable alternatives to the status quo.  
 Secondly, Moore's attempt to read the relationship between the general law of 
underproduction (i.e. rising cost of input procurement and waste disposal) and the 
capitalisation of nature through the lenses of the process of financialisation is at the same 
time important and insufficient. Surely important because it provides an excellent 
innovation of the process of commodification towards a more historically specific 
application. Insufficient, however, because it fails to recognise the unprecedented 
abstraction leap which tendentially characterises the current phase of biocapitalist 
development. To properly grasp such a leap, as we shall discuss later, it is necessary to 
couple the analysis of capitalism with a biopolitical critique of governmentality. This is 
why, before engaging with the unique features of contemporary environmental crises 
(most specifically, climate change), we need to investigate the link between nature and 
political economy through Foucault's notion of governmentality.     
 
                                                 
54 On the new scenario opened up by the centrality of the “commons”, see Mattei (2011). We shall 
discuss this issue both in Chapter 4 and in the general Conclusion. 
92 
 
2 - FOUCAULT: NATURE AS GOVERNMENTAL ELEMENT OF 
VALORISATION 
 
 Although Foucault was interested in a genealogy of biopolitical governmentality and not, 
as Marx was, in a critical analysis of the capitalist mode of production, their conclusions 
about the relationship between the concept of nature and political economy significantly 
converge. Before exploring such a convergence, however, its methodological 
presuppositions must be explored in a little more detail. What is at stake here is the 
modality through which the Marx-Foucault encounter can be established. As we proposed 
in Chapter 1, capitalism and biopolitics must be understood as distinct but inseparable 
concepts in order to provide a methodological grid of intelligibility which is able to 
illuminate the irreducibly singular character of contemporary environmental crises. This 
remark implies that the bond which link Marx and Foucault from our standpoint is not be 
found in a philological examination of their texts. Other scholars have attempted such an 
examination, with equal cleverness but radically incompatible outcomes: whereas 
Thomas Lemke emphasises that “Foucault’s analytics of government offers a theoretical 
and critical perspective that parallels very similar endeavours and recent developments in 
Marxist theory” (Lemke 2002: 60), Adelino Zanini points out that looking for a fruitful 
relationship with Marx in Foucault's writing is “substantially useless” (Zanini 2010: 39). 
Our point, however, is a different one: by staging a theoretical dialogue between Marx 
and Foucault, we seek to forge a conceptual apparatus which is able to grasp and, at least 
potentially, disarticulate contemporary forms of valorisation, management and 
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exploitation. From this vantage point, we agree with Roberto Nigro when he 
compellingly argues that “in posing to Marx Foucauldian problems, and in posing to 
Foucault Marxian problems, we can discover new aspects of their oeuvres and, at the 
same time, new path for today's research” (Nigro 2001: 433). This double contingency, at 
once temporal (primacy of the present) and thematic (focus on environmental crises), 
makes our methodological toolbox resolutely context-specific. We do not claim universal 
validity: while attempting to select a general line of bio-capitalist development we do not 
intend to provide a model to be automatically applied to every set of problematics. On the 
contrary, we maintain that the specific assemblages we are going to highlight reproduce 
and deepen the fruitful tension between historical elements and logical aspects. From this 
perspective, two are the Foucauldian conjunctures we would like to address more 
specifically: a) the relationship between nature and political economy in the context of 
liberal governmentality; b) the development of such a relationship in the shift from 
liberalism to neoliberalism. 
 
2.1 - In the lectures delivered at the Collège de France at end of the 1970s, Foucault reads 
the emergence of liberalism, conceived of in terms of a political rationality rather than of 
an economic theory, as a shift from the centrality of external legal limits to the absolute 
power of the sovereign (disciplinary mechanisms) to the increasing importance of an art 
of government based on political economy (security apparatuses). Liberalism, in other 
terms, is seen as a governmental permanent critique of sovereign power. And it is 
precisely from this critical perspective that the notion of the naturalness of the economic 
process (namely, the relationship between nature and governmentality) is developed by 
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liberal thinkers. Moreover, this notion emerges (both historically and logically) in close 
connection with the rise of population as the specific target of political power; the main 
feature of this category resides in its being historically transformable rather than 
anthropologically normative (Bazzicalupo 2010). As we have discussed in Chapter 1, 
such a peculiar concept of population presents both biological and statistical elements and 
is defined not so much by originary and immutable characters but, rather, by its function 
as a partially dependent variable of power effects that simultaneously pass through it and 
are exercised upon it.55 It is the existence of this partially dependent variable as the main 
object of governmentality that structures the articulation between nature and political 
economy: 
Political economy does not discover natural rights that exist prior to the exercise 
of governmentality; it discovers a certain naturalness specific to the practice of 
government itself. There is a nature specific to this governmental action itself and 
this is what political economy will study. The notion of nature will thus be 
transformed with the appearance of political economy. For political economy, 
nature is not an original and reserved region on which the exercise of power 
should not impinge, on pain of being illegitimate. Nature is something that runs 
under, through and in the exercise of governmentality. It is, if you like, its 
indispensable hypodermis […] It is not background, but a permanent correlative. 
Thus, the économistes explain, the movement of population to where the wages 
are highest, for example, is a law of nature; it is a law of nature that customs duty 
protecting the high price of the means of subsistence will inevitably entail 
something like dearth. (Foucault 2008: 15-16) 
 
                                                 
55 From this standpoint we can fully appreciate analogies and differences between Marx and 
Foucault: both are interested in showing how power first shapes and then manages its subjects. However, 
whereas Marx deploys such an analysis along the conceptual line that connects valorisation and 
exploitation of labour-power, Foucault configures the problem in terms of power relations between 
governmental effects and population.  
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This excerpt is key in that it explicitly shows not only the constitutive link between a new 
concept of nature and political economy, but also the modality through which population 
is mobilised in order to enact it. And, not surprisingly, here we find another example of a 
common-but-divergent issue raised by both Marx and Foucault: in fact, the économistes 
to which the passage refers are none other that Quesnay and his colleagues. For both 
Marx and Foucault, Physiocracy inaugurated a theoretical development which 
transformed the notion of nature from external idolatry to internal principle of 
limitation.56 In a relevant passage, Foucault defines the Physiocratic doctrine as “the 
founding act of economic thought and economic analysis” (Foucault 2007: 55). 
Differently from Marx, however, this development is not read through the lenses of the 
shift from wealth to value but, rather, from the perspective of the innovative set of 
governmental reforms the Physiocrats advocated.  
                                                 
56 Foucault paid consistent attention to the Physiocrats already in The Order of Things (2002), 
originally published in 1966. The context of that engagement is, however, very distant from the one 
Foucault was immersed in the late 1970s. In The Order of Things, Foucault advanced the well-known 
epistemological thesis according to which in the second half of the Eighteenth century the order of 
representation, which is to say the transparency bond that situates sign and content within the same field of 
visibility, crumbled. The consequence of such a collapse is the emergence of human sciences, namely that 
process of progressive emptying which will slowly substitute natural history, general grammar and analysis 
of wealth with, respectively, biology, philology and political economy. The essential feature of this latter is 
the radical assumption of finitude as a starting point of the knowledge-process. From this perspective, there 
is a crucial difference between Mirabeau (and Physiocracy in general) and Ricardo: according to the 
former, “for value to be created nature must be endowed with endless fecundity” (Foucault 2002: 217), 
whereas for the latter “ the apparent generosity of the land is due to its growing avarice; what is primary is 
not need and the representation of need in men’s minds, it is merely a fundamental insufficiency [carence 
originaire].” (Ibid.: 279). The crucial issue at stake is surely that of scarcity but, while in the 1960s it 
played the role of “archeological” discursive formation, in the 1970s it will become a matter of 
“genealogical” element in the history of power techniques. Adelino Zanini (2010) rightly suggests that the 
finitude of the 1960s, conceived of in terms of nomination of the “outside”, could possibly have become the 
population of the 1970s, read as the internal folding of governmentality.  
 
(2009); for, instead, a strong emphasis on discontinuity, see Paras (2006). 
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 The main problem faced by European governments during the second half of the 
Eighteenth century was that of scarcity. Such a complex and decisive burden was feared 
for two interrelated reasons: on the one hand, it generated a shortage of resources (mainly 
food); on the other, it increased the likelihood of urban revolts and uprisings. As for the 
first issue, Foucault notes that scarcity in the late Eighteenth century acted as a self-
propelling process whereby a decrease of food supply would cause a rise in the price of 
grain which would, in turn, induce the hoarding of grain. As a final consequence, the 
price of grain would further increase and the livelihood of the population would be fatally 
threatened (and, evidently, this could entail violent riots). Historically, there were two 
main strategies to tackle this complication: the Mercantilist and the Physiocratic. To use 
Foucault's terminology from the 1960s, the difference between the two strategies bears 
witness to the shift from the analysis of wealth to political economy proper. According to 
the Mercantilists, scarcity should be prevented through the implementation of highly 
“artificial” measures – simultaneously juridical and disciplinary – such as price-
stabilizing policies (e.g. imposing a low price on grains), customs duty on exports and 
administrative regulation of commodity circulation (e. g. banning grain hoarding). Such a 
differentiated set of policies, whose common feature is the attempt to avoid scarcity and 
price rising, failed in that it lowered peasants' profits and, consequentially, diminished 
their incentives to sow. As a logical effect, resource-availability was further constrained 
and food supplies ended up being dangerously exposed to the slightest vicissitudes of the 
weather. The Physiocrats' approach to the problem of scarcity is the polar opposite of 
this. To start with, for them scarcity “was not evil at all”; rather, “it should be considered 
as a phenomenon that, in the first place, is natural, and so consequently, secondly, neither 
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good nor evil. It is what it is” (Ivi: 59). Referring primarily to Louis-Paul Abeille's Lettre 
d'un négociant sur la nature du commerce des grains, originally appeared in 1763, 
Foucault shows how Physiocracy's policy recommendations were configured as the 
categorical opposite of Mercantilism's: the price of grain should be allowed to rise by 
means of the suppression of hoarding prohibitions and the elimination of customs duty 
for exports. Such an increase in price would have the consequence to elevate peasants' 
profits and would incite them to sow more and more. The effect of an increase in 
cultivated fields would be a larger quantity of grains on the market with the next harvest 
and thereby impeding the increase in the price of grain and possibly even halting it 
completely. In fact, even in the event of a meagre harvest in the subsequent year, a high 
price of grain would benefit exports and, in so doing, would “naturally” lead towards a 
decrease. To put it differently, the very rise in prices would set in motion a process whose 
eventual outcome would be its opposite, which is to say a progressive lowering of prices. 
As Foucault notes, the Physiocrats established a governmental dispositif for dealing with 
scarcity such that “by connecting up with the very reality of these fluctuations, and by 
establishing a series of connections with other elements of reality, the phenomenon is 
gradually compensated for, and finally cancelled out, without it being prevented or losing 
any of its reality.” (Ibid.: 59-60). In other words, it is the very naturalness of scarcity that, 
when properly managed, nullifies its own reality.57 This digression on the Physiocrats 
allows us to appreciate in a clearer way the constitutive link between nature and political 
economy that Foucault articulated in the passage we quoted above. Nature is a biological-
                                                 
57 It is important to stress that Foucault discusses Abeille's text in the context of the shift from 
discipline to security, which is to say in the context of the disclosure of the biopolitical horizon. 
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statistical set of fluctuations which is internal, albeit indirectly, to the exercise of 
governmentality. Political economy, conversely, is the ensemble of knowledge practices 
and power dispositifs that allows a coherent, although contingent and context-specific, 
management of such fluctuations.58  
 At this point, we might ask: how is this constitutive link between nature and political 
economy enacted? According to Foucault, it acquires social effectiveness through the role 
played by the market. Obviously, Foucault refuses to conceptualise the market as a 
passive, hidden matter progressively brought to light by the improvement of economic 
theory. Moreover, his analysis is incompatible with the Marxist critique of the market as 
ideology, as a fetishistic mystification of real contradictions in the realm of production. 
Rather, for Foucault the market is a principle of veridiction that allows a new art of 
government to concretely work. In other words, the market is the centrepiece of a new 
biopolitical regime of truth. This crucial, unprecedented mediative/verificative function 
of the market within the nature-political economy nexus is described by Foucault as 
follows: 
Inasmuch as prices are determined in accordance with the natural mechanisms of 
the market, they constitute a standard of truth which enables us to discern which 
governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous […] Inasmuch as it 
enables production, need, supply, demand, value and price, etc., to be linked 
together through exchange, the market constitutes a site of veridiction, I mean a 
site of verification-falsification for governmental practice […] The market now 
means that to be good government, government has to function according to 
truth. In this history and formulation of a new art of government, political 
economy does not therefore owe its privileged role to the fact that it will dictate a 
                                                 
58 For a brilliant – if resolutely anti-biopolitical – reading of this nexus, see Hoffman (2010). 
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good type of conduct to government. Political economy was important inasmuch 
as it pointed out to government where it had to go to find the principle of truth of 
its own governmental practice (Foucault 2008: 32). 
 
From this perspective, the natural traits attributed to market-laws are justified in that they 
play a veridical limiting role with regard to sovereign power. Being unable to fully grasp 
the opaque totality represented by the economic process, the sovereign must limit its 
interventions to possible market failures. Those incidental failures, however, do not put 
into question the spontaneous deployment of the invisible hand that, in connecting 
individual pursuit of profit to the general interest, naturally leads to the best allocation of 
social wealth: as Foucault states, “what we see appearing in the middle of the Eighteenth 
century is a naturalism much more than a liberalism” (Ivi: 62).59 Thus, in Foucault the 
relationship between nature and liberal governmentality is analogous to that of nature and 
capital in Marx. In fact, nature (or, better, the naturalness of the market) provides an 
internal limitation upon which liberalism can put to work its differentiated dispositifs.  
 
 A good example of the liberal way of intersecting nature and political economy through 
the market can be found in the realm of microeconomics and, more precisely, in the 
                                                 
59 Nevertheless, since it is freedom the centrepiece of the governmental practice, Foucault keeps 
using the adjective “liberal” to describe it. Especially because what is specific to such governmentality is its 
freedom-consuming activity: “The new governmental reason needs freedom, the new art of government 
consumes freedom. It consumes freedom, which means that it must produce it. It must produce it, it must 
organise it. The new art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of 
the imperative: 'be free', with the immediate contraction this imperative may contain. The formula of 
liberalism is not 'be free'. Liberalism formulates simply the following: 'I am going to produce what you 
need to be free'” (Foucault 2008: 63). 
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neoclassical thought of English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou (1952). What is commonly 
known as Pigouvian tax (originally formulated in 1912) is, in fact, a perfect 
representation of a sovereign intervention which, while counterbalancing possibly 
detrimental market outcomes, avoids nonetheless to interfere with the invisible hand. In 
liberalism, in fact, governmentality works because of the market (to fix its – inessential 
but ineluctable – imperfections), not for it (to build its – contingent but necessary – 
conditions of possibility). Starting from a general view akin to that of Leontief,60 Pigou 
nonetheless realises that productive activities can (and indeed often do) impact the quality 
of the surrounding environment. As a consequence, both raw materials and waste disposal 
should not be considered as infinite and, as such, should not be gratuitous. Clearly, nature 
appears as internal to productive activities but external to the market. In our terms, nature 
is an enacting – internal but indirect – principle of limitation. In Pigou's view, 
environmental negative externalities (unintended social costs/damages connected with 
productive processes) cannot be sold and bought on the market but should nevertheless be 
internalised in the costs of production. The policy tool through which such an 
internalisation can take place is taxation. From a Pigouvian perspective, the entrepreneur 
must pay for every unit of pollution produced (La Camera 2009). By means of fiscal 
imposition, then, her economic behaviour will be influenced in such a way that her 
interest will be to minimise the social cost (tax) and maximise the efficiency of 
                                                 
60 It must be stressed, however, that the Leontief model and the Pigouvian tax are very different 
conceptual efforts: whereas the first belongs to the field of macroeconomics, being a general equilibrium 
theory, the second refers to microeconomics and, as such, is mostly concerned with the cost-benefit 
analysis.  
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productive factors (marginal private interest).61 The sovereign nation-state, thus, plays a 
fundamental regulatory role in this theoretical framework. Its goal is to allow the market 
to function in a situation of optimal information: the sovereign must limit itself to provide 
market operators with the best information available so that they can interact on the basis 
of a transparent system of comparability between prices/quantities supplied and 
products/services demanded. Behind the political articulation of such procedures lays the 
explicit assumption that the market will be able – by following its own naturalness – to 
efficiently maximise the economic welfare for every community involved in the 
productive process.  
 
2.2 - Before undertaking the analysis of internal stirrings in the history of biopolitics, it is 
important to properly frame the nature of Foucault's engagement with economic theory in 
general. Ute Tellmann has recently argued that, in attempting to overcome the totalising 
economism putatively affecting the Marxist tradition, Foucault “circumvents rather than 
takes up the issue of economy” (Tellmann 2009: 9). His biopolitical lectures, in 
particular, would be fatally flawed by this “strategic evasion”. As Adelino Zanini (2010) 
has compellingly pointed out, however, this strategic evasion allowed Foucault to grasp 
the core of the matter by avoiding a certain economism – related to Marxism as well as to 
Liberal theory – in the understanding of the relationship between the economic field and 
the political field. Refusing simultaneously a formal isomorphism which would imply the 
                                                 
61 The same reasoning applies to possible environmental positive externalities: in this case, we 
would refer to Pigouvian subsidy. What is fundamental, however, is the regulatory function played by the 
sovereign which, in this context, is represented by the nation-state. 
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possibility to conceive of power as a “sellable good” on the basis of its conformity to a 
contractual exchange, and a functional subordination which would conceptualise power 
as the trustee of the status quo, Foucault finds himself in a suitable position to re-
articulate the relation between the two fields. Such a link could be defined as a-
symmetrical complementarity, since the first term implies the second (and vice-versa) 
without a possible harmonic and peaceful configuration. Both realms endlessly refer to 
each other in a state of relative autonomy whose specific crystallisations must be posed as 
what is at stake in the analysis, rather than what is presupposed before the research takes 
place.62 This conceptual linkage allows Foucault to use the transformations of the triadic 
structure nature-market-political economy as a theoretical compass to analyse the 
historical shifts occurred to governmental power within the biopolitical horizon. 
 We are now in the position to ask whether this relationship between economic field and 
political field, that took shape between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, has 
remained unchanged or, on the contrary, has been undertaking significant processes of 
modification. As a starting point, let us stress that the historical horizon of biopolitical 
governmentality is not flatly linear but, rather, contested and traversed by social 
transformations. In fact, at least two different phases of governmentality can be detected. 
The first is liberalism, whose characteristics we briefly discussed. The second phase is 
                                                 
62 In “Society Must Be Defended” (2003), Foucault provokingly asks: “Can the analysis of power, or 
the analysis of powers, be in one way or another deduced from the economy?” (Foucault 2003: 13). Only 
the dismissal of both Marxist accounts and Liberal formulations can open up the space for a new approach: 
“The indissociability of the economy and politics is not a matter of functional subordination, nor of formal 
isomorphism. It is of a different order, and it is precisely that order that we have to isolate.” (Ibid.: 14). 
 Pointedly, Ottavio Marzocca has noted that this contraposition surely requires a significant degree 
of simplification, but it also allows to unearth the potential of a new way of understanding the mutual 
reciprocity between the economic and the political fields (Marzocca 2007). For an application of this 
reciprocity to the field of environmental studies, see Marzocca (2011). 
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neoliberalism and it is interesting to note how profoundly its emergence is connected to 
the concept of nature. According to Foucault, what does not change in the shift from 
liberalism to neoliberalism is the function of the market as a site of veridiction. Thus, also 
neoliberalism is concerned with the construction of an economic naturalness which is 
enacted by a biopolitical regime of truth based on the market. In other words, the formal 
invariance of governmentality is the production of limits to power exercise. What, on the 
contrary, does change is the specific modality of that production, its historical 
contingency. In liberalism the naturalness of the market is centred around the notion of 
exchange and, as such, it is still clearly distinguished from the artificiality of fluxes of 
money, commodities and individuals it is supposed to rationally channel. By contrast, in 
neoliberalism the naturalness of the market is directly created in accordance to the 
artificial principle of formalisation represented by competition. To put it crudely, nature 
has to be artificially constructed in order to practically allow the formal structure of 
economic competition to work. This is why the first wave of neoliberal thinkers 
considered by Foucault (German ordoliberalism of the 1940s and 1950s)63 could accuse 
their liberal predecessors of “naturalistic naïveté”. According to the ordoliberals, the 
market is not a primary datum whose spontaneous structure would be revealed by the 
competitive logic. The order of the factors must be reversed: for the market to function 
                                                 
63 This group of German economists, also known as the Freiburg School of political economy, 
include Walter Eucken, Franz Bohm, Müller-Armack, Wilhelm Ropke and, in general, those who were 
involved in the journal Ordo (founded in 1936) and later became advisors of Chancellor Ludwig Ehrard. 
This latter, in 1948, declared that “the priorities of Germany during the reconstruction period would be the 
removal of price controls, and the setting of clear boundaries between individuals and the state. Erhard was 
aiming not only to differentiate the new Germany from the National Socialist state of the recent past; this 
reconstitution of state powers also reflected the challenge facing the new German state, which could draw 
upon neither historical rights nor the continuity of its juridical institutions as bases for its own legitimacy. 
What instead emerged was a performative basis for legitimacy, where the economic freedom of citizens can 
in itself constitute the basis for political legitimacy” (Flew 2012: 53).  
104 
 
properly, competition is to be first established and then continually enforced. The very 
status of competition as an economic category is radically displaced. For our purposes 
this issue is fundamental and, as a consequence, it is worth quoting Foucault at length 
with regard to it: 
For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of nature. The game, 
mechanisms and effects of competition which we identify and enhance are not at 
all natural phenomena; competition is not the result of a natural interplay of 
appetites, instincts, behaviours and so on. In reality, the effects of competition are 
due only to the essence that characterises and constitutes it. The beneficial effects 
of competition are not due to a pre-existing nature, to a natural given that it brings 
with it. They are due to a formal privilege. Competition is an essence. 
Competition is an eidos. Competition is a principle of formalisation. Competition 
has an internal logic; it has its own structure […] Competition as an essential 
economic logic will only appear and produce its effects under certain conditions 
which have to be carefully and artificially constructed (Foucault 2008: 120). 
 
In this passage we assist to a sort of dislocation of the notion of limit: whereas in 
liberalism natural limits to artificial interventions are produced to allow social wealth to 
freely circulate and increase, in neoliberalism artificiality is directly applied onto nature 
in order to be deployed within the abstract boundaries of the competitive logic. To put it 
differently: whereas in liberalism nature is internalised to function as an enacting limit to 
economic exchange, in neoliberalism nature is artificially created to enact a process of 
valorisation homologous to the formal generative structure represented by economic 
competition (Terranova 2009).  
 We would like to formulate two considerations at this point. The first concerns the 
possibility to interpret this historical shift also from a Marxist standpoint. As we shall 
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better specify in the next section, we contend that recent analyses on the shifts from 
Fordism to Post-Fordism, and from Industrial Capitalism to Cognitive Capitalism, at the 
very least justify such an enterprise. From this perspective, it is possible to refer to a shift 
from liberal capitalism, in which nature is perceived as the limit of valorisation, to 
neoliberal capitalism, in which nature is an element of valorisation. Recent processes of 
marketization of the environment (carbon trading, privatization of natural commons, 
financialisation of scientific research, patenting of cellular structures of living organisms, 
etc.) should be read as the act of crossing a threshold in the abstract internalisation of 
nature within valorisation as a productive element. The second consideration refers to the 
emergence of ecological crises. Neoliberal articulations of naturalness, artificiality and 
competition allow us to shed light on the historical process through which environmental 
degradation (which is an ancient phenomenon that has always affected humanity) has 
been transformed into a pervasive and unavoidable political problem. The hypothesis we 
would like to advance is the following: the ecological crisis is historically rooted in the 
process of industrialisation, and as such it emerged during the liberal phase of 
capitalism. Nonetheless, environmental policies as we know them belong to neoliberal 
capitalism: it is just when the action of governmental actors has the possibility to produce 
nature (which is to say, the surface of their own deployment) that an eco-political 
strategy can be set in motion. To borrow Jason Moore's terminology, there has been a 
shift in the socio-natural relations that structure our contemporary oikeios.  
  
 At this point, two further relevant effects of the shift of emphasis from exchange 
to competition must be acknowledged. The first concerns the necessity of a constant 
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intervention on the part of the state not on the market (to fix negative outcomes), but 
rather within its conditions of possibility (to structure reality according to its needs). 
Rather than a passive referee supposed to supervise the rules of the market-game, what is 
needed is now an interventionist governmentality, a proactive political entity whose task 
is to incessantly re-create the material conditions of a given society according to 
competition, which is to say a flexible principle of formalisation.64 As Foucault brilliantly 
summarises, in neoliberalism “one governs for the market, not because of the market” 
(Foucault, 2008: 121. Our emphases). The analysis carried out by the ordoliberals 
perfectly exemplifies such transformation. For them, in fact, the main problem is to create 
“a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market under the supervision of 
the state” (Ibid.: 116). Otherwise put, what needs to be tested is the capacity of a market 
economy based on competition to shape the state and re-form society. Competition, 
therefore, becomes a social model centred around inequality (as opposed to the crucial 
role of equivalence in a system structured around contractual exchange). This perfect 
inversion of roles between market and sovereignty “displaces the naturalist idea of 
laissez-faire [originally popularised by Physiocrat Vincent de Gournay in the 1750s], 
which needs an essence, whereas competition is a principle of formalisation, and as such 
is produced by an effort, by a tendency” (Zanini 2010: 95). What in classical liberalism 
was a spatial, indirect separation between political sphere (state) and economic sphere 
                                                 
64 With regard to our contemporary situation, Wendy Brown (2006) has poignantly underlined, as a 
consequence of this radically interventionist governmentality, the silent process of de-democratisation 
which has been under way for decades. As she writes: “Neo-liberalism casts the political and social spheres 
both as appropriately dominated by market concerns and as themselves organised by market rationality [...] 
The state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as develop policies and 
promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as rational economic actors in every sphere 
of life” (Borwn 2006: 694). 
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(market), in neoliberalism is substituted by a mutual interference.65 In passing, it is 
important to underline that environmental policy, to be conceived of as a specific 
neoliberal feature, can be configured as the sectorial answer to this newly discovered 
governmental need to intervene in/for the economic field to create proper solutions for 
profit.  
 The second effect to be highlighted concerns the unprecedented importance 
gained by production of subjectivity as a consequence of a new approach to productive 
factors, developed in particular by the second wave of neoliberal thinkers considered by 
Foucault (the applied neoclassical economics of the Chicago School in the United 
States).66 This new approach is defined by a different way to understand labour, namely 
as a human capital composed by “assets” such as education, professional experience, 
mobility (but also language, affect, care, and so on). Foucault is interested in such a 
perspective because it sets in motion a process of “extension of economic analysis into a 
previously unexplored domain” (Foucault 2008: 219). The procedure whereby labour can 
be defined as human capital is relatively straightforward: individuals work for a wage 
and, from their perspective, wage is income; if income is defined as the product or return 
of capital, then it is possible to define labour as capital; since such labour is inseparable 
from its bearer, then it is the labourer that ends up being conceived of as an enterprise. 
From this perspective, thus, “the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise of 
                                                 
65 Thomas Lemke (2001) has aptly noted how, from this perspective, it is possible to read the 
process of “withdrawal of the state” as a governmental technique. 
66 This group of American economists includes Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker, Jacob Mincer and, 
in general, those associated with the Journal of Political Economy in the 1960s and early 1970s. Their main 
focus, through the notion of human capital, was the generalisation of market relations to the totality of 
social spheres. This theoretical effort generated significant intellectual innovations, with economy-based 
understanding of crime, family, marriage, capital punishment, and so on. 
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himself”, or as an “entrepreneur of himself” (Ibid.: 225-226). This process of further 
abstraction by means of which capital is turned into not only the external measure of 
social value, but its exclusive internal source, is what distinguishes (indeed: 
paradoxically inverts) liberal and neoliberal interpretations of the notion of homo 
oeconomicus. The former was politically intangible since its course of action was 
“naturally” led by a market-driven exchange; the latter, on the contrary, shows itself as 
the permanent correlative of a governmentality that, by endlessly modifying 
environmental variables, is finally able to penetrate the very subjectivity of each and 
everyone of economic actors.67  
Foucault's own words invaluably summarise this paradoxical process. In neoliberalism, 
homo oeconomicus, that is to say, the person who accepts reality or who responds 
systematically to modifications in the variables of the environment, appears [...] 
as someone who responds systematically to systematic modifications artificially 
introduced into the environment. Homo oeconomicus is someone who is 
eminently governable. From being the intangible partner of laissez-faire, [it] now 
becomes the correlate of a governmentality which will act on the environment 
and systematically modify its variables (Foucault 2008: 270-271). 
 
Following Christian Laval's interpretation (2007), we can argue that, if all actions are 
seen (and forced) to conform to the economic golden rule (maximise profits/minimise 
costs), this is not because an ideological structure is expanded across the entire society, 
                                                 
67 Jason Read (2009) has properly remarked how such a governmental, subjective penetration bears 
deep resemblance with Antonio Negri's revision of the Marxian notion of real subsumption of labour under 
capital. For a critical reading of this resemblance, see Flew (2012). 
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but because the subject of economic thinking, its concealed anthropology, is now all-
pervasive. 
 
 Let us briefly come back to the triadic assemblage of nature-market-political economy to 
analyse how it is enacted in the context of neoliberal governmentality, which is to say 
how nature functions as an element of valorisation. As above, a good example can be 
found in the realm of microeconomics and, more precisely, in the thought of English 
neoclassical economist Ronald Coase. Coase takes issue with Pigou's attempt to 
internalise unintended socio-environmental costs through taxation and contends that such 
a formulation misses the true nature of the matter. In economic processes, according to 
Coase (1960), the emergence of socio-environmental costs presupposes the existence of 
an entrepreneur-producer (subject A) who causes damage to other actors (subject B). 
Consequently, claims on the part of those putatively damaged represent an advantageous 
(for them) limitation to the entrepreneur's free initiative. The Pigouvian approach, which 
relies on such a situation as a correct one, neglects precisely the bidirectional nature of 
this relation. In other words, a limitation imposed on subject A will cause him a damage 
in such a way that subject B would, conversely, receive an unjustified advantage. Thus, 
economic efficiency in a situation marked by externalities can be better fostered – taking 
in careful account the bidirectional nature of the question concerning the abatement of 
socio-environmental costs – by clearly defining property rights, reducing transaction 
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costs68 and allowing economic actors to freely negotiate the achievement of the best 
position. In other words, contra Pigou, Coase proposes to monetarily quantify socio-
environmental damages (i.e. air pollution) and allow them to be translated into the 
grammar of property rights (and, as such, to “freely” circulate in a competitive market). 
Doing so will make it possible to own the right to pollute, as well as to owe the right not 
to be exposed to pollution. In such a circumstance, barring any constraints to negotiation, 
the original allocation of property rights will automatically lead to an optimal equilibrium 
– to be defined in terms of market efficiency (La Camera 2009). As we see, through a 
market-based reconfiguration of the notion of externality, nature is turned into an element 
of the process of valorisation. With Pigou, the state had to intervene to correct possible 
market failures; with Coase, in contrast, the state has to create proper condition for a 
market of externalities to be established and to properly function on its own terms. This 
passage is perfectly exemplified by the negotiable emission permits which represent the 
main economic tool used to tackle climate change.69 Such permits are based on a 
normative limitation of emissions (cap) and on the creation of a market (trade) on which 
economic actors can exchange their quotas. Two consequences descend from this 
governmental arrangement: the creation of a veritable right to pollute and the possibility 
to make profit out of such polluting activity. 
 Another significant reference point in economic theory is represented by Robert Solow's 
(1974) concept of constant elasticity of substitution between natural and artificial 
                                                 
68 Transaction costs are the expenses to be assumed in order to operate on the market. In general, 
they apply to all activities which precede or follow the act of transaction (if, obviously, their cost is not 
already contained in the price of the good/service object of transaction). 
69 We shall analyse this issue in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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capital.70 Solow's problem asks: how is it possible to sustain economic growth in a 
situation of progressive resources exhaustion?71 According to him, a positive solution to 
such a challenge requires two conditions: that exogenous resource-augmenting 
technological progress occurs at a constant rate and, as we anticipated, that a possible 
reduction in the natural share of the global capital stock can be compensated (or even 
overcompensated) by an increase in its artificial share. Such formulation entails a variety 
of problematic facets, not the least being a grotesque technological optimism that is not 
possible to cover here. What is crucial, for our purposes, is to register how manifestly 
natural resources are now considered as artificial resources (at least tendentially). This 
means that the role played by nature is no longer that of an enacting limit to the economic 
process, but rather that of an actual element of valorisation.    
 
2.3 - From what precedes we can now conclude that neoliberal capitalism is presently 
attempting to transform environmental crises into profitable business opportunities. As 
François Ewald has compellingly argued, ecology is not a rupture; rather, it 
“accomplishes the dream of biopolitics” (Ewald 1986: 9). The governmental dispositif 
through which capital internalises nature as an element of valorisation or, in Ewald's 
terms, biopolitics absorbs ecology, is the paradigm of so-called green economy. Although 
                                                 
70 Significantly from our perspective, before applying this concept to the interplay between natural 
and artificial capital Solow and his colleagues (1961) constructed it with regard to the labour-capital 
relation, thereby gesturing towards the inceptive phase of the translation of labour into the grammar of 
capital that Foucault detected in American neoliberalism.  
71 In 1974 the scarcity of natural exhaustible resources was highly topical in the United States. The 
Club of Rome report entitled Limits to Growth, with its famous prediction of imminent catastrophe, had 
been published shortly before (Meadows et. al. 1972) and the issue had been largely covered in the media. 
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scholars do not share a single and unitary understanding of the notion of green economy 
(Zoboli 2012), we might define it, in a preliminary way,72 as a neoliberal capitalist 
attempt to overcome the spectre of resource exhaustion on the basis of a further 
incorporation of the environmental limit as a new terrain for accumulation and 
valorisation. Through the discursive formation of sustainability,73 and in full synergy 
with capital's need for profit-growing, this process is supposed to governmentally 
harmonize two elements once considered mutually exclusive: economic growth and 
environmental protection. It is this markedly neoliberal framing that, even though rarely 
in an explicit fashion, sets the boundaries within which the green economy debate could 
first arise and then develop. In Foucauldian terms: the green economy is an 
unprecedented key element for a new configuration of governmental practices. Such 
practices can assume a variety of shapes. In the next few pages we will briefly report and 
analyse three of them: a) new business forms; b) new institutional policies; c) new 
conceptual innovations. Our examples do not pretend to fully cover the spectrum of new 
governmental practices; rather, their aim is to show the novelty brought to the foreground 
by the emergence of neoliberal capitalism. In fact, let us recall that the modality through 
which we frame this pivotal issue follows the hypothesis according to which, although 
liberal governmentality (with its peculiar constellation of political, epistemological and 
technological elements) made the multifarious phenomenology of the ecological crisis 
                                                 
72 The notion of green economy (and its critique) will run as red thread in Chapter 3.  
73 The term “sustainability” is derived from “sustainable development”; this latter was popularised in 
Our Common Future, a report published by the World Commission on Environment and Development in 
1987. Also known as the Brundtland report, Our Common Future included the “classic” definition of 
sustainable development: “development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. For a Foucauldian analysis of the concept of 
sustainable development, see Luke (1995). 
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visible, the actual attempts to economically manage and politically deal with it are 
entirely neoliberal.  
 
2.3.1 - Better Place: Doing Business in Neoliberal Green Economy 
Better Place is a venture-backed company based in California; its “mission” is to reduce 
global dependency on oil through the creation of a market-based transportation 
infrastructure that supports electric vehicles. In its view, the environmental benefit of 
such an infrastructure would be double: a significant cut in carbon emissions and the 
creation of a distributed storage mechanism which is potentially able to absorb under-
utilised, off-peak electricity. In June 2011, in preparation for the commercial launch of 
the company's network of charging infrastructure (entirely powered by wind mills), 
Better Place unveiled the first Battery Switch station in Europe at an event in Gladsaxe, 
just outside Copenhagen. The realisation of the project was made possible by the 
partnership with a big player such as Renault-Nissan, which produced the electric car 
Fluence Z.E., and by the implementation of supporting national policies, which provided 
substantial tax breaks.74 As for expected rates of profitability, Johnny Hansen, CEO of 
Better Place Denmark, shows understandable optimism: “based on the interest we have 
received so far, I expect this to be the top selling car in Denmark in just a few years” 
(Hansen reported in betterplace.com).  
                                                 
74 Let us note, once again, how the artificial convergence between big business and institutional 
policy-making is a necessary condition for neoliberal green economy to properly work. 
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 So far, what we see is the quite common adventure of a successful start-up 
involved in the realm of green economy. But there is more to it, especially if we refer to 
the words used by Shai Agassi, the founder and current CEO of Better Place, to explain 
his vision:  
If we can provide the drivers an enjoyable car, that costs less but drives better, a 
country can build a virtual oil field – one that works forever, but leaves no 
footprint on the environment. Such a virtual oil field is more natural than the 
holes we have been digging into the earth to fuel our addiction to oil (quoted in 
Makower, 2010: 151-152. Our emphases). 
 
We emphasized Agassi's last claim because we contend that his interesting wording 
reveals an entirely new conception of nature and, as a consequence, of the crucial 
relationship between economy and environment. Such a new conception is consistent 
with our hypothesis of nature as element of valorisation. In fact, Agassi sees nature as a 
virtual, relatively malleable matrix assembling which it is possible to ensure profitability 
and, simultaneously, to avoid negative impacts on the environment. His “virtual oil field” 
is not natural because of its uncontaminated crude state; rather, it is more natural than 
earthly reserves of oil stored in the subsoil. The naturalness of this virtual oil field is 
situated on a different level of abstraction: it derives its cogency by its capability to 
account for both a low environmental impact of infrastructures and a high level of 
energetic consumption (hence, profits growth). In the last instance, this kind of 
naturalness revolves around the indisputable assumption according to which the market 
relation is not only the best tool to allocate social wealth within the oscillations of 
demand and supply, but also the best strategy to fix the unbalances that those same 
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oscillations created from the industrial revolution onwards. It is clear, then, that in 
Agassi's vision nature (in this case renewable energy produced by wind mills) is neither 
an external factor to the economic system nor an indirect limit to its internal functioning. 
Rather, it is the fundamental element through which economic value can be created, 
accumulated and then further valorised. In other words, his vision epitomises the 
neoliberal understanding of sustainability, through which mainstream advocates have 
long been trying to harmonise imperatives of economic growth and standards of 
ecological protection.   
2.3.2 - EU Environmental Policy: Institutional Arrangements in Neoliberal Green 
Economy 
The emergence of environmental policy in the course of the 1970s can be read as the 
complex outcome of a series of converging pressures. To name just a few: destabilising 
antagonism on the part of ecological movements; the rise of new, profoundly invasive 
biotechnologies; the struggle-induced impasse of a regime of accumulation exclusively 
based on industrial production; the fiscal crisis of the state (and its effects on social 
legitimation); the Oil Shock of 1973 and a worldwide increase in conflicts over scarce 
resources.75  
 A brief exemplifying application of our hypothesis can be found in the historical 
trajectory of the EU Environmental Policy (Aprile 2008; Scichilone 2008). In the 1950s, 
                                                 
75 Some of these issues will be further discussed in the next section. 
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when European Communities arose (ECSC76 1951; EURATOM77 1957; EEC78 1957), 
environmental protection was not part of their institutional aims since, on the one hand, it 
was not perceived as a social urgency and, on the other, the main goal of this process of 
integration was the establishment of a common market based on free trade as key policy-
principle. It was not until the Paris Summit (1972) that European leaders decided to 
extend their authority to ecological issues. As a consequence, they launched an ambitious 
program structured around a series of successive Environmental Action Plans (EAP). The 
first EAP (1973-1977), passed in a policy-climate still profoundly marked by liberal 
discourses, was based on a specific corrective approach, whose goal was to fix 
environmental problems that negatively affected the process of production. Significantly, 
pollution was conceived of as a pathology of the industrial system and, as such, the only 
curative solution was the ex post restoration of environmental anomalies. As a 
consequence, the main policy instruments of the first plan were restrictive legislation and 
application of monetary sanctions. As we see, the attitude towards the environment is 
clear: since it is a necessary condition of industrial production, it is impossible to ignore 
considerable damages. Its ex post restoration, however, is not productive in itself. On the 
contrary, it exclusively aims to reinstate proper conditions for the industrial circuit of 
valorisation. The logic of the environment and the logic of economy are both internal to 
capitalism, but play very different roles: the former is the condition of possibility of value 
creation, the latter is its means of actualisation. 
                                                 
76 European Coal and Steel Community. 
77 European Atomic Energy Community. 
78 European Economic Community. 
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 The second and third EAPs (1977-1981; 1982-1986) paved the way for the 
overcoming of the corrective approach and the endorsement of a pre-emptive approach 
whose official ratification occurred with the fourth EAP (1987-1992). This pre-emptive 
approach was established in close connection with the notion of sustainable development 
(as elaborated by the Brundtland Report - 1987) and marked a profound shift in the way 
of conceiving of the relationship between economy and environment. Here the main 
policy tool is represented by economic incentives and the fundamental goal is to directly 
integrate ecological objectives and industrial production. Progressively, environmental 
protection ceases to be seen as a necessary evil but, rather, comes to be viewed as an 
opportunity for business.79 The tacit assumption of such a conception is that a proactive 
attitude towards the environment – whose aim is the creation of competitive conditions 
for the maximisation of its economic value rather than the reduction/sanction of its 
dissipative usage – would necessarily entail a better environmental protection 
performance. Far from being a limit to the process of valorisation, the environment is 
now proposed by the EU (especially through the politico-statistical production of data by 
the European Environment Agency - 1993) as an artificially created surface upon which 
capital can extract surplus value according to the formal logic of competition. Let us 
note, in passing, that this specific kind of surplus value is also invariably expropriated: 
under neoliberalism, even exploitation is anti-naturalistically naturalised.   
 
                                                 
79 The fifth and sixth EAPs (1992; 2002) will push forward this tendency even more insistently. 
Nowadays, the modulation of public policies on market oscillations represents a priority for the EU 
strategic action.  
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2.3.3 - Bio-mimicry: Conceptual Innovations in Neoliberal Green Economy 
 
It is now more than a decade that the notion of bio-mimicry (Benyus 1997) has been 
advanced and discussed in the circles of green economists. At first, the new concept was 
meant to express a severe criticism to dissipative growth models which were typical of 
industrial capitalism and, in particular, to oil lobbies which strongly opposed their 
abandonment (or even their slightest revision). Today, however, with the green economy 
riding a profitable wave of success – United States American Clean Energy and Security 
Act (2009) doubtlessly represents its apex – bio-mimicry seems to have lost a great deal 
of its critical potential. Beyond the ups and downs of its reception, however, what is 
interesting from our perspective is the silent paradox upon which bio-mimicry ultimately 
rests. In- and for-itself, subtly removed from its material context, this concept is 
configured as rather linear and self-explanatory: given unsustainable levels of pollution 
and resource consumption, the industrial system is doomed to fail economically (dramatic 
rise of raw material's price) and, consequentially, to collapse socially. This is due to the 
indirect artificiality of such a system, whose indifference towards environmental 
feedbacks brings about a fatal neglect of natural limits to growth. This issue could easily 
be solved if productive systems are conceived of as living systems. In other words, 
productive systems should imitate living systems and, in so doing, would simply erase the 
notion of “waste” from their practico-theoretical toolbox. As it is notorious, waste does 
not exist in nature. Such a model for productive systems “is not reliant on linear 
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processes, which are indifferent to waste; rather, on circular processes (e.g. cradle to 
cradle)80, which reuse waste by getting inspiration from the most effective and efficient 
biological system we have ever encountered: nature” (Reina and Vianello 2011: 50). A 
deeply significant articulation of the link between green economy and bio-mimicry is 
proposed by Paolo Ricotti, heterodox economist who has dedicated the last years of his 
research to this issue: 
In green economy there is full awareness of operating with high strategic and 
competitive value. Also in nature there is strategy, intelligence, capability of 
action in any observed case in point. Also in nature there is competition and, in 
fact, the fittest and the genetically strongest survives. Or the one who adopts the 
best procreation strategy […] The green economy and the social model which it 
shapes are fully sustainable insofar as their general processes are engrained in a 
closed-cycle, 'systemic' vision. Such a vision is similar the natural one, whose 
basic logics are determined by chemical-physical-biological elements (Ricotti 
2010: 103 / 171. Our translation).     
 
As we see, at a first sight the argument seems reasonable and scientifically sound; 
moreover, its ostentatious simplicity seems to mantle it with an aura of indisputability: 
after all, “nature knows better” and all humans should follow its example, re-entering in 
it, re-integrate the realm of anthropic production within the much broader realm of living 
production. Things, nonetheless, are not exactly like this. In fact, under which condition 
is it possible even to “think” that natural cycles work “better” than industrial ones? 
Obviously, under the condition of their respective comparability. What is needed, in other 
                                                 
80 See McDonough and Braungart (2002). 
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words, is the transformation of nature from material basis of living being's reproduction 
to provider of biological services.81 For bio-mimicry to become a viable politico-
economical platform it is necessary to have preliminarily economised ecology. This is a 
perfect representation of the process through which neoliberal environments are created: 
we are kept in the paradox of proposing a “return to nature” which is nothing else than a 
further step in the direction of omni-pervasiveness of the subject of economic thinking.  
 It is instructive to note that, according to bio-mimicry supporters, the best (but most often 
the only) way to imitate living systems is to measure and enforce their monetary value. 
“Give a price to nature!” was, in fact, one of the slogans of Grenelle de l'environnement, 
an ambitious and world-wide celebrated program – launched in 2007 by newly elected 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy – whose main goal was to make environmental policies 
the cornerstone of a new model of economic development, no longer based on a 
quantitative increase of the volume of exchanges but rather based on a valorisation of the 
quality of life. One of the most interesting aspects of the debates surrounding the event 
was the argument according to which by considering raw materials “gratuitous”, what is 
obtained is a series of “deliberate distortions in the marketplace” (Hawken, Lovins and 
Hunter Lovins 1999: 15. Our emphasis). Here we find ourselves in the very core of 
                                                 
81 Hawken, Lovins and Hunter Lovins (1999) frame the issue of monetarily measuring nature as 
provider of biological services in the following terms: “Valuing natural capital is a difficult and imprecise 
exercise at best. Nonetheless, several recent assessments have estimated that biological services flowing 
directly into society from the stock of natural capital are worth at least US$ 36 trillion annually. That figure 
is close to the annual gross world product of approximately US$ 39 trillion – a striking measure of the 
value of natural capital for the economy. If natural capital stocks were given a monetary value, assuming 
the assets yielded 'interest' of US$ 36 trillion annually, the world’s natural capital would be valued at 
somewhere between US$ 400 and US $500 trillion – tens of thousands of dollars for every person on the 
planet. That is undoubtedly a conservative figure given the fact that anything we can’t live without and 
can’t replace at any price could be said to have an infinite value” (Hawken, Lovins and Hunter Lovins 
1999: 5). 
121 
 
neoliberal governmentality: by turning the environment from “condition” to “factor” of 
production, it becomes a crucial element of the process of value creation, opening up 
unprecedented opportunities for profit-making. It is as though, in a Marxian sense, capital 
reaches emancipation from nature just to reshape it in its own image and likeness 
(Leonardi 2012). 
 
3 – FINANCE, KNOWLEDGE, ECOLOGY: THE CONTEMPORARY 
TENDENCY 
 
 Having assembled a Marxian-Foucauldian analytical toolbox, we are now in the position 
to investigate the main elements of the contemporary tendency of capitalist development 
from the specific vantage point of the ecological crisis. Two processes are of particular 
interest here: the emergence of a new form of valorisation/exploitation, which can be 
defined as cognitive capitalism, and the rise of financial mechanisms as pervasive 
governmental dispositifs. With regard to the first aspect, what must be emphasised is the 
appearance of the general intellect as a novel configuration of the notion of real 
abstraction, as well as the unprecedented role played by knowledge in the realm of 
productive activity. As for the second aspect, our aim is to uncover the elective affinity 
between financialisation and environmental management. To do so, we shall propose a 
context-specific interpretation of the financial crisis that shook the world in 2008 and the 
dramatic consequences of which we are still facing on a daily basis. The general point we 
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would like to argue for is that, in the course of the last four decades, an unprecedented 
leap of abstraction has taken place. Such a second order abstraction, we contend, is 
necessary (albeit in no way sufficient) for the understanding of the contemporary 
tendency of capitalist development and, consequentially, also of the current ecological 
crisis. To elaborate further on this practico-theoretical dimension, we shall provide a brief 
exploration of the socio-historical trajectory of biotechnologies, whose final point will 
show in all clarity the irreducible difference between Diamond's almond and a Roundup 
Ready GM soybean. 
 
3.1 - Investigating the current configuration of the tendency of capitalist development 
means directing the focus of our attention towards the internal transformation of real 
abstractions. We have seen how the concept of real abstraction can be said to represent 
the differentia specifica of the capitalist mode of production. This quality, however, does 
not imply the logico-historical fixity of the concept. On the contrary, it makes real 
abstraction's stirrings a fundamental tool to map capital's transformation, to produce a 
political cartography of the present time. In other terms, real abstraction can serve as the 
basis for an analysis of the historical specificity of contemporary capitalism, with the aim 
of assessing the lineaments of a knowledge-intensive and information-led configuration 
of capitalism. According to the workerist tradition, this new real abstraction is named 
general intellect. The expression originally appears in Marx's Grundrisse (more 
precisely, in the section known as the “Fragment on Machines”), in one of the few 
passages in which the labour theory of value (according to which the measure/substance 
of value is abstract labour time) is radically put into question. Here Marx argues that a 
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potential development of large scale industry is that the “powerful effectiveness” set in 
motion by the process of valorisation does not originate from abstract labour time but, 
rather, depends “on the general state of science and on the progress of technology.” As 
Marx famously continues: 
In this transformation, it is neither the direct human labour the worker performs, 
nor the time during which he works, but rather the appropriation of his own 
general productive power, his understanding of nature and his mastery over it by 
virtue of his presence as a social body – it is, in a word, the development of the 
social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and 
wealth. The theft of alien labour time, on which the present wealth is based, 
appears a miserable base [miserable Grundlage] in the face of this new one, 
created by large-scale industry itself […] The development of fixed capital 
indicates to what degree general social knowledge [das allgemeine 
gesellschaftliche Wissen] has become a direct force of production, and to what 
degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under 
the control of the General Intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. 
To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in 
the form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real 
life process (Marx 1973: 704-706). 
 
In the workerist tradition, this passage is supposed to describe a reality which will be 
fully in place only with the crisis of the Fordist modality of labour organisation. What is 
fundamental in Marx's analysis is the centrality ascribed to knowledge as a collective 
force (“general state of science”, “General Intellect”, etc.) which is immediately 
configured as a productive impulse, as a powerful, unmeasurable (at least in terms of 
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abstract labour time) source of value.82 Actually, in these pages Marx seems to anticipate 
contemporary debates about the new, pivotal role played by knowledge in globalised 
value chains. Knowledge today is not only a precondition of manufacturing, but the 
veritable centre of the production process. It is, in other terms, the fundamental 
productive factor, such that the economy can be said to be based on the “production of 
knowledge by means of knowledge” (Rullani 2004: 23). It is a circular process whereby 
the output constantly regenerates the input through a relatively cheap innovation based on 
seemingly endless reproducibility. Moreover, knowledge presents another crucial quality, 
namely a non-exclusive cumulativity: in principle, the knowledge we use to produce a 
good/service can be used by anybody else (Rullani 2009). Thus, theoretically, a 
knowledge-based economy introduces a new era in the realm of production: the era of the 
post-scarcity economy. 
 There is, however, an element of the “Fragment” that workerist thinkers approach 
critically. In the “Fragment”, in fact, Marx establishes a direct correlation between fixed 
capital and the general intellect, in so doing suggests that general social knowledge is, 
from the very beginning, incorporated in the system of machines. As such, it cannot but 
                                                 
82 Commenting on the “Fragment”, Adelino Zanini appropriately underlines: “The decisive point, 
evidently, does not consist only of the assertion according to which 'the creation of real wealth comes to 
depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in 
motion during labour time'; but rather in the acknowledgement that the 'powerful effectiveness' of those 
agencies is not related 'to the direct labour time spent on their production'. In other words, this 'powerful 
effectiveness' neither limits itself to register the transformation of the living labour in objectified labour, 
fixed capital, nor to generate an even more complex labour, as a result of the utilisation of that fixed 
capital. Rather, the 'powerful effectiveness' expresses, first of all, the autonomy that, already in Marx's 
epoch, characterised the 'general scientific labour' as social knowledge, as such irreducible to fractions of 
direct labour. It is knowledge which transforms the means of labour in machinery, and it is to the same 
knowledge that it is possible to ascribe a specific ability of valorisation: to knowledge, not to the automaton 
as such. In this transformative process, labour is even more constricted and exploited. The same process 
does not set aside labour; however, being an innovative process, it is no longer, and not necessarily, 
commensurate to direct labour” (Zanini 2008: 197). 
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appear to the worker as an estranged force. Criticising this account, Paolo Virno states 
that “in Post-Fordism, the general intellect does not coincide with fixed capital, but 
manifests itself principally as a linguistic reiteration of living labour” (Virno 2004: 106). 
Even more radically, Christian Marazzi refers to an “emerging anthropogenic model” 
based on the “production of men by means of men [through knowledge]” (Marazzi 2005: 
109). In his hypothesis, the tendential de-materialisation of fixed capital (as well as of 
services/products) directly implies a “putting to work” of human faculties such as 
language, affect, social relations and knowledge-based skills acquired both in 
professional training and, increasingly, in everyday life activities. In other terms, we 
witness the progressive transfer of a series of productive and instrumental functions from 
capital-driven machinery to the living body of the workforce. Obviously, such analyses 
have profound repercussions on the validity of the labour theory of value, which is 
considered by workerist scholars as no longer valid in the current phase of post-Fordist 
organisation of the labour process. For our purposes, however, this aspect presents itself 
as secondary. What is of greater importance is, rather, an understanding of the general 
intellect as the organising principle of contemporary production. As such, the general 
intellect as real abstraction goes beyond the limits of the commodity-form and transposes 
the original indifference of exchange-value towards use-value in the field of a reflexive 
(and paradoxical) indifference of exchange-value with regard to itself. This is exactly the 
leap of abstraction we would like to thematise. Early capitalist real abstractions (labour, 
money, etc.) were grounded on a valorising detachment from a kind of usefulness which 
was presupposed as naturally existing outside the commodity-form. Use-value, in Marx, 
does not receive extensive elaboration since it is supposed to be the natural, pre-existing 
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modality of satisfying equally pre-existing social needs. This is, in the last instance, what 
a commodity is: a “good” kept in a bundle of social relations such that its value does not 
reside in its material usefulness but in its capability to be exchanged for money. In the 
current situation, however, such a presupposition no longer completely holds true: a 
significant number of use-values arise in direct accordance with social needs established 
by capital's irrepressible compulsion to further valorise itself.83 What is at play here is a 
sort of use-value loss of innocence: at a conjuncture where capital's mechanisms of 
exploitation/valorisation are omni-pervasive (albeit heterogeneously assembled), the very 
creation of use-values must be thought, in abstract terms, as deriving from the 
antagonistic struggle that sets the process of capitalist development in motion.  
 This original understanding of the general intellect as the organising principle of 
contemporary production represents the basis of what is commonly known as the 
hypothesis of cognitive capitalism. Such a hypothesis is complex and multilayered, and 
can consequently be approached from a variety of perspectives. However, for our 
purposes, we limit the discussion to the analysis provided by Carlo Vercellone (2005; 
2006a; 2006b; 2007) and Yann Moulier-Boutang (2007). Moreover, we simply outline a 
general premise and then move directly to the Marxian notion of subsumption,84 which is 
what we would like to problematise. Such a problematisation is twofold: from the 
perspective of exploitation, we propose to supplement the interplay between formal and 
real subsumption in the current phase with the notion of impression. Similarly, from the 
                                                 
83 A more empirical analysis of this issue will be carried out in Chapter 3 with regard to carbon 
trading. 
84 With the concept of subsumption, Marx qualifies the forms of subordination of labour to capital 
and it is clear that there is a strict link between this category and both exploitation and valorisation. 
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perspective of valorisation we suggest to supplement that same interplay with the concept 
of abstract self-reflexivity. 
 First of all, while referring to a paradigmatic analysis of the current phase the 
authors we mentioned earlier are not simply posing the problem of a description of the 
contemporary functioning of the multiple circuits of accumulation and/or valorisation. 
Economic sociology has already accomplished this task. Rather, we are dealing with the 
necessity of providing a partial, class-based understanding of Post-Fordist conditions, an 
understanding whose goal is from the very beginning its employment in the social 
struggle to overcome such conditions. Consequently, it is from an analysis of labour 
modifications that the hypothesis of cognitive capitalism allows itself to perceive the 
current phase as a new great transformation, a third capitalist era of which the difference 
from the previous two is precisely defined by a shift in the actual way that capital 
subsumes living labour under itself. On the basis of this elaboration, Vercellone proposes 
a periodisation of the history of capitalism marked by the presence of three main stages 
(Vercellone, 2006a). 
- The first is mercantilist capitalism, in which formal subsumption85 prevails. In this 
context, capital faces an already formed productive network and limits itself to assume it 
as its own base. In this way the privileged locus of production has to be individuated in 
                                                 
85 “The labour process becomes the instrument of the valorisation process, the process of self-
valorisation of capital – the manufacture of surplus-value. The labour process is subsumed under capital (it 
is its own process) and the capitalist intervenes in the process as its director, manager. For him it also 
represents the direct exploitation of the labour of others. It is this that I refer to as the formal subsumption 
of labour under capital.” (Marx, 1990: 1019) 
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the workshop, concomitant with the hegemony of workers' handicraft. The determined 
class-figure of this first moment is the professional worker.  
- The second stage is industrial capitalism, the apex of which is represented by the Fordist 
model. This latter stage is informed by the logic of real subsumption,86 which implies that 
capital produces on its own the means of production, and the pivotal locus of production 
itself is the large-scale factory. This peculiar mass-production of standardised goods 
implies a polarisation of workers' knowledge and skills that in turn involves a strict 
division between directly productive tasks and planning skills. Here the prevalent class-
figure is the mass worker. 
- The third stage begins with the crisis of the Fordist model and is represented by the 
emergence of cognitive capitalism, defined by a specific exploitative relation with 
knowledge, by the diffusion of mass education and, last but not least, by the violent 
inclusion of worker's subjectivity in the circuits of valorisation, conceived of in terms of 
means of production. Moreover, the crisis of the Fordist factory-system foregrounds the 
appearance of a new class-figure defined as mass intellectuality. This shift entails the 
emergence of immaterial labour as the central locus of production. As Maurizio 
Lazzarato points out, “the concept of immaterial labour presupposes and results in an 
enlargement of productive cooperation that even includes the production and 
reproduction of communication and hence of its most important contents: subjectivity” 
                                                 
86 “The general features of the formal subsumption remain, viz. the direct subordination of the 
labour process to capital, irrespective of the state of its technological development. But on this foundation 
there now arises a technologically and otherwise specific mode of production – capitalist production – 
which transforms the nature of the labour process and its actual conditions. Only when that happens do we 
witness the real subsumption of labour under capital.” (Marx, 1990: 1034-1035) 
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(Lazzarato 1996: 140). Obviously, the concept of mass intellectuality does not mean that 
contemporary workers are experts in various academic discipline; in other terms, it has 
nothing to do with the work of the mind. Rather, it has much to do with the apparently 
simple faculty of thought or, at an even simpler level, with the mere faculty of language. 
 Now, at this point one might legitimately ask: which kind of subsumption is 
proper to cognitive capitalism? Vercellone's answer is the following: 
[…] the subsumption of labour under capital, from the point of view of the labour 
process, returns to be essentially formal. This means that the cooperation of 
labour no longer needs to be ruled by capital, and this reaffirmation of the 
autonomy of living knowledge could lead to a resurgence of tensions regarding 
self-determination in the organisation of labour and the social ends of production. 
(Vercellone, 2005: 10) 
 
According to Vercellone, the new phase does not require a different conceptual apparatus 
to be grasped in its singularity; no qualitative shift seems to be involved. Rather, it is a 
matter of investigating a new articulation between formal and real subsumption, an 
articulation in which the former returns to dominance. In fact, since capital progressively 
loses its ability to direct and organise social cooperation, exploitation is deployed through 
a twofold strategy: the extension of actual working hours (new centrality of absolute 
surplus labour) and the hyper-productivity of finance (whose nourishment is the 
autonomy of the general intellect). As a necessary consequence, financial rent – 
conceived of in terms of cognitive means of exploitation – has to be understood as purely 
parasitical. 
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 A different perspective is proposed by Moulier-Boutang (2007), who intends to 
show the unique features of contemporary accumulation by means of a new theory of 
exploitation, which is in turn based on the pivotal notion of a second level exploitation. 
To introduce this concept, the author provides a preliminary distinction within the notion 
of living labour: at a basic level, labour would be defined by a physical, material energy 
expenditure (labour-power), while at a superior level we find memory and cognitive 
functions (invention-power). At this point, Moulier-Boutang advances the thesis that 
cognitive capitalism is more concerned with the violent appropriation of affects, 
subjectivities, knowledge and mental or spiritual capacities, which we find at the superior 
level of living labour (hence second level exploitation). Conversely, both mercantilist and 
industrial capitalism were concerned, albeit in different ways, with the transformations of 
material energy into physical goods. As Moulier-Boutang explains: 
The specificity of cognitive capitalism is that it receives its legitimacy from the 
very nature of its accumulation. And what is the quality of this accumulation 
referred to? It is referred to the fact that it is essentially grounded on second level 
exploitation. Inasmuch as the profitability of capital invested in productive 
activities almost exclusively arises from an exploitation of second degree (which 
means that exploitation of first degree can be reduced to its simplest expression), 
we are witnessing the full deployment of cognitive capitalism. Even before being 
a stabilised regime, a mode of accumulation, capitalism is the tendency to 
transform the mode of exploitation (Moulier-Boutang , 2007: 148. Our 
translation). 
   
Although this analysis might appear overly simplistic and excessively schematic, and 
although the distinction between labour-power and invention-power may seem to be a 
kind of body-mind dualism (to which a shrewd post-Cartesian epistemology has 
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addressed convincing critiques), nonetheless we find it very important since it underlines 
the necessity of thinking the new forms of exploitation outside (albeit in no way against) 
the Marxian notions of formal and real subsumption.87 In a fundamental passage, 
Moulier-Boutang explains that, in order to exploit the general intellect under cognitive 
capitalism, it is necessary “to avoid a perfect objectification (reification or alienation) of 
the invention-power in the labour process or in the product.” (Moulier-Boutang, 2007: 
147-148. Our emphasis). Although valuable and fruitful, Moulier-Boutang's formulation 
is also affected by the problematic we already encountered in Vercellone: while focusing 
exclusively on the economic validation ex post, they seem to delineate a mystical profile 
of social cooperation, an image of the multitude as good in itself, as intrinsically 
innocent. From the perspective of biopolitics as method, this “optimism of the 
intelligence” dangerously resembles a purely voluntaristic projection. Thus, with specific 
regard to exploitation, we need to forge a new conceptual apparatus which is able to grasp 
the necessity of avoiding a perfect objectification of knowledge/labour as an imperative 
descending from the general intellect as real abstraction, as organising principle of 
production. It might be useful, in this regard, to introduce a term borrowed from French 
philosopher Gilbert Simondon (2005),88 whose philosophical investigation mainly 
revolved around the notion of individuation.89 In fact, if we substitute the expression 
                                                 
87 For a truly remarkable analysis along the same argumentative line, see Chicchi (2005). 
88 Simondon's thought has undergone a sort of renaissance in recent years. This new interest in his 
theoretical production has given rise to a rich international debate, whose significant expressions are the 
following: (in French) Stiegler, 2004; Combes, 1999; (in Italian) Ciccarelli, 2008; (in English) Toscano, 
2006. 
89 In the economy of our discourse, it is sufficient to highlight two main theses proposed by 
Simondon. The first is the primacy of the process of individuation over individuated entities. Simondon 
sees individuation as an operation, as a processual becoming by means of which structured individualities 
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“perfect objectification” with “transformation in individuated entities emptied of their 
potentials,” it becomes possible to see how Simondon's thought can help us properly 
conceptualise the forms of exploitation specific to cognitive capitalism.90 
 From this perspective, we can advance two hypotheses and an inference: 1) Both formal 
and real subsumption essentially cope with relatively homogeneous individuated entities 
(in the first case capital finds them as already formed, while in the second it establishes a 
disciplinary process which starts from a well defined point – the individual worker 
formally free to sell her labour-power – and ends in another well defined point – the 
forced inclusion of the proletarian in the scarcely differentiated category of waged-
worker);91 2) Capital, in its cognitive phase, must grant to social cooperation, or subtly 
impose to productive citizens, a certain degree of self-government in order to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
can emerge and relate to each other. At stake is the possibility to philosophically grasp the individual 
through individuation rather than individuation through the individual. The second, closely linked 
theoretical statement is the primacy of a relation over its own terms. Such a relational precedence is 
expressed through the notion of the pre-individual field. By referring to such a field Simondon intends to 
advance the idea that, prior to individuality, being is affected by inconsistency, populated by divergent 
tensions, and pregnant with incompatible potentials. Relationality emerges in this phase of being and is 
consequently able to account for the onto-genesis of individuated entities. 
 In passing, let us stress the close proximity, mutatis mutandis, between Simondon's individuation 
and Moore's oikeios. 
90 It may be useful to note that we do not want to argue for a perfect transition from Fordist and Pre-
Fordist forms of exploitation to Post-Fordist ones. On the very contrary, these exploitative practices tend to 
supplement each other presenting themselves in complex configurations dependent on the singularity of 
any given context. However, this should not prevent us from investigating the specific (i.e. tendential) form 
of exploitation in cognitive capitalism, which is becoming more and more diffused, especially in the 
metropolitan areas of the planet. 
91 A further specification seems necessary at this point. When we refer to “scarce differentiation” we 
are not suggesting that professional and mass workers are comparable to mere automatons and that their 
working activity should be interpreted as mere repetition of mindless gestures. In contrast, what we want to 
highlight is the transformation of the role of autonomous creativity in the process of capitalist value-
production: from fatal threat to be fought through discipline (mercantilist and industrial capitalism) to 
necessary resource to be simultaneously incited and controlled (cognitive capitalism). 
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subsequently, ex post, capture the value they produce. Here, self-government means the 
possibility for them to enter in a non-disciplinary – yet not uncontrolled – process of 
individuation; 3) If these two hypotheses are plausible, then it becomes possible to argue 
for a new conceptual apparatus potentially capable of providing a mediation between a 
determined mode of exploitation of individuated entities (formal and real subsumption), 
and an equally determined mode of exploitation of processes of individuation. 
 This is the reason that we propose to supplement (not to substitute) the notion of 
subsumption with the concept of impression, whose function is to define at a more 
abstract level the specific characteristics of the exploitation of individuation. The reason 
the term “impression” is chosen is twofold: on the one hand, it recalls the Latin locution 
nihil obstat quominus imprimatur, generally abbreviated in the term imprimatur. This 
expression was used by the ecclesiastical authority to approve the printing of books92 and 
refers to a form of control that (rhetorically) does not impose a pre-given outcome but 
rather establishes an initial (and firmly indisputable) condition of acceptability. On the 
other hand, it suggests a photographic metaphor; in fact, it recalls the constitutive 
indeterminacy of the impression of a photographic plate before subsequent treatments 
bring it to full development. Moreover, it discloses the virtual (but nevertheless real!) 
edges of an image without filling them with actual content. To put it otherwise, it refers to 
a dynamic regime of superimpositions in which at the beginning, ex ante, the 
                                                 
92 Texts to which the imprimatur was rejected were immediately included in the list of prohibited 
books (Index Librorum Prohibitorum), formally abolished by Pope Paul VI in 1966.  
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establishment of a limit or threshold takes place.93 This limit then influences the process 
of subjective becoming without positing a necessary outcome to it. However, impression 
is not configured as the purely formal act which consists in drawing an immaterial border; 
on the contrary, it presents itself as a direct tool for governing life, as a biopolitical 
dispositif aimed at selecting subjective trajectories “potentially” functional to capitalist 
valorisation. We say “potentially” because, although the negative injunction occurs ex 
ante, its economic validation, its inclusion in the circuits of accumulation, cannot but 
manifest itself ex post, at the end of the process, when the unpredictable but not unlimited 
outcome actually appears. In other words, although impressed, a process of individuation 
always remains partially indeterminate (since, by definition, it proceeds through the 
activation of unactualised potentials, whose transparent measurement or complete 
management is simply impossible). This means that capitalism is forced to keep open this 
indeterminate processuality, whose mode of development necessarily implies the 
production of antagonisms (Leonardi 2010a). 
 Something very similar also occurs in the realm of valorisation. From this standpoint, it 
is important to highlight the centrality of informationalised knowledge in organising 
multifarious value chains in cognitive capitalism. The work of Italian political economist 
Lorenzo Cillario (1990; 1996) is particularly relevant in this regard. While maintaining a 
classical Marxist approach to abstraction, conceived of as the precondition of 
measurement and equivalence, Cillario nonetheless brings it beyond its limits by 
transposing its functioning from the commodity-form to the production process itself 
                                                 
93 It is important – if perhaps superfluous – to stress that we refer to a temporal terminology from an 
abstractly logical (as opposed to linearly chronological) perspective. 
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(Toscano 2008a). Translating it into Foucauldian terms, we might argue that whereas real 
abstraction involved in the commodity-form proper is mainly concerned with exchange 
(making it possible by providing a system of equivalences), real abstraction in cognitive 
capitalism is configured as further internalised, hence connected with the issue of 
competition (establishing markets by means of calculation models, artificial and context-
specific benchmarking, generic procedures). In other words, the general intellect qua real 
abstraction presents itself as an immediate means of production. Here resides the kernel 
of the leap of abstraction we referred to earlier: we might call it self-reflexivity. Cillario 
poignantly notes the reflexive character of cognitive capitalist real abstraction by 
underlining that “the concept of abstraction which is adequate to the phase in which 
knowledge becomes capital stems from the reflexive character of the process of social 
labour” (Cillario 1990: 168; 1996: 152). What seems to be missing in his analysis, 
however, is the self-referential nature of such reflexivity: capital not only doubles itself, 
but does so without making reference to any external source. In other words, use-values 
are not internalised to fit capital's dynamics (driven by antagonistic struggle); rather, 
capital's logic paradoxically (and, as always, antagonistically) produces use-values to 
which its own valorising processes will be indifferent. This is why it is possible to argue 
for the crossing of an intensive threshold in the process of capital's absorption of society 
as a whole. Again, such self-reflexivity does not deny the absolute relevance of the 
notions of formal and real subsumption. Rather, it supplements them to account for a new 
feature of the process of capitalist valorisation.   
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3.2 - The hypothesis of cognitive capitalism – with the fundamental role accorded to the 
general intellect, its valorisation and its exploitation – is not sufficient to delineate the 
contemporary tendency of capitalist development. If that were the case, in fact, we would 
be confronted with two very insidious shortcomings. The first concerns the long-standing 
misunderstanding about the hegemony of immaterial labour: as Steve Wright (2005) has 
acutely argued, we do not live in an immaterial world. Rather, the profound materiality of 
contemporary immaterial circuits of valorisation/exploitation should be emphasised: to 
manufacture a single laptop, quintals of contaminating materials and several hectolitres of 
water must be mobilised; the diffusion of servers has strongly increased energy 
requirements for offices; logistics and commodity transportations are today more diffused 
than ever. In other words, cognitive capitalism must be understood as the constant 
production of – utterly material – negative externalities which equally affects the 
environment and the quality of life. Moreover, the label “immaterial labour” is at the very 
least unfortunate. In fact, regardless of its product being tangible or intangible, labour 
activity is always material in that it is invariably composed of energy-expenditure. On a 
different but interconnected level, the immaterial labour thesis seems to overlook the 
twofold nature of contemporary occupational structure, in which “only one part 
corresponds to the ideal portrait of the technologically adept 'knowledge worker', while 
the other is constituted by a mass of low-end, poorly paid, insecure, service work” (Dyer-
Witheford 2005: 147). Such complex, heterogeneous stratification, always accompanied 
by an enormous amount of violence, must be firmly kept in mind. With regard to the 
issue of new enclosures, then, George Caffentzis is right in pointing out how their 
occurrence “in the countryside must accompany the rise of 'automatic processes' in 
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industry, the computer requires the sweat shop, and the cyborg’s existence is premised on 
the slave” (Caffentzis 1997: 37).94 It is clear, thus, that the contemporary tendency does 
not register as an increasing hegemony of immaterial labour, but rather as a process of 
multiplication of labour practices (Mezzadra and Neilson 2012), an augmenting internal 
differentiation of the subjective figure of the global worker (Dyer-Witheford 2012).  
 A second problem concerning a perpofect overlapping of the hypothesis of cognitive 
capitalism and the contemporary tendency is that it would underpin a too linear (and 
irreversible) logico-historical succession from formal subsumption to real subsumption 
(Tomba 2009; Mezzadra 2011). In actuality, these two forms of capital's domination are 
always co-present: what changes – from logical as well as historical standpoints – is the 
specific articulations which link the two, and their relationship with other possible 
intensive dynamics (like, following our hypotheses, impression or abstract self-
reflexivity). How, then, can we properly understand the current, tendential articulation 
without falling in the twin-trap of the triumph of immateriality and/or of excessive 
historical linearity? We contend that the key to avoid such impasses is provided by an 
interpretation of the process of financialisation as neoliberal/governmental dispositif. 
Here, again, a simultaneously Marxian and Foucauldian conceptual apparatus proves 
invaluable to grasp the present in its multifarious, and at times profoundly contradictory, 
lines of expansion. It is doubtless, in fact, that the contemporary process of 
financialisation and the rise of neoliberalism must be read in close connection. By 
                                                 
94 It is our conviction, however, that Caffentzis' argument would benefit from the supplement of 
notions such as impression and abstract self-reflexivity. With specific focus on legal and epistemic 
enclosures, see Tavares (2011). 
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“financialisation” we refer to the differentiated practices through which companies, 
institutions and individuals alike become completely embedded in financial transactions. 
The outcome is an unprecedented dependence on unstable markets and volatile money for 
everything from food supplies to services, from education to income. Obviously, we are 
aware of the fact that finance has always been a feature of the capitalist mode of 
production since even before it appeared in its mature form; nonetheless, we contend that 
the current configuration of finance is qualitatively and quantitatively unique. From a 
quantitative perspective, it suffices to recall that in 1973 financial returns accounted for 
16% of all U.S. Profits, whereas in 2007 they made up a stunning 41% (McNally 2011). 
Such an increase is even more evident if we consider the changing amount of daily 
turnover in foreign exchange from 1973 (when the de-linking of money from gold first 
showed its effects) to 2007: $15 billion vs. $3.2 trillion (Ibid.). On a different level, but 
still from a quantity-based standpoint, we need to refer to the radical pervasiveness that 
characterises contemporary finance. It is actually difficult to think of single productive 
activity which is not, in one way or another, captured in global financial flows: the 
coercive expansion of pension funds; the inclusion of the planet's poor in financial 
markets through micro-credit; the inscription of real-estate mortgages in the very core of 
economic growth; the increasing political power of rating agencies; the privatisation of 
Keynesian deficit spending; the explosion of consumer debt to cover the gap between 
diminishing real wages and spiking costs of living, and the list might continue for long 
(Haiven 2011). 
 Contemporary finance is unprecedented, however, also from a qualitative perspective. In 
other words, it is a new, specifically neoliberal governmental dispositif. To grasp this 
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novelty we need to focus on the inceptive event of financialisation, its structural 
foundation. We are referring to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, agreed upon in 
1945, whose main feature was the creation of a dollar/gold standard ($35 per ounce) and 
the establishment of a fixed rate of exchange to tie all other currencies to U.S. dollar. This 
agreement guaranteed a considerable degree of monetary stability from 1945 to 1971: in 
that year, in fact, Nixon suspended the dollar/gold convertibility. There are complex and 
controversial political and economical reasons for this move on the part of the U.S. 
administration, but for our purposes what is pivotal to highlight is that “for the first time 
in history capital operated with officially de-commodified money, a global currency 
regime lacking any tie to past labour embodied in a commodity” (McNally 2011: 92). 
This peculiar de-commodification, namely money as a second order abstraction, gave rise 
to a head-spinning proliferation of financial tools: derivatives,95 Credit Default Swaps, 
Collateralized Debt Obligation are nothing else than immensely complicated – and 
rapidly multiplying – attempts to make profit out of the financial absorption of every 
aspect of social life. As Christian Marazzi brilliantly argues: 
Financialisation is not an unproductive/parasitic deviation of growing quotas of 
surplus-value and collective savings, but rather the form of capital accumulation 
symmetrical with new processes of value production […] Beyond the role of 
finance in the sphere of consumption, what has happened in these last 30 years is 
a veritable metamorphosis of production processes of this very surplus-value. 
                                                 
95 The best critical definition of a derivative is to be found in Brian Holmes: “The idea was that all 
risks, including collective ones, should be made into sellable products, formatted for the market by private 
actors in search of a profit. Yet although it is sellable, the derivative cannot be understood as an ordinary 
commodity of the industrial era. Marx described the commodity as that product of human labour whose 
exchange-value, seemingly animated with a life of its own, acts to render invisible the social relations that 
produced it. Derivatives, however, have nothing directly to do with production; instead they are conceived 
to manage the environmental risks that weigh on the future of speculative activity. In this sense they are 
meta-commodities that govern the unfolding of the contemporary economic model” (Holmes 2010: 230). 
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There has been a transformation of valorisation processes that witnesses the 
extraction of value no longer being circumscribed to the place dedicated to the 
production of goods and services, but that extending beyond the factory gates so 
to speak, in the sense that it enters directly into the sphere of circulation of 
capital, that is in the sphere of the exchange of goods and services (Marazzi 2011: 
48).  
 
Endless expansion led eventually to abstract self-reflexivity. Marazzi himself, by 
referring to dot-com bubble of 2000, significantly talks about a crisis of overproduction 
of self-referentiality (Marazzi 2008).96 Moreover, a new form of 
accumulation/valorisation requires an institutional, governmental counterpart. And it is in 
this conjuncture that finance shows itself as a neoliberal dispositif. In fact, 
financialisation fundamentally transformed managerial practices in at least three central 
areas: a) in business strategy, it privileged the logic of shareholders activism; b) in wage 
relations, it internalised workers by turning them into powerless micro-shareholders; c) in 
everyday life activities, it absorbed people's lives by capturing them in the debt process 
(from student loans to pension funds).97 In general we are witnessing the deployment of a 
veritable government through instability,98 an expansion of financial reason to society as 
                                                 
96 For an intelligent criticism of Marazzi's argument, see Bianchi (2011). 
97 For a brilliant analysis of the recent transfiguration of the Foucauldian entrepreneur of himself into 
an endlessly indebted man, see Lazzarato (2011). 
98 Our perspective is here very similar to what Italian sociologist Luigi Pellizzoni refers to as 
governing through disorder: “Uncertainty [in neoliberalism] is seen no more as a circumscribed situation 
on which to build a few strategic decisions, but as an empowering everyday condition [...] Contingency 
means lack of limits rather than lack of order. Better: disorder, as a positive, enabling systems condition, 
can be handled by carving out provisional room for purposeful manouvre. The more unstable the world, the 
more manageable” (2011: 797).  
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a whole. In particular, from our perspective, such an expansion is clearly visible in the 
field of environmental governance.  
 At this point, let us recall the main elements of the contemporary process of 
financialisation by applying them to an understanding of the meltdown that started (and 
which is currently far from being solved) in 2008. In our opinion, the best interpretation 
of the financial collapse is provided by scholars involved in the Uninomade project 
(Fumagalli and Mezzadra 2010).99 Although their analyses are very complex and richly 
articulated, in the economy of our discussion it is sufficient to highlight three 
fundamental points: 
- This crisis is a new kind of crisis. Although formally identical to every other capitalist 
breakdown (in Marx we find convincing arguments about the systemic function of crises 
as necessary tools to periodically re-create proper conditions for new cycles of 
accumulation), this crisis is historically new in that it concerns the unprecedented 
modalities of accumulation and valorisation that emerged from the 1970s onwards.   
- Finance plays a productive role. Although financialisation is no way a new 
phenomenon (for instance, Marx's articles for the New-York Daily Tribune in the late 
1850s provide an excellent analysis of financial speculation), its contemporary centrality 
and pervasiveness makes the opposition between real and financial economy obsolete. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 We prefer the term “instability” over “disorder” because it more clearly indicates the constant but 
differentiated alternation of ordered and disordered states as the specific terrain upon which contemporary 
neoliberal governmentality deploys itself. 
99 Obviously, there are many other accurate analyses of the global crisis. Amongst the best, let us 
recall: Bazzicalupo and Tucci (2010); Moulier-Boutang (2010); Žižek (2009). 
142 
 
This does not mean that the latter has absorbed the former. Rather, it suggests that the 
two elements must be thought as distinct but inseparable. They are not the same thing, 
but outside of their relation they lose their meaning as interpretative categories. A 
confirmation can be found in the fact that real and financial dimensions are profoundly 
imbricated in the behaviours of economic actors (financialisation of corporate strategies 
and financialisation of wage relations). Finance is directly and actively involved in the 
production of surplus value and, as a consequence, this crisis is financial and real in its 
very essence. 
- Finance is the cornerstone of neoliberal governmentality. This crisis is also the crisis of 
a governance based on systemic instability. From this perspective, what must be stressed 
is the active engagement of finance in subjectively shaping social actors and objectively 
establishing neoliberal environments.100 In fact, financialisation is here understood as the 
specific form of capital accumulation attuned to the new processes of value production, 
namely a governmental dispositif which is able to configure discursive regimes that, by 
affirming themselves as indisputable truths, influence people's conduct through a 
modulation or amplification of their trust and expectations. In other words, we witness a 
crisis of financial governmentality based on the market, whose main feature is the 
dependency of every individual on the financial system. This dependency is secured 
through credit in its various forms and through social insurances, pension funds and 
saving investments. As a consequence, individuals are captured in a logic of 
                                                 
100 On the subjective side of the governmental dimension, see Chicchi (2012). On the objective side, 
see Pellizzoni (2010). On the articulation of the two, see Marzocca (2010; 2011).  
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financialisation whose constraints heavily influence their lives (in the present as well as 
in the future). 
 We are now in the position to analyse in more detail the elective affinity which 
link financialised capital and ecological governance. In fact, it is our conviction that in 
neoliberal capitalism the government of the environment as an element of valorisation is 
performed to a great extent by finance. A recent study published by Oikos International – 
Foundation for Economy and Ecology, a sustainable economics network, shows clearly 
how environmental dynamics are kept in the financial process of establishing competition 
as the generative structure of value creation (Chavez 2010). The study begins by recalling 
the “Porter Hypothesis,” advanced in 1991, that asserts that environmental compliance 
and economic competitiveness are not inconsistent but, rather, complementary. This 
hypothesis is confirmed, according to the study, by the increasing tendency to include in 
financial rating non-directly-economic parameters. For example, the creation in 1999 of 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Group Index (DJSGI) established a global benchmark in 
corporate sustainability by upgrading the stock valuation methodology through the so-
called triple bottom line, which means rating financial performances from economic, 
social and environmental perspectives. More interestingly, however, the study poses the 
question of whether or not there is a positive correlation between good practices of 
Corporate Environmental Governance and companies' market value. In explaining his 
affirmative answer, the author states:  
Investment strategists are in search of new sustainability sources of gaining long-
term competitiveness by differentiation focusing on environmental-based 
corporate strategy. It means learning about how to manage environmental issues 
beyond law and regulation. It means knowing how to identify and to build hard-
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to-imitate sources of environmental-based competitive advantage across the entire 
upstream-downstream business value-chain. This is the genuine differentiation 
strategy some leading CEOs [Chief Executive Officer] and CFOs [Chief Financial 
Officer] are now pursuing. It suggests going from environmental compliance to 
ESG [Environmental, Social and Governance] Business Intelligence (Chavez 
2010: 4-5. Our emphasis). 
 
Leaving aside the triumphalist tone of the article, it seems to us that this profound 
intertwining of ecology and finance reveals how corporations are attempting to reinvent 
environmental challenges as a source of competitiveness. This pervasive and increasing 
marketisation of the environment through financial mechanisms is the concrete face of 
the abstract shift from nature as limit to nature as element of valorisation. 
 Another article which is useful to consider is “The Greening of Markets”, 
published in 2008 by Paul Mills, Senior Economist at the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund]. Focusing specifically on climate change, Mills argues that financial markets can 
play two important roles in challenging global warming. First, they can foster mitigation 
strategies (which is to say, reduction of GHGs [Greenhouse Gases] emissions for a given 
level of economic activity) by optimising carbon permits trading and by directing capital 
towards cleaner technologies. Second, financial markets can “cut the costs of adaptation – 
that is, how economies respond to climate change – by reallocating capital to newly 
productive sectors and regions and hedging weather-related risks” (Mills 2008: 32). The 
first role is fundamental to show how climate change management is increasingly 
translated into the grammar of market logic, whereas the second role is particularly 
interesting in that it is composed by highly complex hybrid instruments (financial and 
145 
 
environmental) such as weather-derivatives and CAT bonds [catastrophe bonds]. The 
former are designed to price and trade both in the uncertainties of the weather and social 
uncertainties about the future of climate change, while the latter are insurance-like 
mechanisms that are putatively intended to disperse catastrophic weather risk and, in so 
doing, to protect vulnerable sectors such as agriculture and coastal property (Cooper 
2010). In his article, Mills explains at length the limits and potentialities of these financial 
tools (as well as the constant governmental support they need to properly work), but from 
our standpoint it is sufficient to report his significant conclusion:  
It seems likely that financial markets will play an integral role in climate change 
mitigation and adaptation in the future. Cap-and-trade seems to be becoming the 
mitigation policy of choice in high-income countries, in which case the global 
market in permits for GHG emissions is likely to become the largest global 
commodity market [...] Moreover, although weather derivatives and CAT bonds 
do not offer a complete panacea, recent deepening in these markets prompts 
optimism that they will continue to innovate and further help adaptation to 
climate change (Mills: 36).101  
 
It seems to us that the link between finance and ecology could not be expressed in a 
clearer manner. Finance is today the main governmental dispositif through which 
environmental challenges are turned into opportunities to create surplus-value and to 
entirely subsume nature under the valorising logic of capitalist markets (Leonardi 2011). 
As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 3, nowhere else than in carbon trading can the 
financial government through instability be seen in a “purer” form.  
                                                 
101 A more detailed analysis of this issue shall be proposed in Chapter 3. 
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3.3 - A good case in point to appreciate both nature as element of valorisation and its 
being shaped by financial mechanisms is provided by the development of biotechnologies 
or, to borrow Melinda Cooper's apt term, the rise of bioeconomy (Cooper 2008). Such a 
concept refers to the expansion of the logic of valorisation to the field of life itself 
through the development of biotech industries. Appropriately, Cooper notes how this 
development is configured as inextricable from the planetary diffusion of neoliberalism: 
“the history of neoliberal theories of growth and biotechnological visions of growth needs 
to be pursued simultaneously” (Ibid.: 19). Neoliberal elites, in fact, have driven the 
process through which financialisation has made it possible to exploit nature as an 
element of valorisation. Contrary to the commonsensical idea according to which political 
leaders would have been in denial about the ecological crisis, Andrew Ross has pointed 
out how they have been collecting data to overcome the challenge of resource exhaustion 
at least since 1972, namely since the publication of Limits to Growth. As Ross explains: 
“in the four decades since the Club of Rome sounded its loud alarm about unsustainable 
growth, we have seen a sharp, upward redistribution of wealth and resources [...] The 
long-term impact of efforts to repossess and hoard assets can be seen quite clearly in the 
statistics of class polarisation” (Ross 2011: 25). As we unmistakably see, biotechnology 
as a scientific enterprise is closely linked both to new circuits of valorisation and to new 
articulations of governmentality. Moreover, it involves knowledge in a very peculiar 
sense: mobilised by the need to inscribe profit-making in the very core of life and nature, 
informationalised science transforms the living in such a way that, instead of turning it 
into a solid background upon which it could find support, science makes it more and 
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more artificial, hence ready to be deployed along the competitive lines of contemporary 
value creation. As Cooper remarks, the molecularisation of scientific knowledge aims at 
“destandardising life” in order to make it further manipulable (Cooper 2008: 31). Here is 
where the notion of biocapital (Sunder Rajan 2006) shows all its analytical fruitfulness: 
by focusing on the intertwining of biological processes and financial mechanisms, it 
firmly grasps the increasingly porous borders between academy and enterprise and allows 
us to thematise the complex relations amongst biotechnology, economy, politics, culture 
and society. The construction of scientific facts and production of economic values are 
now so closely entangled that every attempt to understand their respective developments 
must preliminarily account for their co-extensiveness. It is not by chance that the concept 
of biocapital, before being employed in the field of social sciences, had been largely used 
– since the 1980s – in the realm of financial markets, where it referred to the most 
speculative investment options. Such a speculative character is pivotal: it represents the 
very core of biocapitalistic logic. Whereas the relevance of technoscience in the realm of 
production is undeniable and runs constantly through the course of the XX century, from 
the 1980s onwards a fundamental shift takes place. We can define such a shift as the 
“financialisation of scientific discovery” (Turrini 2010: 16), whereby its uncertainties, 
potentialities and unpredictable outcomes become the terrain of high-risk investments in 
small start-ups, whose only asset is innovative and patented scientific knowledge. In other 
words, the imploding fusion of science and finance – the two “speculative enterprises” 
par excellence (Sunder Rajan 2006: 281) – is the key element of biocapital. Furthermore, 
such a process of unification discloses a visionary logic completely projected towards a 
future to come. Through a careful analysis of the speculative logic which underpins 
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genomic markets, Michael Fortun (2001) aptly highlights the capability of forward-
looking statements to attract investments and produce profits. In the same vein, Sheila 
Jasanoff notes that, despite a very low level of actual commercialisation of 
biotechnological products, “hopes for economic regeneration through biotechnology 
remain undimmed in states seeking to maintain positions of global dominance in a 
second, science-driven industrial revolution” (Jasanoff 2005: 34). 
 From this perspective, an ineludible starting point is 1980: in that year, the first 
biotechnological industry, Genetech, enters the stock market. Moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court, in the well-known Diamond vs. Chakrabarty case, authorised the first 
form of intellectual property on genetically modified life-forms and, in so doing, set in 
motion a process of transformation of patenting law aimed at including life itself within 
it. Finally, the United States Congress passed the Bayh-Dole act, whose main feature was 
the possibility for universities to patent and sell discoveries and inventions realised 
through public funds. Thus, we might say that, at least symbolically, 1980 represents the 
date of birth of the biotechnological era. A common originary point, however, does not 
entail a unitary historical development. In fact, we can subdivide at the very least two 
streams of genetic research, recognised in both industry and university laboratories: “red 
biotechnology,” which stands for biomedicine, and “green biotechnology,” which refers 
to agriculture and environment. The rest of the chapter will be dedicated to a brief 
discussion of an example of a red biotechnological product – Dolly the sheep – and an 
example of a green biotechnological product – Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean. 
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3.3.1 - The developments of Dolly perfectly represent the general features of biocapital. 
She was a domestic female sheep, the first mammal to be cloned – in 1996 – from an 
adult somatic cell, using the technique of somatic cell nuclear transfer. For our purposes, 
more than the complex scientific procedures that made this cloning possible, what is 
interesting is the relationship between the “Dolly technique” and value production. As 
Mauro Turrini has brilliantly argued, “Dolly's cloning might be read as an advanced form 
of capital. Its promissory horizons in the field of healthcare have been immediately 
deployed onto the surface of financial markets” (Turrini 2010: 17). In fact, Dolly's 
biological constitution, although not commercialisable, has been able to realise an 
immediate economic value through a complex operation orchestrated by science, public 
research institution, biotechnological companies, juridical settings and public opinion. At 
first, the Roslin Institute, a public research centre, has created a subsidiary – Roslin Bio-
Med – in order to profit from the cloning technique that produced Dolly's patenting and, 
at the same time, to attract private investments. In 1999, two years after the official 
announcement of Dolly's cloning, an American company involved in stem cell research, 
Geron, bought Roslin Bio-Med's patents in exchange for liquidity and a billion-dollar 
research project to be granted to Geron Bio-Med, an ad hoc company operating at the 
Roslin Institute under the supervision of Ian Wilmut, Dolly's “father”. As it is manifest, 
Dolly's scientific value (the possibility to produce new therapeutic treatments) is from the 
very beginning inextricable from its financial value (the effectiveness in attracting 
investments). Both of them consist in the capability to provide a potentially unlimited 
platform of cellular reconstruction, cultivation and propagation (Franklin 2007). Dolly's 
example shows how multiplicity is configured as the core of biocapital. In it, public 
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research and private interests, science and economy, present and future co-exist. 
Moreover, biocapital presents a peculiar articulation of abstract and concrete: on the one 
hand, both appropriation and capitalisation of biological processes depend on their 
metaphorical transfiguration into informationalised – and open to patenting –technologies 
and procedures. On the other hand, however, the reference to biological materials and 
actual organisms – as well as to health and well being – is unavoidable. As Turrini 
concludes, “biological life is both the means and the end of biotechnology” (Turrini 2010: 
24). It is interesting to note that the process of conversion of life itself into information is 
performed through the presentation of genetic sequences in three different levels of 
body's abstraction: in vivo, as a biological sample; in vitro, as a data code; and in silico, 
as a process of informational re-elaboration. From our perspective, however, what is 
crucial to underline is the fact that such processes cannot be entirely subsumed under the 
logic of commodification of the human body. What is at stake in biotechnologies belongs 
to a different level of (self-reflexive) abstraction: it is the transmutation of life into 
surplus-value. This shift from commodification to financialisation is materially 
exemplified by embryoid bodies (Cooper 2008), namely those biological entities which, 
being in a condition of permanent regeneration, can potentially originate any kind of 
tissue. Through patenting, thus, they transpose the biological promise of an infinite 
reproduction onto an endless source of economic surplus-value.    
 
3.3.2 - The issue of Genetically Modified food is as complex as it is controversial. Its 
supporters claim that it possesses the far-reaching potential to: a) enhance food security 
and hence reduce poverty and hunger by means of increased agricultural productivity; b) 
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improve nutrition through bio-fortification of crops as allowed by biotechnological 
techniques; reduce environmental pollution by decreasing the use of pesticides; c) 
produce a positive economic output due to a reduction in inputs cost; d) address 
developing countries' specific agricultural needs and ecological conditions; and e) to 
increase stability of crop production through the development of drought-resistant, pest-
resistant and insect-resistant seeds (Pence 2001; Winston 2002; Makinde 2004). Critics, 
on the other hand highlight the wide range of hazards GM food doubtlessly entail: a) 
bioprospecting (or, more evocatively, biopiracy) is considered to be a contemporary form 
of colonisation based on unjustified expropriation by means of intellectual property 
rights; b) the tendency to establish a monopolistic market (dominated by Monsanto) is 
seen as implying the ruling out of small-scale, sustainable farming; c) cross-pollination 
poses irreversible threats to biodiversity; d) scientific uncertainty about the effects on 
human health of a diet increasingly composed of GM foods is regarded as unacceptable; 
e) planetary malnourishment is said to result from an unjust distribution of what is really 
an oversupply of food rather than from a shortage of nutrients (Shiva 2001; Weber 2009; 
Robin 2010). 
 From our perspective, what is fundamental to underline with regard to the GM food issue 
is the contradiction between the private use and social character of knowledge (Bensaïd 
2007). To elaborate on this distinction we can advance an epistemological reflection 
according to which GM organisms would fit with the definition Bruno Latour gives for 
objects of concern to political ecology. He designates them as ‘‘'hairy objects' that attach 
themselves in a risky way” (Latour 2004: 40). Such a formulation has three 
consequences: first, genetically engineered organisms have no clear-cut limits and no 
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well-defined essence. There is no sharp separation between their hard core and their 
environment. GM organisms are by kind between the species, transgressing species 
boundaries. Second, their producers are no longer invisible, but appear in the open 
embarrassed, controversial, complicated and implicated with all their instruments. 
Scientific production, with the sharing cooperation it implies, is an integral part of their 
definition. Third, they are “quasi-objects” defined more by side-effects than by rules 
(Latour 1993: 137). Nothing less than unexpected consequences are expected from them, 
consequences that belong to their uncertain, paradoxically anti-naturalistic nature. 
Although anthropogenic, they are alive; nevertheless, they cannot be said to be natural. 
They are objects that can no longer be naturalised and, as such, belong to the 
transformative capacity which fundamentally characterises contemporary – and 
essentially collective – socio-natural relations.  
 Beneath epistemology, however, lies a political kernel that involves, 
simultaneously, capitalist value creation and neoliberal governmentality. Such a political 
nucleus can be fully appreciated by referring to Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean. 
Founded in 1901, Monsanto has been one of the most successful companies in the field of 
basic industrial chemicals. Following WWII, Monsanto championed the use of chemical 
pesticides in agriculture. Its main agrochemical products have included the herbicides 
2,4,5-T, DDT, Lasso and Agent Orange, the latter of which was largely used as a 
defoliant by the U.S. Military during the Vietnam War and which was later shown to be 
highly carcinogenic. In particular, in 1973 Monsanto launched the weed-killer Roundup 
(active ingredient: glyphosate), which has been the number one selling herbicide 
worldwide since at least 1980. Recognising the first steps of an economical as well as 
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political revolution, in the late 1970s Monsanto shifted to biotechnology as its core 
business. As Melinda Cooper properly remarks: 
The commercial calculus was straightforward – instead of profits from mass-
produced chemical fertilisers and herbicides, the agricultural business would 
displace its claims to invention onto the actual generation of the plant, 
transforming biological production into a means for creating surplus-value. 
Moreover, it was predicted that biotechnology would expand the geological 
spaces open to commercial agriculture, making it possible to create plants that 
would survive on arid land or flourish in the degraded environments created by 
industrialised agriculture. Indeed, according to some prognoses, life itself would 
soon be put to work to remediate all kinds of industrial waste – from chemical 
pollution to nuclear fallout (Cooper 2008: 23). 
 
Roundup Ready soybeans actually epitomise the attempt to transform “biological 
production into a means for creating surplus-value”. In 1996, Monsanto commercialised 
genetically modified Roundup Ready soybeans that were resistant to Roundup. The 
advantage of Roundup Ready crops is that they significantly improved farmers' ability to 
control weeds, since glyphosate could be sprayed in the fields without harming their 
crops.102 In 2004, over 90% of U.S. soybean fields were Roundup Ready soybeans, or 
other forms of glyphosate resistant plants. Roundup Ready soybeans are not grown and 
sold just in the U.S.: their cultivation is widespread also in Argentina and South Africa 
and, always in 2004, they were the most extensively planted transgenic crop worldwide, 
occupying as much as 109 million acres (Inouye 2004). 
                                                 
102 Monsanto's GM soybeans, however, do not actually result in higher yields than other non-
genetically engineered varieties. 
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 The application of biotechnology in agriculture thus shows its revolutionary 
potential: by claiming property rights onto seeds' seasonal creation, Monsanto literally 
owns the environmental as well as technological processes of nature production. What 
should belong to the socio-natural collectivity which is defined by the species' capability 
– as mediated by the general intellect – to transform itself, is instead privately 
appropriated. As we see, contemporary capitalistic circuits of exploitation pass through 
nature, rather than act upon it. How could this new articulation of value creation 
politically occur? Consistently with the neoliberal role played by social institutions, an 
intervention aimed at producing market-conditions was necessary. And this kind of 
intervention can be observed in the controversy concerning the notion of substantial 
equivalence. Here the paradox of biotechnological valorisation (and governance) is fully 
appreciable. To be quickly marketed (a crucial element in an economic landscape marked 
by ever-increasing competitive obsolescence), GM crops needed to avoid the stringent 
testing normally required for new food products. As a consequence, biotechnological 
lobbies focused all their attention in gaining support for the recognition and ratification of 
substantial equivalence between traditional and GM-based agricultural techniques from 
national and supra-national institutions such as FDA,103 EPA,104 FAO105 and WHO106 . In 
other terms, insofar as a new GM product presents metabolic and proteinic profiles which 
fall within the same range of variation already exhibited by biochemical profiles of 
existing foods or crops, the two objects can be assumed as being substantially equivalent. 
                                                 
103 U.S. Food and Drug Administration.  
104 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
105 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization. 
106 U.N. World Health Organization. 
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This definition, per se highly controversial, becomes even more complicated when 
considering the problems it raises in terms of intellectual property rights. In fact, granted 
the impossibility of patenting a living organism as it presents itself in nature, biotech 
companies required a new discursive apparatus to be able to translate their scientific 
innovations into the grammar of property rights. Here we see the irreversible blurring of 
the distinction between discovery and invention: once the general intellect becomes the 
main element of a hypothetical tableau économique, it is the social cooperation mediated 
by collective knowledge in all its hybrid forms that imposes itself as the immediate, and 
crucial, force of production (Hardt and Negri 2009). It is a force of production that breaks 
the boundaries between discovery and invention by endlessly re-assembling their 
interaction according to context-specific dynamics. In the last instance, it is political 
violence that is embodied in governmental dispositifs such as national and supra-national 
schemes of policy-regulation. This is particularly clear in the case of GM organisms since 
these institutions gave permission to biotech companies, and especially Monsanto, to 
simultaneously claim substantial equivalence to avoid testing and sufficient difference to 
allow patenting. It is, thus, more than evident how social knowledge embodied in the 
general intellect configures itself at the same time as a crucial productive force and as a 
fundamental stake of political governance.  
 
CONCLUSION 
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 Both “red” and “green” biotechnologies show a constitutive exposition to power 
(valorisation/exploitation + governmentality) as their essential feature. In more general 
terms, this unavoidable exposition to power is the very condition of possibility for the 
notion of environmental crisis to appear as a specific political issue: what distinguishes 
environmental degradation from ecological crisis is the fact that just biopolitical 
governmentality necessarily implies a modality of resource-use which describes a 
systemic tendency towards a constant managerial increase. Environmental degradation 
belongs to “nature idolatry”, to use Marx's words; ecological crisis, on the contrary, is a 
distinctively modern phenomenon. Moreover, we have analysed two distinct moments of 
biopolitical governmentality: in the first, the ecological crisis structures its field of 
visibility, so to speak, by expressing the tensive relations between capitalist accumulation 
and environmental limits. In the second moment, however, social knowledge shows itself 
as the primary means of production and inaugurates the era of the green economy, or the 
attempt to further internalise the environmental limit to turn it into an element of the 
valorisation process.  
 We contend that these shifts, logical as well as historical, meaningfully account 
for the inextricable difference between an ancient almond, such as the one described by 
Jared Diamond, and a Monsanto's Roundup Ready soybean. The first belongs to a socio-
economic texture characterised by a reciprocal externality between nature and society, or 
life and politics. The second, on the contrary, is engrained in a paradigm that assumes the 
general intellect as a real abstraction which is able to enact a process of production in 
which nature itself becomes capitalised and exploited. Thus, whereas the ancient almond 
does not know the “metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” of capitalist 
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valorisation, the Roundup Ready soybean is shaped in valorisation's most contemporary 
image. As a consequence, Diamond's account of knowledge as progressive and 
cumulative human enterprise must be completely rejected. In its historical vicissitudes, 
knowledge had surely experienced moments of quantitative augmentation, but more 
crucially it had lived through ruptures of qualitative shifting. The role of knowledge as it 
is configured in contemporary neoliberal capitalism is not commensurable – at least not 
in any analytical way – to its role in the epoch of hunters and gatherers. Moreover, as the 
application of knowledge to productive processes has changed, so has its function as a 
critical tool for social change. Let us use a distinctively Marxist terminology to draw our 
conclusion in the form of a provisional, even embryonic suggestion: as the critique of 
classical political economy intended to demystify the attempt of naturalising capital, of 
placing its specific relations of production outside historical becoming, so the critique of 
this new phase of the economic process should assume as its main goal the 
demystification of the attempt of capitalising nature, which is to say its total subsumption 
under the homogeneous (and so far destructive) grammar of the market.       
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The Carbon Trading Dogma 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the previous chapter we have argued that primitive accumulation is not a one-time 
occurrence to be situated at the historical origin of the capitalist mode of production, but 
rather a permanent – if variant – correlative to capital's irreppressible drive to self-
valorise. From this standpoint, we now proposes an analysis of carbon trading as an 
example of new enclosure, as a concrete manifestation of the contemporary wave of 
primitive accumulation. Although the multifarious phenomenology of new enclosures 
does not allow us to assign carbon trading any particular privilege,107 it might nonetheless 
be suggested that the constitutive tension between abstraction and concreteness it sets in 
motion makes such an issue the most suitable in order to analyse continuities and ruptures 
within the movements of old and new enclosures.  
 The object of traditional enclosures, those analysed by Marx and imposed in the course of 
the Seventeenth century, mainly concerned, in fact, what we can call common land in its 
threefold meaning: the section of territory beyond private property's borders, that poor 
people could use for sustenance; the allotment rural poor could grow without owning it; 
and the rights of use over certain resources (water, pastures, wood, etc.) within the private 
property's borders (Shiva 2005). In general terms, it was a matter of violently regulating 
                                                 
107 It seems undeniable, however, that the climate crisis has recently become what While, Jonas and 
Gibbs refer to as “the new 'master concept' of environmental governance” (2009: 2). 
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the access to a materially scarce good. From this perspective, some of the new enclosures 
bear striking resemblance to the old: especially in what was once called the periphery of 
the world-system, the destruction of communal controls over the means of subsistence 
has been an all too frequent occurrence from the 1970s onwards. Similarly, roughly in the 
same period, Structural Adjustment Programs sponsored by the International Monetary 
Fund have inaugurated the infamous practice of seizing land for debt,108 paving the way 
for what is today recognised as the trend of land grabbing in Africa. New enclosures, 
however, also show peculiar and unprecedented characters: the issue of intellectual 
property rights is a particularly fitting case in point here. Networked, intangible and 
digital commons, in fact, are tendentially non-rival and one's access to them not only does 
not limit any other's, but might be reasonably said to foster their further innovation and, 
thus, to be beneficial to the commons themselves (Boyle 2003). Therefore, although the 
enclosing violence is one and the same, the old enclosure targeted scarcity to produce 
putatively efficient allocation of the social product, whereas the new enclosure targets 
abundance to produce a scarcity that will, ex post, engender an equally putative efficient 
allocation of intellectual wealth.  
 Following this quite schematic distinction, Carla Ravaioli proposes to distinguish 
between “natural and material commons”, such as those linked to Empedocles' vital 
elements (fire, air, water, earth), and “immaterial and cultural commons”, such as 
                                                 
108 As the radical Midnight Notes Collective appropriately comments: “Just as the Tudor court sold 
off a huge tracts of monastery and communal land to their creditors, so too modern African and Asian 
governments agree to capitalise and 'rationalise' agricultural land in order to satisfy IMF auditors who will 
only 'forgive' foreign loans under those conditions [...] The result now as then is enclosure: the internal and 
external destruction of traditional rights to subsistence. This is the secret hidden in the noise of the 'debt' 
crisis” (1992: 321-322). 
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knowledge and art, but also local public services and welfare state programs (Ravaioli 
2010: 15). Implied in this argumentative line is the idea that, whereas the first type of 
commons is today enclosed in the same way as it was four centuries ago, the second type 
of commons is subject to distinctively contemporary enclosing practices. Although 
interesting and to a certain degree accurate, such a description nevertheless depicts the 
profoundly complex issue of new enclosures in a too simplistic manner. Continuities and 
ruptures, in fact, should not be located in the objects to be enclosed, but rather in the 
capitalist gesture that actually establishes such objects. In other words, what does not 
change is the constitutive and utter violence of primitive accumulation. Instead, what 
does change are the multifarious modalities through which capital inscribes within the 
circuits of accumulation a “substance” which is already sealed by money's imprimatur. 
This is what differentiate contemporary commons from Sixteenth century English land: 
whereas the latter was coercively capitalised, the former is subject to a movement of self-
reflexivity in which capital looks for value within itself. In other words, whereas in the 
case of land the commodity frontier is extensive, in the case of the general intellect such 
frontier is intensive.     
 This shift in the focus of analysis actually entails a serious questioning of the distinction 
between natural, material commons and cultural, immaterial ones. As far as knowledge 
becomes the organising principle of production, such a differentiation not only loses its 
heuristic value, but also runs the risk to prove politically disempowering. The analysis of 
climate change as a political issue might clarify this statement. In a recent and very 
significant book, entitled A Vast Machine, Paul Edwards compellingly shows how the 
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very visibility of climate change relies on complex, contested and always re-negotiable 
knowledge infrastructures. Such crucial notion is defined as follows: 
Instead of thinking about knowledge as pure facts, theories, and ideas – mental 
things carried around in people’s heads, or written down in textbooks – an 
infrastructure perspective views knowledge as an enduring, widely shared socio-
technical system. Here is a definition: knowledge infrastructures comprise robust 
networks of people, artifacts, and institutions that generate, share, and maintain 
specific knowledge about the human and natural worlds (2010: 17). 
 
No one, thus, lives a planetary atmospheric experience without the support of climate 
science. To link a weather-related event – no matter how extreme it presents itself – to 
global warming, a massive mobilisation of the general intellect in its diverse forms 
(various knowledge-factories such as universities, think-tanks, activists' counter-
narratives, etc.)109 is invariably required. Obviously, this dependence on knowledge does 
not make climate change any less concrete or material, both in the individuation of its 
multiple causes and in the destructiveness of its heterogeneous effects. Rather, what the 
conception of the climate as a common subjected to enclosure entails is an entirely new 
way of enacting the tensive interaction between the abstract and the concrete. None of 
these two dimensions is, per se, sufficient to theoretically grasp and politically act upon 
climate change; to the contrary, both are necessary. The simultaneous co-presence of 
theory and practice, once formulated as a goal to be attained, is today – at least in the 
                                                 
109 With specific reference to recently established university programmes, Timothy Luke comments 
as follows: “University training discourses comprehensively reframe 'the environment' as a highly complex 
domain far beyond the full comprehension of ordinary citizens or traditional naturalists: it instead becomes 
something to be managed by expert managerialists armed with coherent clusters of technical acumen and 
administrative practice” (1999: 4). 
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field of climate change – imposed as a pre-condition for any analysis whatsoever. Thus, 
not only use-value – as we argued in the previous chapter – but also sound science must 
wave good bye to its innocent stage. Similarly again, however, this loss does not amount 
to a disqualification of scientific knowledge; in sharp opposition to that, more science is 
needed to politically cope with climate change. Simply, such academic knowledge 
production cannot claim neutrality nor superiority to other forms of knowing.110 A 
climate change-related example might be useful to clarify this point. When asked whether 
official climate-mitigation science should be considered to be “contaminated” with 
politics, activist Larry Lohmann brilliantly replied: 
No. To say the science is ‘contaminated’ would imply that it’s an abnormal 
situation for science to be enabled, constrained and motivated by politics. But it’s 
not abnormal. It’s unavoidable. No world can exist in which policy can be 
‘science-led’ without science being ‘policy-led’ at the same time. Nor would such 
a world be desirable. Nor would it be desirable to live in a world in which people 
believed such a world was possible or desirable (2006: 38). 
 
This is, we believe, a tough but fascinating task for climate justice activists: creating the 
conditions for a convergence amongst different epistemological constellations in order to 
effectively tackle climate change. 
 The basic argument we are going to try to sustain in this chapter can be summarised as 
follows: carbon commodities (cap-and-trade units [e.g. EUAs], offsets [e.g. CERs] and 
                                                 
110 In many cases, the putative superiority of Western scientific knowledge over indigenous 
cosmovisions has been the tool to politically disempower, forcefully displace and violently dispossess local 
communities, most notably in the Global South. We shall discuss epistemological colonialism later in this 
chapter. 
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tradable carbon units in general) should be approached by taking into account their role in 
multifariously supporting the carbon trading dogma, which is to say an extremely cogent 
– albeit empirically undemonstrable – political assumption according to which although 
climate change must be considered a market failure, only markets can provide a viable 
solution to it. This dogma simultaneously presents governmental aspects, which we shall 
analyse from a Foucauldian perspective based on financial government through 
instability, and exploitative ones, which we shall address starting from a (post)Marxist 
account of the exploitation of the general intellect. Consistent with the framework of 
biopolitics as method, developed in the previous chapters, we shall conclude that carbon 
commodities should be conceived of as second order abstractions since, in them, the 
distinction between “natural distinctness” and “economic equivalence” (Marx 1993: 141) 
tends to blur and a decisive element of their exchange-value resides in the ex ante 
creation of capital-based use-values.    
 Before undertaking a more detailed analysis of carbon trading (section 1), of the specific 
commodities it deals with (section 2), and of the three supports of carbon trading dogma 
(section 3), we need to better specify two questions of primary interest from the 
perspective employed in our study. The first refers to the relationship between the 
capitalist mode of production and climate change as a political issue. On a different but 
closely linked ground, the second considers the multilevel role of resistance within the 
framework of problematisation that historically transformed the climate crisis from a 
relatively neglected set of complications to a permanent concern in contemporary global 
governance. As for the first question, it might be useful to make reference to a recent and 
extremely thought-provoking article published by Dipesh Chakrabarty under the title 
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“The Climate of History: Four Theses” (2009). Its main goal is to discuss the relevance of 
critiques of capitalism and globalisation to grasp the historical novelty represented by 
climate change. Chakrabarty proposes to critically consider four arguments, which in turn 
ultimately rest on two fundamental assumptions: 1) although under way since the 
Nineteenth century (Bolin 2007), climate change became publicly “visible” from the 
1980s onwards, that is to say in the course of the neoliberal era; 2) despite the obvious 
fact that intensity and specific causes of climate change are widely debated among 
scientists, there is no need to be skeptical about the anthropogenic nature of the 
phenomenon (Oreskes 2007; Conway and Oreskes 2010). Keeping in mind that the first 
presupposition is consistent with our hypothesis regarding the neoliberal nature of 
environmental policy in general, let us also underline our substantial agreement with the 
second premise. Obviously, climate science should not be regarded as the guardian of an 
eternal and indisputable truth; rather, its history reveals the momentary and always 
reversible outcomes of differentiated controversies, simultaneously political and 
epistemological (Caserini 2008). However, scientific as well as experiential evidence 
supporting the human-induced nature of climate change is today so abundant that the 
process of problematisation refers more to its specific configurations than to its actual 
existence (Caserini 2009). Against this background, Chakrabarty elaborates his 
compelling four theses: the first argues for the collapse of the traditional distinction 
between natural and human history; the second advances the notion of Anthropocene111 – 
                                                 
111 Originally proposed by Nobel Prize-winning atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen in 2002, this 
notion has been more recently defined as follows: “The term Anthropocene, proposed and increasingly 
employed to denote the current interval of anthropogenic global climate change, may be discussed on 
stratigraphic grounds. A case can be made for its consideration as a formal epoch in that, since the start of 
165 
 
which assumes that humans have become a geological force – as a fundamental tool to 
frame the relationship between Marxist critical thought and new theoretical horizons 
disclosed by the emergence of global warming; as an alleged logical necessity, the third 
thesis claims that global (and critical) histories of capital are no longer sufficient to deal 
with our present and should, therefore, be supplemented with a broader species-history of 
humans; the fourth, finally, calls for a “negative universal history” (Chakrabarty 2009: 
222) that arises from a collective, species-shared and impending sense of a catastrophe.     
 From our perspective, Chakrabarty's position should be endorsed with regard to the first 
two theses and refused as for the second two theses. The logical leap between thesis 2 and 
3, in fact, stands in sharp contrast with the basic assumption of biopolitics as method, 
namely that, starting from the second half of Eighteenth century, the accumulation of 
capital and the governmentality of species' population constitute a differentiated unity 
(both logically and historically). Such a multi-layered unity allows us – partly following 
Jason Moore – to read capitalism as a mode of production which is, in itself and 
simultaneously, an ecological regime as well. In other words, capitalism is nothing else 
than a system of value-production organised around a constitutive bundle of exploitative 
socio-natural relations: the two aspects cannot be interpreted separately, unless the 
political unfolding of the ecological crisis is to be understood as solely – and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
the Industrial Revolution, Earth has endured changes sufficient to leave a global stratigraphic signature 
distinct from that of the Holocene or of previous Pleistocene interglacial phases, encompassing novel 
biotic, sedimentary, and geo-chemical change” (Zalasiewicz et al. 2008: 4). 
 For an interesting discussion of Anthropocene from the perspective of contemporary global 
governance, see Dalby (2007). 
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“spontaneously” – arising from the (untenable) industrial interface between Man and 
Nature. Actually, the absence of a biopolitical declination of capitalism from 
Chakrabarty's analysis is particularly surprising given his acceptance of the periodisation 
of Anthropocene proposed by Paul Crutzen: “[It] could be said to have started in the latter 
part of the Eighteenth century, when analyses of air trapped in polar ice showed the 
beginning of growing global concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane” (Crutzen 
2002: 23). In Foucauldian terms, it is fair to state that Anthropocene is the geological 
name of the era of biopolitics; similarly, referring to Moore's words we might call 
Anthropocene the geological declination of the contemporary oikeios of capitalism as an 
ecological regime. It is, therefore, absolutely useful for us to accept Chakrabarty's 
suggestion and to count such a concept among the critical tools to be enacted through a 
methodology based on the notion of biopolitics. However, from a more general 
standpoint, here the issue concerns how to frame the new relationship between 
accumulation of capital and accumulation of men, which is to say: how do the circuits of 
capitalist exploitation/valorisation interact with the government of population as species? 
Assessing global warming in its contemporary form, in his third thesis the Indian 
postcolonial thinker poses such a problem as follows: 
If anything, climate change may well end up accentuating all the inequalities of 
the capitalist world if the interests of the poor and vulnerable are neglected. 
Capitalist globalisation exists; so should its critiques. But these critiques do not 
give us an adequate hold on human history once we accept that the crisis of 
climate change is here with us and may exist as part of this planet for much longer 
than capitalism or long after capitalism has undergone many more historic 
mutations. The problematic of globalisation allows us to read climate change only 
as a crisis of capitalist management. While there is no denying that climate 
change has profoundly to do with the history of capital, a critique that is only a 
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critique of capital is not sufficient for addressing questions relating to human 
history once the crisis of climate change has been acknowledged and the 
Anthropocene has begun to loom on the horizon of our present. The geologic now 
of the Anthropocene has become entangled with the now of human history 
(Chakrabarty 2009: 212).   
 
What Chakrabarty is missing in this passage is the moment of unity which links 
contemporary capitalism and climate change (as well as policy responses to it). Such a 
unity extends well beyond a linear causal connection: surely, climate change is not “only 
a crisis of capitalist management”. However, it is only through the social lenses provided 
by neoliberal anti-naturalism that climate change can be assessed as a crisis which 
simultaneously is caused by capital's past configuration and only by a further acceleration 
of capitalistic development can be resolved. This way of framing the issue does not 
intend to suggest a politically paralysing all-pervasiveness of capital; to the very contrary, 
its purpose is to emphasise capital's constitutive ambivalence. As we have discussed 
above, to “see” climate change as such a massive mobilisation of knowledge is required: 
this is why temporalities such as deep history – which refers to the distant past of human 
species – become fundamental, as Chakrabarty correctly points out. However, 
disconnecting the mobilisation of the general intellect from the process of climate change 
ever-expanding sources of knowledge means loosing sight of the tight link that ties 
knowledge as crucial element of production and present-day circuits of capital's 
valorisation. Hence, global warming is not merely caused by capitalist management 
(moment of separation); it actually exists only in so far as contemporary capitalist 
relations enact the neoliberal socio-nature (moment of unity). By missing this internal 
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and uneven structuration of the dyad capitalism-climate change, Chakrabarty is forced to 
re-instate a sharp distinction between Man and Nature and, eventually, to revive that 
same old-fashioned humanism he wanted to get rid of: “Unfortunately, we [i.e. humans] 
have now ourselves become a geological agent disturbing these parametric conditions 
[i.e. temperature] needed for our own existence” (Ibid.: 218). Moreover, what such an 
analytical framework is unable to account for is the revolutionary potential of the general 
intellect as productive power: it can certainly give rise to the enlightened catastrophism 
suggested by the concept of “negative universal history”. However, this is not a 
necessitated scenario: opposite to this, the general intellect can exhibit its productivity by 
resisting the marketisation of global warming through a political praxis based on social 
struggle rather than a species-infused sense of “common” humanity created by fear of 
impending environmental collapses. 
 By raising the issue of resistance we can now engage with the second introductory 
remark – closely linked to the first – we referred to above. In short, the main question 
here concerns the historical configuration of that ontological primacy of struggle we 
discussed in chapter 1. How, then, is resistance entangled in the process of 
problematisation that progressively shaped climate change (and, more generally, the 
environmental crisis as a whole) as a fully political issue? Our answer is simple and 
straightforward: originating between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, 
ecological resistance against capitalist circuits of exploitation/valorisation created the 
very conditions of possibility for climate change as a policy concern to emerge. Thus, the 
political visibility of global warming is due more to struggles as active agents of social 
transformation than to an objective and gradual unearthing of the ecologically destructive 
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basis of industrial capitalism. It is important to remark that this constitutive and 
productive conception of resistance is not particularly diffused with regard to 
environmental studies at large. Rather, the majority of scholars either do not assess at all 
the generative role of struggles (be they located in the 70s or nowadays), or relegate it to 
an after-the-fact protesting strategy, whose nature would be purely reactive (although not 
necessarily impotent). The former stream can be exemplified by authors such as Michel 
Callon and Bruno Latour or, more comprehensively, by the Actor Network Theory. 
Although analytically masterful and empirically sophisticated, the ANT constrains its 
hybrid subjects-objects and its complex assemblages to a flat political field, devoid of 
social conflict and dominated by an idealistic fetishisation of parliamentary democracy, 
by a quite naïve sense of peaceful dialogism (Latour 2002). On the one hand, when 
Latour provocatively declares that “[l]ike God, capitalism does not exist” (Latour 1988: 
173), he understandably attempts to overcome an hypostatisation of the notion of 
capitalism, but nevertheless ends up uncritically accepting the ideological affinity 
between this latter and the democratic spirit.112 Similar problems emerge with regard to 
Callon's brilliant framework based on framing and overflowing (1998). According to the 
French thinker, when creating a market social actors try to “frame” it, thus making it 
context-free and shielded from the outside world. However, Callon continues, frames will 
always leak or “overflow”. The very idea of the frame relies on the context from which it 
tries to free itself: if the internal substance of a frame was really to be cut off from its 
context, such substance would loose all legitimacy and efficiency. This is why overflows 
                                                 
112 It is useful to stress that, as brilliantly demonstrated by Slavoj Žižek, such an affinity is not only 
ideological, but also less and less empirically tenable given the recent irresistible rise of “capitalism with 
Asian values” (2009: 77), marked by an essential coupling of political authoritarianism and market-driven 
free trade policies. 
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are the rule, rather than the exception: by registering the tensions between the market-
frame and the market-context, overflowing ensures both external development and 
internal consistency. As we see, such a framework certainly accounts for conflictual 
frictions – it actually makes it one of its premises: there is no framing without 
overflowing – but does so by accepting the underlying assumption that only markets are 
involved in these practices. As a consequence, the political outcome of such a theoretical 
elaboration is the search for the good market.113   
Analogously, the notion of conflict proposed by Callon is non-generative: antagonism is 
supposed to foster problem-solving activities which nonetheless never threaten to unhinge 
the overarching market framing. Thus, it comes as no surprise that, with regard to carbon 
trading, Callon proposes a politics of market civilisation as a viable solution to its poor 
ecological performance: 
The challenge of climate change could be one of the first opportunities on a 
planetary scale to raise the question of how to better civilise markets [...] Not only 
do markets need to be civilised, that is, to be included in the multi-
problematisation that is a living source of questions, research and the invention of 
satisfactory answers; but simply by participating in this movement they can act 
also as a civilising force in politics and science. Civilisation may be this never-
ending effort to transform unsolvable issues into solvable problems (2009: 547).  
                                                 
113 Answering to the question: “what is a market that works correctly?”, Callon writes: “It is a market 
which welcome and recognise as one of its most central constituent elements all the actors who demand to 
be taken into account, including those who are considered as marginal or on the verge of exclusion, with 
their points of view, their matters of concern, their proposed tools, framings and models” (2009: 541). As it 
is evident, the violent nature of new enclosures is not only overlooked, but actually ignored. It might appear 
that the brutality of capital's command is absorbed into market framing/overflowing as a form of dialogism 
in which disagreement is solved through persuasion, in a rather social-democratic fashion. Even so, 
however, it must be emphasised that, as Ernesto Laclau (1996) has demonstrated in his masterful critique of 
Richard Rorty (1989), even persuasion is not immune to violence but, rather, founded on it. 
171 
 
 
 
 A good example of the second line of thought can be found in a wide range of critical 
perspectives (ecologist, eco-feminist, post-structuralist, eco-Marxist, etc.) whose shared 
point refers to the idea that resistance follows capitalist changes and/or innovations. 
Particularly illustrative of this framework is Paul Hawken's definition of the “blessed 
unrest”, which is to say the sum total of a myriad of ever-growing small and medium 
organisations engaged on the terrain of social and environmental justice: 
The massive growth of citizen-based organisations responds to threats that are 
new, and, in some cases, game-ending. These groups defend against corrupt 
politics and climate change, corporate predation and the death of oceans, 
governmental indifference and pandemic poverty, industrial forestry and farming, 
and depletion of soil and water. Five hundred years of ecological mayhem and 
social tyranny is a relatively short time for humanity to have learned its self-
created patterns of systematic pillage. What has changed recently, and has offered 
evidence of that hope may be a rational act despite the onslaught of 
countervailing data, is the use of connectivity [...] The insanity of human 
destructiveness may be matched by an older grace and intelligence that is 
fastening us together in ways we have never before seen or imagined (Hawken 
2007: 164-165. Our emphases).  
 
As we see, resistance comes after “human destructiveness”, even if this does not mean it 
is necessarily powerless. Nonetheless, a deep ontological gap separates such a view and 
the one we propose here. In fact, we contend that social struggles produced the 
environmental crisis (and, hence, climate change) in its political form. Before a strong 
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and variegated movement had imposed environmental degradation as an issue to be 
considered, neither governments nor corporations were “seeing” any problem. A detailed 
history of the antagonistic, bottom-up creation of the ecological crisis as a social concern 
to be politically addressed is, to our knowledge, yet to be written. However, we can 
advance at least a contextualisation point and three different elements that might structure 
such a history. The general framework is provided by the failure of the so-called Fordist 
pact between social classes (Negri 2008). By this we mean that historical compromise – 
roughly, manageable conflict on the bourgeois side in exchange for social security on the 
working class side – which configured the boundaries of political experience, at least in 
the global North, during what French historians call les trente gloriouses, namely the 
period between 1946 and 1975, characterised by a strong economic growth coupled with 
an increase of working class' access (both direct and indirect) to social wealth. The 
crucial point here is to realise that the collapse of such a pact was not induced by capital's 
need to auto-innovate but, to the very contrary, by those struggles that were 
simultaneously its driving force and its unsurpassable limit (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2005). Poignantly, referring to the progressive exhaustion of multifaceted components of 
the Fordist pact as capitalist development strategy, militant Midnight Notes Collective 
states: “We refuse to mourn them. For who first voided them but brother and sister 
proletarians around the planet who desired and demanded more, much more than what 
was settled for?” (1992: 319). Against this historical background, the political 
construction of the environmental crisis as a social battlefield can be analysed from at 
least three standpoints:  
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1) At the level of international relations, Harry Cleaver has convincingly shown how 
the often-celebrated Green Revolution114 is to be understood as a “post-war effort to 
contain social revolution and make the world safe for profits” (1972: 177). In short, 
Cleaver argues for a tight link between technology-led increases in food production and 
U.S. anti-Communist foreign policy: crops productivity became a strategic weapon to 
avoid the frightening spectre of revolutionary uprisings in Asia and Africa. 
2) As for the capital-labour conflict in the global North, a new configuration of 
workplace health and safety demands took place in the course of the 1970s. Forced to 
face a new kind of industrial (and especially chemical) noxiousness, many workers 
claimed and eventually imposed the primacy of their health over corporate profit. A much 
stricter regulation was the outcome of such struggle, which Stafania Barca acutely 
suggests to name workers' environmentalism.115 Focussing on the Italian experience, she 
enumerates and discusses the modalities through which this kind of ecology-based 
antagonism conceived of “the workplace as an ecosystem whose specifities were best 
known to the working class” (2011: 103). Significantly from our perspective, workers' 
environmentalism is to be identified first and foremost as a conflict concerning 
knowledge: technical expertise, thus far exclusively managed by corporations, became to 
                                                 
114 Green Revolution regards a series of research, development and technological innovation which 
increased agricultural outputs especially in the so-called Third World. Such an increase begun most 
markedly in the late 1960s and was attained through a widespread use of pesticides, herbicides and 
fertilisers, as well as new breeds of high yield crops (Jain 2010). 
115 In passing, let us note how the analysis of workers' environmentalism put directly into question the 
usual narrative concerning the separation and mutual-irreducibility between the workers' movement and 
environmentalism. Contrary to such a schematic and actually inaccurate narrative, these two movements 
share some of their fundamental roots. A genealogical cartography of frictions and convergencies would be 
of invaluable help but, to our knowledge, this kind of investigation has not yet been comprehensively 
undertaken.  
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be questioned on the very ground of its legitimacy. A class-based, partial counter-
knowledge emerged as a political critique of the self-declared – and eventually unmasked 
– neutrality of technical expertise.   
3) From the standpoint of social differentiation, the rise of the ecological movement 
proper – roughly at the end of the 1960s – represents the oppositional force whose 
pressures will eventually impose environmental issues on the agenda of governments and 
corporations alike. Although distant from the workers' movement in terms of class 
composition and (in some cases) political goals, the nascent ecological movement 
(especially the anti-nuclear one) showed at the same time new ways of mobilising 
revolutionary energies and new cracks in the industrial-capitalist mode of value 
production. 
 
 The ontological primacy of resistance over power is to be conceived as the red thread of 
the following analysis of carbon trading. However, before shifting our attention to such 
an issue, it is important to underline that resistance does not affect climate change as a 
political issue solely on the field of ontology. Rather, as Matthew Paterson has 
penetratingly pointed out, resistance acts as a productive force also at the empirical or 
ontic level of carbon markets' rule-making and, particularly, in terms of establishing best-
practices within them, for example through voluntary certification schemes. According to 
Paterson, global struggles against carbon trading will not overcome it as capital's main 
policy response to climate change, but they “will shape the character of this market 
activity, potentially reduce its worst effects, and generate support for the policies and 
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social change which are essential and for which carbon markets may well be simply a 
distraction” (2009: 251). Clearly, such a claim raises fundamental problems with regards 
to the final goal of resistance to carbon markets (decommissioning or improving them?), 
but it nonetheless shed decisive light on how social struggles do not merely react to, but 
actually contribute to shape, the objects of their critique.     
 
1 - CARBON TRADING: THEORY, PRACTICE AND CRITICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In order to situate the critique of carbon trading in the context of our analytical 
framework, it is important to emphasise its links to two of the dynamics we discussed in 
the previous chapter. First, it can be argued that carbon trading is the specific climate 
change-related form assumed by the neoliberal green economy from the 1990s onwards. 
Such a communal ground can be closely observed in the preparatory document for 
Rio+20 issued by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and entitled 
Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication. According to the experts gathered by the UN, the climate crisis can be 
dubbed as a massive market failure,116 particularly due to the exclusive privilege 
mistakenly conceded to a single criteria: the maximisation of short term profitability for 
capital. Not surprisingly, however, such a market-induced deficiency can be solved by a 
market-based set of incentives: since it is assumed that markets have failed because of 
                                                 
116 This argument has been first – and famously – advanced by Sir Nicholas Stern (2007). 
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“imperfect information” (UNEP 2011: 16), it is supposed to logically follow that a better 
collection and elaboration of data will provide the competitive drive to monetarily 
internalise previously costless – albeit socially damaging – ecological externalities. From 
a global warming perspective, such internalisation requires the creation a new ensemble 
of commodities centred on the complex notion of “carbon” and, simultaneously, the 
establishment of dedicated markets to exchange them. UNEP has entirely and 
unproblematically endorsed such a process117 and, therefore, has exposed itself to 
activists' criticism. For instance Edgardo Lander, from the Transnational Institute, has 
aptly argued that the issue raised by the UNEP report  
[i]s not a matter of questioning the fact that the fundamental decisions in society 
are made by 'the market', but of expanding the market's sphere of information and 
action to explicitly incorporate nature in its logic of values. This requires 
overcoming all obstacles to the full commercialisation of nature. For the good 
functioning of the markets, everything must have a price, opening up new spheres 
for speculation and capital value. It should therefore come as no surprise that they 
[UNEP experts] defend the fundamental role to be played by carbon markets and 
the marked-based programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD+). In fact they do not even play lip service to the 
existence of critiques, disagreements and resistance to these flawed mechanisms 
(Lander 2011: 8). 
                                                 
117 After having lamented that carbon forest activities have been so far relegated to the voluntary 
carbon markets (namely those not regulated by the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol), the UNEP report continues 
as follows: “[a]s the contribution of deforestation and forest degradation to green house gases (GHG) 
emissions has become recognised, this approach to mitigation has moved up the agenda in international 
climate negotiations, first as REDD (reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation) and more 
recently as REDD+, which adds conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks to the list of eligible activities. REDD+ has been likened to a multi-layer PES 
[Payments for Environmental Services] scheme, with transfers of finance between industrialised countries 
and developing countries in exchange for emission reductions associated with improvements in forest 
protection and management, and further transfers from the national level to forest landowners and 
communities” (UNEP 2011: 167). 
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 A second element we would like to stress is the consistency of the contemporary state of 
the art in environmental governance (of which climate policy – and hence carbon trading 
– is a crucial sub-section) with the Foucauldian hypothesis of neoliberal interventionism. 
Indeed, scholars such as Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell have highlighted how 
neoliberalism cannot be limited to the destructive moment of its roll-back (i.e. de-
regulation); rather, it must also be analysed from the perspective of its roll-out, namely its 
constructive practice (i.e. re-regulation) (Peck and Tickell 2002). This new 
interventionism, however, is not solely performed by the state. On the contrary, to 
properly function neoliberalism requires a gradual process of de-nationalisation and 
privatisation of norm-making which eventually paves the way for the emergence of a 
highly complex form of multilevel governance (Sassen 2003; 2006). Such development is 
especially visible in the context of environmental governance, whose analysis can be 
carried forward by distinguishing three different spheres of intervention: the supra-
national one, mostly linked to global multilateralism directed by formal international 
organisations such as the UNEP; the market-based one, focussed on private authority; the 
sub-national one, mainly composed by multi-scalar governance initiatives, including the 
fast growing relevance of Private-Public Partnerships (PPPs).  
 Thus, even in the field of environmental governance, “one governs for the market, not 
because of the market” (Foucault, 2008: 121). For example, according to Steven 
Bernstein and his colleagues, “[c]orporations, social and environmental organisations, 
private-public partnerships, sub-state governments, and even local communities have 
already begun to conceive and implement governance initiatives to address global 
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environmental problems” (Bernstein, Clapp and Hoffmann 2009: 6).118 This is notably 
true for carbon markets in every form they can assume: although a few trading systems 
have been wholly private (for example, the Chicago Climate Exchange [CCX], 
established in 2003 and decommissioned in 2010), the large majority of them mix public 
and private subjects whereby governments either impose a cap and distribute allowances 
or mandate emissions reductions, while private entities trade them to – allegedly – foster 
marginal cost abatements.119 Although devoid of any critical motive, the notion of an 
ensuring state proposed by Anthony Giddens neatly captures such developments. 
According to him, the ensuring state plays simultaneously the traditional role of a “top-
down agency” and that of a facilitator to tie diverse groups of society together to achieve 
“bottom-up solutions” and safeguard that the desired results are effectively achieved 
(Giddens 2009: 69).   
 
 Having provided a practico-theoretical context for our analysis, we are now in the 
position to critically address the historical development and the governmental design of 
                                                 
118 On the fundamental role of transnational corporations in climate policy rule-making, see 
Schreuder (2009). 
119 This multi-layered complexity of climate governance has produced the paradoxical outcome of 
making possible to support carbon trading even against the argumentative structure advanced by its main 
proponent, namely the UNFCCC-COP. For instance, after the disgraceful COP 15 held in Denmark in 
2009, political analyst Radoslav Dimitrov asserted: “Paradoxically, climate policy developments are overall 
positive. Aggregate climate governance comprising regional, national, sub-national and local policies as 
well as non-state initiatives worldwide is thriving. The Copenhagen disaster should not obscure the bigger 
and brighter picture: today the vast majorities of countries with significant emissions have pledged fairly 
ambitious domestic targets, many backed with detailed policy implementation plans [...] While the UN 
process is moribund, multilevel policies are likely to continue to grow” (2010: 818-819). 
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carbon trading schemes.120 Although the direct proportionality between the levels of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere and the surface temperature of the earth was 
discovered in 1896, when Svante Arrhenius, drawing on previous speculations by other 
scientists, gave full account of the greenhouse effect, the emergence of a collective 
awareness about the damaging potential of global warming can be individuated in the 
publication of the Brundtland Report (1987). In 1988 the UNEP, in turn founded as a 
result of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972), 
and the World Meteorological Organisation established the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), a consultive body aimed at providing policy makers with 
accurate scientific knowledge concerning global warming and its social, economic and 
environmental impacts. The First Assessment Report of the IPCC, released in 1990, 
produced an intensification of the public debate around climate-related issues and, as a 
consequence, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de 
Janeiro, 1992) – also known as Earth Summit – released an international environmental 
treaty called United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
whose objective is to stabilise GHG concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous human-induced interference with the climatic system. Importantly, 
moreover, the Framework Convention recognises the principle according to which the 
goal of protecting the climate must be pursued through common but differentiated 
responsibilities between developed and developing countries. Since the treaty entered into 
                                                 
120 The following descriptions are functional to the analytical focus we will develop in the next 
section (centred around the specifities of commodities traded in carbon markets) and, as a consequence, 
does not do justice to the complexities and intricacies that accompanied the history and successive designs 
of carbon trading devices. For a sympathetic systematic approach, see Yamin (2005) and Labatt and White 
(2007); for a critical approach, see Gilbertson and Reyes (2009) and Böhm and Dabhi (2009); for a general 
overview see Newell and Paterson (2010).  
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force in 1994, the signatory states (originally 189, 194 as of May 2011) have been 
meeting annually in Conferences of the Parties (COP) to assess progress in the field of 
global climate policy.  
Of particular importance has been COP 3, held in Kyoto in 1997, in the course of which 
the parties agreed to sign a Protocol to the UNFCCC, known as the Kyoto Protocol (KP). 
The KP is the first legally binding agreement on climate change and provides that the 37 
Annex I countries (so-called developed nations) commit themselves to a reduction of six 
GHGs121 (5.2% on average in the 2008-2012 period, using 1990 as a baseline year), and 
all member countries give general commitments. The KP is intended to achieve 
emissions reductions through a variety of approaches: intervening at the source by means 
of energy saving and energy efficiency strategies, as well as renewable energy 
developments; promoting international cooperation and substantial technology transfers; 
and accounting for emissions sequestration performed by natural carbon sinks, such as 
forests and oceanic phytoplankton, amongst others (Iacomelli 2005).      
 Although the KP has proved to be affected by innumerable flaws,122 from the 
perspective of carbon trading it still represents a sort of “official” date of birth. In fact, 
under the powerful political pressure exercised by the US delegation – led by then Vice-
President Al Gore – the parties agreed to structure both the design and the 
                                                 
121 Actually, the KP targets four GHGs and two groups of gases produced by them. The GHG are: 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). The two groups 
of gases are: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and perfluorocarbons (PFCs).  
122 In their detailed review of climate change policy literature, Gupta et al. (2007) found that no 
credible assessments of the KP contended it had, or will have, any relevant impact in solving the global 
warming crisis. Even the World Bank (2010a) reported that the KP has only had a slight effect on curbing 
emissions increase. In the time-window separating the negotiation of the Protocol and its ratification (1997-
2005), CO2 emissions have grown 24%.  
181 
 
implementation of the KP around three market-led approaches called flexibility 
mechanisms. The basic economic rationale which frames such mechanisms is that trading 
on dedicated markets emissions permits and credits would simultaneously reduce the 
aggregate cost of meeting the targets, foster sustainable development in non-
industrialised countries and create profitable opportunities for green business. In passing, 
let us note how such an assumption is consistent with the hypothesis according to which 
the environmental limit is turned by neoliberalism into an element of the process of 
valorisation.      
 The first of KP's flexible mechanism is emissions trading (ET). The idea of 
emissions trading first emerged in the late 1960s and was then theoretically developed in 
subsequent years by both academic economists and derivatives traders. After some 
experimentations, it became official policy in 1990 as the centrepiece of the US Acid 
Rain Program. In the 2000s, following the Kyoto Protocol's path, the European Union 
took the lead and developed what is today the world's largest carbon market, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), initially implemented in 2005.123 In theory, this 
system is supposed to control pollution by providing economic incentives for achieving 
reductions in the emissions of pollutants. It works as follows: a governmental agency sets 
a maximum limit to the amount of pollutants that can be emitted. The limit or cap is then 
reduced to basic units (emissions credits: AAUs [Assigned Amount Units] under the KP, 
EUAs [European Union Allowances]), which are either sold to firms through auctioning 
                                                 
123 It is curious to remark that the EU attitude towards emissions trading changed radically (before 
2001 European negotiators used to support a carbon tax) due basically to a technical impasse. In fact, while 
the Commission had worked unsuccessfully for years for a unanimous vote of the Council on a proposal for 
a continental energy tax, emissions trading (as a non-fiscal measure) could be approved on the basis of a 
majority vote only (Voss 2007). 
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or gratuitously allocated (so-called “grandfathering”). Firms are required to hold a 
number of permits equivalent to their emissions. The total number of permits cannot 
exceed the cap, thus the amount of total emissions is limited to that level. Companies that 
produce more emissions than their permits would allow must buy more of them from 
those who have succeeded in reducing their environmental impact. The transfer of 
permits occurs through trade: the final outcome is that the buyer pays a charge for 
polluting, while the seller is rewarded for having reduced emissions. Thus, the theory 
concludes, those who find it cheap to reduce emissions will do so, finally achieving 
pollution reduction in the most cost-effective way. Let us note, in passing, that cap-and-
trade, as a regulatory tool, is marked by hybridity: in fact, the cap is set by the state, 
whereas the eventual allocation of permits is organised as a trade. Moreover, it is possible 
to appreciate how simplistically an environmental issue (an excessive amount of carbon 
released in the atmosphere) is translated into the economic grammar of the market 
through the implementation of constitutively neoliberal policies. 
 The second and third of KP's flexible mechanisms are the joint implementation 
(JI) and the clean development mechanism (CDM). Their common underlying economic 
assumption is that it is often more cost-effective to save emissions not at source, which is 
to say where they are actually produced, but elsewhere through technology transfers or 
various investments in renewable energy.124 Significantly, for such a rationale to be 
politically meaningful an environmental premise must be unproblematically assumed: 
namely, that reductions made (or, more realistically, planned) in a given place are 
                                                 
124  This is why such reductions are labelled “carbon offsets”. 
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ecologically equivalent to reductions made or planned in any other place. In other words, 
it is presupposed that it makes no difference whatsoever where CO2, or any other GHG, 
is saved. In this context, JI releases credits (ERUs [Emission Reduction Units]) and 
allows emissions exchange among Annex I countries (mainly European economies in 
transition from the former Eastern Bloc have been concerned to date), whereas CDM is 
designed to stimulate Kyoto-capped countries to include the global South (non-Annex I) 
in the effort to reduce GHG emissions (Figure 1).  
 
 While the amount of JI projects is relatively small, CDM proposals have exploded 
since Russia ratified the Protocol in 2004. As for ET, the two pillars of the mechanisms 
are economic flexibility and cost-effectiveness. In theory, the CDM system works as 
follows: an Annex I country (or a company) invests in projects to reduce GHG emissions 
in a non-Annex I country in exchange for emissions credits (CERs [Certified Emissions 
Reductions]) that can be used to comply to its KP target (Figure 2). 
184 
 
 
In theory, a number of conditions must be met in order for the project to be approved by 
the Executive Board set up for the CDM: first of all, the project must be compatible with 
the overall goal of sustainable development of the host country; second, it must provide 
evidence of additionality, which is to say its impact is environmentally more performing 
than the international aid equivalent to business as usual (BAU); third, the project must 
demonstrate that it was not already registered for funding in the host country's 
development plan; fourth, it must meet the supplementarity requirement with regard to 
the investing country's GHG reduction strategy, meaning that the CDM cannot represent 
more than a small fraction of the the general approach to the KP's targets (in other words, 
emissions reductions are supposed to be mainly saved at home). 
 Although not contemplated in the KP, another programme is of particular interest 
from our perspective: REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation, 
plus conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks and sustainably managing forests in 
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developing countries). Although REDD+ projects are not yet part of KP-based carbon 
markets, the trend toward an inclusion of such projects in the mechanisms of carbon 
trading seems unstoppable and already powerfully under way. Actually, a significant 
quota of REDD+-generated credits are already being sold in voluntary carbon markets, 
clearly showing how such a scheme is “becoming one of the key pillars of a post-2012 
international climate regime, particularly regarding developing countries mitigation 
efforts” (Corbera et al. 2011: 89). The environmental rationale of REDD+ projects relies 
on the twofold fact that, on the one hand, deforestation and forest degradation account for 
between 10-20% of GHG emissions, while on the other forests are conceived of as 
terrestrial sinks, particularly useful for their carbon sequestration capability. As such, 
carbon forestry is rightfully considered to be key to any kind of mitigation strategy. As 
for the CDM, the political process of marketisation of REDD+ is justified by its putative 
faculty to allow flexibility and cost-effectiveness: a corporation with compliance 
obligations, or simply desiring to engage is corporate social responsibility practices, can 
buy credits produced by REDD+ projects (usually located in low- or middle-income 
developing areas) to offset the lack of emissions reduction at source. In a sort of triumph 
of the green economy mantra, REDD+ is understood to give rise to a win-win-win 
situation: “financial incentive for forest conservation, a least-cost measure for climate 
change mitigation and a source of alternative livelihood for forest communities” (Pearse 
2012: 183). This system was first envisaged in 2000 when an IPCC report on LULUCF 
(Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry) outlined how carbon credits could be 
generated by carbon sinks. In 2003, carbon sinks entered the CDM system but were 
confined to A/R (Afforestation and Reforestation) activities. In 2007, however, COP 13 
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in Bali restored the notion of forestry offsets and included REDD+ in the final document, 
known as Bali Action Plan. As of 2012, the UN's REDD+ text, originally proposed in 
2009, is still unfinished and several fundamental issues remain unsolved. However, as 
Joanna Cabello and Tamra Gilbertson insightfully argue, “[a]lthough not yet explicitly 
connected to UN-backed carbon markets, even those REDD+ initiatives currently being 
supported by public money are generally designed to help jump-start forest carbon 
markets” (2012: 167). 
 
 In terms of market value assessed by the World Bank (2007; 2008; 2009; 2010b; 
2011; 2012), carbon trading in its entirety – compliance and voluntary markets, as well as 
primary and secondary markets125 – was worth approximately US $10 billion in 2005, 
just to triple in 2006 to $30 billion. In 2007 it reached $63 billion to then double again in 
2008 to $126 billion. Despite the global economic crisis, carbon trading grew again in 
2009 by 8%, with a total amount of trade volume worth $143 billion. In 2010, however, 
the effects of the financial crisis manifested themselves also in the realm of carbon 
economy, causing it to slightly drop to $142 billion. Surprisingly enough, 
notwithstanding the deepening of the economic downturn, 2011 (the latest figures 
available as of this writing) saw a robust increase in transaction volumes (establishing a 
                                                 
125 From the perspective of biopolitics as method, it is crucial to underline that the very idea of carbon 
trading originated from the private sector. In fact, as Newell and Paterson appropriately remark: “Promoters 
of the voluntary carbon offset markets never tire of pointing out they precede the regulatory markets. The 
first such transaction was in 1989 when AES, a US electricity company, invested in a forestry plantation (of 
pine and eucalyptus) in Guatemala to offset the emissions from its new coal-fired power plant in 
Connecticut” (2010: 109). 
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record high 10.3 billions tCO2e)126 and achieved an astounding aggregate value of $176 
billion. Within the carbon market, the EU ETS represents by a large margin the most 
relevant carbon trading mechanism at present. In 2005 it mobilised nearly US $8 billion 
which became $49 billion in 2008 to spike in 2011, when its value reached nearly $148 
billion. Growth in CDM followed a similar trend in the 2005-2008 time window (from 
$2.5 billion to $33 billion), but then registered a sudden stop in 2009 (just over $20 
billion) due to the “complexity and changing nature of regulations, inefficiencies in the 
regulatory chain and capacity bottlenecks” (World Bank 2010b:2). After having almost 
imperceptibly decreased in 2010, the CDM market grew by 10% in 2011, totalling more 
than $22 billion. Interestingly, the largest share (over 25%) of the CDM market is 
represented by hydroelectric projects, which are generally – albeit very problematically – 
considered a kind of “green”, renewable energy production with no GHG emissions 
(Fletcher 2010). As for carbon forestry, its total value in 2010 was approximately US 
$133 million, while its present volume has more than doubled with regard to 2008. Such 
circumstance is presently propelling the wave of enthusiasm for REDD+ offsets. REDD+ 
has expanded from 30.1 million tCO2e exchanged in primary and secondary markets in 
2009 to 74.7 million tCO2e in 2010, in particular from voluntary markets transactions 
(Ecosystem Marketplace 2011). Moreover, REDD+'s interest for traders extends beyond 
narrow economic considerations: the significance of these projects, in fact, lies in the fact 
that they are penetrating in rural areas to profoundly alter the modalities through which 
communities and landowners manage and value land and, more generally, natural 
                                                 
126 A tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) is the measurement unit of carbon in the dedicated 
markets. 
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resources. As Esteve Corbera and Charlotte Friedli appropriately note: “Community 
forests are discursively becoming reservoirs of a tradable, yet invisible, commodity, and 
land used for grazing can be, temporarily at least, reorganised as forest plantations or 
agro-forestry systems for carbon trading purposes” (2012: 210). Finally, in terms of 
future perspectives, carbon trading is supposed to expand even more steadily in the next 
few years. Referring to three different estimates, Robert Fletcher reports that aggregate 
carbon trading is predicted to reach a value of US $2-3 trillion by 2020 and eventually an 
impressive $10 trillion (2012).127   
  
 Carbon trading's theoretical design, as well the World Bank's enthusiastic figures 
regarding its constant expansion, seem to suggest a very healthy state of global carbon 
markets. As many critics have convincingly shown, however, the reality of actually 
existing carbon markets has never been even close to this idyllic theoretical 
elaboration.128 In general terms, as an excellent empirical study conducted by Michael 
Dorsey and Gerardo Gambirazzio unmistakably reveals, what was conceived of as a 
perfectly competitive market aimed at producing price-based incentives to invest in low-
carbon technologies and productive processes as turned out to be nothing else than an 
oligonomy, namely “a combination of an oligopoly in which there are only a few sellers, 
                                                 
127 Of course, the overall economic size of carbon trading represents just a small fraction of 
derivatives market as a whole, whose value has been estimated in over US $700 trillion (Burne 2011). 
However, it is important to stress that, in proportional terms, the weight of carbon trading is predicted to 
rapidly increase. 
128 Again, the following exposition of carbon trading's flaws does not pretend to be exhaustive; rather, 
it is functional to the specific purposes of our analysis, which mainly concerns the peculiar features of the 
commodities traded in carbon markets. 
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and an oligopsony in which there are only a few buyers” (2012: 27). As a consequence, 
regardless of the multifarious sources of project-financing (private funds, public money, 
institutional investors), carbon trading enacts, in the last instance, a type of market which 
is “remarkably small and controlled by a small number of players with little competition 
among them to be found” (Ibid.: 32). With specific regard to the EU ETS, we can refer to 
at least six flaws: the first refers to the over-allocation of permits due to industrial 
lobbying. The consequence of such lobbying has been the collapse of permit prices as 
early as 2006. In other words, the cap established by governmental agencies is too high 
(Ellerman, Buchner and Carraro 2007). The second problem concerns the so-called 
“windfall profits” for the most polluting sectors, since the allocation of permits is 
determined according to past levels of emissions, so that the more a company polluted the 
more permits it receives (Gullì 2008). The third complication is the possibility of 
complying to the EU ETS cap by purchasing offsets from projects in the global South, 
where it is more difficult to verify compliance. Accountability is an obvious difficulty, 
and corruption has been widespread so far (Lohmann 2011a). The fourth inconvenience 
relates to incentives for the transition to a low-carbon economy, which is to say the very 
goal of carbon markets. Given the collapse of permit prices (which also occurred in 2008 
and 2011), those incentives not only never materialised, but ended up being re-directed to 
massive fossil-based activities (Bond 2012a). The fifth issue regards the so-called “hot 
air”: as we saw, the EU ETS provided highly polluting companies with more permits than 
they needed; in addition, such permits can be banked and used any time in the future, 
granting big emitters the right to postpone emissions cuts at least until 2016. Moreover, 
member countries can also trade permits with Eastern European states and Russia, which 
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possess an enormous excess of allowances because of the collapse of industrial 
production following the meltdown of the Soviet Union: the KP baseline year being 
1990, these countries benefit from allocation actually higher than their current emission 
patterns (Open Europe 2007). The sixth flaw is essentially political: the exclusive 
preference for carbon markets has made it impossible to envisage and implement 
alternative ways of reducing GHG emissions (Childs 2012).  
 Many of these EU ETS flaws affect the CDM as well. This latter, however, 
presents at the very least three distinctive weaknesses – different from one another but 
tightly interrelated – that have been repeatedly demonstrated and criticised by climate 
justice activists. The first concerns the issue of double counting: as we saw, in the context 
of the KP Annex I countries agreed to reduce their GHG emissions with regard to the 
1990 as baseline-year, whereas non-Annex I countries, although not legally forced to cut 
emissions, agreed to attempt a reduction with regard to their Business As Usual 
trajectories. Carbon trading – and especially CDM-projects – is supposed to help both 
sets of actors to meet their targets in the most cost-efficient way. However, carbon offsets 
being a very particular kind of commodity – constitutively intangible and dependent on 
abstract calculations – such convergence between developed and developing countries' 
needs has been largely attained by simultaneously accounting alleged CDM-induced 
emissions reductions both in the proponent state and in the hosting nation. It is important 
to underline that the spectre of double counting is not merely a technical problem 
susceptible of quick design-fixes; rather, it is configured as an intrinsic risk pertaining to 
carbon offsets as abstract commodities. As James Kohm, associate director of 
enforcement at the US Federal Trade Commission's bureau of consumer protection, 
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recently remarked: “Offsets are not like products that you can touch or feel. I might sell 
you an offset for planting a tree, but how do you know that I have not also sold that offset 
to someone else?” (Kohm quoted in Schmidt 2009: 65). Thus, it can be argued that, since 
double counting suites very well the economic interests of both buyers and sellers, its 
diffusion has been impressively wide so far. A second crucial flaw of the CDM refers to 
the unavoidable complexity of calculating (and, hence, meeting) the additionality 
requirements. It is nowadays commonly accepted, even by supporters of CDM projects, 
that in terms of emissions reductions such a scheme is, at best, neutral. In other words, 
the CDM might, indirectly – through its impacts in the EU ETS – and in the long run, 
facilitate investments in renewable energies; however, in itself this flexible mechanism 
does not curb carbon emissions. Moreover, recent and detailed studies have 
authoritatively confirmed the CDM's inherent vulnerability to climate fraud and manifest 
conflict of interest (Drew and Drew 2010). A few brief examples will provide a clearer 
idea of such a predisposition to artificial subterfuge:  
a) In order to be accepted by the CDM Executive Board, every proponent must first 
elaborate a Project Design Document (PDD), whose highly convoluted technicalities are 
often outsourced to professional consultants, usually companies. The largest of those 
companies is Ecosecurities, which has developed over 300 CDM projects successfully 
registered by 2009. Interestingly enough, Ecosecurities is at the same time “the largest 
single purchaser of CDM credits, since its interests lie mainly in trading the credits rather 
than in the projects themselves” (Gilbertson and Reyes 2009: 64);  
b) Carbon credits accredited for the substitution of HFCs from refrigeration factories 
(especially in China) are usually invoked to prove that CDM projects can properly work 
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when properly designed. Such a claim, however, ignores the disturbing reality that, since 
HFC presents a much higher Global Warming Potential (GWP)129 than carbon dioxide, 
its elimination creates an extraordinary amount of credits and, as a consequence, it has 
recently attracted conspicuous investments. Therefore, as paradoxical as it may sound, 
Mike Childs has suggested that “some factories have been built specifically to create the 
pollution to make money from then curbing it” (2012: 16);   
c) Many of the officially accepted CDM projects would have been developed in any case, 
attesting that they cannot be said to be additional in any meaningful way whatsoever. 
Information about such failures is today abundant and easily accessible, but the July 2008 
cable sent by the American Consulate in Mumbai to the Secretary of State and released 
by Wikileaks in August 2011 remains particularly instructive. The cable is a summary of 
a meeting that the Consulate's Office and the US Governmental Accountability Office 
(GAO) had with Indian industrialists regarding their views and experience with the 
CDM. The way corporate as well as governmental actors discuss additionality-related 
issues show unmistakably how these latter are considered irritating bureaucratic 
technicalities to be avoided through fraud and false accounting rather than legitimate 
conditions of project-feasibility. As climate and energy specialist Payal Parekh 
commented on her blog:  
The cable is a gold mine – it provides clear evidence that non-additional projects 
(those that do not provide real emission reductions) are being supported. And 
even better, the statements come directly from the horses' mouths – project 
                                                 
129 A more detailed analysis of this concept shall be provided in the next section. 
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developers, a former head of the CDM Executive Board, project auditors, 
financiers and CEOs of major Indian industrial companies (Parekh 2011). 
 
A third problem related to the CDM is what has been defined carbon colonialism. It 
refers to the long-standing power unevenness that defines international relations. To 
simplify a little, this critical argument runs as follows: after having historically over-used 
the atmospheric carbon dump, the global North is currently postponing its emissions 
reductions by outsourcing them in the global South through the CDM (Lohmann 2005). 
In practical terms, the putative cuts resulting from the difference between a 
counterfactual baseline centred around a BAU projection and the actual trajectory of 
carbon emissions (which should in theory benefit from clean technology transfers) ends 
up being ascribed to Northern states or companies, even though it is released in the 
Southern share of the planetary carbon dump. Heidi Bachram strongly criticises such 
practices in the following terms: 
The dynamics of carbon trading, whereby powerful actors benefit at the 
expense of disempowered communities in both North and South, is a modern 
incarnation of a dark colonial past. European colonialism extracted natural 
resources as well as people from the colonised world. In the 20th century, 
international financial institutions took on the role of economic coloniser in 
the form of Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) for the “Third World”. 
Now an ecological crisis created by the old colonisers is being reinvented as 
another market opportunity. This new market brings with it all the built-in 
inequities that other commodity markets thrive upon. From the pumping of 
pollution into communities of colour in Los Angeles to the land grabbing for 
carbon “sinks” in South America, emissions trading continues this age-old 
colonial tradition (Bachram 2004: 16).  
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 A different, but equally dramatic form of contemporary colonialism is at play in 
the context of REDD+ projects. The reference here is to what can be labelled as 
epistemological colonialism. A market-based account of nature – in turn reliant on 
Western scientific modes of thinking – is given indisputable privilege over indigenous 
cosmovisions whose relationships with landscapes and environments are irreducible to 
the mediative function of money as a general equivalent.130 Furthermore, with regard to 
the role played by the general intellect in contemporary productive processes, it is crucial 
to note that REDD+ is also being used to plant in the South Genetically Modified Trees 
(GMT), which is to say trees that are specifically engineered to be transformed into liquid 
fuels (agro-fuels), electricity, plastic or various chemicals. All of these are supposed to be 
key elements in combating climate change through carbon trading. The rationale for 
planting GMTs is, once again, maximisation of profit through minimisation of land used: 
biotech lobbyists argue that GMT plantations would protect forests by allowing for “more 
wood on less land” (Petermann 2011). However, knowledge-related colonialism is but 
one aspect of a more general colonial rule imposed by carbon trading and, in particular, 
by REDD+ projects. Such a rule is neatly synthesised and deeply criticised by The 
International Forum of Indigenous Peoples On Climate Change in its first statement to 
the United Nations on REDD, released in the course of the COP 13 in Bali, Indonesia: 
REDD will not benefit Indigenous Peoples, but, in fact, it will result in more 
violations of Indigenous Peoples' Rights. It will increase the violation of our 
                                                 
130 On a different but intertwined level, it is important not to forget the multifarious attempts to 
commodify traditional indigenous knowledge through various modalities of bioprospecting (i.e. the process 
of discovery and commercialisation of new products based in biological resources, typically in the global 
South). For an instructive case study, see Ratuva (2009); for the centrality of indigenous knowledge in 
resisting market expansionism, see Walsh (2002); for the link between REDD+ and bioprospecting, see 
Lohmann (2008). 
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Human Rights , our rights to our lands, territories and resources, steal our land, 
cause forced evictions, prevent access and threatens indigenous agriculture 
practices, destroy biodiversity and culture diversity and cause social conflicts. 
Under REDD, States and Carbon Traders will take more control over our forests 
(reported in Boas 2011: 60). 
 
 
 After this very brief overview, it is not difficult to conclude that, in terms of 
reducing emissions, carbon markets do not work.131 Better still: there is a manifest short-
circuit between the environmental goal and the economical means of carbon trading. In 
fact, although no ecological improvement has been made, a huge amount of value has 
been created and then transferred to fossil fuel-intensive companies through the 
production of what can be called climate rent. As Larry Lohmann aptly points out: “The 
fact that governments are both suppliers and regulators of emissions commodities has 
encouraged rampant rent-seeking and complicated allocation schemes that profit, rather 
than penalise, heavy polluters” (quoted in Reyes 2011: 6). Probably, rather than claiming 
that carbon trading does not work, it is better to argue for its environmental irrelevance; 
on the other hand, its economical impacts have been significant even if not consistent 
through time (frequent carbon price collapses have repeatedly undermined the markets' 
credibility even on their own terms). Borrowing Lohmann's brilliant paraphrasing of 
                                                 
131 Ironically, where the multilateral environmental policy failed, the global financial crisis 
succeeded: in 2009, Annex I CO2 emissions decreased by 6.5% (although, not by chance, non Annex I 
emissions rose by 3.3%). As the latest International Energy Agency report states: “Energy consumption in 
2009 was affected by the global financial crisis and some of the CO2 emissions trends seen may be 
deceptive [...] In the medium term, Annex I CO2 emissions are expected to rebound when economic 
conditions pick up” (IEA 2011: 8). 
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Foucault's famous statement about the prison system, it is possible to conclude that 
carbon trading “has always been offered as its own remedy: the reactivation of its 
techniques as the only means of overcoming its perpetual failure [...] the supposed failure 
is part of its functioning” (Foucault quoted in Lohmann 2011b: 102).    
 
2 - CARBON COMMODITIES AS SECOND ORDER ABSTRACTIONS 
 
 The critiques we have briefly reviewed show the profoundly violent character of the 
carbon-related wave of new enclosures132 and provide the line of continuity between 
those and the old ones. It is now time to analyse in greater detail the historical novelty 
represented by carbon commodities, and specifically EUAs and CERs. As for the 
investigation conducted in the previous chapter, our main references – or, better: points of 
departure – are provided by a Marxist reading of the climate crisis and a Foucauldian 
approach to accounting (in our case, carbon accounting) as not merely a technical, 
supposedly faithful translation of physical entities into financial ones, but rather as a 
productive governmental dispositif whose implementation sets in motion a political 
constellation of meaningful practices. After having theoretically situated our reflection, 
                                                 
132 A report issued in 2009 by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan's Global Humanitarian 
Forum, entitled The Anatomy of a Silent Crisis, acknowledges that – due to a lack of effective policy 
response – “an estimated 325 million people are seriously affected by climate change every year. This 
estimate is derived by attributing a 40% proportion of the increase in the number of weather-related 
disasters from 1980 to the present to climate change and a 4 % proportion of the total seriously affected by 
environmental degradation based on negative health outcomes [...] Application of this proportion projects 
that more than 300,000 die due to climate change every year – roughly equivalent to having an Indian 
Ocean tsunami annually” (Global Humanitarian Forum quoted in Sharife and Bond 2012a: 1).   
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we will address three interrelated issues: a) the production of unprecedented use-values 
by means of a massive and constitutive mobilisation/exploitation of the general intellect, 
with specific regard to forestry as conceived of under REDD+ projects; b) the ambivalent, 
fluid and contested legal nature of EUAs, which make such commodities not only 
actually existing (as opposed to fictitious), but also particularly fitting to the neoliberal 
mantra of government through financial instability; c) the financial nature and 
knowledge-based character of CERs – in particular with regard to the issue of 
additionality – as well as their problematic but governmentally efficient interface with 
uncertainty as a crucial element of carbon trading. 
 
 A particularly relevant Marxist understanding of the climate crisis, and the mainstream 
solution to it – i.e. carbon markets – is provided by Patrick Bond's recent volume entitled 
Politics of Climate Justice (2012a). Bond makes explicit reference to David Harvey's 
theory of capitalist development centred around the pivotal notion of crisis. Elaborating 
on Marx's analysis, Harvey sees the tendency to over-accumulate until a critical threshold 
is crossed as the main character of capitalism as a mode of production. A capitalist crisis 
can be defined as “a condition in which surplus production and reinvestment are blocked. 
Growth then stops and there appears to be an excess over-accumulation of capital relative 
to the opportunities to use capital profitably” (Harvey 2010: 45). If growth does not 
rapidly recover, as it has clearly been the case with the recent financial meltdown, we 
witness both a significant devaluation of capital and diversified attempts to displace the 
crisis, to “move” it along spatial as well as temporal lines in the eventually impossible 
hope of seeing it disappear. The analysis of spatial-fixes and temporal-fixes as 
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displacement strategies has been carried out by Harvey three decades ago in his seminal 
The Limits to Capital (1982), but has been remarkably updated (Harvey 2003) to fit our 
neoliberal present through the addition of a third dislocation tactic, namely accumulation 
by dispossession. Such an expedient allows capital to impose its dominance over non-yet-
capitalist terrains of social and natural life and to internalise them in its valorising 
mechanisms. In other words, accumulation by dispossession is a form of forced 
redistribution of wealth from the already poor to the already rich by means of the 
privatisation of the commons, financialisation of the entire economy, management and 
manipulation of crises in the interest of the private sector (e.g. Structural Adjustment 
Programs) and the implementation of savage cuts to social programmes and the welfare 
state (e.g. current spending reviews and austerity policies in the EU).   
 With specific regard to the neoliberal era, Harvey puts his tripartite scheme to work and 
explains how capital has been able to displace its over-accumulation crisis (rooted in the 
1970s) through: a) a spatial dispersion of critical issues based on the process of 
globalisation; b) a temporal capacity to defuse social tensions by means of 
financialisation; c) a violent act of plunder and colonisation of “virgin” territories centred 
around accumulation by dispossession, which is to say a new form of imperialism 
(Harvey 2005). Patrick Bond names this three-fold displacement procedure as “shifting, 
stalling and stealing”, and proposes to critically address carbon trading from this 
perspective. As he argues: 
Carbon markets offer useful vehicles for shifting, stalling and stealing, since from 
the standpoint of space, they move the challenge of emissions cuts to the South 
(hence preventing industrialisation). From the standpoint of time, they permit a 
financialised futures-market approach – no matter how fanciful – to the supposed 
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prevention of planet threatening climate change. And from the standpoint of 
accumulation by dispossession, by 'privatising the air' (through carving up the 
atmosphere to sell as carbon credits) the maintenance of an exploitative 
relationship between capital and non-capitalist spheres is also crucial (Bond 
2012a: 74). 
 
The practico-theoretical merits of Bond's analysis are multiple: first, it rightly frames 
carbon trading as a neoliberal attempt to manage the global warming crisis; second, it 
precisely locates its financial origins and provides insightful ground to assess the 
impending risk of a “subprime carbon shock” (Chan 2009: 3); third, it places a market-
based solution to climate change in the context of the perennial, capital-induced power 
unbalance between the global North and the global South. Thus, to a significant degree, 
such an analysis should be considered valid and accurate. From our perspective, however, 
an important element of the contemporary circuits of valorisation is being overlooked. 
We refer to the location of exploitation only in the “relationship between capital and non-
capitalist spheres”. According to Bond, the new commodities traded in carbon markets 
should be conceived of merely as new substance, extracted from non-(yet)-capitalist 
territories, for the immutable commodity-form, namely the very locus of capital as a 
social relation. Although, as we said, such a process is undoubtedly under way, we 
contend that it does not exhaust the complexity of the privatisation of the atmosphere. 
Rather, consistent with the hypothesis of nature as an element of valorisation, we argue 
that exploitation is directly at play in the very process of creating carbon commodities in 
a (partially) new form. Our goal is to show how the (potentially sclerotic) self-reflexivity 
of financial valorisation transposes the commodity frontier within itself and, in so doing, 
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make it intensive (second order abstraction) rather than extensive (first order abstraction). 
This means that the interplay between use-value and exchange-value can no longer be 
exclusively understood as a translation from “natural distinctness” to “economic 
equivalence” (Marx 1993: 141). On the contrary, a decisive element of carbon 
commodities as exchange-values resides in the ex-ante creation of capital-based use-
values. In brief, we would like to supplement an analysis of carbon trading as a 
displacement strategy (mostly based on accumulation by dispossession) with an account 
of it structured on what Sandro Mezzadra (2012) has termed accumulation by 
exploitation.133 From the perspective of a political critique of carbon trading, the notion 
of accumulation by exploitation is most fruitfully articulated by connecting it, on the one 
hand, to the mobilisation of the general intellect as the organising principle of 
contemporary common production and, on the other hand, to the self-reflexive creation of 
new use values within capitalist circuits of valorisation. Thus, we propose to refer to it as 
accumulation by second order abstractions.  
 In this context, one of the main theoretical premises of Bond's study, namely the 
reciprocal externality between neoliberal capital and the planetary climate, must be put 
into question and constructively problematised. In an important passage, the author 
writes: 
If the Earth's atmosphere – specifically, climate and weather patterns that are 
viable for human life and capital accumulation – is considered to be an element of 
                                                 
133 In his notable review of the Italian edition of a collection of David Harvey's essays (amongst them 
is The Right to the City, 2008), Mezzadra argues that in the most recent developments of Harvey's thought, 
albeit embryonically, a convergence between accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by 
exploitation might be detected. 
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'non-capitalist organisation', as it should be, then the commodification of the air 
itself, via the carbon markets, is a way for capital to accumulate on the one hand. 
Yet on the other hand, at the same time, it is a way for capital to contribute to the 
'continuous and progressive disintegration' of a liveable climate, because as we 
again must point out, carbon markets are a false solution to the climate crisis 
(Bond 2012a: 71. Our emphasis). 
 
Leaving aside the controversial issue of whether or not capitalism is, in the long run, 
compatible with life-sustaining atmospheric conditions,134 are we really sure that climate 
and weather patterns should be considered as elements of non-capitalist organisation? At 
a first sight, this separation might appear as an indisputable matter of fact. At a closer 
look, however, such an issue proves to be all but trivial: as we anticipated following the 
lines of research traced by Paul Edwards, the linkage between extreme weather events 
and global warming is not immediate. For such a correlation to make sense – which is to 
say, to be open to scientific investigation as well as governmental management – the 
filter-function performed by differentiated knowledge infrastructures is decisive and 
unavoidable. As we will argue in more detail with regard to forestry and REDD+ 
projects, the use-value of carbon commodities – namely the primal hold on which their 
exchange-value develops its indifference – is not natural. In other words, in the context 
of carbon trading the Marxian relationship between “natural distinctness” and “economic 
equivalence” has to be rethought in light of the tremendous mobilisation of the general 
intellect which is incorporated in the knowledge infrastructures and, as such, it implies 
what we have called in the previous chapter an abstraction leap. Ingmar Lippert 
                                                 
134 We shall return to this issue in the Conclusion. 
202 
 
compellingly proposes the term extended carbon cognition to refer to the multifarious 
assemblages of heterogeneous entities which constitute the contested notion of GHG 
emissions; as he states, “carbon emissions came into existence through a socio-technical 
network [...] based on a cultural setting that configured humans and non-humans in a 
specific [corporate-driven] way” (2011: 7). Let us note, in passing, that such a putting to 
work of the general intellect is never neutral: on the contrary, it is always marked by 
exploitation as impression. Otherwise stated, money (exchange-value) does no longer act 
as the (first order) abstract counterpart of a putative external nature (use-value); rather, 
money becomes the unsurpassable limit, as well as the original seal, of the knowledge-
based process by means of which new use-values are created to conform to neoliberal 
capital's needs (hence the characterisation of carbon commodities as second order 
abstractions). This underlying tension between the moment of informational 
heterogeneity (differentiated knowledge-sources organised by the general intellect) and 
the moment of monetary equivalence (situated both at the beginning of the process – 
capital's need to self-valorise – and at the end of the process – realisation through 
verification) is at the very heart of the act of governing through financial instability. We 
must stress once more that the problem it represents is entirely political: the argument 
according to which carbon trading can be improved by means of creating more and better 
information hides the bare fact that knowledge production is today the very battlefield 
upon which the antagonism between capital and labour (in the form of the general 
intellect) takes place.135 As a consequence, “more and better information” means nothing 
                                                 
135 Since repetita juvant, let us stress once again that this argument is context-specific and grounds its 
(obviously disputable) validity on its application to the case of carbon trading. Extending this argument to 
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else than a temporary outcome of the struggle: capital is winning. However, such an 
outcome, as we shall see in the next chapter – dedicated to climate justice movements – is 
far from being secured once and for all. The instability-induced crises are in fact 
proliferating at an unprecedented pace and carbon markets become progressively 
problematic even on their own terms. 
 
 As we highlighted in the previous chapter, these new features of exploitation do not occur 
in a political vacuum but, rather, in the stratified context of a governmentality whose best 
definition is, following Foucault, neoliberal rationality. Against this background, it is 
possible to propose an analysis of carbon accounting as a specific governmental dispositif 
which, by theoretically designing and politically implementing a regime of truth based on 
market competitiveness, translates the visibility of the climate crisis (which progressively 
arose as a by-product of the liberal phase of governmentality) into its manageability 
(which is the main character of the contemporary, neoliberal phase of governmentality). 
This analytical framework allows us to overcome a long-standing bias of the Marxist 
tradition which, according to Larry Lohmann, while stressing “the priority of exchange to 
commensuration, has perhaps neglected exploring the ways categories created by new 
commensurations help make possible new forms of exploitation and value” (2009: 502). 
Carbon accounting, in fact, represents a fundamental element of the climate-related form 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
contemporary global production as a whole would require an immensely more complex analysis than the 
one provided here. 
204 
 
of financial government of the general intellect through the production of a perpetual 
state of instability. Capitalist valorisation/exploitation and governmental management are 
but two sides of the same coin and, in the context of global warming as a planetary crisis, 
carbon accounting embodies their entanglements through the production – via political 
categorisation and non-neutral establishment of comparability – of notably governable 
objects (tCO2e, EUAs, CERs, etc.) as well as eminently governable subjects (green 
consumers, carbon neutral corporations, carbon traders, etc.). 
 Referring to the governmental role of accounting practices in general, the 
Foucauldian-inspired field of governmentality studies136 has produced a series of 
important inquiries, which are of great relevance for our purposes.137 In general terms, 
such inquires aim at showing and unpacking the complex link between governmental 
practices and calculative infrastructures: by rendering numerically comparable what is 
essentially incomparable – for example in the form of a single financial figure which 
contains and enacts irreducible kinds or classes of different entities – accounting 
assembles into one category the multifarious heterogeneity of the world and, as such, 
configures itself as profoundly political. To qualify such a process, Neil Fliegstein has 
aptly advanced the label of “politics of quantification” (1998). Moreover, as proposed by 
Stephen Collier, accounting could be located in the list of topologies of power, namely 
“patterns of correlation in which heterogeneous elements – techniques, material forms, 
institutional structures and technologies of power – are configured and transformed” 
                                                 
136 Four important volumes, amongst many, belonging to this tradition are: Burchell, Gordon and 
Miller (1991); Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996); Dean (1999); Miller and Rose (2008). For a critical 
discussion of this general topic, see Ciccarelli (2008). 
137 For a meritorious critical review, see Mennicken and Miller (2012).  
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(2009: 78). In a similar vein, Nikolas Rose has emphasised the performative function of 
numerical production: 
Numbers do not merely inscribe a pre-existing reality. They constitute it [...] The 
collection and aggregation of numbers participate in the fabrication of a 'clearing' 
within which thought and action can occur. Numbers here help to delineate 'irreal 
spaces' for the operation of government, and to make them out by a grid of norms 
allowing evaluation and judgement (Rose 1999: 212). 
 
In short, calculability enacts governmentality but, at the same time, governmentality 
provides the numbers which compose calculability with their context-specific meanings. 
The link between these two aspects is constitutive and ineluctable. This does not mean, 
however, that such a relationship can be configured a-historically. On the contrary, 
accounting as a politically invested social practice has performed more than one function. 
In the Fordist epoch, for example, accounting played a disciplinary role both by 
reinforcing the principles of scientific management and by forcing workers' subjectivities 
to conform to the rhythms of the factory system (Lambert and Pezet 2012). In carbon 
accounting, however, such a disciplinary feature is coupled with a more proactive 
function aimed at literally shaping the climate crisis in such a way that it (putatively) 
suits competitive markets. In other words, carbon accounting simultaneously activates 
and is framed by the neoliberal regime of truth which conceives of the environment (in 
this case, the climate) as an element of the process of valorisation to be inserted as 
smoothly as possible within the mechanisms of profit-making. In the context of 
potentially catastrophic global warming, such a regime of truth, which finds in the market 
its principle of veridiction, gives rise to a dogmatic equation – as indisputable as it is 
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undemonstrable at the empirical level – that, elaborating on the recent work of Larry 
Lohmann (2011c), we might define as follows: 
 
climatic stability = reductions in CO2 emissions = carbon trading = sustainable 
economic growth 
 
The cogency of this dogma is demonstrated not only by the insistence with which the 
UNFCCC has invested in carbon markets notwithstanding their irrelevant – if not 
negative – ecological impacts, but also by the increasing difficulties encountered by 
market actors in justifying the narratives of green economy and sustainable growth. For 
instance, commenting on some interviews with carbon trading participants collected at 
Carbon Expo 2010 (the “Global Carbon Market Fair & Conference”), Philippe 
Descheneau and Matthew Paterson conclude that the tension between increasing 
economic profits and non-existent emissions reductions can be expected to “play a role in 
how carbon actors construct markets on a daily basis. There are limits to the cognitive 
dissonance which would be produced by entirely ignoring the goal of emissions 
reductions while constantly telling a story about such reductions” (2011: 676. Our 
emphasis).138 On a more technical level, this carbon trading dogma is enacted by three 
                                                 
138 This cognitive dissonance is, we believe, particularly compelling when analysed in the framework 
of exploitation through impression. In fact, the incitement to a very specific kind of freedom (or self-
government, or autonomy) which is from the outset bound to its eventual translatability into the grammar of 
money, should be assumed to act as a multiplier of frictions between the potential infinity of autonomous 
practices (heterogeneity) and the exclusionary nature of the only possible outcome (money-making).   
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supports: informational (production of market-based carbon knowledge)139; legal 
(enforcement of a regulation framework aimed at implementing government through 
instability)140; calculative/promissory (de-politicisation of the future by means of its 
market-led prefiguration).141 
 To further substantiate this theoretical argument, it might be useful to refer to an 
important article recently published by Francisco Ascui and Heather Lovell, titled “As 
Frames Collide: Making Sense of Carbon Accounting” (2011). The starting point of the 
authors is compelling: carbon accounting is shown in its different meanings to different 
subjects. For example, to scientists carbon accounting refers to the practice of making 
experiment-proof measurements of GHG emissions; to governmental negotiators, it is 
linked to the set of rules that establishes comparability between emissions and removals 
as reported with commitments at the national level; to CDM practitioners, it implies “the 
measurement of reductions in emissions relative to a hypothetical baseline, and other 
processes associated with the subsequent creation of a new tradable commodity: a carbon 
credit” (2011: 978); to the International Accounting Standards Board, “it concerns the 
accounting of tradable emissions rights and obligations arising under emissions trading 
schemes” (Ivi: 979); finally, to corporations involved in reporting to various disclosure 
programs (such as the Carbon Disclosure Project142 or the Climate Registry), it requires 
                                                 
139 See section 2.2 below. 
140 See section 2.3 below. 
141 See section 2.4 below. 
142 The Carbon Disclosure Project was introduced in 2002 (guided by the telling aphorism: “what gets 
measured can be managed”) and has since then proven to be fairly effective in mobilising institutional 
investors: by 2008, the CDP was backed by US $57 trillion worth of assets from over 3000 financial 
institutions (Newell and Paterson 2010). Its greater achievement, however, is that it showed with extreme 
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numerical quantification and ensuing publication of GHG emissions for which companies 
may accept varying degrees of responsibility. Notwithstanding the multilayered 
complexity of carbon accounting, Ascui and Lovell also provide an excellent general 
definition of it (Figure 3). 
Figure 1. Source: Ascui and Lovell (2011: 980). 
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clarity the elevation of climate change as a critical shareholder value issue for investors, hence its elective 
affinity with financial markets. 
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For our purposes, this overview of the internal articulations of the notion of carbon 
accounting is crucial since it sheds analytical light on the heterogeneous assemblages 
produced by the general intellect in its diverse forms. What emerges form this 
examination of the various meanings of carbon accounting is a shared need to produce 
information as measure, coupled with a necessity to find multiple sources for it. 
Although the authors claim that increasing harmonisation amongst divergent perspectives 
would amount to a general improvement in accounting practices,143 we find Donald 
MacKenzie's take on the issue to be more convincing: “The most detailed rulebook will 
on its own be insufficient to determine the practice of bookkeeping and accounting” 
(MacKenzie 2009a: 120). Similarly, Larry Lohmann underlines how “full cost accounting 
is an ever-receding mirage” (Lohmann 2009: 502). This constitutive incompleteness is all 
the more understandable when situated within the hypothesis according to which carbon 
accounting is a governmental dispositif aimed at enabling government through instability. 
In fact, Dimitar Zvedzdov has accurately indicated that “accountants need to be involved 
                                                 
143 “Unacknowledged and unresolved tensions in carbon accounting can undermine confidence in 
climate science, policies, markets and reporting, thereby ultimately discouraging action to mitigate climate 
change: making sense of carbon accounting presents an opportunity to make a positive contribution to find 
practical solutions” (2011: 991). 
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in corporate sustainability accounting” not so much because of their professional 
expertise – no matter how masterful that might be – but rather because of their privileged 
position as “information gatekeepers” (2011: 601).  
 In other words, it is not the ability to translate physical knowledge into financial 
reporting that counts the most; on the contrary, it is the possibility of accountants to be 
exposed to multiple sources of carbon-related information that makes their contributions 
relevant to companies. Actually, the knowledge filter-function proves to be fundamental, 
especially since the crucial task involved in creating value out of knowledge is selection 
rather than further production. Once again, however, we have to stress the political nature 
of such a selective process: deciding which knowledge agencies are to be considered 
truth-producers – and about what – is one of the main contemporary features of 
exploitative capitalist command. Keeping this point in mind, the issue of knowledge 
selection is neatly captured by the notion of valorimeters advanced by Koray Ḉaliṣkan 
and Michel Callon: 
We suggest the term 'valorimeters' to denote the various tools, procedures, 
machines, instruments or, more generally, devices effecting this controversial 
translation of values into figures and, more precisely, into monetary amounts. 
Calculative agencies which are able to achieve the imposition of their 
valorimeters, that is, their numeric calculation tools and algorithms, with their 
calculatory modes have a good chance of simultaneously being able to impose 
prices that those tools make it possible to calculate; they become positioned to 
transform their own valuation into an obligatory passage point and can spread the 
definitions of value that are more closely aligned with their interests (Ḉaliṣkan 
and Callon 2010: 17).    
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Moreover, Ascui and Lovell article is of great interest to us for another reason: originally 
drawing on Callon's methodology of framing and overflowing (1998), the authors argue 
that the contemporary debate on carbon accounting can be seen as a collision of five 
different frames: physical (measurement, estimation and calculation of chemical and 
geological attributions of GHG flows through the biophysical environment); political 
(national, hybrid units of measure – which are neither purely political nor plainly 
scientific – as embodied by the work of the IPCC); market-enabling (quantification and 
commensuration of intangible entities such has GHG emission permits/credits in order to 
turn them into new commodities); financial (establishment of economic-driven 
comparability in order to inscribe new liabilities, assets and value flows into corporate 
bookkeeping); social/environmental (creating assessable carbon for corporate reporting 
and disclosure, for example through product life cycle analysis [LCA]).  
 Ascui and Lovell's analysis of the collision between these frames is grounded on a 
historical understanding that assumes the first three categories (physical, political and 
market-enabling carbon accounting) as flatly successive since relevant literatures about 
them appeared in chronological sequence. Therefore, physical investigations dating back 
to Arrhenius would have provided the raw material for political considerations emerged 
in the 1990s, which in turn would represent the basis for a market-enabling approach to 
be developed and implemented in the 2000s. Finally, after carbon trading was established 
as a functioning system, both financial concerns and socio-environmental issues could be 
internalised in the realm of carbon accounting. From a simply chronological perspective, 
this linear trajectory appears to be natural as well as indisputable: as a first step we find 
science and a close-to-perfection adequacy of real entities to objects of thought; then, as 
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soon as the matter enters the political arena, things get complicated and require value-
based judgements, which compete to impose their interpretations of facts; finally, once a 
solution has been agreed upon (carbon trading as climate saviour), interpretations 
multiply and prescriptions about which economic tool is the more suitable collide, 
creating wide debates about operational implementation.  
 However, from the standpoint of a critical genealogy based on biopolitics as method, 
such a representation incurs a number of shortcomings. Firstly, physical accounting itself 
should not be considered as unproblematically objective: authoritative scholarship has by 
now come to the fairly common conclusion that Western science is but one way – 
absolutely not “innocent” – of making sense of the natural environment (Jonas 1974). 
Furthermore, what is central to a genealogical exploration is not so much the actual 
contents of knowledge, but rather the governmental rationality that sets them in motion. 
As a consequence, while it is true that “with the exception of financial carbon accounting, 
all of the other framings look to physical carbon accounting for fundamental principles” 
(Ascui and Lovell 2011: 984), it is false that those principles are enacted in a politically 
homogeneous manner.  
 What the authors fail to recognise is the shift from liberal capitalism to neoliberal 
capitalism, and especially the new way nature is subsumed under valorisation. Thus, the 
point of view of a critical genealogy of carbon accounting completely reverses the 
chronological line of succession: it is the need to turn the climate crisis into a profitable 
opportunity for business which drives the political elite to assess the issue from a market-
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led perspective, which in turn mobilises pre-existing knowledge to suit its purposes.144 
Such a “recuperation” is not a mere act of “bringing back”: to make “old” science 
convenient for “new” needs a multiplication of knowledge-based activity must take place. 
In fact, the creation of physical carbon information is not a neutral, context-less process. 
As Ingmar Lippert has warned with regard to the Environmental Management System 
(EMS)145, the classificatory practices which underlie carbon accounting should be 
addressed suspiciously: information is in itself a procedure prone to political selection. 
Appropriately, Lippert notes: “in the process of information being classified, some parts 
of the original set of data are disregarded and not made transparent”. Moreover, as he 
continues: “If we zoom into a category and question the relations stabilising its inside we 
are confronted with ontological politics. It is a politics about what kind of carbon is 
constructed and, eventually, emitted into social and economic reality” (Lippert 2012: 
139). This is why carbon accounting is intrinsically hybrid: within its borders, physics 
and atmospheric chemistry melt into politics and social science fired by the meta-framing 
provided by market competitiveness.  
 Thus, carbon commodities – as (partially) produced by carbon accounting – can be 
understood as a specifically governable objects: their production is performed by the 
exploitation of the general intellect as governed by the valorising self-reflexivity typical 
of neoliberal financial markets. This knowledge-based productivity which fundamentally 
                                                 
144 Larry Lohmann seems to be perfectly aware of this genealogical inversion when he writes: “The 
requirements of commodity creation – accounting, ownership, the possibility of capital accumulation – lead 
to the framing of the climate problem, and 'climate services', in terms of flows of molecules, especially of 
CO2 molecules” (2011b: 91). 
145 EMS is “an organisational structure which supposedly helps the organisation to move onto a 
trajectory of change towards incremental greening” (Lippert 2012: 144). 
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shapes carbon commodities is recognised by Ascui and Lovell, despite their disputable 
genealogical reconstruction as well as the lack of an in-depth analysis of exploitative 
practices occurring in this specific kind of innovative activity. In fact, the following quote 
nicely captures the essential and extensive mobilisation of the general intellect as the 
material base of carbon commodities production: 
Carbon has been difficult to classify in part because accountants and accounting 
standard-setters lack a full appreciation of the 'production process' of carbon 
credits: the science, politics and market-enabling rules involved in turning 
greenhouse gas emissions, and emissions reductions, into tradable commodities. 
A lack of knowledge and experience can be expected to reduce over time, but a 
more fundamental challenge is the way in which types of knowledge and 
information are framed by accountants as relevant to their decision-making 
(Ascui and Lovell 2011: 988-989).  
 
 Before delving in a more detailed way into the three operational supports of the carbon 
trading dogma, let us briefly consider the processes of shaping subjectivity which are 
disclosed by the marketisation of the climate crisis (Leonardi 2010b). Actually, it is from 
this standpoint that exploitation through impression, conceived of as a biopolitical 
dispositif aimed at selecting subjective trajectories potentially functional to capitalist 
valorisation, reveals itself in the clearest manner. A first form of exploitative production 
of climate subjectivity is provided by green consumerism, which is to say the translation 
at the level of individuals of a global crisis. Patiently constructed by marketing agencies 
(Grant 2007) to be coupled to the distorted idea of climate change being solvable through 
isolated, personal purchasing models, green consumerism represents nowadays a reliable 
market sector known as LOHAS (Lifestyles of Health and Sustainability), estimated 
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globally at US $500 billion and covering almost 20% of the population in OECD 
countries (Ross 2011). Interestingly, calculability and classificatory practices are also 
fundamental in enacting this market-led relationship to global warming. As Andrew Ross 
brilliantly states: 
The most everyday manifestation of this new [climate related] calculus is the 
growing habit of assessing the carbon footprint of every product and every 
personal movement, including acts of labour. Indeed, quantifying the world’s 
energy throughput on the micro-level of personal conduct is becoming a pseudo-
political obsession. In some ways, it is a perverse spin on the statistical tyranny of 
the GDP, reducing our actions and our use of material things to a data-set, the 
outcome of which is a moral assessment of our thermodynamic performance. 
Carbon-Neutral Man is the goal, a model of ascetic behaviour that is the obverse 
of the wasteful hyper-consumer (Ross 2011: 21). 
 
Another fitting example of a way of channelling the amount of liberty necessarily granted 
to the general intellect towards the marketisation of carbon – let us not forget that, as the 
notion of impression entails, “freedom in the marketplace” invariably implies elaborate 
practices of governmental management and self-monitoring – is provided by the 
mobilisation of carbon traders' desires.  
 Descheneau and Paterson, in their analysis of Carbon Expo 2010, emphasise the 
significant role of practitioners' affects and cultural values in making and sustaining 
carbon markets. At the heart of those processes, the authors detect a subjective orientation 
“which is not simply motivated by calculations of profit and risk, but is mobilised by a 
sort of liminal energy channelling through the boosters of these markets. It is definitely 
the 'romance, not the finance', which makes carbon markets go round” (2011: 667). It 
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must be highlighted that the modalities through which such genuine ecological 
enthusiasm is impressed by competitive markets are central to the production of value 
proper to carbon trading. For example, notwithstanding a certain anxiety due to the 
growing recognition that carbon markets' environmental performance is dramatically 
poor, the mantra of simultaneous environmental beneficence and commercial promise of 
carbon trading is compulsively repeated in the process of network creation which is 
fundamental to put different actors, techniques and products together so that value gets 
manufactured in various ways. Moreover, significant is the cynicism through which such 
enthusiastic environmentalists tap into a certain sense of general public's guilt about 
carbon emissions to channel it towards new, profitable visions of “healthy consumption” 
(e.g. Low-carbon diet), which are motivated by an extreme precision of calculation 
(carbon and carbs) and a profound level of self-control based on a market-framed 
interrelation between desire, debt, denial and “treat” (Harrington 2008).146  
 There are several other examples of individual subjectivity formation through a market-
driven interiorisation of the climate crisis – practices which articulate individuals as 
agents managing their own carbon behaviours in relation to a complex global goal of 
minimising climate change: Carbon Rationing Action Groups (CRAGS), schemes based 
on Personal Carbon Allowances – but it is crucial not to forget that the creation of 
eminently governable subjects does not concern exclusively, and probably not even 
primarily, individuals. Rather, such creation heavily impacts the collective spheres in all 
                                                 
146 There are clearly many similarities between this sense of guilt about carbon emissions and the 
European Union elites' attempt to represent the debt crisis as caused by dissipative and senseless credit-
induced lifestyles on the part of the lower classes. The passive interiorisation or active refusal of such debt 
guilt is today a fundamental political stake in European crisis management practices (and, of course, for the 
forces which oppose them). For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Dominijanni and Marazzi (2012). 
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of its forms: at a corporate level, through the progressive “greening” of Corporate Social 
Responsibility; at a state level, by means of the multiplication of ecological educational 
campaigns and governmental reforms aimed at sharpening environmental performances; 
finally, on a civil society dimension, we witness an expansion of large environmentalist 
NGOs (such as Greenpeace, the WWF, or 350.org) to the point in which global climate 
policy includes them as fundamental actors.147 Therefore, as Matthew Paterson and 
Johannes Stripple correctly remark, this peculiar kind of climate governmentality – that 
entails a sort of “conduct of carbon conduct”, to elaborate on a famous Foucauldian 
phrasing – “is enabled through calculative practices that simultaneously totalise 
(aggregating social practices, overall GHGs emissions) and individualise (producing 
reflexive subjects actively managing their GHGs practices)” (2010: 359).148   
 
3 - USE-VALUE LOSS OF INNOCENCE: THE THREE SUPPORTS OF CARBON 
TRADING DOGMA 
 
 In an extremely thought-provoking article published in 2008 and titled “Accumulation By 
Decarbonisation and the Governance of Carbon Offsets”, Adam Bumpus and Diana 
                                                 
147 This is, once again, an ambivalent process: on the one hand, it is a positive development that parts 
of civil society are involved in global policy making. On the other hand, however, their involvement is to a 
great extent due to their being impressed by capital. As Larry Lohmann pointedly note: “350.org embodies 
the CO2 fetish in its very name, referring to '350 parts per million' atmospheric concentration of CO2 
target” (2011b: 106). 
148 Interestingly, Paterson and Stripple propose to approach climate governmentality through the 
metaphor of Myspace “because of the similarities between the sorts of communicative rationality involved 
in carbon markets and software like My Space or Facebook” (2010: 343). 
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Liverman provide insightful ground to theoretically establish a fruitful convergence 
between the notions of accumulation by dispossession and accumulation by second order 
abstractions. The authors coined the term accumulation by decarbonisation to show how 
capital's accumulation in the context of climate governance is based both on violent 
episodes of evictions and colonialism and on the unprecedented – albeit problematic – 
creation of considerable opportunities to reduce concentrations of GHGs, to foster 
sustainable development through carbon offsets and to make profit out of emission 
trading. Whereas the reference to the analytical tool articulated by David Harvey is 
explicit – “the international climate regime may be seen to follow the pattern of 
accumulation by dispossession” (142) – the creative side of carbon trading is frequently 
evoked but eventually left rather undertheorised. Consider for instance the following 
passage: 
The institutions that govern carbon reductions (from market structuring to 
creating material projects to the marketing and selling of reductions) define the 
value placed on a tonne of carbon [equivalent] that is reduced. However, in this 
case the economic value of the environment is not simply for the resources it 
provides, but for the protection of the biosphere through a reduction of the risk of 
climate change as a whole. This broader implication reworks the value of an 
environmental resource that contributes to wider environmental protection 
(Bumpus and Liverman 2008: 147. Our emphases). 
 
The emphases we added are intended to show how the authors are aware of crucial issues 
such as classificatory practices, constitutive uncertainty/instability in governing the 
climate and production of new values out of the environment. However, this awareness 
does not amount to a full clarification about how exactly does accumulation by second 
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order abstractions take place in the realm of carbon trading. We suggest to approach such 
an issue from the perspective of the continuing unfolding of the tension between 
exchange-value and use-value in carbon markets. As it is widely recognised in climate 
governance scholarship, this tension appears to be quite distinct from its traditional shape. 
For instance, Adam Bumpus states: 
Carbon offsets have some very specific attributes associated with their 
commodification that contrast them to commodification in other 'natures'. The 
most important of which is that, in contrast to commodifying a unit of nature in 
order to govern its existence, like timber, carbon offsets create a commodity and 
value out of a piece of nature – carbon dioxide in the atmosphere – that, if 
achieved properly, does not exist (Bumpus 2011: 616). 
 
Similarly, Descheneau and Paterson locate the difference between Carbon Expo and other 
momentous market fairs in the irreducible non-comparability between the products being 
sold: 
While new products such as the iPad are clearly hyped enormously, the hype has 
some relationship to the (purported) use-value of the object. By contrast, the 
products in the carbon market have no use-value. The tonne of carbon refers to a 
tangible unit of measure, but demands for the right to emit it arise purely out of 
government regulatory activity. The tonne of carbon has thus to be abstracted to 
something more tangible for market actors, i.e. financial or monetary products. 
Thus, what is being sold is not the tonne per se but rather the financial or 
discursive representations of it (Descheneau and Paterson 2011: 667-668. Our 
emphasis).  
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On their part, Tamra Gilbertson and Oscar Reyes elaborates on this problematic by 
referring to the arbitrariness of carbon pricing: “The commodity traded as 'carbon' does 
not actually exist outside the numbers flashed up on trading schemes or the registries held 
by administrators [...] This makes putting a price on carbon largely an arbitrary exercise” 
(2009: 12-13). Analogously, the TransNational Institute's Carbon Trade Watch remarks: 
“These [carbon trading's] failings are not caused by teething problems, but are 
symptomatic of the extreme difficulties of assessing the value of 'carbon', which is a 
commodity which bears little relation to any single real world object” (quoted in Sharife 
and Bond 2012a: 15). 
 The global picture that emerges from these quotations is a rather confused one: on what 
basis can we make sense of a use-value that would be, successively, contained in its own 
future non-existence, defined by its absence, composed by numerical calculations and 
resembling an unreal world object? A promising line of research is provided by 
conceiving of carbon commodities' use-value as information. As such, this kind of use-
value transcends (while still maintaining a relationship with it) the interplay between 
“natural distinctness” and “economic equivalence” as reciprocally indifferent. In fact, 
what makes carbon information useful? To answer this question we need to connect the 
production of relevant carbon information to the carbon trading dogma which links 
climate stability to market creation by means of a financial government through 
instability. Against this background, carbon commodities' use-value is nothing else than 
the dogmatic assumption according to which climate markets will make the transition to 
a low carbon society more cost-effective than any other political strategy. If this is true, if 
carbon information possesses a use-value only in so far as it conforms to the carbon 
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trading dogma, then we cannot assume it as “naturally distinct” by its exchange-value. 
The regime of truth that affirms the manageability of the climate crisis only by means of 
(allegedly) competitive financial markets ends up establishing a paradoxical self-
indifference between a use-value which originates directly from capitalist circuits of 
valorisation and an exchange-value whose status is irremediably split: on the one hand, to 
perform its monetary function, it must be indifferent to its use-value; on the other hand, 
however, it receives its very meaning by the same regime of truth which created its use-
value, making the two aspects indissociable. On the top of the extensive tension between 
“natural distinctness” and “economic equivalence” (which is still active, albeit not 
exclusively: after all, a tonne of carbon dioxide exists beyond carbon information), it 
occurs an intensive division within the field of “economic equivalence” in a way that 
perfectly mirrors the self-reflexivity typical of finance as a mode of capital accumulation. 
Thus, from the perspective of carbon trading, the most significant process of valorisation 
takes place in the internal stratification of carbon as a commodity: in order for value to be 
created, various sources of collective knowledge must be put to work so that a permanent 
state of uncertainty allows climate markets to re-instate their indisputable sovereignty 
over the management of global warming even in front of their blatant environmental 
failure.149 To conclude this elaboration, we find it useful to refer to a compelling analysis 
proposed by Jerome Whitington, which perfectly expresses what we mean by carbon 
commodities as second order abstractions: 
                                                 
149 In passing, let us note that the elective affinity between financial and ecological crisis finds in the 
use-value loss of innocence a fundamental point of articulation. 
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'Carbon' is not a physical commodity even if it includes certain physical 
parameters. 'It' is an assemblage of agreements, conventional practices, durable 
artifacts and rules held among people who operate in very different contexts 
around the world. Permits are a system of monetised rights. Credits or offsets are 
a quantified, incentivised change in behaviour. Both take their literalised form as 
data entries in online government registries. Understanding the contingencies of 
the assemblage is central to understanding the uncertainties at the core of the 
market [...] The clearest demonstration that carbon dioxide is not a physical 
commodity is that lots of different GHGs are traded as equivalent based on units 
of 'carbon dioxide equivalence' (CO2e), expressed in tons, which is actually an 
equilibration of the gases' effect on the warming of the atmosphere. It is the 
gases' warming effect that has value, whether operationalised as a permit or a 
reduction (Whitington 2012: 118-119. Our emphasis). 
 
Whitington formulation is relevant to us since it clearly points out that it is not 
measurement through tonnes of molecules of CO2 (e.g. “physical” accounting) which 
engages in valorisation, but rather its subordination to other scientific standards, whose 
uncertain nature is broadly acknowledged by both scientists and traders. For example, as 
Donald MacKenzie (2009b) has prominently unveiled, the notion of Global Warming 
Potential (GWP) – which governs the “equilibration of the gases' effect on the warming 
of the atmosphere” – firstly sprung up as contested within the IPCC and, secondly, has 
been scientifically modified but kept politically stable. Similarly, the individuation of a 
maximal quantity of CO2 emissions to be released in the atmosphere ultimately rests on 
the establishment of a stable threshold-figure which has been known as climatic carrying 
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capacity (or climate-cycling capacity).150 As Nathan Sayre has convincingly shown, 
however, the very concept of carrying capacity is extremely problematic and reluctant to 
be contained in a well-defined set of borders: “If carrying capacity is conceived as static, 
it is theoretically elegant but empirically vacuous; but if it is conceived as variable, it is 
theoretically incoherent or at best question-begging” (2008: 131). As we see, what 
represents a fundamental element of carbon valorisation is not so much the content of 
singular knowledge-procedures, but rather the internally stratified mobilisation of the 
general intellect. The aim of such a mobilisation, in neoliberal capitalism, is to produce 
commodities which fit a competitiveness-driven world.151 This is why, on the one hand, 
financial markets and carbon markets are structurally identical152 and, on the other hand, 
those latter cannot but constantly manifest a sclerotic short-circuit between the 
environmental rationale which initially fostered them (reduction of GHGs emissions to 
slow down global warming) and the economic rationale which assumed and imposed that 
only profit-oriented activity could efficiently reach that ecologic goal.153   
                                                 
150 The same process of assuming the stability of climatic carrying capacity also refers to any attempt 
(often endorsed by large NGOs) to establish an optimal quantity of CO2 emissions levels. 
151 Here we can appreciate the discrepancy between the power of the general intellect as a productive 
force and the corruption which is forced upon it by the finality of production being entirely subsumed and 
impressed by the market logic. We will analyse in more detail this issue – with specific regard to the ways 
out to this discrepancy created by resistance practices – in the next chapter. 
152 As Arthur Mol precisely articulates: “Abstract carbon markets increasingly become subject to and 
partly dominated by instruments, practices and products of creative investors, banks, traders, brokers, and 
speculators who see the GHG emission rights and offsets just as financial products, as a means of profit 
making. Thus we see a further diversification and specialisation in carbon market networks, where specific 
actors become expert in specific market actions. In the EU ETS, for instance, manufacturers with carbon 
emissions have hardly been involved in trading yet, whereas energy generators and financial institutions 
have been quick to set up carbon trading departments in their companies and developed strategies to 
increase profits by commodity price differences in spot and future markets” (2012: 18). 
153 As Larry Lohmann effectively expresses: “A commodity approach abstracts from where, how, 
when and by whom the cuts are made, disembedding climate solutions from history and technology and re-
embedding them in neoclassical economic theory, trade treaties, property laws, risk management and so 
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3.1 - Carbon forestry, or: the informational support of carbon trading dogma  
 
In order to more precisely specify what we have termed use-value loss of innocence, we 
will use forestry – and, in the context of REDD+ projects, carbon forestry – as an 
example to articulate our analytical toolbox. Within a capitalist economic horizon, forests 
can be generally said to possess three use-values: communal sustenance, raw material for 
industry (especially constructions and paper production) and recreational attractiveness. 
In classical Marxist terms, has we have seen in the previous chapter, forests' exchange 
value is a product of the double movement of enclosures and labour as real abstraction: 
communal sustenance (tendentially) disappears under the violence of private property,154 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
forth. For example, carbon trading gives emissions-reduction technologies that are likely to result in 
unquantifiable but important 'spillovers' leading to radically-lessened long-term dependence on fossil fuel 
equal weight with technologies lacking such effects, as long as both achieve the same numerical emissions 
reduction over the short term in a particular locality. While carbon trading encourages ingenuity in 
inventing measurable 'equivalences' between emissions of different types in different places, it does not 
select for innovations that can initiate or sustain a historical trajectory away from fossil fuels (the 
effectiveness of which is less easy to measure). Indeed, once the carbon commodity has been defined, 
merely to weigh different long-range social and technological trajectories or evaluate and 'back-cast' from 
distant goals is to threaten the market-efficiency imperative” (2010a: 81). 
154 The young Marx, commenting in 1842 on a proposal to make the law prohibiting collection of 
wood even more stringent, writes in the Rheinische Zeitung: “If the law applies the term theft to an action 
that is scarcely even a violation of forest regulations, then the law lies, and the poor are sacrificed to a legal 
lie [...] The Assembly [Rhenish parliament] repudiates the difference between gathering fallen wood, 
infringement of forest regulations, and theft of wood. It repudiates the difference between these actions, 
refusing to regard it as determining the character of the action, when it is a question of the interests of the 
infringers of forest regulation but it recognises this difference when it a question of the interests of the 
forest owners” (1975: 227-228). 
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industrial wood becomes a standardised, fungible and mobile commodity155 to be 
exchanged on the basis of the quantity of labour time embodied in its production, forest 
landscapes and wilderness are turned into touristic objects, until recently an almost 
exclusive bourgeois prerogative as a sign class of distinction. In the first case we see 
forestry in its irreducible “natural distinctness”, whereas in the second case we have the 
results of the process of commodification, namely forestry as “economic equivalence”. 
As Marx repeatedly asserted, the capitalist mode of production establishes a relationship 
of mutual indifference between use-value and exchange-value: only the latter counts as 
crystallisation of abstract labour time, while the singular properties of the former are 
economically disregarded. In other words, capital does not create forests' use-values; on 
the contrary, it builds upon them an exchange-value produced by means of its 
mechanisms of abstract valorisation.  
 Obviously, the actual modality of this transition from “natural distinctness” to “economic 
equivalence” greatly varies according to spatial and temporal contexts. Moreover, it is 
highly influenced by class struggle since this directly determines the social means by 
which surplus-value is distributed. This point can be better articulated by assuming the 
recent developments of forest-management in the Canadian province of British Columbia 
(BC) as a reference point. In the mid-1930s, as Michael Ekers (2008) minutely reports, a 
variety of forestry projects were pursued by governments (both at the federal and the 
                                                 
155 Larry Lohmann qualifies wood as a commodity in a very useful way: “Modern wood product 
manufacture tends to rely on ‘framing’ large tracts of land for maximum, relatively short-term, commercial 
production of uniform timber or pulpwood. Land is surveyed, examples of desirable species tagged, their 
‘fit’ with existing machinery assessed, and return per hectare of various types estimated. Stands are thinned 
and biodiversity and human habitation that is ‘extraneous’ to the varieties selected is reduced or eliminated. 
Ultimately, serried, factory-friendly monocrops of species can be planted” (2010b: 235). 
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provincial level) and businesses to modernise the forest industry. In an attempt to make 
the transition from use-value to exchange-value smoother and faster (in Marxist 
terminology: increasing the relevance of relative surplus-value with regard to absolute 
surplus-value, which is to say augmenting labour productivity), those projects “improved 
communications and transportation networks”, fostered “reforestation as well as intensive 
wood production”, and envisaged a refined, “broad multi-use forestry policy targeted at 
the bourgeoning tourist industry” (2008: 310). Moreover, Ekers' most recent research 
(2012) insightfully proposes to jointly assess the issues of unemployment, relief camps 
and production of forestscape in Depression-era BC as important elements to understand 
the future development of Canadian forestry. 
 In the post-WWII period, forestry became a crucial element of BC context-specific 
declination of the Fordist compromise between social classes. In a fascinating article, 
Scott Prudham (2007) cleverly links the emergence and wide acceptance of industrial 
sustained-yield forest regulation to the rise and progressive hegemony of so-called 
Gompers' style or non-partisan unionism. Sustained-yield management can be referred to 
as a process of normalisation of forests, namely the creation of a forested landscape with 
varying and predictable age structures geared towards permanent crop rotation. The 
normal forest, or Normalbaum – as it was originally called in German – emanates at the 
intersection between the Western tradition of scientific forestry and capital's needs for 
forests' valorisation. Thus, drawing on managerial literature from the 1950s, Prudham 
proposes the following definition: “An ideally constituted forest with such volumes of 
trees of various ages so distributed and growing in such a way that they produce equal 
annual volumes of produce which can be removed continually without detrimental 
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impacts to future production” (Brasnett quoted in Prudham 2007: 264). The introduction 
of sustained-yield management in BC was not a technical issue, but rather a deeply 
political one. In fact, the main left-wing party at the time, the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation (CCF) – precursor of the current New Democratic Party 
(NDP) – advocated a radical agenda of forest nationalisation motivated and legitimated, 
according to Prudham, by a “distinct set of use-values akin to an agrarian stewardship 
ethic that would govern the mutual transformation of nature and society” (Ibid.: 262). 
However, the main woodworkers unions in the province – the International Woodworkers 
of America (IWA) – endorsed the version of the sustained-yield regulation proposed by 
the government-backed Sloan Commission, merely proposing a few adjustments to make 
it milder in its social effects. Eventually, in order to gain political political support from 
the IWA, the CCF abandoned its radical positions on forestry. As Prudham explains: 
The demise of the CCF's nationalisation agenda and the IWAs prosaic stance on 
the politics of forest production and regulation reflected and reinforced a shift 
from radical to reform socialism [...] and the consolidation of a North American 
class compromise and labour peace that would help to define Fordism. As the 
trade-union movement drifted toward bread-and-butter 'Gomper's style unionism', 
the CCF moved in parallel toward reform socialism, propelled by the conjoined 
objectives of aligning itself with the trade-union movement in Canada and of 
retaining political relevance in provincial and federal legislatures [...] This 
increasing focus on industry-specific and workplace-specific issues [was] 
characterised as an ideological and material division of labour between 
conception (for the bourgeoisie) and execution (for the workers) (Prudham 2007: 
277). 
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The main point we derive from this discussion is that, although the relationship between 
forestry use-value and exchange-value has changed over time and has been influenced by 
the vicissitudes of class struggle in different spatio-temporal settings (in BC, the normal 
forest is the exemplification of such relationship), the poles of that relation maintained a 
relatively stable position.156 The use-value of forests kept being principally linked to the 
provision of raw material for industry, while the exchange-value of forests followed the 
convulsions of the capitalist mode of production as a whole but never ceased to be the 
monetary expression of crystallised abstract labour time.  
 It is our conviction, however, that the rise of carbon forestry in the context of REDD+ 
projects profoundly modifies this state of affairs. REDD+ is nothing else than a system of 
incentives for developing countries to protect and better manage their forest resources, 
essentially based on the political creation and accounting recognition of a financial value 
for the additional carbon stored in trees or not emitted to the atmosphere (Corbera and 
Schroeder 2011). Two points are of primary importance from our perspective: first, this 
use-value of forests is not comparable with those we discussed above. It is now their 
capacity to absorb, sequester or sink CO2 that makes them useful from a climate change 
mitigation standpoint. However, we have seen with Jason Moore that global warming is 
(as part of the planetary ecological crisis) the expression of the contemporary oeikos, 
namely of the bundle of socio-natural relations which structures the neoliberal phase of 
                                                 
156 It might be useful to recall that this was not a necessary historical outcome: as Prudham suggests, 
the implementation of the CCF's forest nationalisation project might have completely boulversed this 
scenario. Although it is disputable whether or not nationalisation per se should be seen as a sufficient 
condition for anti-capitalism, it seems clear to us that Prudham's indication referred to communism as 
production of use-values. In general terms, a revolutionary process as destruction not only of the link 
between use-value and exchange-value, but also of exchange-value itself, should always be conceived of as 
a historical possibility. 
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capitalism. From this descends the conclusion that carbon forestry possesses a use-value 
only in so far as the climate crisis (as embodied in neoliberal capitalism) is recognised as 
a political issue whose solution is contained in the principle of veridiction of its regime of 
truth: competitive-based markets. There is no “natural distinctness” at play in carbon 
forestry: its use-value is from the very beginning subordinated to the self-valorising needs 
of capital. This non-naturality leads us directly to second aspect we would like to 
highlight: carbon forestry use-value is intrinsically informational. To be created as a unit 
of measure to be valorised through market exchange, “forest carbon” must undertake a 
highly complex process of creation-through-calculation. At the most basic level, as 
demonstrated by Larry Lohmann, the production of carbon forestry offsets requires the 
general acceptance of the following, extremely controversial equation: 
 
“a molecule of CO2 of fossil origins = a molecule of CO2 of biotic origin” (2011c: 197). 
 
The problematicity of such an equation in terms of forest carbon accounting has been 
known and assessed as early as the publication of the LULUCF-report (2000). For 
instance, Joanna Cabello and Tamra Gilbertson report two of those inconsistencies: a) 
“While LULUCF activities can remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere (referred to, 
in the climate jargon, as removals by sinks), this removal can be reversed and result in 
emissions, i.e. by fires. This is refereed as non-permanence”; b) “Forestry emissions and 
removals may still occur many years after a project or intervention happens,while 
emissions from fossil fuels occur immediately when the fuel is burnt” (2012: 165-166). 
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More generally, the constitutive uncertainty of REDD+ carbon accounting derives from a 
very controversial definition of what a forest actually is. As Tom Goldtooth, from the 
Indigenous Environmental Network, acutely points out:  
Adding to the likelihood of REDD+ money flowing to the worst forest destroyers 
is the definition of 'forest' used by the UNFCCC, which includes monoculture 
tree plantations and clear-cuts (euphemistically referred to as 'temporarily 
unstocked areas'). Under this definition, the Brazilian government's plans to 
replace part of the Amazonian forest with oil palm plantations would not count as 
deforestation. Industrial loggers could also benefit from REDD+ by claiming to 
be practising 'sustainable forest management', while criminalising indigenous 
agricultural and forest practices (Goldtooth 2011: 20). 
 
Moreover, with regard to the equivalence of fossil and biotic origins of CO2 molecules, 
Lohmann is absolutely right in pointing out its often overlooked consequence, and 
precisely that this imposed correspondence, “by ignoring the difference between the two 
carbons in terms of climate history, also intensifies climate class struggle, providing 
'scientific' and economic sanction for extensive land grabs from the poor, who are likely 
to be displaced at high human cost (not included in the calculations)” (Lohmann 2011c: 
197). This is the other side of the climate class struggle that takes place at the level of the 
general intellect: while the conditions for the common production of the plenty for all 
(potentiality of use-value creation) are in place and ready to be communistically 
mobilised, the violence of the market forcefully impresses the process of knowledge-
production with the seal of market competitiveness (corruption of the common through 
exchange-value imposition). Both sides of this peculiar terrain of class struggle should be 
taken into account. With regard to carbon forestry, by comparing it to the Fordist 
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governmental dispositif of the “normal forest”, we propose to label the REDD+-based 
system of governance as post-normal forest. This term clearly makes reference to the 
epistemological debate launched in 1993 by Silvio Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz with 
their article Science for the Post-Normal Age. Elaborating on Thomas Kuhn's (1962) 
characterisation of a paradigm as a “normal” situation in which the large majority of the 
scientific community shares the basic assumptions of research procedures – 
epistemological revolutions, on the contrary, being “abnormal” ruptures through which 
the paradigm develops itself by being questioned from a variety of perspectives – 
Funtowicz and Ravetz argue that, in late-modernity, “normal” epistemological situations 
are less and less frequent. This is why, in the context of what they call “post-normal age”, 
“typically facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent” (2003: 
1). In essence, post-normal science reflects an epistemological framework in which the 
boundaries between “normal” paradigms and “abnormal” scientific revolutions tend to 
blur, making the constant questioning of assumptions through unavoidable accounting for 
uncertainty an everyday condition. Hence the adjective “post-normal” to refer to a 
process of knowledge creation in which “normality” and “abnormality” tend to melt into 
each other. This situation, epitomised by the constitutive role played by uncertainty in 
contemporary politico-epistemological practices, perfectly mirrors that of REDD+ carbon 
forestry. In fact, the assessment of trees' sinking capacity, as well as the definitory 
process through which carbon emerges in the form of a new commodity (offsets, i.e. 
second order abstractions), essentially depend on the impossibility to establish a fully 
standardised system of measurement. Such an impossibility can be fully appreciated by 
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reporting a passage from the introduction of a peer-reviewed and widely cited article on 
Above Ground Biomass (AGB) allometric models of calculation:  
In this study we evaluate the uncertainties in the estimation of AGB density [...] 
We developed local multi-species models using 244 trees from 26 locally 
abundant species and assessed four sources of uncertainties in AGB estimates: (i) 
uncertainty in AGB estimates bound to the number of trees to build allometric 
models; (ii) the bias introduced when aggregating species in a single multi-
species allometric model; (iii) the uncertainty on the choice of the allometric 
model, and in particular whether locally developed models AGB estimates are 
more accurate than estimates of 'foreign' models. Finally (iv), we assessed the 
sampling variability when estimating the AGB at landscape level, using different 
numbers of plots and allometric models (van Breugel et al. 2011: 1649).  
 
Significantly, the conclusion of the study shows how the political selection of calculating 
methodologies is the only guarantee of the results' validity (no matter how uncertain): 
“Allometric models vary strongly in their prediction of stand and landscape AGB, 
making model choice an important source of uncertainty” (Ibid.: 1655). 
 To summarise: far from being configured as a deficit of the system, the instability 
induced by accounting uncertainties is what makes the post-normal forest produced by 
market-driven REDD+ projects eminently governable and, as a consequence, a fitting 
example of the informational support of the carbon trading dogma. Moreover, it deeply 
concerns the issue of class struggle at the level of second order abstractions: in fact, it 
shows how ineluctably the general intellect must be granted a sufficient space of 
manoeuvre to produce value but, at the same time and in an equally ineluctable way, it 
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also shows how violently such creative autonomy ends up being corrupted by its forced 
translation into the homogeneous grammar of markets. 
 
3.2 - The contested nature of EUAs, or: the legal support of carbon trading dogma  
In some long-standing, acute streams of the Marxist tradition, the theoretical 
interpretation of the rule of law rests on its duplicity, or intrinsic ambivalence: litmus 
paper of force relations between classes at a given moment, on the one hand; battlefield 
upon which those same classes struggle to modify that balance of forces, on the other one 
(Negri 2010). The process of emancipation of the oppressed requires a direct engagement 
with rule of law but can not extinguish its afflatus in the limited horizon disclosed by its 
codes and prescriptions: a productive logic of inside and against is supposed to regulate 
not only a revolutionary strategy, but also the very mode of development of the system of 
rights and regulations. In the context of carbon trading, such ambivalence of the law is 
even more pronounced given the hybrid nature of cap-and-trade schemes such as the EU 
ETS: as we discussed above, while the cap is set and enforced by governmental agencies, 
the trade is mainly performed by private actors (or, in any case, following private law 
norms). From this hybridity emerges the necessity of a legal support for the carbon 
trading dogma which operates in two main ways: a) by replacing the alleged clarity of the 
law with a constitutive uncertainty that produces the conditions of instability on which 
contemporary financial governmentality relies; b) by affecting the very nature of the new 
commodities created to be traded in carbon markets.  
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 The instability produced by the contested legal nature of EUAs can be exactly 
appreciated through another reference to carbon accounting: in fact, as soon as the 
European Union actually created the new commodity, a vociferous debate concerning its 
legal status took place amongst actors as diverse as local, national and regional public 
agencies, private corporations, NGOs, accounting professional organisations, unions and 
academics. In fact, as trivial as it might seem at a first sight, the question “what is a 
EUA?” is all but simple to be answered. EUAs were established in 2003 by the EU 
Emission Trading Directive, which defines them as follows: “EUA means an allowance 
to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period, which shall be 
valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of this Directive and shall be 
transferable in accordance with the provisions of this directive” (Council Directive 
2003/87, art. 3 [a]). This very large definition, which essentially copes less with what the 
new tradable unit is than with what it entitles the holder to do, has four elements: a) the 
right to emit; b) a specified substance; c) of a certain quantity; d) over a defined period of 
time. As it is evident, many accounting standards157 could fit such a definition. At this 
                                                 
157 However important accounting practices may be in assessing the contested legal nature of EUAs, 
it is important to remark that they do not exhaust this field of research. For instance, in terms of 
establishing an isomorphic relationship between allowances and derivative contracts – hence enforcing 
their facilitated tradability in secondary markets, more speculation-prone than compliance or primary 
markets – the Council Directive 2004/39 (Annex I, Section C, art. 10) is particularly instructive. By 
assuming that carbon market participation will be driven not only by compliance, but also by speculation, 
the Directive includes allowances in the “List of Financial Instruments” in the following way: “Options, 
futures, swaps, forward rate agreements and any other derivative contracts relating to climatic variables, 
freight rates, emission allowances or inflation rates or other official economic statistics that must be settled 
in cash or may be settled in cash at the option of one of the parties (otherwise than by reason of a default or 
other termination event), as well as any other derivative contracts relating to assets, rights, obligations, 
indices and measures not otherwise mentioned in this Section, which have the characteristics of other 
derivative financial instruments, having regard to whether, inter alia, they are traded on a regulated market 
or a Multilateral Trading Facility (MTF), are cleared and settled through recognised clearing houses or are 
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point, the problem for the EU became that of clarifying the legal character of the EUAs. 
For this reason, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) was urged to 
develop mandatory guidance for the financial reporting of the emission permits and, in 
view of the specialised, unprecedented and fundamental nature of the subject, the IASB 
asked its International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC) to 
undertake the task. The first draft of such effort was published in May 2003 and, after 
two rounds of discussion and revision, the IFRIC Interpretation 3: Emission Rights 
(known as IFRIC-3) was finally issued in December 2004, just a few days before the 
official start of the EU ETS. In brief, the IFRIC-3 recommendations designed a mixed 
measurement model that can be summarised in three main points: a) EUAs should be 
considered as intangible assets (no matter if freely issued by governments, publicly 
auctioned or purchased on the market) and therefore fall under International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 38. Moreover, these assets should be configured as tradable 
independently from the liabilities; b) EUAs that are allocated for less than fair value (i.e. 
market value), should be initially measured at their fair value, and the difference between 
the actual expense and fair value should be classified as a government grant and therefore 
accounted for under IAS 20 (Government Grants and Disclosure of Government 
Assistance). This peculiar grant should be at first regarded as deferred income in the 
balance sheet, and subsequently registered as income over the compliance period; c) 
EUAs liabilities should be considered once emissions are actually made, and that should 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
subject to regular margin calls” (reported in Foundation for International Environmental Law and 
Development [FIELD] 2005: 18. Emphases added).  
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be internalised as a provision, therefore falling under IAS 37 (Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets). Moreover, the liability should be measured at fair 
value, which is to say the best estimate of the amount of money required to settle the 
current obligation at the balance sheet day (Casamento 2005). 
 Although the technicalities of such specialistic recommendations are of utter 
importance – for instance, point a) articulates the tension between environmental and 
economic goals, whereas point b) accounts for the creation of windfall profits – from our 
standpoint the wild reactions to IFRIC-3 are even more telling since they unmistakably 
reveal the need for uncertainty to “properly” govern carbon trading. As Allan Cook 
recalls: 
The result [of IFRIC-3 publication] was a public outcry. Companies complained 
that application of the interpretation would force them into showing a completely 
distorted picture of their performance in their annual and interim financial 
statements. The IASB, while recognising that the IFRIC had made a valid 
interpretation of the relevant IASs, accepted that the end result was confusing in 
certain respects. Perhaps fortunately, the expected market for Emission Rights 
was slow to develop and IASB took the opportunity to withdraw the 
interpretation in June 2005, only six months after it had been issued (Cook 2009: 
457). 
 
Since the IFRIC-3 withdrawal, there has been no international guidance on how to 
account for EUAs and a diversity of practices, often irreducible to one another, have 
emerged (McGready 2008). From the perspective of the large majority of social sciences' 
studies of carbon accounting, such an absence of standardisation – whose outcome is the 
total arbitrariness of financial classificatory practices – is regarded as a sort of youthful 
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sin to be overcome in due time as the field progresses towards a more shared and 
harmonic common accounting language. Heather Lovell and Donald MacKenzie, for 
example, propose to distinguish two stages in the history of accountants' relation to 
climate change: stage one – “reluctant engagement” – starts in the late 1990s and ends in 
2005 with the withdrawal of IFRIC-3, while stage two – “strategic engagement” – covers 
the second half of the past decade and arrives up until now and is marked by a new 
interest emerged amongst accountancy standard setters in 2008, whose materialisation 
was the joint IASB/IASF (Financial Accounting Standards Board) project. According to 
the authors: 
The IFRIC-3 launch and then withdrawal (stage one) highlights how there is 
likely to be conflict in these technical accounting discussions when corporations 
feel strongly about an issue, typically when it affects their profit. It is interesting 
that with the re-launch of the IASB/FASB Emissions Trading Schemes project 
conflict seems less evident. Indeed, recent interviews with accountants at major 
EU ETS companies have suggested a readiness for clear guidance from the 
standard setters (along the lines of IFRIC-3) because of a strong desire to make 
carbon accounting easier (reducing choice, thereby eliminating the current 
necessity of following a range of different national, international and corporate 
guidelines), and so that companies can be fairly compared with their competitors, 
creating a level playing field (Lovell and MacKenzie 2011: 726-727). 
Whether this “strong desire” reflected a true conviction or mere wishful thinking, it 
irremediably crashed on June 29th 2011, when the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) Foundation posted on its website the following note: “Discussions in 
the Emissions Trading Schemes project were deferred in November 2010 when the IASB 
and the FASB decided to amend the timetable of some projects. As a result of the pause 
in work of this project, the IASB will consider whether the project will remain on the 
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agenda consultation process” (IFRS Foundation 2011). This outcome, hardly surprising 
from the perspective of government through instability, shows one more time how carbon 
trading is grounded in an enacting, constitutive and unavoidable uncertainty. Let us 
stress, in passing, that uncertainty does not equal confusion, but rather indeterminacy: at 
this regard, Luigi Pellizzoni proposes to distinguish between “constraining non-
determinability” and “enabling non-determination” (2011: 797). While the former 
conceives of contingent openness from the perspective of the lack of control over 
unknowable causal chains by social actors, the latter institutes a sense of liberty built 
around an idea of causal chains as impossible to predetermine but at the same time 
susceptible of management in such a way that social actors can handle and orient them in 
the desired direction.    
 
3.3 - The CDM additionality issue, or: the calculative/promissory support of carbon 
trading dogma  
The centrality of calculative practices as forms of politics of quantification has been 
analysed above, but we think it can be fruitfully approached also from the perspective 
provided by the problematic issues linked to CDM additionality. In this case, in fact, the 
calculative dimension of the carbon trading dogma finds itself inextricably linked to its 
promissory character and, as consequence, presents interesting social dynamics with 
regard to the interplay between climate politics and governmental orientations towards 
the future.  
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 As we anticipated above, additionality can be defined as the difference between a 
certain course of action linked to carbon markets and a counterfactual scenario built on 
the hypothetical continuity of past industrial behaviours. A precise graphic rendition of 
such a concept can be found in figure 4. 
 
Figure 3. Source: Bumpus (2011: 615). 
 
Although apparently simple and straightforward, at a closer sight the notion of 
additionality shows a significant number of critical aspects, both at a technical and at a 
conceptual level. Before discussing them, however, let us stress once again the two 
particular conditions of possibility for such a notion to actually emerge. First of all, CERs 
– the monetary expression of additionality – as well as contabilised emissions reductions 
– the environmental form of additionality – exist only by virtue of extensive mobilisation 
of the general intellect as expressed in multifarious knowledge-based processes. 
Secondly, this mobilisation occurs in, and is channelled by, new market-driven 
institutional settings, such as the CDM Executive Board (EB), the Project Design 
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Document (PDD) or the Designated National Authority (DNA). According to the 
UNFCCC: 
The PDD must qualify through a rigorous and public registration and issuance 
process designed to ensure real, measurable and verifiable emission reductions 
that are additional to what would have occurred without the project. The 
mechanism is overseen by the CDM EB, answerable ultimately to the countries 
that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. In order to be considered for registration, a 
project must first be approved by the DNA (quoted in Drew and Drew 2010: 4). 
 
As we can see, the technical intricacies which characterise a PDD (figure 5) are supposed 
to perform a quality-filter function, ensuring just viable projects get financed.  
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Figure 4. Source: Drew and Drew (2010: 6). 
 
However, here resides the main technical fallacy of additionality: as further evidence of 
the impossibility to establish a fully standardised accounting methodology, carbon 
consultants and their employer rapidly turned to their advantage the PDD templates to 
increase profitability with regard to credit production through uniform procedures that, 
while deepening in an extreme way PDD's length and technicality, invariably excluded 
“discussion of issues such as local regulatory politics, corporate reliability, non-linearity, 
economic uncertainty and climatological unknowns” (Lohmann 2009: 506). Once more, 
the politics of quantification shows itself as all but neutral: the full mobilisation of the 
general intellect is unmistakable (consider for instance points A.4.2, B.2, B.5, C.2, D.1 
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and E.3), but its aim is not to share or redistribute the value created; rather, the goal is to 
foster governmentally enacting instability. As an analyst caustically pointed out, CDM 
credits are an “imaginary commodity created by deducting what you hope happens from 
what you guess would have happened” (quoted in Lohmann 2009: 511). 
 There are, however, other shortcomings which affect CDM additionality at an 
even more profound, conceptual level. To properly assess them, we have to introduce the 
distinction between financial and environmental additionality. The former refers to 
whether a given project investment would have taken place in the absence of the credit-
gaining CDM provisions. In principle, for a CDM project to be approved carbon 
financing must be the decisive financial factor. Nonetheless, this means that another 
short-circuit between economic and environmental rationales cannot but take place: be 
them private or institutional, lenders follows market rules and tend to orient themselves 
towards projects which are profitable on their own, even without the CDM. Analogously 
to what we observed with regard to biotechnologies – GM companies arguing for their 
crops' substantial equivalence to natural ones when talking to the FDA, and for their 
crops' sufficient difference when attempting to patent them – CDM traders find 
themselves in a paradoxical position: when facing their financial bankers, they need to 
emphasise the high profitability of the projects; when discussing with the CDM EB, by 
contrast, they need to claim the same projects would not be financially viable without 
carbon funds. This is, we argue, just another proof of how instability (and potential 
sclerosis) is at the core of contemporary climate governmentality. 
 Environmental additionality is even more problematic than its financial 
counterpart and allows us to reflect on the specific sequestration of the future enacted by 
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the CDM. Determining environmental additionality requires: a) a project baseline, or 
reference case, that estimates what would have happened in the absence of the CDM 
project methodologies for estimating a project's actual GHG emissions reduction; b) a 
quantitative comparison of actual emissions to baseline projections. The difference 
between the baseline and actual emissions (i.e. the amount of GHGs abated) is the 
amount of environmental additionality achieved by the project. In other terms, CDM 
environmental additionality requires the mobilisation of both a calculative and a 
promissory apparatus that, joined together, represent the third support of the carbon 
trading dogma.158 This support works first and foremost by means of an ideological de-
politicisation of decision-making. In order to create a common plane of comparability 
between the (hopeful) future prescribed by the CDM project and the (catastrophic) future 
designated by the counterfactual baseline, a radical presupposition have to be 
unproblematically assumed: the CDM is the only alternative to the hypothetical BAU 
scenario. As a reciprocal corollary to this assumption, the BAU future course of action 
must be one and is dependent on calculations conducted in the present. To synthesise, the 
dark future promised by planetary global warming can be avoided only by the 
intervention of the CDM. Larry Lohmann poignantly elaborates on such an ideological 
articulation of market freedom and historical determinism as follows:  
For accounting to be possible and carbon credits to be saleable, each project must 
be framed as generating a determinate number of credits. That becomes possible 
only if the counterfactual scenario of the 'baseline' world is framed as singular, 
                                                 
158 It must be stressed once again, however, that the financial and environmental dimensions of 
additionality are not independent from one another. On the contrary, they configure themselves as the two 
sides of the same coin. 
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that is, separated out from a large number of other theoretically possible without-
project scenarios. [...] To disentangle a single baseline necessitates framing the 
political question of what would have happened without projects as a matter of 
technical prediction in a deterministic system about which near-perfect 
knowledge is in principle possible. Social conditionalities that do not easily lend 
themselves to prediction (socio-economic development, demographic trends, 
future land use practices, international policy making, etc.) are reduced to 
technical and methodological uncertainties. Project proponents, by contrast, must 
be framed non-deterministically, as free decision-makers, if their carbon project 
initiatives are to be seen as 'making a difference' (Lohmann 2009: 511).  
 
Here we can appreciate in its full deployment the cogency of the carbon trading dogma: 
either the future is imaginable as brought about by redeeming market competitiveness, or 
humanity is doomed to face the catastrophic effects of anthropogenic climate change. 
Political alternatives to the CDM are, to put it in the simplest way, unthinkable. To 
borrow one last time Lohmann's apt words, we can surely state that “the claim that 
alternative low-carbon or non-carbon futures do not exist becomes a way of dumping 
carbon in those futures” (Lohmann 2006: 209).  
 Thus, the calculative/promissory support of carbon trading dogma establishes a 
perverse interface between salvation and catastrophe which strongly resonates with what 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy (2002) has called “enlightened doomsaying” [catastrophisme éclairé]. 
In fact, such a notion proposes a curious inversion of the present-future relationship by 
means of which a contemporary assessed worst-case scenario is assumed to be already 
verified in order for its actual future verification to be avoided. Paradoxically, then, the 
future ends up being thought as simultaneously deterministically defined and caused by 
societies' political decisions. As Dupuy puts it, the future is “counterfactually 
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independent from the present” (2002: 107). Such independence, however – at least with 
regard to carbon trading – is predicated on the putatively indisputable assumption that 
only the market can eventually disrupt the apocalyptic consequences implied in the 
unfolding of climate change. Here resides the main strength of the carbon trading dogma: 
by enacting a regime of truth through which the market is envisaged as the sole saviour in 
front of the impending ecological collapse – notwithstanding its role in bringing about the 
issue of global warming in the first place – political alternatives and social oppositions 
are dubbed not only as useless, but actually as damaging since their implementation 
would cause unforgivable delay in a situation characterised by ineluctable urgency. In a 
compelling series of studies, Frédéric Neyrat (2006; 2008) has argued that such an 
enlightened doomsaying is not only compatible with the Foucauldian biopolitical 
hypothesis, but veritably represents its contemporary configuration in the form of a 
biopolitique of catastrophes. Neyrat appropriately states that “the biopolitics of 
catastrophes occludes a proper eco-politics. The political management of the possible 
future is actually its digestion [la gestion politique du possible est la digestion du 
possible] and makes another politics impossible” (2006: 115).  
 Let us note that such a formulation of biopolitics of catastrophes closely recalls 
our hypothesis of impression as a crucial contemporary feature of capitalist exploitation. 
In chapter 2, we defined impression as a dynamic regime of superimpositions in which at 
the beginning, ex ante, the establishment of a limit or threshold takes place. This limit 
concerns the future translatability of labour outcomes into the grammar of money. Such 
translatability, although imposed at the beginning of the process, cannot but manifest 
itself ex post, when the value produced by the general intellect is actually captured. In the 
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case of CDM, the ex ante threshold is represented by the counterfactual baseline, while 
its ex post validation is configured as the putative – albeit indisputable in the carbon 
trading dogma framework – emissions reduction which is supposed to take place in the 
future. Between the two moments, carbon traders and governmental agencies are free to 
explore as many possible ways to bring about the desired outcome out as they want, as 
long as those modalities are consistent with the basic imposition of impression: the end-
product must be monetarily shaped. In a sense, they are “free” to (partially) emend the 
PDD and to evaluate market possibilities to mould their strategy in the most profitable 
way. What they cannot do, however, is to question the ex ante imperative (we must 
change or the world will collapse) and the ex post imposition (the change will have to be 
market-driven and, hence, eventually profitable). 
 Before concluding this section, let us stress that the carbon trading dogma is not 
an unassailable fortress; on the contrary, even its internal consistency shows signs of 
decay (not to mention all the oppositions it has received from social movements). As we 
argued in chapter 2, although impressed, a process of individuation always remains 
partially indeterminate (since, by definition, it proceeds through the activation of 
unactualised potentials, whose transparent measurement or complete management is 
simply impossible). This is the crucial terrain upon which political ecology (and climate 
justice, with specific regard to the purposes of this work) should engage its battle: 
framing resistance as the catalyst of political instances which are irreducible to a 
governmental rationality based solely on the market logic. Antagonism, then, would 
become the vehicle of translation of those instances into the institutional language of 
environmental policy, not only as it is currently conceived, but also as it could be 
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envisaged after the incorporation of new political horizons. In other words, its task is the 
disarticulation from within of the truth-games upon which environmental 
governmentality is founded.159 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In order to bring to a close the discussion we have articulated in this chapter, it could be 
useful to more directly inscribe the specificities of carbon commodities into a broader 
history of commodification. As we exposed, such history is marked by both continuities 
and ruptures. Larry Lohmann has provided the best elaboration of the former with regard 
to the two great historians of commodification: Karl Marx and Karl Polanyi (2001). 
Consider for instance the two following quotes: 
Just as the creation and quantification of the working day was a major site and 
instrument of class struggle in early capitalism, so the assemblage of equations 
that go into the creation of climate commodity are major sites and instruments of 
class struggle in today's nascent carbon markets (Lohmann 2011c: 196). 
 
Just as objectified, abstracted 'land' and 'labour' had emerged with the early 
modern European transformation of agriculture and gathering, so an objectified, 
abstracted, commodified [carbon] 'risk' emerged as a new reality as well as a new 
term of economic and financial art (Lohmann 2010b: 227).  
 
                                                 
159 We shall analyse in more detail this issue in the next chapter. 
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Our contribution to the contemporary debate about carbon trading units has been to show 
how, besides these accurate and undeniable continuities, also ruptures are detectable and 
should be taken into account. Such ruptures depend on the new, neoliberal rationality 
based on the formal privilege accorded to competition (government through instability), 
as well as on the unprecedented characters of capital's valorisation (financial self-
reflexivity) and exploitation (impression). It must be clearly acknowledged, however, that 
our analysis does not amount to a portrait of capital's self-valorisation as independent 
from labour, as it would be in the financial dream of money growing on money (M-M'). 
In other words, no matter how peculiar and novel carbon tradable units are, as second 
order abstractions they still remains commodities. Although internalised within capitalist 
circuits of expansion, the relationship between commodities and money still presents 
itself as mediated by labour in the form of the general intellect.  
 This point can be better articulated by making yet another reference to the debates 
which have accompanied the failed attempts to define what a EUA essentially is. Such 
debates are important to us because they shed insightful light on the unprecedented 
“metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties” which affect the commodity form of 
carbon tradable units. In fact, as Jerome Whitington has brilliantly put it: “Strictly 
speaking, carbon credits [i.e. CERs] and permits [i.e. EUAs] are not commodities but 
novel assets whose characteristics depend on the intricacies of how they are created, what 
they are meant to represent, how they are traded and what they can be used for” (2012: 
118). Although this distinction between commodities and assets is grounded on 
accounting practice controversies, we contend that its relevance largely transcend its 
technical-specialistic origins. Actually, it provides a new framework, in a mutated 
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context, for the Marxist problem of the relation between money and commodities we just 
evoked. In fact, EUAs are not to be considered property rights:160 their informational 
nature, as well as the fact the they are issued by governmental agencies, makes them not 
exclusionary – at least not in the way ordinary private property is – and not permanent – 
they might be revoked at any time by the same governmental agencies. For this reason, 
and also because of the lack of clear guidance from existing regulation, it has fallen to 
traders to carry out the task of conceptualising the proprietary nature of EUAs. 
Particularly interesting, in this context, is the proposal formulated by Jillian Button in a 
compelling articled published in 2008 and entitled “Carbon: Commodity or Currency?.” 
Her starting point is straightforward: although the commodity-model is the most 
widespread thus far, it has not been the only one under discussion. Quoting conservation 
biologist Jon Rosales, Button remarks that “even if entitlements to the new commodity 
are distributed to all parties' satisfaction and the fabricated market accepted, in many 
cases it is not clear what is being bought and sold. Increasingly vague commodities are 
being crafted to fit the necessities of a market system” (Rosales quoted in Button 2008: 
582). Far from retaining the critical stance that motivated Rosales' words, Button ends up 
reaching his same conclusion but for the exact opposite reason: since carbon trading has 
                                                 
160 Unsurprisingly again, this issue is highly contested: while the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the 
Marrakesh Accords (2001) and the EU Emission Trading Directive (2003) are silent on the matter, the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Model Rule (RGGI), which includes several states and provinces in the 
North-Eastern U.S. and Eastern Canada, openly posits that “No provision of this regulation shall be 
construed to limit the authority of the Regulatory Agency to terminate or limit such authorisation to emit. 
This limited authorisation does not constitute a property right” (quoted in Button 2008: 574). Differently, 
other schemes, such as the New Zealand's Individual Transferable Quotas in Fisheries, purport to create 
property rights. Beyond the usual role played by uncertainty, what is at stake in the issue can be clarified by 
directly quoting Jillian Button: “The question of whether an emission right is a property or a quasi-property 
right is an interesting one, and is particularly pertinent to the relationship between the unit-holder and the 
government. Legislative drafters who carefully preclude any property rights are likely attempting to prevent 
future claims against the government by permit-holders arising from government action which devalues 
that person's carbon units, for example by changing the regulatory system” (Ibid.).  
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been conceiving of its commercialisable units exclusively as commodities, it has not 
realised its full potential yet. Button justifies her somewhat hyper-neoliberal claim by 
arguing that a commodity-model for carbon permits necessarily implies a system of 
equivalences based on the comparability between different GHGs – through the unit of 
measure of tCO2e. According to her, such need for measurement – which would treat 
permits as corn or soybeans, no matter how artificially – is due to the fact that, kept in the 
tension between the environmental and economical goals of Emissions Trading Schemes, 
traders have to date privileged the former: “To protect environmental certainty, a 
sacrifice is made because diverse and potentially valid and geographically appropriate 
economic strategies are left unexplored and unexploited” (Ibid: 586). To solve this 
problem – curiously named “equivalence impasse” – Button proposes to consider carbon 
units as sui generis, essentially synthetic assets which simultaneously exhibit features of 
commodities and characters of currencies. This is by far the best definition of EUAs we 
can envisage. However, by exclusively stressing the currency-like side, Button continues 
her reflection affirming that non-equivalent emissions permits would be traded exactly as 
non-equivalent currencies and would consequently ensure a constant liquidity for carbon 
markets. The conclusion of the argument, in all its strictest logical consistency, is 
startling: 
Under the currency-model, otherwise unproductive incompatibilities amongst 
carbon units would be avoided by recognising these incompatibilities. The fiction 
that all carbon units should be or could ever be equivalent is removed, and the 
environmental value of a unit is expressed in terms of its exchange value. Interest 
groups would be less motivated to pressure governments to exclude weaker units 
from the market, because they would not drive down the overall standard of the 
market (Ibid.: 588. Our emphasis).   
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In these fascinating lines the neoliberal paradigm of nature (the environment as element 
of valorisation) encounters the eternal dream of capital, namely the possibility to create 
value out of itself without passing through the mediation of labour. Although this position 
is minoritarian in the context of carbon trading debates, it is somehow exemplary in that 
it shows the perfect capitalistic solution to the tension between economic and 
environmental goals of Emissions Trading programmes: environmental value being 
directly expressed in terms of exchange-value. Here we are even beyond the lost 
innocence of use-value: we witness to a veritable – if inapplicable from a policy 
perspective – becoming exchange-value of use-value.  
 As extreme as it certainly is, this argument is very instructive in that allows us to better 
understand the role of money in governing through instability the mobilisation of the 
general intellect in the context of financial-environmental markets. David McNally 
(2011), as we discussed in the previous chapter, suggests that after the collapse of Bretton 
Woods we saw the emergence of a de-commodified money, which is to say a kind of 
money independent from past labour embodied in it. Through a Marxian-Foucauldian 
approach, we have attempted to show how, in carbon trading, exploitation and 
valorisation are governed by money in its financial form: this money finds its measure not 
in past labour, but rather in the act of commanding the labour process in its (current as 
well as future) making. Very differently, in Button's capitalist utopia we see money 
creating more money (dare we say environmental money?) out of itself: the tension 
between ecological and commercial goals of carbon trading is recognised as non-existent 
since the former is already expressed in the latter.  
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 Button's elaboration, however, is more relevant than its outcome since it shows its 
material inconsistency: through a sort of reduction ad absurdum, this God-like 
affirmation of exchange-value shows in its unavoidability the capitalist need for an 
external source of productive energy. Exchange value will never multiply by itself: in the 
case of carbon trading, it emerges by the imposed management and violent exploitation of 
the general intellect. This is why the capital created in carbon markets is not and cannot 
be exclusively labelled as “fictitious”: on the contrary, it is derived from the 
contemporary forms of exploitation and accumulation. As suggested by Luigi Pellizzoni, 
the neoliberalisation of nature has little to do with the production of fictitious capital: 
“What is at stake is the crafting of entities that did not exist beforehand, like the patented 
gene with its organic-informational ambivalence or the variably embodied in the GWP 
[Global Warming Potential]. There is nothing fictitious in these commodities: they are 
commodities, their reality is nothing else that this” (2011: 799). Rather than fictitious, 
thus, carbon commodities are better qualified as characterised by a twofold materiality. 
On the one hand, their creation entails a massive mobilisation, management and 
exploitation of labour in the form of general intellect. On the other hand, as Adam 
Bumpus (2011) has convincingly argued, the informational nature of carbon tradable 
units requires to be enacted through a necessarily context-specific set of socio-natural-
technical operations which regulates the actual interaction between financial markets and 
local social processes or specific interactions between given technologies and the 
atmosphere. We contend that the recognition of this double materiality of carbon 
commodities is crucial not only in understanding the productive processes which create 
them, but also in politically establishing an effective practice of resistance against them.     
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Carbon Profanations and Multi-scale Resistances at 
Durban's COP17 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the previous chapter we argued that social struggles have been central both in 
transforming climate change (and the environmental crisis in general) into a properly 
political issue and in driving the operational development of carbon trading. In this 
chapter, however, our main focus will be the role of multiscale resistances in potentially 
overthrowing carbon markets from their dominant position as governmental agents of 
global warming. More specifically, we are interested in analysing some variants of the 
transnational climate justice movement from a perspective in which the critique of carbon 
trading does not only aim at decommissioning financial-environmental markets, but also 
at re-appropriating the productive force from which they originate. In other terms, we will 
attempt to emphasise those elements of contemporary climate struggles which gesture 
towards a re-directioning of the mobilisation of the general intellect, rather than those – 
and there are many – which praise for a return to pre-industrial levels of CO2 emissions 
by means of re-instituting pre-capitalist patterns of behaviour. 
 We propose to analyse these aspects of the climate justice claims through a theoretical 
framework based on the notion of profanation. The concept has been recently revived by 
Giorgio Agamben (2007a), but the way we intend to use it rests on further elaboration 
and, especially, on its connection with Michel Foucault's understanding of the process of 
subjectivation. In his account, the French philosopher goes back to the original ambiguity 
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of the term “subject”, which has a double Latin etymology: the neuter subjectum, that 
refers to the idea of sovereign actor, and the masculine subjectus, whose meaning is 
linked to the semantic field of subjugation. This constitutive ambivalence allows Foucault 
to show how subjectivity is from the very beginning and endlessly kept in a becoming 
composed by both reactive forces, that push it towards subjection, and affirmative forces, 
that strive to fully activate their potential of autonomous subjectivation. The link between 
this elaboration and our attempt to forge profanation as a valuable tool to interpret climate 
justice demands is to be found in the essay titled “The Subject and Power” (2000), 
originally published in 1982, in which Foucault proposes to subdivide social conflicts 
into three categories that, albeit neither mutually exclusive nor evolutionarily successive, 
differentiate historical epochs according to their relative, tendential hegemony. The first 
category is represented by the resistance against various forms of domination (moral, 
political, religious); the second is configured as opposition to exploitation, conceived of 
in economic terms as violent separation between the producer and the product of her 
labour; finally, the third refers to the attempts made by social actors to subtract 
themselves from subjection, which is to say the set of practices that ties individuals to a 
fixed identity and, in so doing, favour their submission to others. In positive terms, this 
third category can be defined as struggles for subjectivation. 
 According to Foucault, our contemporaneity is marked by the progressive prevailing of 
the third kind of struggle, in which at stake are the processes of subjectivation. These 
processes are conceived of as both resistance against normalization and active 
engagement in new, non-constrained identitarian articulations. These processes involve a 
specific transversality with regard to traditional definitions of working class struggle, 
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usually considered to be centred around the exclusive interests of the proletariat. 
Furthermore, the object against which they are exercised is not power per se, but the 
material, local effects of power. Finally, and crucially, what is at stake in these processes 
is knowledge (its sources, its usages, its production). As Foucault writes: 
they [struggles for subjectivation] are an opposition to the effects of power linked 
with knowledge, competence and qualification – struggles against the privileges 
of knowledge. But they are also an opposition to secrecy, deformation, and 
mystifying representations imposed on people. There is nothing 'scientistic' in 
this (that is, a dogmatic belief in the value of scientific knowledge), but neither is 
it a skeptical or relativistic refusal of all verified truth. What is questioned is the 
way in which knowledge circulates and functions, its relation to power. In short, 
its regime of truth (2000: 330-331). 
 
As we see, the fundamental goal of struggles for subjectivation is the disarticulation of 
normalizing regimes of truth. The critique of knowledge-apparatuses through which 
subjection is imposed on people is configured as appropriation and then inversion of their 
mechanisms. Moreover, this focus on knowledge can be read, we suggest, in accordance 
with our hypothesis of nature as an element of the process of capitalist valorisation 
through the exploitation of the general intellect. Consequently, the effectiveness of 
profanations should be measured according to their capability to read the specific 
tendency of contemporary social development and then to disarticulate the capitalist 
regime of truth (in our specific case the carbon trading dogma) upon which it rests. 
 As we anticipated, Giorgio Agamben has recently proposed an illuminating investigation 
of the Roman Law, according to which sacred are objects or procedures that exclusively 
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belong to the Gods, and that consequently result interdicted to men's free usage. On the 
contrary, profane are those same objects or procedures once they have been subtracted 
from the religious dimension and returned to men's common use. From this perspective, 
sacrifice, the very act of consecration, presents itself as the religious power's device par 
excellence, the one that takes upon itself the responsibility to affix the seal of separation 
to the free interplay of differences. Upon this separation, subsequently, the same religious 
power builds up a hierarchical order whose functional aim is its mere reproduction. In the 
same framework, profanation configures itself as the perfect antithesis of sacrifice, since 
it is conceived of as “the counter-dispositif that returns to the common use of men what 
the sacrifice had separated and divided” (2009b: 21). Two points have to be stressed here. 
First, the analytical grid established by Agamben does not apply merely to religion, but 
rather to all power systems. In fact, every order or authority necessarily needs an original 
separation to provide a solid frontier between what is true/right and what is false/wrong. 
In other words, every system of power needs a clearly defined regime of truth. This 
necessity is even more pronounced in contemporary capitalism, whose spectacular nature 
aims to enact a pure form of separation or, as Agamben puts it, “something absolutely 
unprofanable”. Secondly, profanation does not simply criticise the status quo and the 
separation upon which it is established, but also provides concrete alternatives, albeit 
often in embryonic forms, by creatively shaping new modes of being, new behaviours, 
new and previously inconceivable battlefields. Appropriately connecting these two levels, 
and importantly recalling the nature of capital as an antagonistic social relation, Agamben 
states: 
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It is possible that the unprofanable, on which the capitalist religion is founded, is 
not truly such, and that today there are still effective forms of profanation. For 
this reason, we must recall that profanation does not simply restore something 
like a natural use that existed before being separated into the religious, economic, 
or juridical sphere. This operation is more cunning and complex than that and is 
not limited to abolishing the form of separation in order to regain an 
uncontaminated use that lies either beyond or before it. Even in nature there are 
profanations (2007a: 81). 
 
Let us underline once again the twofold nature of profanations: immanent critique of the 
present state of affairs and material prefiguration of a new possible social structure. In 
temporal terms, the reference to a desirable future enacts already existing critical 
potentials in such a way that an opposition to the status quo immediately activates the 
construction of a new form of social organization, previously unimaginable. Thus, we 
contend that contemporary climate struggles can be read as disarticulations of the carbon 
trading dogma which simultaneously undermine its functioning and prefigure alternative 
solutions to the challenges of global warming.161 The goal of the following sections, and 
particularly those concerned with an analysis of the different levels of the multiscale 
politics of climate justice, will be to understand and specify in some details how this 
process of prefigurative disarticulation opened up by what we might call carbon 
                                                 
161 Prefigurative politics is one of the main features of eco-socialism as envisaged by Joel Kovel: 
“The prefigurative praxes that are to overcome capital in an ecosocialist way are at once very remote and 
exactly at hand. They are remote insofar as the entire regime of capital stands in the way of their 
realization; and they are at hand insofar as a movement toward the future exists embedded in every point of 
the social organism where a need arises [...] If everything has a prefigurative potential, then prefiguration 
will be scattered over the entire, disorderly surface of the world [...] This is a blessing, because it signifies 
that there is no privileged agent of ecosocialist transformation, but it also imposes a great responsibility. 
For as they now exist, instances of ecocentric production are scattered and mainly entrapped like irritants in 
the pores of capital. The task is to free them and connect them, so that their inherent potential may be 
realized” (2002: 240-241). 
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profanations already affects the carbon trading dogma, and which anti-capitalist scenarios 
it problematically discloses. 
 However, it is necessary to clearly state the ambivalent nature of profanations. In fact, 
there is nothing in them which is emancipatory in principle. Profanations have always 
been part of the history of the oppressed and of their struggle, and often ended up being 
turned into yet another driver of capital's accumulation by means of violent recuperation 
or subtle co-optation. After all, capital has been so far the profaning machine par 
excellence: as Marx and Engels pointed out in The Communist Manifesto, the compulsion 
to overcome limits is exactly what is unavoidable for capitalism to maintain its power, its 
ability to “constantly revolutionise the means of production”, to “melt all that is solid into 
air”, and to “profane all that is holy” (1978: 476). So, in light of this historical evidence 
that profanation has been constantly absorbed by capital, why should we stick to the 
concept – albeit revisited through Foucauldian and Agambenian lines of reasoning? The 
reason is that the ambivalent nature of profanation is not only crucial to understand 
capitalist development, but also to envisage a non-capitalist future. Avoiding to consider 
the lines of tension that at the same time link and separate struggles and circuits of 
valorisation does not make them any less real: it just distances the observers' gaze from 
the actual terrain of struggle (Leonardi 2010c). We contend that ambivalence should not 
be averted, but, rather, widened. A framework based on the notion of carbon profanation 
can potentially shed new light on how to force the frictions exposed by climate struggles 
to heights which are beyond the carbon trading dogma's system of compatibilities. This 
is, in a nutshell, the wager of activist inquiry: organising political lines of tension while 
simultaneously analysing their unfolding. 
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 Although the research scheme centred around the concept of carbon profanation is 
rather theoretical, the materials upon which the following analysis is grounded are to a 
significant extent empirical: we spent nearly two months in Durban (from October 27th to 
December 17th 2011), gathering various types of information about the COP 17 and the 
struggles it would have been surrounded by. Therefore, a brief explanation of the 
techniques of data collection and classification we used is required to properly grasp the 
next sections. First of all, our intention is not to objectively “verify” the two-fold 
hypothesis entailed by profanations (i.e. climate justices disarticulates the carbon trading 
dogma + climate justice prefigures alternative ways of managing global warming as a 
planetary crisis), but rather to forge an interpretative tool which is able to qualitatively 
expand the possible meanings of the object of study. More specifically, we would like to 
show how connecting the political management of the climate crisis to other social 
aspects of contemporary capitalist crises potentially brings the system of compatibilities 
upon which the carbon trading dogma is grounded to a point of ungovernability. In fact, 
one of the key issues the notion of profanation brings to light is that of organising 
convergences, namely the political process of unification through conflict which can 
potentially deactivate the putatively indisputable valorising imperatives the carbon 
trading dogma is constrained to endlessly replicate. As a consequence, our empirical 
research shall explore such problematic by means of multiscale perspective: in section 2 
of this chapter (transnational level), this connection refers to the global North's historical 
responsibilities in producing climate change; in section 3 (national level), it regards 
unemployment as an endemic problematicity in South Africa's political scenario; in 
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section 4 (local level), it concerns environmental racism and massive people's 
displacements as a result of a CDM project which privileges big polluters' interests 
against population needs in the Durban area.  
 As an analytical caution, let us note in passing that the spatial scales utilised in our 
research are selected for heuristic purposes and do not constitute fixed and immutable 
entities: rather, our investigation aims at showing how their various interconnections 
ceaselessly modify their mutual constitution. Our approach, in other words, intends to 
shed light on the modalities through which their juxtapositions represent crucial elements 
in the process of organising convergences between different climate-related conflicts.     
 The empirical methodology we opted for is linked to multisited ethnography, a socio-
anthropological elaboration originally proposed by George Marcus and Michael Fisher 
(1986): according to them, it is necessary to build up a conceptual topology (in our case 
centred around the notion of profanation), which is to say a different way of thinking 
about field sites in relation to analytic and theoretical questions about the world we live 
in. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, who has successfully employed such approach in his masterful 
Biocapital, multisited ethnography “necessitates reconfigurations of the spatial 
boundaries of ethnographic practice to map onto the spatial reconfigurations of the 
relationship between 'local' and 'global' brought about by global capitalism” (Sunder 
Rajan 2006: 30). It is precisely this new articulation of local and global aspect, their 
intertwining as well as the different standpoints they disclose, that makes a conceptual 
topology particularly useful. A conceptual topology, in fact, establishes a specific link 
between the local and the global such that the former does not “confirm” the latter but, 
rather, their interplay increases both the understanding of a given situation and the 
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possibility to politically act upon it. As Sunder Rajan continues, “if capitalism is always-
already multiple and mutable, then the challenge is less one of creating a grand unified 
theory of capitalism than one of contributing to a proliferation of thick, multiple, locally 
grounded analyses of technoscientific market regimes and practices” (Ibid.: 31). Thus, 
our goal is to empirically enrich our analysis of the modes of abstraction that underlie the 
co-emergence of carbon commodities and carbon markets. 
 This solution allows social research to reach cogent results both at the explanatory 
and transformative level, and – at the same time – to avoid the trap of all-embracing 
generalization. As we argued in chapter 1, we intend to maintain as open as possible the 
tension between our hypothesis regarding the main features of the contemporary 
tendency of capitalist development and the multifarious forms they assume at different 
geographical scales and and temporal configurations. In other words, we use multisited 
ethnography to avoid the risk of a “voluntaristic projection” of a desired state of affairs 
onto the empirical reality of the situation we are going to analyse. Furthermore, the 
positionality of the observer is important at this regard (Gobo 2001): we argue that her 
partial gaze (we belong to the climate justice movement and have been – and still are – 
engaged in the processes we shall analyse below) is the very source of the scientific 
relevance of the study. Obviously, we do not claim objective validity for our results: on 
the contrary, we consider them open to discussion and actually hope they will be disputed 
and questioned by the scientific community as well as by the activist circles. However, 
we refuse to conceive of our partiality as an element of anti-scientificity. From this 
perspective, our methodology is consistent with the workerist tradition of co-research 
(Alquati 1993; 1994). As Emiliana Armano and Raffaele Sciortino pointedly argue: 
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Co-research, which emerged in the early 1960s as militant fieldwork with 
workers at FIAT Mirafiori and other factories in Piedmont (Olivetti, Lancia), is 
both an activity of enquiry and a knowledge process, entailing a reciprocal 
transformation in the identity of the researcher and what began to be called 
workers’ subjectivity. As a practice of intervention, it placed the militant 
researcher on the same level as the subject of the enquiry, annulling the separate 
figure of the ‘vanguard’, so dear to the logic of the traditional Left. In doing so, it 
reformulated horizontally the relationship between theory, praxis and 
organisation. It was a practice that could not be formalised in a method, one that 
made it possible to read, even in periods of passivity, signs of impending conflict, 
informal organisational forms and constituent ambivalences that lay in the gap 
between the class’ technical composition (the objective articulation of labour-
power) and its political composition. Not by chance, these enquiries played an 
active role in the Italian cycle of working class conflict that opened in Turin with 
the revolt of Piazza Statuto (July 1962), anticipating in turn Italy’s decade-long 
‘1968’ (Armano and Sciortino 2010). 
 
This nullification of any superiority whatsoever to be accorded to the researcher, with 
regard to her interviewees or textual as well as dialogical sources, has played an 
important role in our empirical study and, hopefully, has helped us respecting that 
proportion between the figure of the researcher and that of the activist we argued for in 
chapter 1. 
  
 In the economy of the following empirical research, we have found useful to subdivide 
our ethnographic sources into four dossiers, to be constantly understood against the 
general background provided by the academic as well as popular literature about global 
warming and climate-related conflicts we took into account in the previous chapters and 
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will continue to consider in the remaining part of the dissertation. The four dossiers are 
structured as follows: 
dossier A: it is composed by eleven semi-structured interviews, whose length varied from 
a minimum of 15 to a maximum of 90 minutes, with significant exponents of the 
transnational climate justice movements. These interviews were aimed at further 
elaborating the main issues emerged by the analysis of the background literature. In 
particular, the interviews entailed both the clarification of a number of complex topics 
and the recognition of recurrent disputed points in climate justice debates. As said, the 
interviews were semi-structured, which means that they all originated from the same 
general framework – composed by five broad themes162 – but allowed new questions to 
be brought up during the interview as a result of the interviewees' elaboration with regard 
to specific issues. All the interviewees were aware of our role as researchers and agreed 
to be mentioned in this study as members of their climate justice organisations.163  
                                                 
162 The general framework of the semi-structured interviews was composed by the following broad 
themes: a) a brief activist biography with particular regard to climate justice; b) views on ecological debt 
and, more generally, on issues concerning the idea of global North and global South sharing “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”; c) views on the One Million Climate Jobs campaign and, more generally, 
on South African climate/environmental policy; d) views on the Bisasar Road landfill in South Durban and, 
more generally, on Durban's municipality (eThekwini) climate/environmental policy; e) views on the 
climate justice movement future perspectives. 
163 Here is the list of interviewees: Bond, Patrick (director of the Centre for Civil Society, University 
of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa); D'Sa, Desmond (South Durban Community Environmental 
Alliance, Durban, South Africa); Di Pierri, Marica (A Sud & Italian Network for Environmental and Social 
Justice [RIGAS], Rome, Italy); Firpo Porto, Marcelo (National School of Public Health, Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil); Hallowes, David (independent researcher, Durban, South Africa); Kovel, Joel and Saul, Quincy 
(Ecosocialist Horizon, New York, United States); Mnguni, Thomas (Greater Middelburg Residential 
Association, Mpumalanga, South Africa); Murphy, Alan (Coordinator of Ecopeace Party, Durban, South 
Africa); Peek, Bobby (GroundWork, Durban, South Africa); Yanez, Yvonne (Acción Ecológica and Oil 
Trade Watch, Quito, Ecuador); Yuen, Eddie (editorial board of Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, New York, 
United States). 
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dossier B: it is composed by ethnographic notes drafted in the course of the several 
assemblies, meetings, seminars, public discussions, fund raisers, socials, book launches, 
protest concerts, direct actions and rallies we have taken part of. It also includes casual 
conversations with local people not necessarily involved in the struggles against COP 17. 
The methodological perspective through which such notes have been collected and 
classified can be called “observative” (Gobo 2001: 133): the interpretation has been 
limited as much as possible in an attempt to “register” the conversations “in their 
essential factuality” (Ibid.: 134). This dossier is particularly important because it has 
allowed us to acknowledge the wide internal variety of the climate justice movement in 
its multifarious manifestations.  
dossier C: it is composed by the informative material produced by the organisations 
belonging to the climate justice movement and includes pamphlets, leaflets, songs, 
documentaries, the COP 17 special issues of South African radical monthly magazine 
Amandla! [Power!], and non-violent bimonthly magazine Satyagraha: In Pursuit of 
Truth. It also includes personal photographic material and the following climate activists' 
websites:  
http://conferenceofpolluters.wordpress.com/; 
http://durbanclimatejustice.wordpress.com/; 
http://cop17insouthafrica.wordpress.com/tag/occupy-cop-17/; 
http://durbanknights.wordpress.com/; 
http://www.climate-justice-now.org/. 
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dossier D: it is composed by an extensive coverage of Durban's local newspaper The 
Mercury and South African prominent weekly magazine Mail&Guardian (from October 
29th to December 15th 2011). It also includes excerpts as well as images from local 
publications concerning the COP 17 but not necessarily linked to the climate justice 
movement (e.g. the catalogue of the art exhibition DON'T/PANIC, held form November 
23rd 2011 to February 19th 2012 at the Durban Art Gallery, or the advertisement 
distributed by companies within the International Conference Centre – where the COP 17 
took physically place).  
 The crucial relevance of these four dossiers for our research is not going to be fully 
represented by the direct references we will make to them in the following sections. 
However, their fundamental role in shaping both our theoretical elaborations and our 
analytical toolbox cannot be underestimated. The constant engagement with the material 
they contain – from the very first days of collecting to their provisional classification, 
from their comparison with the literature background to the final revision of their 
collocation within this chapter – has been a continuous source of critical feedbacks and 
unexpected openings in the process of writing this dissertation. As such, their value for 
the current project is inestimable.  
  
1 - DURBAN'S COP 17: SITUATING THE 'CONFERENCE OF 
POLLUTERS' 
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 December 11th 2011, early morning: the sun is slowly rising over Durban when UNFCCC 
COP 17 President, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane164, officially closes the longest climate 
negotiations in history – over 36 hours of “injury time”. Somehow surprisingly, given the 
thick skepticism which constantly surrounded the whole process, she proudly announced 
the reaching of an agreement: the Durban Platform. As an experienced diplomat, 
Nkoana-Mashabane explained that, although not all participants could be satisfied by the 
final outcome, it nonetheless represented “a clear turning point and a testament to what is 
achievable when Parties work together”.165 
 
  
                                                 
164 South African Minister of International Relations and Co-operation. 
165 This and the following quotes are taken from dossier D. 
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Figure 1. COP 17 logo. Source: Dossier D. 
 
A more precise idea of such a “clear turning point” can be attained by comparing Todd 
Stern's (chief USA negotiator) and Claudia Salerno's (chief Venezuela official) reactions 
to the Durban Platform. Whereas for the former we are confronted with a “very 
significant package”, for the latter we face a “very bad agreement”. As usual in such 
circumstances, the cacophonous overlapping of diametrically opposed voices 
immediately started. At least three typologies are detectable: the sad-but-optimistic (e.g. 
Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu, head of the Africa Group: “It's a middle ground, we meet mid-way. 
Of course we are not completely happy about the outcome, it lacks balance, but we 
believe it is starting to go into the right direction”, or Selwin Hart, chief negotiator on 
finance for the Coalition of Small Island States: “I would have wanted to get more, but at 
least we have something to work with. All is not lost yet”); the exultant (e.g. Christiana 
Figueres, UNFCCC's chief: “In honour of Mandela: It always seems impossible until it is 
done. And it is done!”, or Cohris Huhne, UK Energy and Climate Secretary “This is a 
great success for European diplomacy. We've managed to bring the major emitters like 
the US, India and China into a roadmap which will secure an overarching global deal”); 
268 
 
and the angry (e.g. Nimmo Bassey, chair of the Friends of the Earth International: 
“Delaying real action until 2020 is a crime of global proportions. Increase in global 
temperatures of 4 degrees Celsius, permitted under this plan, is a death sentence for 
Africa, Small Island States and the poor and vulnerable worldwide”,166 or Climate Justice 
Now! press release: “the agreement is creating a climate apartheid where the richest 1% 
of the world have decided that it is acceptable to sacrifice the 99%. It constitutes a crime 
against humanity”).  
 As it seems clear, the main problem raised by the Durban Platform, whose main features 
will be discussed below, is its vagueness, its constitutive openness to partial 
interpretations, its manifest incapability to clearly indicate a line of conduct. In short, its 
uncertain nature. It would be a mistake, however, to read such uncertainty as an 
unintended shortcoming of subsequent rounds of negotiations. On the very contrary, it 
represents the privileged terrain upon which the problematic interplay between 
environmental protection and economic growth has deployed itself . In fact, the trajectory 
of global environmental governance as designed by the UNFCCC is nothing else than the 
attempt to translate the multifarious phenomenology of climate change (and of the 
ecological crisis in general) into the homogeneous grammar of competitive markets.  
 This section aims at contextualising this direction of environmental governance, whose 
apex has been reached in Durban, in two main ways: in the one hand (section 1.1), we 
will situate the Durban Platform within the context of recent carbon trading 
developments. On the other hand (section 1.2), we will briefly trace an activist history of 
                                                 
166 This and the following quotes are taken from dossier C. 
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the principal opposition to such an orientation, namely the transnational climate justice 
movement. 
 
1.1 - The Durban Platform: post-Kyoto carbon trading and the Green Climate Fund 
 
By the time the Durban COP 17 was getting organised, a significant part of civil society 
hopes in the multilateral negotiating process were already buried. Nothing to be 
compared with COP 15 in 2009: as Marica di Pierri remembers, “in Copenhagen there 
was a big attention on the part of governments and media. Gordon Brown talked about 
the absence of a Plan B. The expectations on Obama, epitomised by the Nobel Peace 
Prize he received just a few days before the COP 15, were huge. And yet, no agreement 
was reached in Copenhagen”.167 COP 16 in Cancún marked a step ahead, since an 
agreement was actually reached (albeit Bolivia refused to sign), but surely that was not 
what activists and in general the public opinion were striving for. Actually, Patrick Bond 
dubbed the Cancún outcome as “market revivalism”,168 since it simply provided carbon 
trading palliatives: they do not aim at actually reducing CO2 emissions, but limit 
themselves to rhetorically justify profit-making activities. 
 Given these premises, just a naive observer would have expected Durban's 
COP17 to decidedly change direction. In fact, nothing of that sort occurred. Actually, as 
                                                 
167 Dossier A. 
168 Dossier A. 
270 
 
Larry Lohmann has acutely pointed out with regard to it, the overarching question being 
dealt with in Durban was “how to keep the carbon markets going without targets” 
(Lohmann and Böhm 2012: 85). More specifically, two were the main issues to be 
discussed at the International Convention Centre in downtown Durban: the future of the 
Kyoto Protocol (whose first period ends in 2012) and the financial architecture of the 
Green Climate Fund, politically advanced but not institutionally defined during the 2009 
COP15 in Copenhagen and the 2010 COP16 in Cancún. As for the Kyoto Protocol, it 
received what can be termed extreme therapeutic obstinacy; in other words, it is 
artificially kept alive. As Oscar Reyes appropriately explains:  
Although Kyoto did not die in Durban, an agreement was made that reduces the 
Protocol to a Zombie-like state. The current industrialized countries reduction 
targets expire in 2012, with no guarantee that new targets will be legally adopted 
at the subsequent COP in Qatar. The Durban's agreements kept Kyoto's carbon 
trading mechanisms alive – a 'remarkable and unexpectedly positive outcome', 
according to lobbyists from the International Emissions Trading Associations 
(IETA) – although they did little to revive the ailing markets themselves, which 
crashed to their lowest ever levels at the start of the talks and look like to remain 
on life support as the next phase of the financial crisis unfolds (2012: 22). 
 
The second matter of concern for Durban's COP17 was the Green Climate Fund.169 In 
theory, it is a mechanism to transfer money from the developed to the developing world, 
                                                 
169 The GCF has been a constant target of activists' criticism. One of the most effective forms such 
criticism assumed was that of artistic/cultural mocking. As an example of this trend, we report here the 
lyrics of the song CEE (Climate Economic Empowerment, a clear ironic/subversive reference to one of the 
post-apartheid most controversial South African policies, which is to say the BEE – Black Economic 
Empowerment) by Zimbabwean MC Comrade Fatso: “[chorus] Look, the dirty laundry's all gone 
green/Someone threw some money into the washing machine/Coz climate is the new blings/The new 
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in order to assist the developing countries in both adapting to climate change effects and 
mitigate its causes. According to the UNFCCC, “The Green Climate Fund will support 
projects, programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties using 
thematic funding windows”.170 Its objective, highly ambitious and at the moment far from 
being guaranteed, is to raise $100 billion a year by 2020. As articulated in Durban, 
however, the GCF has assumed the shape of a financial tool intended to “scale up” 
carbon markets through their direct involvement in internationally financing climate 
change adaptation and mitigation practices. In other words, the GCF constitutes the 
attempt to further increase the role of the private sector within the framework of global 
environmental governance. Again in the apt elaboration by Oscar Reyes:  
The common denominator of all the carbon market measures announced at 
Durban was the continued expansion of trading mechanisms [...] Scaled up carbon 
markets are also proposed with the aim of pushing an increasing proportion of 
climate financing through the carbon market [...] Durban saw a renewed push for 
the extension of the existing carbon markets alongside an increased emphasis on 
the private sector in climate finance (2012: 26-29).  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
diamonds, the new shiny, spangly thing /// Comrades: I’m sure you’ve heard of the crisis in the world 
today/Floods in France, disappearing islands and droughts in Zimbabwe/How do we deal with all our 
carbon emissions rising/With global warming, increased instability and insane petrol pricing/Comrades: I 
would like to announce my brand new policy/I call this policy CEE/It's simply entitled Climate Economic 
Empowerment/How to make money from mother nature and from the environment/Coz climate is the new 
blings/The new diamonds, the new shiny, spangly thing/We’ve run out of ways to make money for a 
living/But, comrades: now we have carbon markets and carbon trading/So will we save the planet? Hell 
muthafucking no!/But we’ll have the biggest, most fantastic party till we hit ground zero/So lets co-opt the 
NGOs and some scholarly scholars/Coz we wanna go green like freshly minted US dollars/So in that sense 
yes we are the real green party/Because nature is time and time is money/So give us your money and give it 
to us by the tonne/Put it in my bank account – it’s called the Green Climate Fund!” [Dossier C]. 
170 Dossier D. 
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Whether such a sclerotic insistence on private money to fill the GCF – “illusionary” 
insistence, according to Bobby Peak, from GroundWork, who defined the Green Climate 
Fund as an “empty bank account”171 – is due to institutional inertia, ideological fixation 
or pathological compulsion to repeat, what is crystal clear is that carbon markets as 
privileged devices of environmental governance will not be able to impose the emissions 
reduction targets the planet needs to avoid the catastrophic effects of global warming. 
Further evidence of this incapability is provided by the fact that the World Bank – 
infamously known for being involved in massive funding of fossil fuel-intensive projects 
– is probably going to act as the guarantor of the GCF.  
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Figure 1. Protest at the Speakers Corner. Source: Dossier C. 
 
As independent researcher David Hallowes aptly states, “the idea of spending public 
money to create conditions for private investments in the GCF is absurd. It seems they 
simply want to create another financial bubble”.172 
 To summarise, the Durban Platform did not mark any relevant discontinuity from 
the market revivalism pompously launched in Cancún. However, this sort of market 
hegemony within the UNFCCC has been counterbalanced by a progressive radicalisation 
of climate justice demands. In order to analyse in some detail three particularly relevant 
(for our purposes) amongst them, we need to briefly describe the historical trajectory of 
the transnational climate justice movement. 
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1.2 - A brief history of the climate justice movement 
 
From the general perspective I briefly outlined, it is simply impossible not to label 
Durban's COP17 as a complete failure. Fortunately, however, during the summer of 2011 
the city was not exclusively populated by elegant businessmen and restless bureaucrats. 
For the whole duration of the conference, in fact, a significant mass of activists never 
stopped contesting mainstream climate politics and never ceased to seek for alternatives 
to tackle global warming, at local as well as at transnational levels. An obvious example 
is the Global Day of Action on Climate Justice (December 3rd), which mobilized around 
10,000 people. Although the rally was vociferous and colorful, its effectiveness was 
undermined by the subordination of grassroots movements to mainstream NGOs. As 
radical intellectual Ashwin Desai stated, criticizing “big name spectacle NGOs”: “the 
local grassroots organizations were reduced to spectators, and were allowed only the 
occasional cameo appearance with most often a single line: 'Amandla!' [Power!]”.173 
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Figure 2 & 3. Images from the Global Day of Action. Source: Dossier C. 
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In order to properly understand the conflicting dynamics that took place in Durban, 
however, we need to assess more directly the history of the climate justice movement. 
According to Patrick Bond (2012a), the first attempt to forge a veritable climate advocacy 
dates back to the mid-1990s, when big NGOs and a few grassroots movements created 
the Climate Action Network. Since 1997, however, this network adopted a very 
collaborative strategy with regard to the global elite and openly supported the PK carbon 
trading mechanisms. More radical climate justice demands, such as a 50% GHGs 
emissions reduction by 2020 and the decommissioning of nascent carbon markets, began 
to be articulated by a variegated movement whose lineage includes several different 
traditions, amongst which two are of particular relevance: 1990s anti-racist 
environmentalism, whose main merit has been to unmistakably show the link between 
ecological protection and social justice; and 1990s advocacy by Ecuador-based Acción 
Ecológica, whose elaboration of the ecological debt as an international justice issue has 
greatly inspired climate consciousness around the world. An intense process of 
networking at the beginning of the 2000s led to the formation, in 2004, of the Durban 
Group for Climate Justice, whose radical anti-market approach is perfectly represented by 
the “Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading”, which states: 
As representatives of people’s movements and independent organisations, we 
reject the claim that carbon trading will halt the climate crisis. This crisis has 
been caused more than anything else by the mining of fossil fuels and the release 
of their carbon to the oceans, air, soil and living things [...] We denounce the 
further delays in ending fossil fuel extraction that are being caused by corporate, 
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government and United Nations’ attempts to construct a “carbon market”, 
including a market trading in “carbon sinks”. History has seen attempts to 
commodify land, food, labour, forests, water, genes and ideas. Carbon trading 
follows in the footsteps of this history and turns the earth’s carbon-cycling 
capacity into property to be bought or sold in a global market. Through this 
process of creating a new commodity – carbon – the Earth’s ability and capacity 
to support a climate conducive to life and human societies is now passing into the 
same corporate hands that are destroying the climate. People around the world 
need to be made aware of this commodification and privatization and actively 
intervene to ensure the protection of the Earth’s climate. Carbon trading will not 
contribute to achieving this protection of the Earth’s climate. It is a false solution 
which entrenches and magnifies social inequalities in many ways: The carbon 
market creates transferable rights to dump carbon in the air, oceans, soil and 
vegetation far in excess of the capacity of these systems to hold it [...] The Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), as well as many private 
sector trading schemes, encourage industrialised countries and their corporations 
to finance or create cheap carbon dumps such as large-scale tree plantations in the 
South as a lucrative alternative to reducing emissions in the North [...] In addition 
to these injustices, the internal weaknesses and contradictions of carbon trading 
are in fact likely to make global warming worse rather than “mitigate” it [...] 
‘giving carbon a price’ will not prove to be any more effective, democratic, or 
conducive to human welfare, than giving genes, forests, biodiversity or clean 
rivers a price.174 
 
Signed by almost 200 associations, the “Durban Declaration” paved the way for a more 
consistent organisational structure which finally emerged in 2007 with the foundation of 
the Climate Justice Now! network.  
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Figure 4. Climate Justice Now! logo. Source: Dossier D. 
 
 
Composed by nearly 500 organisations (as of November 2010) from all over the world, 
the network expresses an articulated conception of climate justice summarised by the 
basic principles all members share by joining the activist platform. Such principles are the 
following 
Climate Justice Now! will work to expose the false solutions to the climate crisis 
promoted by these governments, alongside financial institutions and multinational 
corporations - such as trade liberalisation, privatisation, forest carbon markets, 
agro-fuels and carbon offsetting. We will take our struggle forward not just in 
climate talks, but on the ground and in the streets, to promote genuine solutions 
that include: 
- leaving fossil fuels in the ground and investing instead in appropriate energy- 
efficiency and safe, clean and community-led renewable energy; 
- radically reducing wasteful consumption, first and foremost in the North, but 
also by Southern elites; 
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- huge financial transfers from North to South, based on the repayment of climate 
debts and subject to democratic control. The costs of adaptation and mitigation 
should be paid for by redirecting military budgets, innovative taxes and debt 
cancellation; 
- rights-based resource conservation that enforces Indigenous land rights and 
promotes peoples' sovereignty over energy, forests, land and water; 
- sustainable family farming and peoples' food sovereignty. We are committed to 
building a diverse movement locally and globally for a better world.175 
 
In preparation of the massive protests organised in Copenhagen against the COP 15, 
Climate Justice Now! was joined by the European left's Climate Justice Alliance and was 
able to hegemonise to a significant extent the broad opposition to the multilateral process, 
attracting to its direct actions and seminars numerous activists from more mainstream 
groups like Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network and 350.org.  
 The disaster represented by the Copenhagen Accord, however, re-fashioned the 
constellation of climate activism in its more familiar shape: on the one hand, climate 
justice grassroots movements radically opposing carbon trading and UN multilateralism; 
on the other one, big NGOs attempting to impose “less worse” solutions by lobbying and 
pressuring “from the inside”. This political furrow became even more pronounced in 
April 2010, when the Bolivian government- launched (but civil society-run) World 
People's Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth was held in 
Cochabamba. The demands put forward by the “People's Agreement on Climate Change 
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and the Rights of Mother Earth” showed a revolutionary potential such that basically no 
governmental agency – let alone corporation – could accept given the current socio-
economic conditions.176 Amongst the most radical of such demands are the following: 
- 50% reduction of GHGs emissions by 2017; 
- stabilisation of temperature rise to 1 degree Celsius and of CO2 atmospheric 
levels to 300 parts per million; 
- repayment of the climate debt owed by the global North to the global South; 
- full respect of human rights and the inherent rights of indigenous people; 
- ratification of the universal declaration of the rights of Mother Earth to ensure 
harmony with nature; 
- establishment of an International Court of Climate Justice; 
- rejection of carbon markets and commodification of nature and forests through 
the REDD+ programme; 
- promotion of measures to change the consumption patterns of developed 
countries; 
- end of intellectual property rights for technologies useful to mitigate climate 
change; and  
- payment of 6% of developed countries' GDP to addressing climate change.177 
 
                                                 
176 Although the Bolivian government has backed the Cochabamba proposals, and both Bolivia and 
Ecuador's new constitutions includes rights of nature, the process of politically implementing the principles 
of the “People's agreement” is highly problematic (Mueller 2012).  
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Notwithstanding the political distance between the two strands of climate justice – which 
was evident also in late-2010 at COP 16 in Cancún – transnational climate advocacy at 
large tried a reconciliation to organise as broad an opposition as possible to the upcoming 
COP 17 in Durban. This decision created the problematic scenario described above by 
Ashwin Desai with regard to the Global Day of Action on Climate Justice, which also 
affected the 'People's Space' organized by the Civil Society Committee on UNFCCC 
COP17 (commonly referred to as C17178), a two-week long counter-conference that took 
place on Howard Campus, at the University of KwaZulu-Natal.179 Although the C17 
'People Space' programme was immensely rich in its diversified interests and approaches 
(experience exchanges, teach-ins, campaigns launches, collective debates, concerts, press 
conferences, film festivals, thematic seminars, keynote addresses, etc.), the organization 
of the event as a whole was affected by a number of flaws. To name but a few: lack of 
mobilization of local grassroots movements; general deficit of climate consciousness and 
relative failure of producing valuable and easily accessible information on the topic; 
excessive breadth of the C17 coalition, with consequent subordination of radical politics 
to unity. As for the first two points, Alan Murphy, from Ecopeace Party, lucidly stressed 
that “we lacked reciprocal solidarity. Different groups were campaigning for their 
                                                 
178 The C17 represented a broad range of organizations including NGO’s, Community Based 
Organizations, faith communities, trade unions and academia. Many of the organizations on the committee 
were themselves coalitions. To give a quick idea of how diverse were the many 'souls' of such a coalition, 
examples of actors involved in the committee are the following: Earthlife Africa eThekwini, TimberWatch, 
South Durban Community Environmental Alliance, Greenpeace Africa, Congress Of South African Trade 
Unions, Economic Justice Network, GroundWork. 
179 This location, quite far from downtown, was just the first of a long series of logistical 
problematics, culminated with the organization of competing events in different parts of the city, with the 
obvious consequence of defeating the purpose of civil society convergence. As Patrick Bond (2012b) 
shows in full detail, however, a significant amount of logistical inconveniences depended on intentional 
delays on the part of the City of Durban and other governmental agencies. 
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limited, if legitimate, goals. This is understandable but it's also a clear problem for civil 
society”.180 Moreover, with specific regard to the last point, particularly instructive was 
the climate justice international conference Dirty Energy Week: Challenging Climate 
Gangsters (November 22nd – 25th), during which a lively exchange of climate politics 
world-views took place between critical insiders (“The UNFCCC is a terrain of struggle: 
we need to force our demands into the multilateral process”) and radical outsiders (“the 
Stockholm Syndrome is serious: you need to realise you've been kidnapped”).181 As an 
overall ex post activists' self-criticism, we can easily – and entirely – subscribe Patrick 
Bond's analysis, according to which 
delegitimization of global capitalism's climate policy reformism, especially when 
reliant on self-destructing carbon markets, should have been the starting point for 
a coherent politico-intellectual demolition of the COP17, and a matching activist 
programme. Without that in place, it makes more sense to dedicate time and 
energy to the national, sub-national and local sources of the crisis, and return to 
the global scale – perhaps in 2013 or later (although time is running out) – with a 
formidable array of recent climate justice victories, momentum and cadres 
(2012b: 67).  
 
To conclude this section, we might juxtapose the two main features of the transnational 
climate justice movement as it has been framed above: on the one hand, its inherent 
fluidity, its lack of co-ordinated organisational structures and common analytical 
perspectives as well as political horizons. As Patrick Bond and Michael Dorsey have 
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recently argued: “Climate justice movements across the world have not solidified a set of 
tactics, much less strategy, principles, ideology and foundational philosophy” (2011: 
298). Quincy Saul, from Ecosocialist Horizon, sees this process of organising 
convergences as the crucial issue to which the politics of climate justice will be 
confronted in the near future: “An ambitious task would be to just say: well, climate 
change is the most dangerous challenge the world has ever faced, so we need to build a 
worldwide movement to counter that. But a more realistic, modest task is to do all we can 
to help already existing local struggles developing a global vision of ecosocialism and 
move towards an ecosocialist horizon. That can take many forms, but mainly it's a matter 
of organising convergences. This is the key strategic question of the XXI century”.182 On 
the other hand, however, climate justice movements have also expressed themselves as 
constituent power, namely as irreducible profaning instances which are able – at the same 
time – to deconstruct the carbon trading dogma and to envisage viable alternatives. As 
Michael Dorsey has emphatically written:  
These demands are not just positions against authority – anti-positions – “against 
power”, per se. To the contrary, the demand for climate justice is an expression of 
hope – indeed, desire and love – and a demand for objectives rooted in collective 
decision-making that are well beyond the provisional scope of power as presently 
conceived. The climate justice movement is therefore one of liberation as well as 
economic and ideological sovereignty. Prophetically, the struggle for climate 
justice dares to demand changing the world without reproducing hierarchical state 
or market power as it is currently known. In this way, it holds both a threat 
against the hegemonic doxa and a novel promise of liberation (2007: 20). 
 
                                                 
182 Dossier A. 
284 
 
By critically overlapping those two main features (need to strategically unify divergences 
and twofold nature – at once deconstructive and creative – of climate struggles), we aim 
at framing profanation as organising convergences as methodological principle to 
investigate three specific climate justice campaigns. Our focus will be on how, by 
connecting heterogeneous demands into single campaigns, climate justice activists tend to 
force the carbon trading dogma beyond its system of compatibilities.  
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2 - THE TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL: REPAYING THE CLIMATE DEBT 
 
 I think that capitalism is the worst enemy of humanity 
and if we do not change the model, change the system, 
then our presence, our debate, our exchange, and the proposals 
that we make in these meetings at the UN will be totally in vain [...] 
I feel that it is important to organise an international movement 
to deal with the environment, 
a movement that will be above institutions, 
businesses and countries 
that just talk about commerce, 
that only think about accumulating capital. 
We have to organize a movement that will defend life, 
defend humanity, and save the earth. 
I think that it is important to think about 
some regions, some sectors and some countries 
repaying what has often been called the ecological debt. 
If we do not think about how this ecological debt will be paid, 
how are we going to solve the problems of life and humanity? 
 
Evo Morales – 2007 
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 One of the most crucial issues discussed by climate advocates in Durban's C17 concerned 
the so-called climate debt. Such a notion is of particular interest from our perspective 
since it closely links the global dimension of climate change policies (North vs. South) to 
their financial character (predominance of carbon trading as a putative solution to global 
warming). At a first sight, the concept of climate debt appears as remarkably 
straightforward: since industrialised countries and high-emissions societies have 
evidently overused the planetary carbon dump in the last two centuries and a half, 
decisively contributing to atmospheric degradation, these same subjects owe developing 
areas – whose climate responsibilities are incomparable, if existing at all in some 
instances – a global warming-related reparation which still awaits to be paid. The 
Bolivian government's submission to the UNFCCC in 2009 brilliantly summarises the 
issue as follows: 
The climate debt of developed countries must be repaid, and this payment must 
begin with the outcomes to be agreed in Copenhagen. Developing countries are 
not seeking economic handouts to solve a problem we did not cause. What we 
call for is full payment of the debt owed to us by developed countries for 
threatening the integrity of the Earth's climate system, for over-consuming a 
shared resource that belongs fairly and equally to all people, and for maintaining 
lifestyles that continue to threaten the lives and livelihoods of the poor majority 
of the planet's population [...] Any solution that does not ensure an equitable 
distribution of the Earth's limited capacity to absorb GHGs, as well as the costs of 
mitigating and adapting to climate change, is destined to fail.183 
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As this excerpt suggests, the apparent simplicity of climate debt as a political category is 
merely superficial, and various complexities emerge as soon as three main problematics 
are tackled: a) how to calculate the actual amount to be compensated for? Given the 
ecological nature of the misused entity, its translation into the grammar of money risks 
replicating the very procedures performed by the carbon trading dogma; b) how to 
demand the repayment? Given the tendency of human rights-based discourses to be co-
opted by neoliberal agencies through legal means, a new paradigm grounded on a 
conception of Earth's climate as a global common should be established in order to ensure 
a radical shift away from green economy policies184; c) how to transfer the agreed sum in 
such a way that it reaches actual climate victims and is used to foster a veritable transition 
towards a low-carbon economy, centred around decentralised renewable energy rather 
than fossil fuels? Given a long-standing history of endemic global South elites' 
                                                 
184 A good example of the shortcomings of a rights-based activist discourse is provided by the recent 
water struggles in Johannesburg, South Africa. As Patrick Bond and Jackie Dugard convincingly argues 
(2008), despite their good intentions many activist campaigns organised around the notion of individual 
water rights ended up fostering rather than stopping the process of neoliberalisation of nature. In a 
subsequent article, Bond critically observes that a perspective grounded on retail water provision, in which 
water is conceived of as an economic commodity, “only to a limited extent links water consumption 
(including over-consumption by firms and wealthy households) to ecosystem sustainability” (2010: 311). 
However, the issue of a rights-based approach to environmental campaigns has been broadly – and 
critically – discussed in activist scenes and, obviously, its multifarious features makes it difficult to find a 
definitive solution. For instance, two different – albeit not necessarily mutually exclusive – interpretations 
are provided by Marie Hurchzermeyer and Ashwin Desai. According to the former, marginal gains through 
courts are important aspects in the struggle for emancipation: “Urban Reform in this sense is a pragmatic 
commitment to gradual but radical change towards grassroots autonomy as a basis for equal rights” (quoted 
in Bond 2011c: 247). Differently, Desai notes that “if one surveys the jurisprudence of how socio-economic 
rights have been approached by South Africa courts there is, despite all chatter, one central and striking 
feature. Cases where the decision would have caused government substantial outlay of money or a major 
change in how they make their gross budgetary allocations, have all been lost. Cases where money was not 
the issue [...] or where what was being asked for was essentially negative – to be left alone – the courts 
have at times come grandly to the aid of the poor. And even to have some of these judgements enforced by 
the executive is a story in and of itself. I have no problems using the law defensively, but when it comes to 
constitute the norms by which political advances are determined, it is extremely dangerous. By flirting with 
legalism, movements have had their demands infected with court pleadings. We have heartfelt pleas for the 
observance of purely procedural stuff, consult us before you evict us. We have demands for housing, now 
become 'in situ upgrading' and 'reasonable government action'” (Ibid.). 
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corruption, the necessity to envisage new community finance strategies as well as 
unprecedented means of popular control over energy programs imperiously emerges.  
 Referring to the first point, an important reflection is provided by Joan Martinez 
Alier, according to whom the factors of such a huge calculative effort are almost 
innumerable and should provisionally include:  
The (unpaid) costs of reproduction or maintenance or sustainable management of 
the renewable resources which have been exported; the actualized costs of the 
future lack of availability of destroyed natural resources (for instance, the oil and 
minerals no longer available, the biodiversity destroyed); the costs of (unpaid) 
reparation of the local damages produced by exports (for example, the sulphur 
dioxide of copper smelters, the mine tailings, the harms to health from flower 
exports, the pollution-irreversible damage); the (unpaid) amount corresponding to 
the commercial use of information and knowledge on genetic resources, when 
they have been appropriated gratis (“biopiracy”) (2003: 24-25). 
  
Although such list could be indefinitely expanded, the main problem concerning the 
calculation of climate debt (and more comprehensively, as the previous quotation shows, 
of ecological debt185) refers not so much to the elements to be considered, but to the value 
they should be accorded. Here the crucial issue of how to translate environmental values 
into monetary figures appears in all its ambivalence: Martinez Alier correctly remarks 
that “tropical rainforests used for wood export have an extraordinary past we will never 
know and ongoing biodiversity whose destruction we cannot begin to value” (Ibid.: 10). 
Simultaneously, and correctly again, his reasoning unfolds as follows: “although it is 
                                                 
185 On the more general notion of ecological debt, see Martinez Alier (2002) and Simms (2005). 
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impossible to make an exact accounting, it is necessary to establish the principal 
categories and certain orders of magnitude in order to stimulate discussion” (Ibid.: 11). In 
other terms, the proposal is to disarticulate the monetary politics of quantification from 
the carbon trading dogma: to dis-orient it. Money would still function as a general 
equivalent, but instead of enabling capital's self-valorisation it would be subordinated to 
environmental justice.186 In this way, Martinez Alier concludes with a precise figure to be 
repaid: “If we take the present human-made emissions of carbon, [this amounts to] a total 
annual subsidy of $75 billion forthcoming from South to North” (Ibid.: 27)187.  
 Obviously, however, establishing a figure to be repaid – albeit complex and politically 
non-neutral as a procedure – does not exhaust the depth presented by climate debt as a 
political category. In fact, particularly controversial is the issue concerning the actual 
modality of repayment. Unsurprisingly, the UNFCCC proposes to locate the source of 
money (whose amount is, however, far from having been already agreed upon) either in 
the Green Climate Fund or – which is essentially the same – in the revenues produced by 
various carbon markets mechanisms (ETF, CDM, REDD+, etc.). Social movements, on 
                                                 
186 This argument can be considered as a variation of the main theme of the money of the common. 
According to Christian Marazzi (2012) such a theme refers to the monetary form of the socio-economic 
contribution performed by the general intellect. In other words, the money of the common expresses the 
constituent power of social knowledge as organisational principle of contemporary production without 
passively accepting its subordination to financial imperatives of valorisation through self-reflexivity. Not 
by chance, Marazzi criticises recent proposals by the European Central Bank of project bonds – obligations 
aimed at financing large infrastructural constructions – and counters to them sustainable bonds – similar 
obligations whose goal would be the provision of funds to projects aimed at fostering local sustainability 
under communities' control. For an extremely thought-provoking commentary to Marazzi's intuition see 
Lucarelli (2012).  
187 Obviously, this is not the only estimate of ecological debt. For instance Patrick Bond (2009) 
reports that Vandan Shiva has calculated that wild seed varieties alone account for $66 billion of annual 
biopiracy benefits to the US. Another possibility, again reported by Bond, is explored by Richard Norgaard 
and his colleagues, according to whom the global North would be responsible for $1.8 trillion in concrete 
damages over several decades. 
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the other hand, demand that such source of money be independent from carbon trading 
(as it would be through the climate basic income, as we will see below), or – even better – 
located outside conventional circuits of capitalistic valorisation. For instance, Esteve 
Corbera and Charlotte Friedli envisage a sort of de-commercialised REDD+ scheme to be 
regarded as an Ecological Debt Fund. As they argue, “the fund could serve as the main 
financial instrument of developed countries to pay back the ecological debt acquired with 
poorer countries as a result of sustained ecologically uneven exchange and the historically 
uneven contribution to global GHG emissions” (2012: 235). From our perspective, such 
proposal is extremely interesting since it maintains the massive mobilisation of the 
general intellect upon which contemporary value-production is increasingly based upon, 
but strongly opposes its subordination to profit-making imperatives.  
 This issue brings us directly to the second and third aspects of climate debt, which 
are particularly important to reflect on the peculiar, extremely close interrelations it 
establishes with the financial debt that lies at the very core of current global crises, 
especially in the Eurozone. Such affinities, in turn, will allow us to better articulate 
climate debt campaigns as specific forms of carbon profanations. From the perspective 
of biopolitics as method, it seems reasonable to argue that those phenomena are but the 
two sides of the same coin: as financial debt expresses the governmental sequestration of 
the future by neoliberal, self-reflexive economic instability, so climate debt (and the 
repetitive procrastination of its repayment) exposes the refusal by Northern elites to 
politically account for their past dominance. In other words, they configure themselves 
respectively as the economic and environmental dimensions of one and the same crisis of 
capitalism as world-ecology. Thus, this framework shows the first aspect of climate debt 
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repayment campaigns as a carbon profanation, hence as a process of organising 
convergences. As contemporary, tendentially high-educated and yet deeply deskilled 
workforces in the global North structure their radical claims around the slogan “we won't 
pay your crisis!”188 – hence advancing a profoundly abolitionist demand – so global 
warming-affected communities in the South pretend the immediate end of violently 
unjust international relations – hence articulating a different, but nonetheless very 
proximate in spirit, abolitionist demand (Ross 2011).189 As Nicola Bullard of Focus on 
the Global South aptly points out: “The only way the debt can be repaid is by ensuring 
that the historic relations of inequality are broken once and for all and that no 'new' debt 
will accumulate. This requires system change, both in the North and in the South. That's 
why climate debt is such a subversive idea” (quoted in Bond 2012a: 132).190  
                                                 
188 Although such slogan originated in the 2008 student mobilisations in Europe (known as 
Anomalous Waves), and is consequently tightly linked to university struggles and resistance against student 
loans, it must be stressed that the financial debt social movements currently opposed is profoundly 
multilayered and differentiated. As an excellent reportage by Astra Taylor for the magazine The Nation 
clearly explains, the exposition to diverse forms of debt is what provides a common ground to the 
multifarious experiences of contemporary workforces: “'Debt is the tie that binds the 99 percent,' Occupy 
organizer Yates McKee has written: 'from the underwater and foreclosed-upon homeowners who were first 
pummeled by the economic crisis, to the millions of debt-strapped students who are in default or on the 
brink, to all those driven into bankruptcy by medical bills, to workers everywhere who have been forced to 
compensate for more than thirty years of stagnating wages with credit card debt, to the firefighters and 
teachers who have had to accept pay cuts because their cities are broke, to the citizens of countries where 
schools and hospitals are being closed to pay back foreign bondholders. Given the way debt operates at the 
municipal and national levels, the issue affects us all—even those who are fortunate enough to be debt-free, 
as well as those so poor they don’t have access to credit. Debt is one of the ways we all feel Wall Street’s 
influence most intimately, whether it’s because of a ballooning mortgage payment or a subway fare hike or 
a shuttered clinic'. 'This is why we’re not talking about a debtors’ movement, but a debt resistance 
movement,” says 28-year-old Chris Casuccio, a Strike Debt member whose student loan debt has swelled 
to more than $100,000 since he graduated” (Taylor 2012). 
189 On a different level, which we cannot fully articulate here, also the foreign debt might be included 
in the equation, as Ecuador's President Rafael Correa's inaugural statement clearly demonstrates. In fact, 
Correa has defined his country foreign debt as “illegitimate” and “contracted in dubious circumstances”. 
For a very unsympathetic – and yet fully detailed – discussion of this issue, see Porzecanski (2010). 
190 Such “historic relations of inequality” have obviously changed their shapes over time. David 
Hallowes provides an excellent overview of their current state of affairs: “Global production networks have 
located the dirty end of the production chain in the global South, giving the North the appearance of clean 
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 Obviously, the path towards a harmonisation of radical demands around different but co-
existing forms of debt is all but clearly traced and/or easy to walk. On the contrary, it is 
fairly reasonable to assess a significant gap between generally Southern alternatives 
based on a culture of sober and respectful sharing – as expressed by formulations such as 
buen vivir (“good living”, as opposed to ceaseless attempts to “living better” by having 
more) and sumak kausai in Latin America, or ubuntu in Africa –191 and generally 
Northern desires to participate as much as possible in the abundance promised by endless 
economic growth. However insidious it may appear – and indeed be – such a gap is not 
impossible to overcome. A good starting point to explore convergences between the two 
sides192 is to establish a connection between the radical demand of an unconditional basic 
income (Van Parijs 1995; Fumagalli and Lucarelli 2008) in Europe and what can be 
provisionally defined as a climate basic income in the Global South. First and foremost, 
the two claims share a common refusal of (or, at the very least, a strategic independence 
from) the language of human rights: in fact, it is not a matter of establishing a legally 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
production. This is an uneven process but, schematically, what has emerged is a triangular ordering of the 
global economy. Raw materials from Africa and Latin America are taken to the Asian factory to produce 
goods consumed in the North. This flow of resources is largely managed by Northern transnational 
corporations who also determine the technologies of production, control product development and allocate 
'value' – or profit – through the network. The global concentration of control in the hands of transnationals 
is a striking feature of the global restructuring of production and this intensified following the financial 
meltdown. Heavy pollution in China, and recent scandals involving the contamination of foods produced 
there has as much to do with cutting imposed by Northern transnational as with cowboy development in the 
wild East. As Wolfgang Sachs has observed, self-poisoning is the price newly industrialised nations have to 
pay for grater share of value creation, while produces of raw materials, at the bottom of the industrial 
supply chain, face the wholesale destruction of their environments” (2011: 106). 
191 On these mainly indigenous alternatives to the capitalist growth-addiction, see De Marzo (2009; 
2010).  
192 It is important, however, to stress once again that the two sets of interests are in actuality much 
more nuanced than they are presented in our impressionistic review. Our aim is to simultaneously stress the 
strategic necessity and the political possibility of organising convergences, not to exhaust the multifarious 
expressions this problematic can assume in a variety of given contexts. 
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recognised right to consume or to pollute. Rather, what is at stake is the political 
recognition of precarious workers as productive subjects, on the one hand, and Southern 
populations as (most often) climatically better performing on the other hand. In this 
sense, both campaigns represent a profanation of the carbon trading dogma since the first 
proposes a different direction for the mobilisation of the general intellect, whereas the 
second counters community organisation and control over local resources to the self-
valorising imperative of global financial capital. 
 To explore the relevance of this commons-based approach as opposed to a rights-based 
one, it is useful to consider the case of the Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs) 
programme, advanced in particular by the German Green party and including a 
controversial “per capita right to pollute”. According to Patrick Bond, there are 
fundamental questions such a programme problematically avoids: 
[...] whether environmental justice can be measured merely in terms of formal 
'equality'; whether environmental justice is instead historical, political-economic 
and grounded in social struggles of those adversely affected; and in turn, whether 
environmental justice should not aim higher, for a broader, deeper eco-social 
transformation? The GDRs approach may foreclose these questions by reducing 
the challenge to incremental reformism (Bond 2012a: 137).  
 
In a similar vein, Larry Lohmann critiques the programme's 
[...] tacit endorsement of a long-discredited concept of 'development' that 
condescendingly sees 'resilience' as 'far beyond the grasp of the billions of people 
that are still mired in poverty', and that singles out for special climate blame 
'subsistence farming, fuel wood harvesting, grazing, and timber extraction' by 
'poor communities' awaiting Northern tutelage in capital flows, social networking, 
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carbon trading and methods for holding policy-makers accountable. (quoted in 
Bond 2012a: 137). 
As we see, although rights-based and commons-based approaches are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive, the GDRs show a profoundly different attitude than the one 
expressed by the basic income claims. Yet, as we anticipated above, unconditional basic 
income in the global North and climate basic income in the South are not completely 
overlapping concepts. When asked about their respective affinities and divergences, 
Patrick Bond stated: “There are similarities, certainly. They can be found in the concept 
of just transition: for that to happen, it is equally crucial that precarious workers receive a 
basic grant and that the climate debt is paid from the North to the South. However, the 
Climate Basic Income Program payment is specifically designed to avoid that the climate 
debt is repaid through market mechanisms such as carbon trading or the Green Climate 
Fund. We need to ensure that money actually goes from the North to affected people 
rather that from the North to Southern private sectors of corrupted agencies. The goal is 
to reduce intermediaries' role as much as possible. This means that the money goes 
directly to people. An interesting project is underway in Namibia, where the equivalent of 
approximately 15$ has been transferred directly to a thousand women through 
international aid – especially from German-based Rosa Luxembourg Foundation. This 
has been extremely important because these women can do what they want with the 
money, so that they can adapt the way they find most appropriate to the negative impacts 
of North-induced climate change”.193 The global warming-related Basic Income Program 
                                                 
193 Dossier A. 
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in the Namibian village of Otjivero has recently been the object of a detailed reportage by 
Dialika Krahe for the German magazine Der Spiegel: 
It sounds like a Communist utopia, but a Basic Income Program pioneered by 
German aid workers has helped alleviate poverty in a Namibian village. Crime is 
down and children can finally attend school. Only the local white farmers are 
unhappy [...] “This country is a time bomb”, says Dirk Haarmann, reaching for 
his black laptop. “There is no time to lose”, he says, opening documents that 
contain numbers he hopes will support his case. Haarmann and his wife Claudia, 
both of them economists and theologians from Mettmann in Western Germany, 
were the ones who calculated the basic income for Namibia. And both are 
convinced that “this is the only way out of poverty” [...] “The basic income 
scheme doesn't work like charity, but like a constitutional right”. Under the plan, 
every citizen, rich or poor, would be entitled to it starting at birth. There would be 
no poverty test, no conditions and, therefore, no social bureaucracy. And no one 
would be told what he or she is permitted to do with the money [...] “In a country 
like Namibia”, says Haarmann, “a basic income would achieve what conventional 
development aid could never do: provide a broad basis for human development, 
both personal and economic” (Krahe 2009). 
 
This reportage clearly shows how a climate basic income can not only work, but also be 
considered in connection with an unconditional basic income. Once again, the process of 
organising convergences profanes (although partially and ambivalently) the exclusive 
drive for self-valorisation of the carbon trading dogma. 
 The second aspect of climate debt campaigns as carbon profanations can be appropriately 
appreciated by considering a specific proposal emerged in the Yasuní National Park in 
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East Ecuador. This national park, which is also a biodiversity hotspot194 and the 
traditional territory of the Huaorani people, contains the country's largest oil reserves. In 
particular, two abundant petrol blocks – ITT [Ishpingo-Tambococha-Tiputi] and Block 31 
– are estimated to be worth 960 million barrels of probable reserves (Martinez 2010). In 
2007, Ecuador's President Rafael Correa presented a proposal concerning these oil 
reserves to the rest of the international community, demanding so-called developed 
countries to take responsibility for $350 million as a compensation – over a ten-year time-
span – in exchange for leaving this oil in the soil. This figure is equivalent to half of the 
expected profits should the country exploit the ITT oil field.  
 
  
                                                 
194 In the course of the C17 workshop on this issue, an activist from Ecuador informed us that “with 
an estimated 2,274 tree and shrub species, Yasuní protects a large stretch of the world's most diverse tree 
community. In fact, there are almost as many tree and shrub species in just one hectare of Yasuní's forests 
as in the entire United States and Canada combined”; dossier B. 
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Figure 5. Yasuní proposal logo. Source: Dossier D. 
 
It is important to remark that such proposal actually prefigures a non-capitalist way to 
confront the issue of fossil fuel-addiction since it does not limit itself to criticise 
destructive oil companies and complacent governments. Rather, the Yasuní proposal, 
which became state policy in 2007, practically delineates a new energy and development 
model based on leaving crude oil underground. As Yvonne Yanez – who, as a long-
standing Acción Ecológica activist has been working on the issue for more than two 
decades – declares, “This project has nothing to do with carbon markets or payment for 
environmental services. The Yasuní proposal, who owns a lot to the indigenous way of 
conceive of existence, represents a new conceptualisation of what life or energy is: it 
actually gestures towards a post-oil civilisation”195. This idea of a transition to a post-
petrol energy model is manifest in the four main points the proposal consists of, as listed 
by Oilwatch activist Esperanza Martinez: 
3) Not extracting the crude oil from the subsoil; 
                                                 
195 Dossier A. 
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4) Channelling international resources in the form of compensation, 
donations, and symbolic sale of the crude oil that will remain unexploited; 
5) Creating a capitalisation fund whose interest could provide a permanent 
source of income; 
6) Using these funds to embark on a model of self-sufficiency with regard to 
food production and energy supply, in order to work towards constructing a post-
petrol Ecuador (Martinez 2010: 234). 
 
Equally important, in terms of designing a non-market-based approach to ecological 
issues, are the “expected results: 
4) Protection of ecosystems in those areas chosen to be new frontiers of oil 
devastation; 
5) Protection of local and global climates; 
6) Respect for the rights of local populations; 
7) Putting to work a new post-oil energy model”.196 
As we see, the political backbone of the Yasuní proposal is radically incompatible with a 
regime of truth based on the uncontested primacy of competition and self-valorising 
market forces and, as a consequence, demanding to leave the oil in the soil (and the coal 
in the hole, and the tar sand in the land – as activist in Durban chanted on many 
occasions) means profaning the carbon trading dogma through the political creation of 
                                                 
196 Dossier C. 
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post-capitalist conditions of energy production, distribution and usage. However, as we 
have repeatedly highlighted, no profanation is – in principle – immune from co-optation. 
The constitutive ambivalence of the Yasuní proposal as carbon profanation is perfectly 
expressed by Esperanza Martinez: 
Many different mechanisms were explored during the first year of this initiative. 
Not all of them were critical of the traditional neoclassical focus, nor even of the 
neoliberal model. For example, an attempt was made to deploy an external debt-
based mechanism in order to guarantee that the oil would not be exploited, in 
combination with a carbon bond within the framework of emissions trading. Just 
as excuses are sought in the international arena, so too in Ecuador. Finally, the 
Yasuní Guarantee Certificate (CGY) was designed. While attempts have been 
made to distance these certificates from carbon bonds, the argument that it will be 
impossible to get money outside of the market, nonetheless threatens to turn them 
into a new market mechanism (Ibid.: 243).  
How to maintain the political force of such radical demand and, hence, avoid capitalist 
recuperation? It is our conviction that an approach based on local oil reserves (as well as 
global climate) as common/s would be helpful to defend and reinvigorate a process of 
establishing new, more resilient institutions. Such institutions, we contend, are potentially 
able not only to resist co-optation, but also to generalise the struggle to leave the oil in the 
soil, and climate change governance out of market hegemony. We will expose and 
discuss a perspective grounded on the notion of the common/s in the conclusion. 
 
3 - THE NATIONAL LEVEL: ONE MILLION CLIMATE JOBS 
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 Apartheid was a new term but an old idea. 
It literally means “apartness” and it represented 
the codification in one oppressive system 
of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans 
in an inferior position to whites for centuries. 
What had been more or less de facto 
was to become relentlessly de jure. 
The often haphazard segregation of the past three hundred years 
was to be consolidated into a monolithic system 
that was diabolical in its detail, inescapable in its reach, 
and overwhelming in its power. 
The premise of apartheid was that whites were superior 
to Africans, Coloureds, and Indians, 
and the function of it was to entrench white supremacy for ever. 
As the Nationalists put it, 
“Die wit man moet altyd baas wees” 
(The white man must always remain boss). 
Their platform rested on the term baasskap, 
literally boss-ship, a freighted word that 
stood for white supremacy in all its harshness. 
 
Nelson Mandela – 1994 
 
 
Apartheid was pervasive and inflicted unnecessary 
and untold suffering on all its victims. 
And you might say without exaggeration 
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that every person who was not white 
to some extent was a victim of this horrendous policy. 
Black people should by rights have been filled with hatred 
and resentment and should have been baying for the blood 
of white people for all that apartheid had done to them. 
Our new Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, 
called us 'a nation of victim', 
and that was an apt description up to a point. 
But we should also declare that ours 
was also wonderfully a nation of survivors, 
with some quite remarkable people 
who astounded the world with their capacity to forgive, 
their magnanimity and nobility of spirit. 
 
Desmond Tutu – 2002 
 
 In order to properly understand the profound relevance as well as the specific 
problematics of the One Million Climate Jobs campaign, it is necessary to situate it in its 
contingent South African context, and more particularly in the multifarious challenges 
faced by the “developmental state” in the post-apartheid era. Patrick Bond defines the 
notion of developmental state as follows: 
Though it typically refers to the East Asian experience combining 
manufacturing-sector growth and diversification with authoritarian politics, I 
take this oft-abused phrase to mean – in a South African context – a 
combination of macro-economic neoliberalism and unsustainable mega-
project development, dressed up with rather tokenistic social welfare policy 
and rhetorical support for a more coherent industrial policy (Bond 2008a: 8).  
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The transition from the progressive policy proclaimed by the first ANC197-led 
government in 1994 – RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) – to the 
openly neoliberal platform eventually adopted by the same government in 1996 – GEAR 
(Growth, Employment and Redistribution) – cannot be described in detail here. Suffice to 
say that the initial attempt to build the “Rainbow Nation” on the basis of a strategy of 
economic growth through just redistribution was soon sacrificed on the altar of the 
national inclusion within the global circuits of capital accumulation.198 As Patrick Bond 
suggests, while resolutely “talking left”, the ANC leadership was rapidly “walking right” 
(2006). A perfect example of this attitude is represented by the fundamental policy called 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), launched in 1994 and then revisited several times 
in the course of its implementation. In theory, BEE can be defined as  
[...] an integrated and coherent socio-economic process [which is] aimed at 
redressing the imbalances of the past by seeking to substantially and equitably 
transfer and confer ownership, management and control of South Africa's 
financial and economic resources to the majority of the citizens. It seeks to ensure 
broader and meaningful participation in the economy by black people [but also 
other minorities: Coloureds, Indians] to achieve sustainable development and 
prosperity (BEE Commission Report quoted in Weston 2011: 155).  
 
                                                 
197 African National Congress. 
198 For divergent but equally detailed analyses of the post-apartheid debates and controversies, see 
Marais (2001), Bond (2005) and Hirsch (2005). 
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Notwithstanding such noble and fair premises, it is nowadays commonly recognised that 
“BEE has facilitated the structural expansion of the white elite class to include a small, 
black elite, overcoming the international constraints to capital accumulation posed by 
apartheid, while maintaining the basic class structure of South African society” (Ibid.: 
147).199 In other words, the “developmental state” in South Africa embodies the 
neoliberal merging of private markets and public administrations we described in the 
previous chapters.200 In fact, a brilliant paper recently delivered by Alex Casamento and 
Chris Webb defined South Africa as a competitive state (Casamento and Webb 2012).201 
 As soon as the Tripartite Alliance government202 embraced the global neoliberal 
atmosphere of the late 1990s, the problem of how to specifically inscribe the South 
African economic context into the planetary financial circuits of capital accumulation and 
valorisation emerged. In general terms, the influence of global capital penetrates in South 
Africa through the uncontested primacy of the so-called minerals-energy complex 
                                                 
199 For an in-depth analysis of BEE, see Mancini (2011). 
200 David Hallowes brilliantly describes such mechanism with regard to the implementation, occurred 
in 2002, of the Micro-Economic Reform Strategy and the Integrated Manufacturing Strategy. As he 
explains, these policies “were premised on an open, export-oriented economy tied into the world economy 
through global production chains; and they were formed from an imagination of development as produced 
through market competition based in high-tech, high-capital and high-energy enterprises. This excluded the 
majority of South Africans from the core of the economy while subordinating this economic core itself to 
the needs and profits of global capital” (2011: 86-87). 
201 Discussing the many challenges faced by the South African Left in the post-apartheid era, Dale 
McKinley argues that “the state has rapidly become the 'public arm' of a slowly deracialising capitalist 
ruling class (both bureaucratic and corporate). The African National Congress (ANC), which is in political 
and administrative possession of the state, is under the effective control of this ruling class and is fully 
committed to serving its interests. Despite the more recent growth of a crisis of ideological identity and 
political division, the ANC's own leadership layers, as well as those of its alliance partners (COSATU – 
Congress of South African Trade Unions) and (SACP – South African Communist Party) have become 
sub-agents of such class rule” (McKinley 2008: 68). 
202 The term “tripartite alliance” refers to the historical affiliation the ANC holds with COSATU and 
the SACP.  
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(MEC), which makes the country's economy the second most energy-intensive in the 
world.203 The MEC is structured around large-scale, energy-intensive industry and 
mining and consumes over 60% of the country's total electricity output (Hallowes 2011). 
Moreover, it is underpinned by coal as the fundamental source of energy. The extraction 
rate of South Africa rich reserves is ever-increasing in particular to supply coal-fired 
electricity for transnational corporations such as Anglo American, BHP Billiton and 
Arcelor Mittal. As Patrick Bond (2011b) has unmasked, this kind of electricity is among 
the cheapest in the world since it is provided under apartheid-era pricing agreements. As 
a consequence, multinational conglomerates are supplied with electricity for less-than-
cost (about 1/8 of what domestic consumers pay). Nevertheless, at present over 30% of 
South African population have no or minimal access to electricity. 
 Beyond its unfair production and unjust distribution, from the perspective of 
climate change the economic dominance of MEC in South Africa presents the further 
problem of being extremely carbon intensive. In fact, as Patrick Bond, Rehana Dada and 
Graham Erion have recently documented, “[South African] CO2 emissions rate in the all-
important energy sector – measured per person per unit of output (i.e., the economy's per 
capita energy intensity) is twenty times worse than that of even the United States” (2009: 
7). And yet, as the same scholars report, a survey conducted by GlobalScan in 2006 
revealed that less than half South Africans consider climate change a “serious problem”. 
Consequently, they conclude, “more than in nearly any other society, ordinary South 
Africans have been kept in the dark by government, media and business – with civil 
                                                 
203 On the several problematic situations linked to the dominance of MEC over South African 
economy see Sharife and Bond (2011).  
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society making uneven efforts to address the deficit” (Ibid.). Actually, during our 
research period in Durban, it was common to be exposed in casual conversations with 
taxi drivers or other Durbanites to arguments like this: “Never seen such a rainy 
summer... No wonder we are hosting the climate change conference!”.204 
 It is against this general background that our analysis of the One Million Climate 
Jobs205 campaign should be situated. We choose to focus on this specific struggle for two 
orders of reasons: on the one hand, this campaign possesses the clear – and somehow rare 
– advantage of being at the same time technically feasible and politically realistic. On the 
other one, it is extremely interesting in that it assumes the carbon trading dogma of the 
green economy – capital is able internalize the environmental limit in such a way that 
ecological protection and economic growth can go hand in hand – but immediately 
disarticulates and inverts it. By means of a strategic profaning move, instead of coupling 
low impacts and dividends' increase, the One Million Climate Jobs campaign links the 
transition to a low carbon economy to the erasure of unemployment, a historical and 
particularly dramatic plague of the South African workforce.206 
                                                 
204 Dossier B. 
205 The first One Million Climate Jobs campaign was launched in the UK in 2009. Obviously, 
however, its translation into a specifically South African context has significantly modified both core 
arguments and practical implications. For a detailed analysis if the British experience, see Neale (2009). 
206 It is important to stress that, although unemployment is a general feature of the capitalist tendency 
to produce crises, its specifically South African form is irreducible to a universal characterisation of the 
problem. As Franco Barchiesi appropriately notes: “The rate of unemployment, presently standing at 
around 25% of the economically active population, does not in itself explain the full extent of the crisis, or 
its nature. Nor does the fact that two-thirds of the working-age, able-bodied population aged 18 to 34 have 
never worked in their lives, or the fact that only one third of the African economically active population is 
in full-time, formal jobs. More generally, South African society is facing – and this is a reality remarkably 
impervious to shifts in the economic cycle and in the economic policy discourse – a widespread decline of 
waged employment as a condition of stable social insertion, citizenship, and the enjoyment of social rights. 
The most visible impacts of wage labour’s decline are deepening labour market inequalities and the 
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Figure 6. One Million Climate Job campaign logo. Source: Dossier D. 
 
The basic claim of OMCJ is almost self-evident: by shifting crucial productive activities 
from a fossil fuel-based model to a low-carbon scheme it is possible to create at least one 
million new jobs. Such jobs must be, and this is a fundamental element, both decent and 
people-driven. “Decency” is defined in terms of social as well as psycho-physical safety 
and of healthy working conditions, whereas “people's centrality” is declined along the 
line of population's primacy over profit. Keeping in mind the three pillars of this 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
expansion of working class poverty, which, encompassing a growing number of workers with formal 
occupations as well as casual ones, is engulfing urban as well as rural areas” (Barchiesi 2008: 52-53). 
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transitional strategy – ecological sustainability, social justice and state intervention – the 
activists list their set of priorities. As they write: “We can and must: 
? produce our electricity from wind and sun in a way that is driven by the energy 
needs of all people, and that protects nature; 
? park private cars and get onto our feet, bicycles, trains, taxis and buses; 
? convert our homes and public buildings so that they use less energy and use water 
more efficiently; 
? grow enough food for all people through techniques such as agroecology that are 
labour intensive, low in carbon emissions, protect soil and water, and provide 
healthy food; 
? protect our natural resources, especially water, soil and biodiversity, to make sure 
that we can continue to meet the basic needs of all people; 
? provide basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation so that we address 
the legacies of apartheid and build the resilience of our people to withstand the 
effects of climate change”.207 
  
 In the materials distributed by OMCJ campaigners, the specific contents of every 
listed demand are well articulated, clearly expressed and, crucially, sustained by solid 
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scientific research. From our perspective, this feature is of particular importance because 
it allows us to interpret this campaign as a peculiar form of carbon profanation at the 
national level. In fact, the collective production of knowledge which made possible the 
construction of the campaign shows two characters that are consistent with the twofold 
nature of profanations. Firstly, as sketched above, activists assume the starting point of 
climate capitalism (creating value by means of solving catastrophic global warming), but 
immediately disarticulate it by questioning the very notion of value. Just as the green 
economists, OMCJ activists recognise the climate crisis as a terrain for development – as 
a job creator rather than as a job killer – but do so by privileging the working classes' 
interests instead of the financial sector's needs. Through this decisive move the campaign 
overcomes the insidious issue of the – often conflicting – relationships between 
environmental advocates and trade unionists. Such inclusivity strongly resonates with 
Andrew Ross' reflection on the possibility to effectively resist the austerity measures that 
are sweeping the Eurozone: 
It’s very likely that the impact of the new austerity politics will set back the 
green-labour cause (and it is intended to do so) but there can also be no doubt 
now about the political potential of synchronizing the movements for social, 
economic, and environmental justice – a potential that has got a big boost from 
the climate crisis. Indeed, if the climate crisis did not exist, it may have been 
necessary to invent it so that this synchrony could finally occur (2011: 45). 
 
Ross' point is definitely applicable to the OMCJ campaign: actually, it is refreshing and 
encouraging to see, as organizations involved in the project, actors as diverse, and once 
very disconnected, as the COSATU, the WWF, the Rural People's Movement, the New 
Women's Movement, the Institute for Zero Waste, the National Union of Mineworkers 
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and many others. Even more importantly, such process of organising convergences 
seems to be immune from the risk of levelling the radicality of demands since it 
originates at the intersection between scientific knowledge production/diffusion and local 
activism; hence, it configures itself as more difficult to be co-opted and/or recuperated. 
Workers, unemployed and environmentalists are connected not through specific, single-
issue political practices, but rather by a new, general understanding of the climate crisis 
as a political means of social liberation and jobs-creation. 
 However, the critique of the carbon trading dogma by means of unprecedented 
coalition-building processes does not exhaust the political relevance of this campaign. In 
fact, the second aspect of OMCJ as carbon profanation concerns its (potential) 
incompatibility with the capitalist desire/need to self-valorise. Here, the general intellect 
is heavily mobilised as the organising principle of production, but is not corrupted by the 
primacy of profit-making over collective wealth-sharing. The technical accuracy of each 
possible intervention within the context of various sectors, as reported in Table 1, is 
striking and demonstrates the simultaneous quality and radicality of the bottom-up 
research carried out by OMCJ activists. Decentralization of energy supplies, public 
subsidies for renewable sources, electricity basic allowances, new means of pursuing 
energy efficiency (such as retrofitting old buildings), reforms of the transport system, 
creation of greenwalls and greenroofs, restoration of polluted rivers and wetlands, 
widespread rainwater harvesting: these are but few concrete proposals to create jobs by 
decarbonizing the national economy (potentially) beyond capitalism.  
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Table 1. Source: Dossier C. 
 
 At this point, we would like to underline what we consider a great strength of this 
campaign and, subsequently, to discuss one of its possible limits. Firstly, it is evident that 
the climate crisis is correctly conceived of as a global political issue whose implications 
affect every aspect of individual as well as collective life. Even more importantly, climate 
change is tackled as a crisis reflecting uneven power relations (between classes and 
between world's regions) and unequal catastrophic distribution (the poorer suffer the 
most, and yet are the least culpable). From this perspective, technical feasibility cannot be 
confused with technocratic approaches. OMCJ presents itself as a non-neutral solution by 
identifying who is responsible for the problem: a form of capitalistic market based on 
carbon-intensive accumulation for the sole purpose of making profits. This is why the 
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envisaged strategy “does not exclude the private sector altogether, but [it] cannot rely on 
businesses to take urgent action as their bottom line of profitability and accountability to 
shareholders mostly prevents them from doing what is required socially and 
environmentally”.208 In other words, the animal spirits of capital must be tamed in order 
to ensure a people-driven transition to a low-carbon economy.  
 Exactly this explicit and welcome politicization, however, this complete rejection 
of any technocratic rhetoric whatsoever, might represent a serious limit to the entire 
radical architecture of the campaign. In fact, who is in charge of this “taming”? OMCJ 
advocates seem to have no doubts about that: it cannot but be the nation state. Although, 
at times, such a state-centrism appears to be counterbalanced by a significant emphasis on 
community self-governance,209 it is fair to say that the institutional pivot of the transition 
is individuated in the (positive) power of the state as opposed to the (negative) influence 
of the market. Consider, for instance, the following passage: “A just transition to a low-
carbon economy requires state intervention. The imperatives of climate change and job 
creation on the one hand potentially conflict with trade rules rigged to meet the needs of 
transnational corporations on the other. Solutions to climate change lean heavily on local 
production to create jobs and reduce emissions. Local production – whether for the 
manufacture of renewable energy or transport or food – will require a range of initial 
protections such as: subsidies to local producers, non-price-competitive contracts, and 
import tariffs to help make foreign products uncompetitive. These essential measures 
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209 For example, the expression “publicly owned and community-controlled” recurs quite often in 
OMCJ materials. 
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would discriminate against foreign companies and investors and could therefore be non-
compliant with the vast complex of trade rules explicitly designed to prohibit such 
measures. The struggle against climate change requires a struggle against the trade rules 
'rigged in favour of the rich'”.210 
 As we see, the state vs. the market framework could not have been expressed in a 
clearer manner. Let us be direct, though: the problem with this framework does not 
concern the necessity to limit the market's all-pervasiveness but, rather, the very 
possibility that such a crucial task might be performed by the contemporary, heavily 
neoliberalized state. Actually, the analysis we provided in the previous chapters suggests 
that states and markets are deeply entangled in the cogency of the carbon trading dogma. 
As a consequence, we contend that the prefigurative dimension of the OMCJ campaign 
would benefit from a non-state-based perspective such as that grounded on the notion of 
the common/s, which we will expose and discuss in the conclusion. 
 
  
                                                 
210 Dossier C. 
314 
 
4 - THE LOCAL LEVEL: SHUTTING DOWN BISASAR ROAD 
LANDFILL 
 
You cannot just get rid of the pollution. It settles. 
And most of the waste [at Bisasar Road dumpsite] 
was burned at night. 
Now they want to put a new set of generators in the valley 
and flare off additional methane 
that would not be used for electricity. 
In the process, more than 43,000 tonnes of carbon 
will be produced every year. 
They are saying it is going to alleviate global warming 
because they are going to get carbon credits [...] 
It's the opposite. It's a disaster. 
It's another form of colonialism. 
 
Sajida Khan – 2007  
 
 
 Besides global and national issues, Durban C17 dedicated a great deal of its attention to 
local struggles. In fact, no hierarchy could be detected amongst different oppositional 
scales, all the effort being directed towards the creation of a reciprocally incremental 
virtuous circle amongst them. Perhaps the best way to approach local scale problematics 
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in the context of anti-COP 17 mobilisations is to analyse the role played by “big events” 
in Durban's municipality (eThekwini)'s strategy to foster the city's growth. Whereas in the 
late 1990s Durban implemented innovative policies and generally acted supportively with 
regard to street traders and community-based informal activities, starting from the mid-
2000s eThekwini turned to an investors-friendly strategy exemplified by the slogan 
“world-class city”. Rather than the needs of the population, Durban's city officials choose 
to privilege putative, market-driven exigencies centred around the organisation of “mega-
events” in the hope to link urban expansion to tourism, sport happenings (the soccer 
World Cup in 2010211 is most likely going to be a prelude to an Olympic bid for 2024), 
and international trade. Quite unsurprisingly, such a strategy configures itself as very 
risky, to say the least; in addition, it implies a relevant increase in GHG emissions. As the 
SDCEA [South Durban Community Environmental Alliance] has aptly remarked: 
Global capital has made the succession of mega-events into significant sources of 
profit with carbon emissions to match. For host countries and cities, they present 
the opportunity to market themselves to global investors. These opportunities 
come at a very dear cost. FIFA212 walked off with staggering profits from the 
World Cup, the corporate sponsors latched onto the global audience, and Durban 
was stuck with a bill of SA Rand 2 billion [approximately US$ 250 million]. The 
prestigious Moses Mabhida Stadium has not been filled since the World Cup, and 
maintenance alone drains the city coffers. South Africa will also pay handsomely 
for the privilege of hosting COP 17 (2011: 125).  
Obviously, such price to be paid looks very different depending on who is gazing at it. 
According to a representative of Durban's businesses association, interviewed in early 
                                                 
211 On the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, see Desai and Bond (2010). 
212 Fédération Internationale de Football Association; it is the organiser of the World Cup. 
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December by local newspaper The Mercury, “hosting environmentally responsible events 
has positioned Durban as an innovative, globally competitive event destination. With 
experience gained from FIFA World Cup and now COP 17, Durban continues to set the 
benchmark for hosting large gatherings that are economically sustainable and efficient 
and take care of the environment at the same time. Durban is a leader in incorporating 
green practices and principles into events to maximize the positive benefits and minimize 
the negative impacts of large events. In addition, significant progress has been made in 
influencing decision-makers to set benchmarks for future green events and build 
sustainable principles in the way we do business”213.  
 On the contrary, street vendors participating to the public hearings on climate change and 
poverty, hosted by SDCEA in 2011, observed that “COP 17 will be a big event with 
many visitors from around the world. And we know that they will then start with 'street 
cleaning', so the international visitors will not see dirty street vendors. We want support 
for our demand that we are not cleaned off the streets. We have learnt that the same thing 
happens in other parts of the world when they host big events. And we experienced it 
during the football World Cup”214. Actually, in preparation for COP 17 Durban has been 
turned in a sort of perverse case study of socio-environmental injustices, in so far as a 
large number of poor people have been displaced from homes, streets and even fishing 
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piers in the area adjoining the International Convention Centre (ICC) (Bond and Desai 
2011).215 
 However, beyond a history of violent evictions and a recent neoliberal shift towards 
dubious forms of urban growth, Durban also shows a remarkable tradition of radical 
movements' resistance and civil society protagonism. Most importantly from our 
perspective, South Durban communities' environmental concerns about air pollution from 
industrial plants and refineries played a significant role in resisting local as well as 
international power, already during the apartheid-era.216 More specifically, two dates 
must be mentioned: in 1993, a group of community organisations and NGOs formed the 
South Durban Environmental Forum (SDEF), which in 1997 became the South Durban 
Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA). These movements engaged local and 
                                                 
215 Another example of COP17 conceived of as a mega-event by eThekwini is the much-advertised 
art exhibition entitled DON'T/PANIC, held form November 23rd 2011 to February 19th 2012 at the Durban 
Art Gallery. In the words of curator Gabi Ngcobo: “DON'T/PANIC is a curatorial project responding to the 
subject of climate change, with the aim of unsettling both those who snub the subject and those who pay it 
an overwhelming amount of attention. Climate change is not a subject to be disregarded but perhaps it is 
one in which, within art, one can find syntaxes that transverse scientific stringency and start to inhabit more 
enabling spaces – spaces that tend toward the fictional, the fantastical, the spectral. Here I refer to art that 
has the ability to touch but never with the aim of embracing; art that is disobedient and disruptive; art that 
refuses to be an overt functional tool and therefore has the power to act against the general drift of the 
world.” (dossier D). 
216 Although regrettably understudied, the connection between anti-apartheid and environmental 
justice struggles is profoundly relevant from the perspective of biopolitics as method. It is impossible here 
to analyse this issue in the depth it certainly deserves, but we find it useful to report an important account of 
it recently proposed by David Hallowes: “The environmental justice movement [in South Africa] emerged 
in the early 1990s. It saw the environmental destruction of apartheid in explicitly political terms and 
challenged the dominant view that reduced the environment to wildlife conservation. It also responded to 
the peripheral place of the environment within the imagination of liberation. For many black people, the 
environment was associated with conservation and conservation with forced removals. It was a middle-
class white concern that put animals before (black) people and not relevant to the urgent needs of the 
country for development and social justice. Nonetheless, many of the demands articulated during the 1980s 
responded to environmental injustice: unions demanded health and safety at work; civics demanded water, 
energy and waste services; and everyone demanded the transformation of South Africa's spatial regime – an 
end to pass laws and urban influx controls and comprehensive redistribution of land. So in many ways, the 
struggle against apartheid was was implicitly also an environmental struggle as was first recognised by the 
National Environmental Awareness Campaign, founded in Soweto in the aftermath of the June 1976 
uprising” (2011: 92). 
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national governmental agencies not only on the level of organising opposition to given 
projects, but also – and more crucially – they worked restlessly to undermine the truth 
claims upon which both apartheid and post-apartheid environmental racism217 was/is 
based. In other words, their struggle targeted official – and often biased – knowledge and 
established a political field of legitimacy for alternative knowledge produced from the 
bottom up to foster progressive demands in the realm of environmental justice. A good 
example of this is the criticisms radical NGO groundWork addressed to the Air Quality 
Bill presented to the South African parliament in February 2004. Initially, this policy did 
not recognise the protection of people's health as one of its objectives, basically 
disregarding the connection between pollution and ill-health – which was the pillar of 
civil society counter-knowledge efforts. Although vociferous protests halted the 
government plan and forced the contested policy to include the Environment Right as it is 
incorporated in the South African Constitution (namely, as strongly related to health 
issues), David Hallowes is right in reflecting on the initial omission in the following 
terms: 
[W]hether intentionally or not, [it] appeared to play to a corporate agenda that 
works to dissociate health and industrial pollution on the grounds of 'scientific 
uncertainty'. Scientific uncertainty is in fact the twin of wilful ignorance. As 
industry uses it, certainty must be absolute: the link between pollution and ill-
health must be demonstrated in each case. Medical studies on the causes of ill-
health, however, work on the basis of statistical probabilities and are not 
compatible with absolute certainty. Industry thus demands a standard of proof 
that it knows is impossible. The strategy is to invalidate statements linking 
                                                 
217 In its most general meaning, the term “environmental racism” refers to situations in which 
racialised communities are targeted for the placement of polluting industries and factories. We will address 
the issue in a little more details below. For an excellent introduction, see Bullard (1993). 
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pollution and ill-health and so exclude them from public debate and make the 
relationship invisible. It puts the onus of proving harm onto those who suffer it 
and simultaneously raises the costs of doing so (2011: 100).  
The consequence of the opposition to the Air Quality Bill was a decisive process of 
diffusion of knowledge which gave birth, in 2006, to the fundamental South Durban 
Health Study which, on the one hand, corroborated local people's long-argued connection 
between refineries' pollution and various diseases and, on the other hand, echoed people's 
demand for significant exposure reduction. The high quality of this research – a constant 
feature of Durban's eco-justice activism – can be properly appreciated in both sections of 
the study: “a health risk assessment based on monitoring South Durban residents' 
exposure to air pollutants; an epidemiological study that analysed the actual status of 
inhabitants' respiratory health by examining children at selected schools and their 
parents”218. 
 It is against this vibrant activist background – in which scientific truth and political 
claims melt into each other and become stakes of social struggles – that we chose to 
address the campaign aimed at shutting down Bisasar Road dumpsite as an example of 
(partial) carbon profanation. The reason of this choice is twofold: on the one hand, such 
an issue links together apartheid-era environmental racism and contemporary carbon 
trading's devastating effects; on the other hand, its controversial unfolding – which 
affected both supporters of the landfill and resisting communities – presents itself as 
particularly useful to problematise our hypothesis of carbon profanation. In fact, both of 
its aspects (organising convergencies + prefiguring a non-capitalist horizon) have been at 
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times overwhelmed by tactical concerns and/or by tacit co-optation. In other words, 
profaning acts can never be taken for granted. Nonetheless, we contend the example is all 
the more relevant since it stresses one more time that profanations are not automatic by-
products of capitalist development; rather, they need constant participation, persevering 
organising and favourable contingent conditions to be effective and fulfill their 
emancipatory promises.  
 The history of Bisasar Road landfill begins even before its own establishment in 1980. In 
fact, in 1961, through the infamous Group Areas Act, the apartheid government relocated 
Indian populations across Durban to the area called Clare Estates, where Bisasar Road is 
situated. As was typical of apartheid, no compensation for this violent displacement was 
or has ever been paid and many Indians were forced into greatly inferior housing 
settlements. In the 1960s, at the time of the resettlement, there was a large quarry on 
Bisasar Road that was lined with trees and green space. In 1980, when the local 
government was running out of landfill space, the quarry was transformed into the 
Bisasar Road dump. Obviously, the fact that this was almost an entirely Indian 
neighbourhood during the time of apartheid is not coincidental. As it is manifest, the 
establishment of Bisasar Road dumpsite represents a textbook case of environmental 
racism (Erion 2009). This was probably the main reason – although certainly not the only 
one – why the project encountered from its very outset organised resistance by local 
populations. The majority of Indians living in Clare Estate were relatively middle-class 
and thus had the resources to rapidly get organised against the dump. The leader of this 
movement aiming at shutting down the landfill was Sajida Khan (1952-2007), whose 
intense community activism did not decline after the promise to close down the dump 
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was broken by the first ANC-led government in 1996. Despite a diffused, fierce and 
multi-tactics (amongst others: informative picket lines, dump blockades, a community-
wide petition signed by more than 6,000 people) campaign co-ordinated by Khan, the 
government not only decided not to close the landfill, but actually deliberated to extend 
its life-span. This governmental pronouncement was all the more controversial given the 
profoundly detrimental dump-related health effects: in her informal surveys of the 
neighbourhood (a striking and powerful example of knowledge creation from below), 
Khan showed that seven out of ten residents in the area of Clare Estates closest to the 
landfill had reported at least one person in their household developing cancer (Reddy 
2005).219 Khan herself died of cancer in 2007 and was convinced her diseased was 
directly linked to her exposure to various pollutants released by the dump. However, as 
Khadija Sharife brilliantly put it, Khan's long-standing community activism was able to 
diagnose a broader political cancer: “Poor countries are so poor they will accept crumbs. 
The World Bank knows this and they are taking advantage of it” (2011: 158). 
 How did the World Bank get involved in Bisasar Road landfill? Basically, through its 
transformation into a CDM project in 2002. Instead of closing the landfill, as demanded 
by local populations, eThekwini – more specifically, Durban Solid Waste (DSW) – 
decided to apply for CDM status through a landfill gas capture project. This project 
                                                 
219 Concerning health-related issues at Bisasar Road, Graham Erion comments: “For Khan and other 
residents in Clare Estates there is only one place to lay the finger for their poor health: the dump. Prior to 
the 1990s there were very few government regulations on waste management and thus Bisasar was able to 
have a medical waste incinerator on its site and accept other forms of hazardous waste. Even when stricter 
regulations were put in place and the landfill ceased incinerating hazardous waste, Khan still cites 
unsubstantiated [as conducted by community activists] studies where the limits of waste emissions 
considered potentially hazardous were exceeded in hydrogen chloride by 50%, cadmium by 200%, and lead 
by more than 1000%. Limits for suspended particulate matter were also exceeded” (2009: 35). 
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received US$15 million from the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund in start-up capital 
and, schematically, can be summarised as follows:  
at three landfill sites across the city – Bisasar Road, La Mercy, and Mariannhill – wells 
are drilled to capture methane gas that would otherwise be released into the atmosphere 
as a GHG at least twenty times more potent than CO2. By 2006, landfill gas was captured 
and flared at the Bisasar Road and Marianhill landfill, but this is only about 7% of the 
potential gas that could be captured. The proposed project plans to significantly increase 
both the efficiency of the gas capture (allegedly up 83% in 2012) and the dropping to 
approximately 45% collection efficiency over the twenty-one year life of the project. 
Once the gas has been captured it will be put into electricity generators for use by 
industrial consumers, thus offsetting coal emissions from the electricity these industries 
would have used in the absence of the project (Erion 2009). As we see, local officials 
claimed – strictly adhering to the carbon trading dogma – that the CDM had transformed 
a problematic issue into a profitable business opportunity. In fact, proponents of the 
project claim to produce two climate benefits. In the words of an activist running a 
workshop at C17 on this issue, these are: “preventing the release of methane in the 
atmosphere and generating electricity which supposedly offsets coal emissions”. 
However, she continued, “the climate benefits, if any, are offset by increased emissions in 
developed countries which buy the carbon credits generated”220.  
 This insightful remarks raise two different questions we already encountered in the 
previous chapter: a) do CDM-projects actually reduce global carbon emissions?; b) is the 
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criterion of additionality really satisfied? In the case of the Bisasar Road dumpsite (but 
the same can be said of all CDMs), the first answer is easy: no. However, the second 
answer is more nuanced and needs further exploration. Let us recall that, in principle, for 
a CDM to be accepted it must show its additionality with regard to a counterfactual 
scenario built on a future projection of the business as usual situation. Such requirement, 
in the case of Bisasar Road landfill, is controversial to say the least. On the one hand, 
DSW claims that CDM funding would allow increased efficiency both in flaring and 
waste collection. On the other hand, however, John Parkin, Deputy Head of Engineering 
at DSW, declared contradictorily that “what makes it [Bisasar Road project] worthwhile 
is the revenue that can be earned from carbon credits”, and that “it started off as an 
environmental project in 2003. The Kyoto Protocol was only signed up to 51% by 2005. 
We already started the project and we were going ahead no matter what, so whether 
CDM became reality or not, the project was going to go ahead” (quoted in Sharife and 
Bond 2011: 41-43). Understandably, thus, Khadija Sharife and Patrick Bond called the 
Bisasar Road CDM a perfect example of “municipal and multifaceted fraud” (Ibid.).  
 More important from our perspective, however, is to report and discuss the various 
form of community oppositions to the CDM, as well as the problems such oppositions 
encountered. In fact, as soon as the World Bank sponsored the project, Saijda Khan 
strategically filed a lawsuit against municipal authorities for failure to close the landfill. 
This move forced the WB to back off in 2005, but did not put an end to Bisasar Road 
324 
 
operations.221 As explained in the above mentioned workshop, “it continues to be an 
unsightly place of rotting garbage spreading repugnant odours, invasive dust and life-
threatening toxins over the surrounding neighbourhood. The landfill has a history of poor 
operation, which includes toxic leachate leaks and toxic air emissions. In addition, there 
is no buffer zone between the landfill and residents, who are located literally within a few 
meters of the site. Ten public schools are also located within one square km of the 
landfill”222. Moreover, the new CDM-induced operations even worsened the conditions 
faced by residents since, “due to methane-electricity conversion processes, fumes from 
rotting waste possess a much higher level of lethal chemicals and metals”223.  
 This worsening of Bisasar Road dumpsite's conditions was made possible to a great 
extent by a profound political fracture affecting local communities, whose unavoidable 
outcome was a significant reduction of the effectiveness of their resistance. In fact, 
eThekwini and DSW perfectly performed the divide et impera strategy by exploiting 
class differences to break the potential unity of affected people. 
Figure 7. Protest against Bisasar Road landfill continuing operation. Source: Dossier C. 
                                                 
221 In 2006, the French Development Agency pledged long-term loans of US$ 8 million to Durban's 
landfill gas projects (Bisasar Road is by far the largest of the three), alongside the US$ 1.3 million extended 
by South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry (Bond 2007). Moreover, in 2008 the World Bank was 
replaced by an investment company, Trading Emissions, which acquired the right to buy one million 
emissions reductions credits (Sharife and Bond 2009).  
222 Dossier B. 
223 Dossier C. 
325 
 
 
While Indian, middle-class residents have demanded the closure of the dumpsite due to 
health concerns, black Zulu residents have opposed this demand due to livelihood-related 
matters. In particular, the Kennedy Road (also adjoining the dump) shack dwellers, 
organised in the movement called Abahlali baseMjondolo,224 welcomed the chance to 
have few of their members recover recyclable materials from the landfill. Although very 
dangerous,225 the shack dwellers' movement considered landfill waste picking to be more 
                                                 
224 Abahlali baseMjondolo (in isiZulu: those who live in the shacks) is a South African shack 
dwellers' movement which is well known for its campaigning for public housing. The movement refuses 
party and parliamentary politics, boycotts and has had conflictual relationship with the ANC. Its key 
demand is that the social value of urban land should take priority over its commercial value and it 
campaigns for the public expropriation of large privately owned landholdings. Its crucial organising 
strategy is to try to create urban commons from below by trying to create a series of linked communes. 
Abahlali baseMjondolo became nationally known through its successful struggles against adverse living 
conditions and police repression. For an in depth analysis of the movement, see Pithouse (2006). 
225 Health workers from a Durban clinic confirmed that Kennedy Road residents suffers severely 
from asthma, sinusitis, pneumonia and even tuberculosis. Although the toxic body load is to date unknown, 
the Cancer Society of South Africa has labelled the area a “cancer hotspots” due to the fact that heavy 
metals and other noxious substances are present in significant quantities in water, air and shifting soils 
(Sharife and Bond 2012). 
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appealing than nothing. As an informative booklet recently released – and broadly 
discussed at C17 – by GAIA [Global Alliance for Incinerators Alternatives] reports: 
Faced with the opposition of Clare Estate formal residents, the city officials and 
their international partners cultivated the support of shack dwellers. DSW 
presented false promises to the informal settlement of benefits derived from the 
CDM project. This included promises that the CDM project would secure fifty 
engineering scholarships and two hundred formal jobs. The reality was six jobs 
and five bursaries over twenty-one years for residents of eThekwini, Durban... 
According to African shack dwellers, DSW also promised that they would receive 
cheap or free electricity; and that five to ten percent of profits were to be used for 
community development. But the shack dwellers still have no electricity [...] 
Moreover, DSW eventually limited access to the dump due to safety and health 
concerns, especially after one of the recyclers was killed by an onsite 
compactor.226 
Although the leader of Abahlali baseMjondolo, S'bu Zikode, acknowledged political 
manipulations by DSW by declaring that “we were used; they even offered us free busses 
to protest in favour of this project [...] to damage those who oppose it” (quoted in Sharife 
and Bond 2012: 40), the movement still believes that the continued operation of the 
landfill offers its members an opportunity to address livelihood concerns, however 
limited. This is particularly striking in light of two interrelated facts: a) eThekwini's 
broken promises; b) Sajida Khan's reasonable alternative to the CDM project: 
Since the 1990s, we have been asking them to remove the methane. What they 
can do is look for alternatives. There is gas liquification process that can take out 
the methane, purify it and add it to diesel for trucks and use it as fuel. It can be 
pumped and used in industries. There is a gas pipeline running right along the 
dumpsite. All they have to do is extract and purify the gas and add it to that 
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pipeline. It is far cheaper but they would not get so much of the emissions 
reduction credits. But the what is more important, the health of the community or 
making money at the expense of the community? (in Dada 2009: 103). 
As we see, according to Khan the methane should indeed be removed, but through nearby 
gas pipes instead of being burned and flared on the site. Khan's objective was twofold: 
Bisasar Road immediate closure and simultaneous conversion of methane to electricity to 
occur a long way from residential areas. Unfortunately, as Khadija Sharife and Patrick 
Bond aptly point out, for her vision to be realised a set of favourable political conditions 
were necessary, but absent: 
Khan required something bigger than we find in Durban and South African 
politics at present: a united red and green civil society front that can defeat the 
local-global capitalist-patriarchal rubbish industry, using a 'zero waste' 
philosophy that would create dozens – perhaps hundreds – of reliable jobs in 
recycling for Kennedy Road shack dwellers who could be suitably resettled with 
security of tenure, on stable land in the immediate vicinity. With such a political 
front in place and the municipality on post-neoliberal hands, the simultaneous 
termination and rehabilitation of the Bisasar Road dump could then proceed, as 
Khan has demanded, potentially with stable soil cover, vegetation and a new 
public space for the oppressed neighbours (Sharife and Bond 2009: 100). 
 What, then, can the campaign to shut down the Bisasar Road landfill, led by Sadija 
Khan, tell us about the notion of carbon profanation? First of all, as we anticipated, it is a 
useful example to remember how effective organising and valid counter-knowledge 
might be insufficient to defeat global capital and local governmental actors: proper 
political conditions are also required. From this perspective, we may consider such 
campaign as a missed – albeit still potential – carbon profanation. With regard to the first 
aspect of profanations, there is no doubt that Khan's proposal was at the same time a 
disarticulation of the carbon trading dogma (health comes before profit) and a (failed) 
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attempt to organise convergences amongst different groups towards a common radical 
goal. Moreover, referring to the second element of profanations, the critical development 
of a Zero Waste strategy227 from below clearly delineates an anti-capitalist model beyond 
competitive obsolescence and wasteful consumption. Co-ordinating the centrality of 
waste-pickers' economic function and the reduction of garbage creation is simply 
incompatible with a mindset which perceives gas-to-electricity conversion as a way to 
fabricate carbon credits. Especially this last point – the articulation of a new, post-
capitalist economic meaning of the notion of waste – can play a fundamental role in 
envisaging a productive system based more on the circulation of knowledge and 
information than on the physical expansion of the throughput, which is to say the amount 
of matter and energy which traverses the economy (and is eventually thrown away in the 
form of rubbish). To elaborate on this premise, the Zero Waste approach would 
politically benefit, we contend, from a practical as well as theoretical engagement with an 
inclusive and intrinsically dialogical perspective such as that grounded on the notion of 
the common/s, which we will expose and discuss in the conclusion. Perhaps a mutual 
influence between these two frameworks could overcome that “main strategic flaw” 
Ashwin Desai has acutely detected in Khan's long-standing battle: 
                                                 
227 “Zero waste is a philosophy that encourages the redesign of resource life cycles so that as many 
products as possible are reused. As a result, trash sent to landfills and incinerators is minimal. A working 
definition of zero waste, often cited by experts in the field originated from a working group of the Zero 
Waste International Alliance [zerowaste.org] in 2004: “Zero Waste is a goal that is ethical, economical, 
efficient and visionary, to guide people in changing their lifestyles and practices to emulate sustainable 
natural cycles, where all discarded materials are designed to become resources for others to use. Zero 
Waste means designing and managing products and processes to systematically avoid and eliminate the 
volume and toxicity of waste and materials, conserve and recover all resources, and not burn or bury them. 
Implementing Zero Waste will eliminate all discharges to land, water or air that are a threat to planetary, 
human, animal or plant health”. For a more detailed analysis of such a category, see Palmer (2005), and 
Connett (2005). 
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Sajida's main strategic flaw was the belief that by meticulous scientific 
presentation of the facts, based upon thorough research, she could persuade the 
ruling class. Facts became the main weapon of struggle. But without an ongoing 
critical mass of people, once the World Bank was convinced she was right and 
dropped out – apparently the case by 2006, just as happened with the Narmada 
dams in India – then the domestic government stepped in to take up the slack. So 
eThekwini municipality is now taking over from the World Bank and looking for 
investors because the bigger cadreship is not there to stop it. Facing down the 
World Bank was impressive and deserved the claim to a victory. But its one thing 
to tell truth to power, and Sajida was absolutely brilliant in defeating the system's 
experts. But one needs a much bigger mass movement to go beyond that (quoted 
in Sharife and Bond 2009: 100-101). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The three campaigns we have analysed in this chapter – climate debt, OMCJ, and Bisasar 
Road CDM – demonstrated at the same time the constituent power of carbon profanations 
in their capacity to both disarticulate the carbon trading dogma and to prefigure 
progressive alternatives to it, and the intrinsic limits to which they are constantly 
exposed. Moreover, we suggested that a contamination of these experiences with a 
perspective based on the notion of common/s might be beneficial in terms of gaining 
institutional consistency and resisting capital's co-optation. As anticipated, we will 
discuss such issues in the conclusion of our dissertation. The main point concerns the 
configuration of the climate (and, hence, of its crisis) as a commons to be managed 
beyond – although not necessarily, and in any case not always, against – the double trap 
of private and public property. Such configuration is, at the moment, little more than a 
work in progress in its initial stage. It is, however, especially significant since, within the 
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Climate Justice Now! Network, there is no unity concerning the political approach to be 
adopted with regard to the specific abstractions – created by the mobilisation of the 
general intellect – upon which carbon trading is structured. Two opposite examples are 
provided by Yvonne Yanez, from Acción Ecológica and Oil Trade Watch, and Joel 
Kovel, from Ecosocialist Horizon. According to the former, “as movements, we shouldn't 
fight capitalist abstractions with other abstractions. We need to look at the concrete and 
start from that. We need to look at lifestyles which have nothing to do with a capitalist 
approach to fossil fuel and base our struggles on that concreteness. This lifestyles are 
often called 'traditional' but they are much more 'modern' than fossil fuel-based lifestyles. 
And they are not necessarily indigenous: many fishermen communities conduct a live in 
perfect balance with nature”.228 At the other side of the spectrum, Kovel argues that “a 
proper eco-socialist strategy cannot just avoid the reality or run away from it, like: the 
wild man goes up onto the mountain... Well, this is sheer folly: the suicidal, hysterical, 
nihilistic response to the challenge of climate change”.229 These statements do not 
represent, we contend, an unsurpassable political impasse; rather, they individuate a 
problematic field of intervention upon which a perspective based on the theory of the 
common/s might be particularly useful.  
 Although obviously embryonic, a form of militant action which situates itself on this 
level is, perhaps, detectable in the social movement that in Durban has labelled itself 
Occupy COP17. Mainly composed by international activists constantly – but not 
exclusively – involved in cultural jamming and delegitimation-through-irony 
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masquerades (the “Conference of Polluters” logo and the clownesque protests became 
very popular amongst anti-COP17 activists)230, this movement set as its main goal the 
creation of a political bond between Occupy and Climate Justice advocacy at large. 
Although small in numbers and often (self)confined to the municipality-conceded 
'Speakers Corner' (just in front of the International Convention Centre), Occupy COP17 
managed to hold general assemblies on a daily basis and to facilitate the encounter of 
many different groups (as well as official delegations).  
 
Figure 8&9. Speakers Corner by Night & Conference of Polluters logo. Source: Dossier C. 
 
 
                                                 
230 They also attracted local as well as national national media, monopolising headlines and debates 
for many days in a row (dossier D).  
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Particularly relevant has been the attempts to weave a rebellious red thread linking past 
local resistances to contemporary global uprisings. From this perspective, the legacy of 
Ghandian satyagraha231 – originally developed in 1906 in the columns of the South 
African news-sheet Indian Opinion – which can be loosely translated with “insistence on 
truth”, has been brilliantly adjusted by local activists to fit the contemporary scenario. As 
one of them explained in an informal meeting, “the truth we need to insist upon isn't a 
truth for everybody. It's the warm, calm and compassionate truth of the people against the 
cold, heartless and treacherous truth of transnational corporations. It's a truth that link us 
all by excluding those who want to oppress us. Let's believe in it and let's be confident: it 
might take a long time, but we'll eventually win this battle”.232 Another powerful 
reactivation of historical memory concerned the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), 
founded and led by Stephen Biko (eventually murdered in 1977 while in the custody of 
the South African Security Police [SASP]). Such Movement emerged in the mid-1960s 
and rapidly gained widespread support amongst black youth, enough support to organise 
the notorious Soweto uprising in June 1976, when at least two-hundred people were 
killed by the SASP as students marched to protest the use of Afrikaans language in 
African schools. The main political tenet of the BCM was the refusal of white monopoly 
on truth, especially the condescending values of white people of liberal opinion. The 
BCM's strategy of ceaselessly challenging the dialectic of apartheid South Africa as a 
                                                 
231 The term “satyagraha” has been coined by Mahatma Ghandi and refers to a practical philosophy 
connected with broader categories such as non-violent resistance and civil disobedience. Ghandi employed 
this strategy both in the context of the Indian independence movement and in his earlier struggle in South 
Africa (Huttenback 1971). His teaching has been hugely influential, for instance in Nelson Mandela's anti-
apartheid struggle and in Martin Luther King Jr's campaigns during the civil rights movement in the United 
States.  
232 Dossier B. 
333 
 
means of raising awareness to empower black thought and create an alternative system of 
value could be of great relevance for the current global struggle against carbon trading, at 
least according to some Occupy COP17 activists. One of them argued in a meeting: “My 
people's slogan during mass demonstrations was 'black man, you're on your own'. Well, 
today it's the same for us all, not just black men because today's apartheid concerns 
climate instead of race and is everywhere, not just in South Africa. We don't give a damn 
about what they say: there can be no trust, no trust at all. They've shown us what they 
want and what they are so many times that we need no more. We refuse even to listen, or 
we just listen to unmask their lies. We need to raise our consciousness about climate 
change and then think about something different. We don't need them but they need our 
ignorance. 'Climate justice man, you're on your own'!”233. 
 This effort to infuse contemporary struggles with the force of past ones was invaluable 
and particularly crucial in trying to globalise resistance instead of capital. Even more 
important, however, was the attempt to articulate a strong but highly problematic link 
between anti-austerity struggles (“We won't pay your crisis!”, “We are the 99%”) and 
climate justice mobilizations (“The global North must pay its ecological debt!”, “Are we, 
mainly from the global North, actually the 99%?”). This attempt – recognised by activists 
as a crucial one – gave us the possibility to start thinking, at the collective level, about a 
global convergence of struggles which wont arise spontaneously but will have to be 
patiently build, little by little. As a New York-based activist shouted during a general 
assembly: “I'm a midwife and I feel sorry every day for all the newborn. I feel sorry 
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because this world is fucked up. Is fucked up in my country, because they won't be able 
to go to college or to pay their mortgages. It is fuck up in Africa because your land is 
being stolen. It is fucked up in the small islands because they are gonna be underwater. I 
feel sorry for them but I also think they're calling me to action. Me and you: all of us. It's 
a responsibility we have: don't pay the mortgage, take back the land, stop oceans' levels 
rising. It's just one struggle. It's either we win or this fucked up world won't recover”234. 
Just like this political convergence, the climate as a commons to be reclaimed and 
alternatively managed does not exist in nature. It must be produced along with new 
institutions that are able to give it enough consistency to escape both the state and the 
market. The goal is far away, barely visible at the moment. But the first steps moved by 
Occupy COP17 give us, at the very least, something to be hopeful about. The brief 
reflections we will advance in the general conclusion are meant to provide a provisional 
set of theoretical points to further substantiate this hope. 
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General Conclusion: Planetary Climate as a Global 
Common/s 
In the case of the atmosphere 
the climate crisis now calls for a shift in perspective. 
It is urgently necessary that we all voice 
the same claim of entitlement, 
which arises from our understanding 
of the atmosphere as a commons, 
instead of surrendering this resource, 
by virtue of our inaction, 
to arbitrary misuse by individuals. 
The perspective we need to adopt is that 
the climate belongs to us all. 
 
Silke Helfrich and Jörg Hans – 2010 
 
We might call this an ecology of the common – 
an ecology focussed equally on nature and society, 
on humans and the non-human world 
in a dynamic interdependence, care, 
and mutual transformation [...] 
One might still conceive of economic production 
as an engagement of the subject with nature, 
a transformation of the object through labour, 
but increasingly the 'nature' that biopolitical labour transforms 
is subjectivity itself. 
This relation between economic production and subjectivity 
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thus cuts out the ground from under 
traditional notions of the labour process 
and creates a potentially vertiginous loop. 
We can cut through some of these seeming paradoxes, 
though, by approaching the production process 
in terms of metamorphoses of the common. 
And it should be obvious that this kind of economic process, 
central to biopolitical production, 
is also an ontological process through which 
nature and subjectivity are transformed and constituted. 
 
Michael Hardt and Toni Negri – 2009 
 
There are no commons without commoning. 
 
Peter Linebaugh – 2008 
 In a recent, deeply thought-provoking article (2012), Joel Wainwright and Geoff Mann 
have appropriately remarked that the political implications of the global climate crisis 
should be regarded as no less dramatic than its ecological effects for social justice and 
human well-being. Undertaking a risky – but surely worth – realist approach to possible 
future configurations of power exercise, the authors list four alternative social formations 
that might arise to face the greatest challenge of our time: a) climate Leviathan, in which 
the UNFCCC drives climate-related efforts based on carbon trading and technological 
innovations to slow down global warming; b) climate Mao, in which a planetary 
sovereign power assumes as its main task to limit capital's circuit of valorisation to 
reduce unjust wastefulness, excessive GHGs emissions and unsustainable consumption; 
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c) climate Behemoth, in which scientific evidence is downplayed by conspiracist 
denialism and evangelical rhetoric, so that reactionary populism and radical anti-state 
libertarianism can join forces to ignore the crisis and accelerate business-as-usual 
behaviours; d) climate X, in which local hubs of the global climate justice movement 
manage to organise not only a successful resistance against carbon trading and its 
exploitative mechanism, but also a new institutional setting for a low-carbon society. 
Quoting the notorious statement by Frederic Jameson – “it is easier to imagine the end of 
the world than the end of capitalism” – Wainwright and Mann call for a new engagement 
with radical imagination on the part of ecological activists so that climate X can be 
envisaged as “worldly and structurally open: a movement of the community of the 
excluded that affirms climate justice and popular freedoms against capitalism and 
planetary sovereignty” (2012: 17). 
 Wainwright and Mann's notable analysis is intended to generate discussion and – 
possibly – build unity among different expressions of climate justice advocacy and, as 
such, doubtlessly represents a welcome contribution. From a mainly theoretical 
perspective, however, we found particularly interesting the two questions posed at the 
beginning of their reflection: a) “Do we have a theory for revolution in the name of 
climate justice?”; b) “Do we have a theory of how capitalist nation-states are 
transforming as a consequence of planetary change?” (Ibid.). 
 Our contribution to answer to the first question is basically contained in the notion of 
carbon profanation, which has been articulated in Chapter 4 and shall be further 
substantiated in the second part of this Conclusion. On the other hand, our attempt to 
assess the specific problematic advanced by the second question – although we would 
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substitute “valorisation/exploitation mechanisms” to “nation-states” – has been carried 
out in Chapter 2 and 3 by employing the analytical toolbox provided by biopolitics as 
method, as elaborated in Chapter 1. From this standpoint, a red thread has been unfolding 
throughout the first three chapters of this work as an underground current: the 
controversial issue concerning whether or not capitalism and the environmental crisis can 
be thought as compatible. Quite unsurprisingly, while the Marxist tradition is generally 
consistent in considering capitalism and sustainability as essentially incompatible 
(O'Connor 1998), the supporters of carbon trading tend to perceive the issue as a false 
problem, taking for granted the possibility and desirability of a sustainable declination of 
capital (Stern 2009).  
 In both camps, however, more nuanced positions are available: from a Marxist 
perspective, Tadzio Mueller and Alexis Passadakis have argued that, although the 
antagonism between capital and life is at the origin of what they call biocrisis, such an 
antagonism is not necessarily unmanageable since it represents simultaneously the limit 
and the driving force of contemporary capitalist development. As they compellingly 
explain:  
While this is by no means a foregone conclusion, the biocrisis is the opportunity 
that might just allow capitals and governments to at least temporarily deal with 
the legitimation and accumulation crises [...] How? By internalising the 
antagonism at the heart of the biocrisis – that between human life and capital – as 
a drive of a new round of supposedly green accumulation, and as a legitimating 
device for the further extension of governmental authority into the nooks and 
crannies of everyday life (Mueller and Passadakis 2010: 558). 
Differently, from a perspective which assumes capital's relations as the only available 
horizon, Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson discusses four possible scenarios for the 
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near future of climate capitalism: a) in the neoliberal utopia of perfectly functioning 
carbon markets, competitiveness would drive a smooth transition to a low-carbon 
economy; b) in the stagnation case, carbon trading fails and leads to cynicism and 
fatalism, with the global North facing increasingly expensive adaptation challenges and 
the global South being reduced to a reservoir of climate refugees; c) in the decarbonised 
dystopia the triumph of technological-fixes is coupled with the rise of political 
authoritarianism; d) in climate Keynesianism stronger governmental supervision of 
carbon trading, instances of climate justice and redistributive policies converge in the 
form of a Green New Deal. The two authors do not conceal their preference for the last 
scenario and describe it as follows: 
The development of strong rules to guide carbon markets, policies to reach areas 
that markets cannot affect and a global bargain to create an integrated 
decarbonisation of the economy across the world become the central elements in 
creating a genuinely new form of capitalism [...] The potential benefit of such an 
economy become more evenly spread around the world. But at the heart of this 
coalition remains global finance – whose coordinating power is mobilised and 
channelled by governments to achieve decarbonisation (Newell and Paterson 
2010: 178). 
With regard to this long-standing debate, our position is resolutely on the side of Mueller 
and Passadakis: climate capitalism, namely a sector-specific application of the green 
economy, is not only possible but, to a certain extent, already under way. Obviously, this 
does not mean that a planetary and irresistible spreading of carbon trading practices 
would solve global warming: judging from the first years of its implementation, such an 
outcome looks very unlikely. Actually, a recent issue of Economist magazine has titled an 
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article about global carbon markets Complete Disaster in the Making, and has argued the 
following: 
The trouble is that the supply of credits has far outstripped demand. The one-
billionth CER was issued on September 7th [2012]. But the largest greenhouse-
gas emitters either did not ratify the Kyoto protocol (America) or were not 
obliged by it to cut emissions (China and India). That has left Europe as the main 
source of demand for credits, and the CDM has become a sort of annex to 
Europe’s cap-and-trade scheme, the Emissions Trading System. But the euro 
crisis has reduced industrial activity (cutting pollution) and European firms were 
anyway given overly generous carbon quotas under the cap-and-trade scheme. So 
carbon prices have collapsed, falling from $20 a tonne in August 2008 to below 
$5 now (Economist 2012). 
Adamantly, carbon trading does not work. What we would like to suggest, however, is 
that regardless of carbon markets poor performance, it is still possible to make money out 
of the climate crisis. In fact, the same article seems to suggest that, assuming the EU will 
overcome the crisis soon and stricter caps will be set, there might be a boost in demand 
with the CDM providing a valuable link between regional and national carbon markets 
which are emerging in several areas of the world. Again: to solve a problem induced by 
the market, more market is needed. This is why, we contend, rather than structuring anti-
capitalist critiques of carbon trading on putatively unsurpassable contradictions between 
Earth's physical limits and capital's cannibalistic voracity, it is more useful to 
meticulously show, discuss and struggle against the innumerable reasons that make 
climate capitalism socially, politically and ecologically undesirable. 
 None other than this, in fact, was the goal of our analysis in Chapter 2 and 3: to analyse 
the historical specificity – i.e. the neoliberal character – of nature conceived of as an 
element of contemporary processes of valorisation. In a parallel way, we intended to shed 
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light on the unprecedented modalities through which this notion of anti-naturalistic 
nature embodies subtle and pervasive forms of exploitation of the general intellect. 
Against this background, an important argument was implicit and concerned the necessity 
of a perspective based on class-partiality to make sense of the climate crisis: seen from a 
capitalist vantage point, cooling the planet is an option if and only if profits are created in 
the process; by contrast, the general intellect as well as affected communities and global 
climate activists think of “true” solutions to global warming as new, non-monetary-based 
and decentralised ways of practising ecological decision making. 
 In other words, our contribution to “a theory of how capitalist valorisation/exploitation 
mechanisms are transforming as a consequence of planetary change” can be summarised 
through the the five main steps of our analysis: a) a Marxian-Foucauldian methodological 
apparatus to simultaneously read the environmental crisis from a historico-materialistic 
and a biopolitical perspective; d) a political account of the shift from nature as an 
enacting limit to nature as a crucial element valorisation as co-extensive with the 
affirmation of the general intellect as the main organising principle of production and 
neoliberalism as hegemonic form of governmentality; c) a critique of the crucial 
discursive formation of the green economy, whose main feature is the harmonisation of 
capital's imperatives of economic growth and ecological necessities of energy and matter 
throughput reduction; d) a problematisation of the relationship between use-value and 
exchange value and the discussion of a hypothesis according to which, in contemporary 
capitalism and with specific regard to carbon commodities, use-value would have lost its 
innocence and increasingly become based on the capital's need to self valorise; e) a 
critical approach to the carbon trading dogma, namely the peculiar regime of truth which 
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translates the green economy mantra into the field of climate change policy, and its three 
supports: informational, legal and calculative/promissory.   
 Referring to the first question posed by Wainwright and Mann – “Do we have a theory 
for revolution in the name of climate justice?” – we have proposed to use the notion of 
carbon profanation as an analytical tool to interpret three campaigns linked to the notion 
of climate justice. Our intention was to highlight both dimensions of such climate 
struggles: the deconstructing one, aimed at disarticulating the carbon trading dogma, and 
the creative one, based on a political prefiguration of a post-capitalist way to manage 
global warming. As we argued in Chapter 4, all three empirical case studies – climate 
debt, One Million Climate Jobs and Bisasar Road landfill – would benefit by a sort of 
contamination with a perspective centred around the notion of the common/s. Thus, to 
properly contribute to answering Wainwright and Mann's question, we need to better 
specify both this concept and its application to climate justice conflicts. As a preliminary 
remark, however, let us stress that our discussion merely intends to sketch further lines of 
possible research and, as consequence, is meant to open up new spaces of 
problematisation rather than to solve or exhaust them. Thus, in a very impressionistic 
way, we shall consider three closely interrelated points: a) how the common/s diagonally 
cuts the state vs. market dichotomy (issue of ownership); b) how the common/s 
diagonally cuts the material vs. immaterial dichotomy (issue of productivity); c) how the 
common/s' dynamic unfolds by incrementally reinforcing its revolutionary potential (issue 
of organisation). 
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 A remarkable definition of the notion of commons has been recently provided by Silke 
Helfrich and represents for us an ideal starting point: 
Commons are a network that sustains, that is woven together from our 
multilayered relationships to natural, social and cultural resources. They are not 
separate from us; they do not exist without us [...] The concept of the commons 
sheds light on the two sides of this relationship, reveals its two faces. On the one 
hand, it highlights the nature and function of the resources under discussion. On 
the other hand, it raises questions about the state of the communities associated 
with those resources and the conditions required for their success. The common 
pool resources concerned here – whether material or immaterial – are the basis of 
all productive, reproductive and creative processes. Without genes, there can be 
no diversity. Without land, no food. Without light, no growth. Without sound, no 
music. Without language, no communication. Without knowledge, no progress. 
Without water, no life (Helfrich 2010: 1).235 
The conceptual history of this notion has a very long tradition, but it also shows 
unprecedented characters in the current phase of capitalist development. Thus, our 
hypothesis is that, although capital has attempted to pillage the commons ever since its 
inception – i.e. primitive accumulation – its contemporary configuration diverges from 
the preceding ones in that the commons play the role of crucial element of production, not 
just an aspect amongst many. It is this historical novelty that suggests to use the 
expression common/s instead of commons. As Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson 
appropriately argue, the difference between the singular and the plural [common vs. 
                                                 
235 Common-pool resources (CPRs) are a type of good consisting of a natural or human-made 
resource system (e.g. an irrigation system or fishing grounds), whose size or characteristics makes it 
expensive, but not impossible, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining advantages from its use. 
Unlike pure public goods, CPRs face problems of congestion or over-use, because they are subtractable. A 
cCPR usually consists of a core resource (e.g. water or fish), which defines the stock variable, while 
providing a limited quantity of extractable fringe units, which defines the flow variable. Whereas the core 
resource must be protected or controlled in order to allow for its continuous use, the fringe units can be 
harvested or consumed. For an in-depth analysis, see Ostrom (1990). 
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commons] is important: in fact, “the former signals a process of production, both entirely 
immanent and material, by which instances of the latter acquire extension in time and 
space. At the same time it gives to this plural instances an intensive quality that brings 
them into relation in contingent but also constitutive ways” (2013: forthcoming). 
 The first point to be made, following Mezzadra and Neilson's reasoning, is that the logic 
of the common/s disrupts traditional images of sovereignty as split between state power 
and market self-referentiality. From this perspective, it is undeniable that the main 
reference of contemporary disputes is to be located in ecologist Garrett Hardin's classic 
article, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968). According to him, a given population 
sharing land as a commons will necessarily end up over-exploiting it. He took as an 
example a common pasture to which everyone might add more livestock for grazing in 
the absence of any restriction whatsoever. This example delineates a hypothetical 
scenario in which individual farmers can take private benefits from the commons without 
taking into account its overall carrying capacity. Hardin's analysis then concludes that a 
shared resource cannot but be over-used: hence, the tragedy of the commons and the 
superiority of privatisation in whatever form. 
 There are at least two main problems here: the first is historical and refers to the fact that, 
as acutely noted by David Harvey, Hardin's hypothetical commons ultimately rests on a 
very narrow – if not imprecise – set of assumptions, “largely driven by the example of the 
land enclosures that occurred in Britain from the Sixteenth century onwards. As a result, 
thinking [about the common/s] has often polarised between private-property solutions or 
authoritarian state intervention” (2011: 101). Secondly, Hardin's tragic narrative defines 
as a commons something which actually is not a commons, but rather a regime of 
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unregulated access to land. In such a situation – never empirically experienced or 
recorded – anyone can appropriate the wealth contained in the natural resource under 
consideration without taking responsibility either towards its maintenance or towards 
other users. It is, in other words, the ideal-type of non-governance: as David Bollier 
suggests, “the story Hardin tells is not about common land, it is about no man's land” 
(2010: 3). In fact, a commons is the polar opposite of the absence of governmental rules: 
it is a social system based on self-government and consensus rights for controlling access 
to and use of a particular resource. When properly functioning, a commons possesses 
well-defined boundaries which are porous and open to further innovation and 
development. Those boundaries are recognised and respected by participants, so that 
possible free riders can be identified and sanctioned. 
 As we see, it is not the absence of rules that defines a commons. Rather, it is the fact that 
those rules cannot be exclusively – or even primarily – ascribed to state authority or 
market invisible hand. Commons are “goods” which cannot be categorised as either 
“public” or “private”. As a consequence, the role played by citizens, or civil society, 
become fundamental to understand and evaluate the commons as a specific – if 
multifarious – community-based form of management. Commenting on an extensive field 
research conducted in 1994 with other colleagues, Elinor Ostrom remarks: 
By considering the interaction between actors at different levels of governance, it 
is possible to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the variations in 
diverse governance outcomes in the management of common-pool resources 
based on the needs and interests of citizens. We have learned that citizens do play 
an essential role in the governance of common-pool resources and that efforts to 
turn over all of the responsibility for governing these resources to external experts 
are not likely to protect them in the long-run. The complexity of the resources at 
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local, regional, national, and global levels do require complex governance 
systems involving citizen input in diverse fashions (Ostrom 2010: 9). 
Now, the fundamental question raised by this analysis of the commons is the following: is 
it possible to envisage and produce a form of ownership which is different from both state 
regulation and market automatism? Ostrom's research is somehow reluctant to engage on 
this plane, its interest essentially lying in the articulation of an integrative-intermediate 
domain between the public and the private spheres, which directly mirrors the 
construction of a social law by European jurists in the early Twentieth century (Mezzadra 
and Neilson forthcoming). Other scholars, however, have opted for a more radical 
approach aimed at highlighting the disruptive potential of common ownership with regard 
to both state-centred solutions and market-driven logics. In passing, let us note that the 
proliferation of public-private partnerships in the context of climate governance (analysed 
in Chapter 3) actually shows how both the state and the market are deeply implicated in 
the new wave of enclosures. The necessity to look for alternative ways of managing the 
commons is posed, first and foremost, by neoliberal governmentality itself.236 
 Kolya Abramsky has dedicated to the concept of common ownership an important essay, 
titled “Sparking a Worldwide Energy Revolution” and published in 2010. There, he 
argued that common ownership has the potential to build new relations of production, 
exchange, and livelihood. In particular, and with specific regard to the energy sector, 
                                                 
236 This does not mean, however, that non-all pervasive state powers and/or market mechanisms 
cannot have a role in the process of expanding the common/s. For example, with regard to state programs, 
Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greg de Peuter argue that those can be important but the “growth and 
interconnection of the commons have to precede such state interventions, to prefiguratively establish the 
necessary preconditions”. Conversely, the common/s should “grow beyond the moment of such direct 
interventions, in a proliferation of self-starting components that exceeds centralised control” (2010: 47).   
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three main advantages of community control over natural resources can be detected: a) a 
rational management and use of remaining fossil fuel reserves; b) an acceleration of the 
shifting process towards a low-carbon economy through a veritable just transition, which 
is to say a collective planning of the intentional and comprehensive phase-out, in 
accordance with shared priorities and pace; c) a modification in allocating the economic 
revenues from the rent of natural resources by directing those monetary flows towards 
common benefits during the period when they are still in use. Abramsky is aware that the 
concept of common ownership alone will not bring about these necessary changes in the 
general economic system. However, he rightly points out that it can function as a catalyst 
for the innumerable struggles already taking place worldwide: 
Of course, common ownership will almost certainly not guarantee any of those 
outcomes. It is not panacea [...] Common ownership of energy resources (fossil or 
renewable) and their associated infrastructures and technologies cannot be 
understood as blueprints to be implemented from above by policy makers. They 
are not theoretical models or predictions. If we are ever to see such ownership 
structures become the dominant form of ownership, they will be the outcome of 
lengthy and complex struggles, led by grassroots social movements against 
capital relations within the energy sector (and more generally), with both users 
and workers in the sector playing a key role in these struggles. It will be 
important to create political spaces that are broad enough to include these 
struggles (Abramsky 2010: 639-640).  
As we see, it is always the struggle that eventually defines forms of ownership, means of 
economic control or planning, and social relations in general. Moreover, we contend that 
the notion of common/s can be of use in the process of organising convergences amongst 
radical demands from below. The “broad political spaces” Abramsky refers to are exactly 
what can infuse further strength and resilience in campaigns such as those we analysed in 
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Chapter 4. In fact, the notion of common/s clearly delineates a conflictual frontier within 
the horizon of which the collective unmistakably takes precedence over the individual. 
Common rights are not reducible to a simple multiplication of liberal individual rights. 
On the contrary, they express the productive power acquired by the social body in the 
form of the general intellect. This is why the common/s defines simultaneously the 
battlefield and the goal of contemporary struggles. As David Harvey brilliantly points 
out:     
The central conclusion is that the collective labouring that is now productive of 
value must ground collective, not individual, property rights. Value [...] is the 
capitalist common, and it is represented by money, the universal equivalency by 
which common wealth is measured. The common is not, therefore, something 
extant once upon a time that has since been lost, but something that, like the 
urban commons, is continuously being produced. The problem is that it is just as 
continuously being enclosed and appropriated by capital in its commodified and 
monetary form (Harvey 2011: 105). 
 This passage from Harvey brings us to the second point we would like to articulate: the 
issue of productivity. In general terms, it suggests that the internal differentiation of the 
notion of common/s cannot be structured along the material vs. immaterial axis, as 
proposed for example by Giovanna Ricoveri (2010). In fact, as we have seen in Chapter 
3, climate change itself is impossible to be experienced – even to be thought – in the 
absence of refined and complex knowledge infrastructures. A better approach to the 
multilayered nature of common/s can be found in formulations that distinguish various 
instances by degree rather than by kind.237 In this way, the productive tension between the 
                                                 
237 From this perspective it might be useful to report Christian Siefkes's masterful reflection on the 
contiguities between digital and physical peer production: “Is it possible to produce 'what you need, when 
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common as a historical form of production (and potentially, the basis for an emancipatory 
political project) and the commons as singular, contingent and relatively autonomous 
crystallisations of its dynamics can be preserved. Once the centrality of the mobilisation 
of the general intellect is recognised as the driving force behind the crucial role played by 
the common/s in contemporary capitalist circuits of valorisation/exploitation, different 
taxonomies become useful tools to advance both theoretical understanding and political 
efficacy. One of those taxonomies of the common/s is proposed by Antonio Lafuente, 
whose first proper concern is to emphasise “the historical nature of commons, which 
suggests that they are not objective facts, but rather the fruit of a political decision 
necessarily tied to the surrounding technologies” (2010: 1). Subsequently, Lafuente 
differentiates the category of common/s along four lines, explicitly non-mutually 
exclusive: the body (sensitivity and corporality), the environment (biosphere and 
geosphere), the city (domesticity, culture and urbanism) and the digital (codes and 
structures). Beyond specific interconnections amongst the four realms, what is important 
to underline here is that Lafuente's formulation allows us to fully appreciate the peculiar 
intertwining between abstract and concrete: common/s are not immediate, natural givens; 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
you need it' for everybody, on this limited planet? That question cannot be answered without considering 
the social form of production [...] Peer production is benefit-driven: in contrast to capitalist production, the 
goal is not 'to make money'. Instead, the specific needs, desires, and goals of the participant determine what 
happens [...] It has been noted that commons-based peer production can produce only information, not 
things. The underlying notion is that it excels in the sphere of information, which is so easy to copy and 
change, but fails in the material world, which is not. But this argument misses the fact that it is not an 
inherent property of information that makes it so easy to copy, but rather a question of infrastructure. 30 
years ago, only corporations with extremely expensive specialised machinery were able to reproduce 
music. Only the spread of broadband internet connections and sufficiently large hard discs made it 
commonplace. Similar developments regarding the production of physical things are not only possible – in 
some areas, they are already under way. The reproduction of physical things is possible if three conditions 
are met: you need access to the complete design, to the required resources, and to the necessary means of 
production” (2012). 
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rather, they are the outcome of a determinate process of production whose organisation is 
the political stake of contemporary class struggle.  
 In a similar fashion, Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greg de Peuter historicise the 
concept of common/s by dissecting it in three typologies: eco-social commons (ecological 
sphere: the customary sharing of environmental resources in early-capitalist societies); 
labour commons (social sphere: socialist planning and liberal welfare state); networked 
commons (digital sphere: open source, free software and peer-to-peer production on the 
Internet). What is fundamental in Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter's approach is the 
antagonistic proximity which links the circulation of capital to the circulation of the 
common/s: “If the cellular form of capitalism is the commodity, the cellular form of 
society beyond capital is the common. A commodity is a good produced for exchange, a 
common a good produced to be shared. Exchange presupposes private owners between 
whom it occurs. Sharing presupposes collectivities within which it occurs” (2010: 44). 
Considering how profoundly – as we have shown with regard to carbon trading in 
Chapter 3 – contemporary commodity production relies on the mobilisation of the general 
intellect as a common/s, we can easily appreciate the cogency of such antagonistic 
proximity. This is why contemporary production must be regarded as eminently 
ambivalent: from a global perspective, it represents the highest degree of exploitation 
ever experimented, but it simultaneously discloses the possibility of its revolutionary 
inversion. As Mezzadra and Neilson brilliantly put it: 
The proliferation and spread of enclosures in the contemporary world produces a 
huge amount of violence, sufferance, and pain, intensifying both dispossession 
and exploitation. But at the same time, at least conceptually, these enclosures 
provide an important perspective on the vacillation of the legitimacy of private 
351 
 
property as societal rule. In any act of enclosure, whether literal or not, this 
legitimacy is affirmed. Struggles against enclosures and for the commons across 
the globe show the absolutely concrete, reverse and antagonistic side of this 
conceptual moment (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013: forthcoming).  
It is in this potential reversal that the notion of profanation as an act of radical 
imagination finds its ideal habitat. In fact, it suggests the possibility of prefiguring a post-
capitalist future by disarticulating the regime of truth upon which neoliberal 
governmentality is grounded. In Chapter 4, we analysed three examples of carbon 
profanation. It seems to us that, in a sort of circular movement, they enrich the following 
theoretical prefigurations of a common/s-based world proposed by Dyer-Witheford and 
de Peuter, and are simultaneously enriched by them: 
Eco-social commons would be institutions managing the biosphere not as a 
commercial resource, but as the shared basis for any continuing form of human 
association – collective agencies for planetary climate control, fishery reserves, 
protection of watersheds, and prevention of pollution [...] By labour commons we 
mean the democratised organisation of productive and reproductive work. This 
brings us back to [the example of] worker cooperatives, in which the workplace is 
an organisational common, the labour performed is a commoning practice, and 
the surplus generated, a commonwealth [...] By networked commons we mean 
communication systems that unleash, rather than repress, the tendency of digital 
technologies to create non-rivalrous goods and common pool resources that 
overflow intellectual property regimes. We are not thinking merely of liberal 
'creative commons' initiatives, but of large-scale adoption in public institutions of 
open-source practices (Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter 2010: 45).  
 This movement of mutual and enriching contamination brings us to the third and 
last point we would like to make with regard to the notion of the common/s, namely the 
issue of organisation. In short, the crucial question is twofold and can be expressed in the 
following terms: How does the common/s' dynamic unfold? How is it possible to 
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organise this dynamics in such a way that it is controlled enough non to be exposed to co-
optation, but also open enough not to find itself ossified?   
The first question has received different but equally valid answers in the workerist 
tradition: Hardt and Negri have defined the dynamics of the common/s as “generation” 
(2000: 387); Dyer-Witheford has stressed the centrality of its “circulation” (2006: 1); 
Mezzadra and Neilson have proposed the locution “opening and reopening in translation” 
(2013: forthcoming). Beyond terminological options, however, what is important to 
underline is that the common/s grows through the simultaneous production of a unitary – 
but not universal – political horizon and of singular – but not self-referential – spatio-
temporally localised conflicts. Between the two planes the connection is constant and 
represents a “nondialectical synthesis” (Casarino and Negri 2008: 70), which means that 
for the common/s' dynamic to successfully deploy itself a process of incremental 
expansion through a widening of struggle fronts must take place. This processual 
character of the common/s is nicely captured by Massimo De Angelis who, elaborating 
on Peter Linebaugh's intuition, remarkably provide the following definition:   
Commoning is about the (re)production of/through commons. To turn a noun into 
a verb is not a little step and requires some daring. Especially if in doing so we do 
not want to obscure the importance of the noun, but simply ground it on what is, 
after all, life flow: there are no commons without incessant activities of 
commoning, of (re)producing in common. But it is through (re)production in 
common that communities of producers decide for themselves the norms, values 
and measures of things. Let us put the 'tragedy of the commons' to rest then, the 
basis of the economists' argument for enclosures: there is no commons without 
commoning, there is no commons without communities of producers and 
particular flows and modes of relations. Hence, what lies behind the 'tragedy of 
the commons' is really the tragedy of the destruction of commoning through all 
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sorts of structural adjustments, whether militarised or not (De Angelis 2010: 
957). 
This quotation makes crystal clear the constitutive connection that links the notion of 
common/s and the concept of profanation. Moreover, it allows us to begin answering the 
second aspect of the twofold question posed above. In fact, a necessary condition for the 
processuality of commoning to be maintained and possibly augmented is, on the one 
hand, the disarticulation of the regime of truth based on the legitimacy of enclosures and, 
on the other hand, the prefiguration of a different narrative to discursively sustain the 
revolutionary potential embodied in the common/s. This is exactly what a profanation 
does. Consider for example the following passage from a compelling article by David 
Bollier: 
The point of talking about the commons is to open up a larger conversation about 
types of wealth and value. Not all wealth can be expressed through a market 
price. And, indeed, other types of value – ecological, social, democratic, moral – 
need to be fully recognised and actively protected. The very epistemology of 
conventional economics has trouble doing this; the commons is helpful because it 
offers a way to name species of wealth that classical liberal and neoliberal 
economics prefers to overlook [...] The commons helps us develop a broader 
understanding of 'wealth' by introducing the idea of inalienability. Certain 
resources have value beyond any price, and should be insulated from market 
forces. The beauty of nature, the sanctity of specific places, the ecological value 
of wildlife, the ethical norms of selling safe products, the moral values and 
traditions that define a community – all represent wealth beyond price (Bollier 
2010: 2). 
None other than this is the challenge facing the climate justice movement: experimenting 
politico-organisational means to disarticulate an exclusively capital-based notion of value 
and at the same time institute and protect a new approach to the commonwealth produced 
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by the general intellect in constitutive connection with the physical conditions of planet 
Earth. The walk is long and tortuous but activists do not start from scratch: as we have 
seen, proposals for climate debt repayment are under way, campaigns to slow down 
global warming by creating a more just society are being pushed forward, and local 
struggles continue to threaten the cogency and legitimacy of the carbon trading dogma.     
 If the general intellect is the productive source of commonwealth, it is now time 
for the class of producers to re-appropriate the products of its labour. This means, first 
and foremost, to directly challenge the governmental hegemony of financial markets, as 
Occupy in North America and the Indignados in Europe are doing on a daily basis. 
Financial systems, however, should not be carelessly destroyed or merely 
decommissioned: they express the power of the general intellect and this power must be 
retained in order to foster the common/s' growth. Rather, it is the common/s' corruption 
that should be pitilessly targeted by activists. Following an intuition of Italian 
philosopher Carlo Sini (2012), we would like to conclude this work on a provocative 
note: what if financial markets themselves are nothing else than the most amazing 
common/s waiting to be saved from itself, from its own privatistic disease?   
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Appendix 1 
 
My empirical research has extensively used interviews and, thus, had received the 
Research Ethics Board approval on October 20th, 2011 (project number: FIMS-2011-12-
007). 
The study has used two broad methodological strategies: 
1- Semi-structured in-depth interviews. We conducted in-depth interviews with 
participants about the ways through which they experience their environmental activism. 
The interview guide (below) provides one or two general questions about each of three 
major themes, framed broadly as: How do participants began to be involved in the 
Climate Justice movement? Which flaws do participants perceive in the market-led 
strategies to cope with the environmental crisis, and which correctives would they 
propose? How do participants engage with the double nature of their ecological activism 
(locally situated in South Africa but globally involved in the Climate Justice Now! 
Network)?  
The interview guide was designed to be flexible rather than rigid. All the three basic 
themes have been addressed, but the order and wording of specific questions has evolved 
over the course of the events.  
Interview Guide:  
Theme 1. Discrepancies between strategies of global ecological marketization and 
actual effects of local environmental policies 
Main question: How do you read, from an activist perspective, the tensions between 
global environmental policies and their implementation in the local, South African 
context? 
Theme 2. Political alternatives 
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Main question: Do you envisage alternative ways of managing the environmental crisis, 
and specifically climate change? 
Theme 3. Subjective tensions 
Main question: In your opinion, how can some environmental activists protest against 
and, simultaneously, participate to the 17th UN Conference of the Parties? 
 
2- Close analysis of existing literature from different sources (newspapers, political 
journals, scientific articles, books, websites). Acting as Visiting Scholar at the Centre for 
Civil Society at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in Durban, we had the possibility to 
study in great details the developments of environmental activism in South Africa.  
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